

APPENDIX A

Label, definition and internal classification

We label these parties as ‘regionalist’ following previous authoritative studies (De Winter and Tursan, 1998; Jolly, 2007; Deschouwer, 2009). Since the scholarship is characterised by extensive terminological profusion and lack of consensus,¹ it is very important to clearly define the underline concept and, when relevant for the interpretations of results, discuss definitional differences. Following De Winter, we define regionalist parties on the basis of their ideology, as those parties whose primary concern is the achievement of some kind of territorial self-government (De Winter, 1998, p. 204-205). As pointed out by other scholars, although the definition is based on ideology, it also entails a territorial characterisation: regionalist parties are only present, as organizations or in terms of electoral activity, in a specific territory of the state (Tursan, 1998, p. 5; Gomez-Reino, 2008). In other words, ‘regionalist’ parties are also ‘regional’ (‘non statewide’) or, more precisely, they are a sub-set of regional parties.² In common with most regional parties they also have an ambition to administer regional powers and resources in the exclusive interest the region (Gomez-Reino et al., 2006, p. 258).

Our dataset contains two innovative elements. First, we code regionalist parties’ level of ideological radicalism in respect to their self-government claim, distinguishing between moderate (autonomist) and radical (secessionist) ones. Then we made a sub-classification, distinguishing between protectionists and federalists (amongst moderates), and between ambiguous and separationists (amongst radicals). We choose this classification precisely because it refers exclusively to the level of institutional self-government demanded by the party without tapping into identity questions.³

How we gathered the data

In order to identify regionalist parties and to be able to classify them according to their ideology we proceeded in several steps. First, we collected regional vote shares for regional and national elections in 19 West European and OECD-countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States).

¹ Many different alternative labels have been used to refer to largely similar sets of parties. Just to mention some examples: ‘ethno-regionalist’ (e.g. Tronconi, 2009), ‘regional’ (e.g. Brancati, 2008), ‘ethno-regional’ (e.g. Levi and Hechter, 1985), ‘ethnonationalist’ (e.g. Connor, 1977), ‘peripheral nationalist’ (e.g. Gourevitch, 1979), ‘peripheral’ (Rokkan and Urwin, 1983), ‘regional nationalist’ (e.g. Van Atta, 2003), ‘minority nationalist’ (e.g. Lynch, 1996), ‘stateless nationalist’ (e.g. Guibernau, 1999), ‘non state wide’ (e.g. Pallares et al. 1997), ‘stateless nationalist and regionalist’ (e.g. Hepburn, 2009), ‘ethnoterritorial’ (e.g. Rudolph and Thompson, 1985), ‘autonomist’ (e.g. Elias and Tronconi, 2011), ‘secessionist’ (e.g. Sorens, 2005).

² For instance, while all Belgian parties are ‘regional’, Deschouwer distinguishes ‘regionalist’ parties from all the others using the same definition and terminology as those used in this article (Deschouwer, 2009).

³ Some authors highlight the distinction between parties insisting on the recognition of the multi-national character of the state as opposed to other regionalist parties that do not have nationality claims (Lancaster and Lewis-Beck, 1989; Hepburn, 2009). However, this classification overlaps with ours (secessionists vs. autonomists) only to some extent, as the claim for recognition of a separate national identity does not necessarily entail a claim for secession.

Second, we consulted the literature and looked at party labels and the territorial concentration of the vote to create an initial dataset. In case of electoral coalitions whereby the regionalist party is a junior party we used the seat allocation within the coalition to assign vote shares to the different coalition partners. When regionalist parties coalesce for elections and we could not use the seat allocation as a mechanism to allocate vote share (for example in the case when the electoral coalition obtains one seat) we allocated the total vote share to the senior party.

Third, we applied a relevance criterion; we include in our dataset each regionalist party which obtained at least 1% of the vote and/or one seat in one national *or* regional election. This has led to a dataset of 234 regionalist parties in 17 countries. Greece and Japan have also regionalist parties, but they do not reach the 1% or one seat criterion.

Subsequently, we made use of secondary sources, party internet sites and party manifestoes and documents (see bibliography) to determine whether a party can be considered as regionalist and whether it can be classified as autonomist or secessionist. The discriminatory criterion is whether a party claims various degrees of self-government without putting into question the unity of the current state or it demands its region to break away from the current state. For a significant number of parties we were not able to identify their ideology. Although they constitute less than 10% of the total variation in vote shares for national and 16% for regional elections, it nevertheless has led to the exclusion of six countries (Australia, Austria, Finland, Norway, Portugal, and the United States). In addition, it has led to the exclusion of 12 ethnic parties (see below). In the next and final step we excluded controversial cases and we do not consider regionalist party competition beyond the core region (see below). The end result is a core dataset of 77 regionalist parties participating in regional and/or national elections in 11 countries. Table A1 lists these parties, their ideology and their core region.

Ethnic parties

Some parties do not demand decentralization for a particular region but rather claim specific (ethnic) group rights, for example, the right to communicate in one's native language which is not recognised as an official state language. We prefer to label these parties as 'ethnic' and we do not consider them to be regionalist. For completeness sake we list the parties we have identified as ethnic. For Austria, they are the *Karnter Wahlgemeinschaft* (KWG) and the *Karntner Einheitsliste* (KEL) (*Kärnten*); for Denmark the *Slesvigske parti - Schleswigsche Partei* (SP; *Sonderjyllands*); for Finland the *Svenska Folkepartiet* (SFP; several Finish mainland regions and *Åland*); for Germany the *Südschleswigsher Wählerverband* (SSW; Schleswig-Holstein); for Italy, the *Unione Slovena* (US; Friuli-Venezia Giulia) and the Ladin parties in South Tyrol: *Ladins* (Ladins), *Moviment Politich Ladins* (MPL), and *Unione Autonomista Ladina* (UAL); for New Zealand the Maori Party (MP; country-wide); for Norway, the *Saami people's list* (SPL; Finnmark); for the United States, the *Partido Nacional de la Raza Unida* (PNRU; Texas).

Controversial cases

The classification of parties according to their ideology may provoke some discussion and this is probably also the case for some regionalist parties. For three parties it is not clear in how far they act separately from statewide parties. These are the *Christlich-*

Soziale Union (CSU) in Bavaria, Germany, the *Union del Pueblo Navarro* (UPN) in Navarre, Spain, and the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) in Northern Ireland. The inclusion of these parties is highly problematic as it would open the way to the inclusion of regional branches of statewide parties which are rather autonomous from the central party and put forward regionalist claims, such as the Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSC). In this case the distinction between regionalist and statewide parties would disappear.

Other controversial cases concern the regionalist parties competing in the ethnically divided regions of Northern Ireland and Navarre. For these parties it is not clear whether their demands are directed to the central state (i.e. an autonomy claim) or serve to compete with alternative border-drawing claims. These parties are for Northern Ireland (UK) the Democratic Unionist Party (DPU), the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), *Sinn Fein* (SF), and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). For Navarre (SP), it applies to *Unión del Pueblo Navarro* (UPN), *Convergencia Democrática de Navarra* (CDN), and the Basque parties of the coalition *Nafarroa Bai*. We prefer to exclude controversial cases.

Electoral participation beyond the core region

Some regionalist parties listed in table A1 compete in more than one institutional region but we do not consider regionalist party competition beyond the core region. As explained above, some of these regionalist parties look for territorial boundary change rather than for more autonomy for the region they compete in. The parties and regions concerned are: for Belgium, the Flemish parties in Brussels (N-VA, VB, and VU), the FDF beyond Brussels, and the RW beyond the Walloon region; for Italy PSD'Az and MpA beyond Sardinia and Sicily, respectively; for Spain the Basque regionalist parties (AR, EA, EE, HB and PNV) participating in Navarra elections and the ERC beyond Catalonia.

We also do not consider pan-regionalist parties beyond the core region which consists of multiple institutional regions. This concerns the *Lega Nord* beyond *Padania* and the PDS beyond Eastern Germany (see notes below table A1). The decision to participate in elections beyond the core region may be induced by electoral rules –e.g. only statewide electoral lists are allowed– or by the electoral strategy of the regionalist party –e.g. the regionalist party needs a couple of hundreds vote more to obtain a national seat. We think that the self-government ideology of regionalist parties is by and large, if not completely, affected by party competition in the core region.

Validation of ideology scores

The literature on regionalist parties is characterised by extensive terminological profusion and lack of consensus (see above) and few scholars have attempted to develop a classification of regionalist parties which goes beyond an ‘inclusion or exclusion’ dichotomy (i.e. a party is regionalist or not). More in general, the most comprehensive collective works on party positioning have not devoted much attention to the centre-periphery dimension – e.g. the Comparative Manifestos Project.

Amongst studies based on expert surveys, i.e. methodologically closer to ours, we identify two available datasets: the 2006 Chapel Hill surveys (Hooghe et al., 2010) and the EPAC dataset by Szöcsik and Zuber (2012). Differently from our dataset, both of them cover a much shorter period: only the 2000s.

In the EPAC dataset we find two measurements concerning party positioning. One of them ('Territorial model') appears to be very similar to ours both conceptually and operationally. Conceptually, it aims to capture the position of parties regarding a range of possible institutional relationships between the central state and a given region. This is very similar to what we are after, with the only difference that, limiting our analysis to regionalist parties, we are just concerned with the periphery side of the centre-periphery spectrum, whereas the EPAC includes all types of parties (and, therefore, includes centralist positions too). Operationally, the coding scheme consists of an ordinal set of classes identified by qualitative characteristics. Below, we report the question asked to experts and the proposed answers:

Territorial model: In multinational states, parties may have different positions on which territorial model best suits a multinational society. Please indicate with an "x" whether any of the parties explicitly support any of the following territorial models (A-G):

- 1 = unitary state
- 2 = decentralization
- 3 = decentralization on ethnic basis
- 4 = symmetrical federalism, where all regions have equal rights
- 5 = asymmetrical federalism, where a national minority region has more rights than other regions
- 6 = independence for a national minority region
- 7 = annexation of the national minority region by another state

In contrast, the second measurement in the EPAC dataset ('Territorial Autonomy'), as well as the variable 'DECENTRAL' in the 2006 Chapel Hill survey (then relabelled 'REGIONS' in the 2010 survey), differ both conceptually and operationally. Conceptually, they are both concerned with party positioning on the idea of autonomy or political decentralization (i.e. how much parties are in favour or against it), without any specification on the amount of autonomy/decentralization. Operationally, the respective questions ask the experts to place parties along a quantitative continuum in which no qualitative threshold is indicated, aside the two extremes: 'strongly in favour of/against territorial autonomy' (EPAC); 'strongly favours/opposes political decentralization' (Chapel Hill). We find these two measurements to be particularly suitable for detecting state-wide parties' general orientations towards ethno-regionalist demands for self-government, rather than for detecting their preferences in terms of amount of self-government being devolved, let alone the radicalism of ethno-regionalist claims (which is what we are after). Therefore, we deem them unsuitable for a validation test of our measurement.

Another study which could be, in principle, used to validate our measurement is the classification made by De Winter (1998: 205-2007). However, since we drew so much on this work and on the whole volume (De Winter and Türsan, 1998) – definitions, conceptualizations, operationalization, and even coding decisions – we deem that even a very high correlation between the two measurements would not prove much, beyond the mere fact that our classification can be considered a minor reformulation (in terms of categories) and an empirical extension of De Winter's.

For all these reasons, we run a validation test using the ‘Territorial Model’ measurement of the EPAC dataset. We calculate a Pearson correlation between our measurement (centre-periphery radicalism; we take the scores for the 2000s) and the expert answers on the territorial model question. The resulting correlation score is very highly (Pearson R 0.81, N parties is 28, $p < 0.01$), providing strong support for the validity of our classification.

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Table A1. Dataset on regionalist parties

Country	Core region	Party	Ideology on Self-Government
Belgium	Brussels	<i>Front Démocratique des Francophones</i> (FDF)	Protectionist (1960s); Federalist (1970s-2000s)
	Flanders	<i>Nieuw Vlaamse Alliantie</i> (N-VA)	Separationist
		<i>Vlaams Belang</i> (VB)	Separationist
		<i>Volksunie</i> (VU)	Federalist (1950s-1970s); Ambiguous (1980s); Separationist (1990s)
Walloon region	<i>Rassemblement Wallon</i> (RW)	Protectionist (1960s); Federalist (1970s-1980s)	
German Community	<i>Pro Duetschsprachige Gemeinschaft</i> (ProDG)	Federalist (1970s-2000s)	
Canada	Quebec	<i>Bloc Québécois</i> (BQ)	Separationist
		<i>Action Démocratique</i> (AD)	Ambiguous
		<i>Parti Nationalist du Québec</i> (PNQ)	Separationist
		<i>Parti Québécois</i> (PQ)	Separationist
		<i>Québec Solidaire</i> (QS)	Separationist
		<i>Rassemblement pour l'Indépendance Nationale</i> (RIN)	Separationist
		<i>Union Nationale</i> (UN)	Federalist (1940s-1950s; 1970s-1980s); Ambiguous (1960s)
	Western Canada*	Western Canada Concept (WCC)	Separationist
Denmark	Faroe Islands	<i>Fólkaflokkurin</i> (FF)	Federalist (1940s-90s); Ambiguous (2000s)
		<i>Sjálvstýrisflokkurin</i> (SSF)	Federalist (1940s-90s); Separationist (2000s)
		<i>Tjóðveldi</i> (TV)	Separationist
	Greenland	<i>Inuit Aṭaḡatigiit</i> (IA)	Separationist
	France	Alsace	<i>Alsace d'Abord</i> (AdA)
Corsica		<i>Accolta Naziunale Corsa</i> (ANC)	Ambiguous
		<i>Unione di u Populu Corsu-Partitu di a nazione Corsa</i> (UPC-PNC)	Protectionist (1970s-1980s); Federalist (1990s-2000s)

		<i>Corsica Nazione</i> (CN)	Separationist
	Rhone-Alpes (Savoy and High Savoy)	<i>Ligue Savoisiennne</i> (LS)	Separationist
	Brittany	<i>Union Democratique Bretonne</i> (UDB)	Protectionist (1980s-1990s); Federalist (2000s)
Germany	Bavaria	<i>Bayernpartei</i> (BP)	Separationist (1940s-1980s); Ambiguous (1990s-2000s)
	Eastern Germany**	<i>Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus</i> (PDS)	Federalist
Italy	Aosta Valley	<i>Union Valdôtaine</i> (UVA)	Federalist
		<i>Union Valdôtaine Progressiste</i> (UVP)	Federalist
		<i>Rassemblement Valdôtaine</i> (RV)	Protectionist
		<i>Vallée d'Aoste Vive</i> (VAV)	Federalist
		<i>Fédération Autonomiste</i> (FA)	Protectionist
	Trentino-Alto Adige (South Tyrol)	<i>Südtiroler Volkspartei</i> (SVP)	Protectionist (1948-1956); Federalist (1957-2000s)
		<i>Tiroler Heimatpartei</i> (THP)	Protectionist
		<i>Süd-tiroler Freiheit</i> (S-TF)	Separationist
		<i>Union für Südtirol</i> (UfS)	Separationist
		<i>Die Freiheitlichen</i> (DF)	Ambiguous
	Trentino-Alto Adige (Trentino)	<i>Partito Popolare Trentino Tirolese-Partito Autonomista Trentino Tirolese</i> (PPTT-PATT)	Protectionist (1940s-1960s); Federalist (1970s-2000s)
		<i>Unione Autonomista Trentino Tirolese</i> (UATT)	Federalist
	Sardinia	<i>Partito Sardo D'Azione</i> (PSd'Az)	Protectionist (1940s-60s); Federalist (1970s and 1994-1997); Ambiguous (1979-1993 and since 1998)
		<i>Sardigna Natzione</i> (SN)	Separationist
		<i>Partito del Popolo Sardo - Fortza Paris</i> (PPS-FP)	Ambiguous
		<i>Independentia Repubrica de Sardigna</i> (IRS)	Separationist
		<i>Lega Sarda</i> (LSar)	Separationist
	Sicily	<i>Movimento per le Autonomie</i> (MpA)	Protectionist

	Northern Italy – Padania***	<i>Lega Nord</i> (LN)	Protectionist (1980s); Federalist (1992-1995; and 2000s); Separationist (1996-99)
Netherlands	Friesland	<i>Fryske Nasjonale Partij</i> (FNP)	Protectionist
Spain	Basque Country	<i>Partido Nacionalista Vasco</i> (PNV)	Ambiguous (1970s and 2000s); Federalist (1980s-1990s)
		<i>Eusko Alkartasuna</i> (EA)	Separationist (1980s-1990s); Ambiguous (since 2001)
		<i>Euskadiko Ezkerra</i> (EE)	Separationist
		<i>Herri Batasuna-Heusakal Herritarrok-Batasuna</i> (HB-HH-Ba)	Separationist
		<i>Aralar</i> (AR)	Separationist
		<i>Partido Comunista de las Tierras Vascas</i> (EHAK)	Separationist
	Catalonia	<i>Convergència i Unió</i> (CiU)	Federalist (1970s-1998; and 2002-2007); Ambiguous (1998-2002; and after 2007)
		<i>Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya</i> (ERC)	Ambiguous (1970s-1988; and since 1997); Separationist (1989-1996)
	Galicia	<i>Bloque Nacionalista Gallego</i> (BNG)	Separationist (1970s-1986); Ambiguous (since 1987)
	Andalusia	<i>Partido Andalucista</i> (PA)	Protectionist (1970s-1980s); Federalist (1990s-2000s)
	Aragon	<i>Partido Aragonés</i> (PAR)	Protectionist
		<i>Chunta Aragonesista</i> (CHA)	Protectionist (1980s-1994); Federalist (1995-2000s)
	Cantabria	<i>Partido Regionalista de Cantabria</i> (PRC)	Protectionist
	Valencia	<i>Unió Valencia</i> (UV)	Protectionist
	Asturias	<i>Partiu Asturianista</i> (PAS)	Protectionist
<i>Unión Renovadora Asturiana</i> (URAS)		Protectionist	
Rioja	<i>Partido Riojano</i> (PR)	Protectionist	
Extremadura	<i>Partido Regionalista Extremeño</i> (PREX)	Protectionist	
	<i>Coalición Extremeña</i> (CEX)	Protectionist	
	<i>Extremadura Unida</i> (EU)	Protectionist	

	Balearic Islands	<i>Unió Mallorquina</i> (UM) <i>Partit Socialista de Mallorca-EN</i> (PSM-EN) <i>Partit Socialista de Menorca</i> (PS-Me)	Protectionist (1980s-1992); Federalist (since 1993) Federalist Protectionist
	Canary Islands	<i>Coalición Canaria</i> (CC) <i>Coalición Agrupaciones Independientes de Canarias</i> (AIC) <i>Centro Canario</i> (CCN)	Protectionist (1990s-2004); Federalist (since 2005) Protectionist Protectionist
Sweden	Scania	<i>Skånepartiet</i> (SP)	Protectionist
Switzerland	Ticino	<i>Lega dei Ticinesi</i> (LT)	Federalist
UK	Scotland	Scottish National Party (SNP) Scottish Greens (SG) Scottish Socialist Party (SSP)	Separationist Separationist Separationist
	Wales	<i>Plaid Cymru</i> -The Party of Wales (PC)	Ambiguous(1940s-1991s and since 1997); Federalist (1992-1996); Separationist (since 2003)

Notes:

* Western Canada includes the provinces: Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan.

** The current *Länder* of the former DDR are: Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Brandenburg, Berlin (which includes former Western Berlin), Saxony-Anhalt, Saxony, and Thuringia. The PDS is considered as a regionalist party only up to 2007 (when *Die Linke* was created).

*** According to the latest version of the *Lega Nord*'s statute, Padania is formed by the following (institutional) regions: Lombardy, Veneto, Piedmont, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Trentino Alto-Adige, Aosta Valley, Liguria, Emilia-Romagna, Toscana, Marche, and Umbria. However, in the first formulation of Padania by party ideologist Gianfranco Miglio (1990) it included neither the Northern special status regions (Trentino-Alto Adige, Aosta Valley and Friuli-Venezia Giulia) nor the Central regions (Tuscany, Marche and Umbria). We prefer to adopt the first territorial definition of Padania as the LN's 'core region' as we believe that it is here that the votes given to the LN are more strictly related to Northern Italian (or Padanian) identity and to claims for self-government. We, therefore, consider the party's electoral scores only in Lombardy, Veneto, Piedmont, Liguria and Emilia-Romagna.

ROBUSTNESS ANALYSES

From table 1 one can observe that most regionalist parties participate in Italian and Spanish elections. In order to test for the robustness of the results we reran the logit and multinomial models but excluding Italy (tables 3A and 4A) and Spain (tables 3B and 4B). To ease interpretation of the results we have indicated loss of statistical significance in **yellow**, a change in the results which confirms our hypotheses in **green** and a change in the results which are counter to our expectations in **red**.

When Italy or Spain is excluded from the analysis we lose about a 100 to 140 cases which is about a quarter of the total number of observations. The robust analyses do not include more than 350 observations which is a low number for multinomial logit models which contains four categories in the dependent variable and whereby parties do not move much across categories. Not surprisingly, most of the differences in the results reported in tables 3A, 3B, 4A and 4B concern loss of statistical significance. Out of total of 79 differences in results 56 concern loss of statistical significance (yellow), 11 concern results which run counter to our expectations (red) and 12 results are now in line with our expectations (green).

Focusing on the main variables of interest, the regional authority, regional reform and reform laggard variables, we can observe that only two findings run counter to our expectations. Regional reform leads regionalist parties to moderate their autonomy claims in national elections when the analysis excludes Italy (table 4A). However, given that the probability approaches complete certainty (i.e. a probability of 1.00) we suspect this result to arise from estimations problems due to a low total number of observations. In addition, the logit model results for national elections remain robust when Italy is excluded (table 3A).

When Spain is excluded from the logit model regional reform changes sign for national elections which indicates that regionalist parties moderate their claims when more authority is decentralized to the region (table 3B). However, the multinomial logit model results for regional reform reported in table 4B for national elections are clearly robust. None of the results reported in the tables below concerning regional elections run counter to our expectations. Nevertheless, when Italy or Spain is excluded from the analysis it may lead to a loss of statistical significance for some of the variables.

The other independent variables are also affected when Italy or Spain are excluded. It would take too much space to discuss all different results in depth. We just note that 42 differences concern loss of significance whereas confirming and disconfirming results balance each other (9 instances for both). When we focus on the confirming and disconfirming results in the models which exclude Italy (table 3A and 4A) we may observe that the results for the statewide party and regionalist party competition variables confirm our expectations but that the results for the island dummy and party size run counter to what one would expect. The results for the electoral system and number of effective parties confirm our expectations when Spain is excluded (tables 3B and 4B) but the results for the variables that tap into regional distinctiveness (regional language, regional history and the island dummy) disconfirm our expectations (table 4B).

Overall we conclude that the analyses show that the results are robust in particular when it concerns the main variables of interest, namely the regional authority, regional reform and reform laggard variables.

Table 3A. Determinants of the ideology of regionalist parties: probabilities for being radical.

Exclusion of Italy.

	national elections			regional elections		
	low	high	change	low	high	change
Regional authority	0.35	0.26	-0.09	0.06	0.36	0.30*
Regional reform	0.10	0.64	0.54*	0.21	0.21	0.00
Reform laggard	0.30	0.32	0.02	0.21	0.43	0.22*
Regional language index	0.05	0.55	0.50*	0.06	0.32	0.27*
Regional history index	0.30	0.22	-0.08	0.21	0.58	0.20*
Island dummy	0.30	0.12	-0.18*	0.21	0.12	-0.08
Electoral system	0.30	0.98	0.68*	0.21	0.45	0.24
Number of effective parties	0.35	0.23	-0.12	0.23	0.17	-0.06
Regional government	0.30	0.12	-0.18	0.21	0.13	-0.08
Statewide party competition	0.40	0.21	-0.19*	0.16	0.27	0.11
Regionalist party competition	0.11	0.63	0.52*	0.17	0.25	0.08
Party size	0.18	0.47	0.29*	0.27	0.16	-0.10
Number of observations		349			320	
Number of parties		52			57	
Wald chi ²		51*			27*	
Log pseudolikelihood		-136			-157	
McFadden R ²		0.38			0.25	
Count R ²		0.80			0.78	

Notes: * p < 0.05.

The table displays the results of a logit model whereby the dependent variable reflects whether the regionalist party is moderate (=0) or radical (=1). Shown are the probabilities for being a radical party when the independent variables go from low to high. The categorical variables go from their minimum to their maximum and the continuous variables go from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while all other variables are held at their median (categorical variables) or their mean (continuous variables).

Table 4A. Determinants of the ideology of regionalist parties.

Exclusion of Italy.

	national elections				regional elections			
	moderates		radicals		moderates		radicals	
	P	F	A	S	P	F	A	S
Regional authority	-0.97*	0.75*	0.12	0.10*	-0.48*	-0.02	0.36	0.14
Regional reform	0.99*	-0.90*	-0.08	-0.02	-0.11*	0.22	-0.08	-0.03
Reform laggard	0.00	0.02	-0.09	0.08	-0.07*	-0.12	-0.04	0.23
Regional language index	0.00	-0.43*	0.20	0.24*	-0.15	-0.40	0.53	0.02
Regional history index	0.00	0.13	-0.19*	0.06	-0.18	-0.28	-0.00	0.11
Island dummy	0.00	0.23*	-0.19*	-0.04	-0.03	0.26	-0.22	-0.01
Electoral system	0.00	-0.67*	0.01	0.66*	-0.07*	0.03	-0.19	0.24
Number of effective parties	0.00	0.25	-0.29*	0.04	0.07	0.31	-0.48	0.11
Regional government	0.00	-0.02	0.10	-0.07*	0.06	-0.02	0.08	-0.10
Statewide party competition	0.00	0.16	-0.08	-0.08*	0.03	-0.18	0.10	0.04
Regionalist party competition	0.00	-0.58*	0.50*	0.09*	-0.31*	-0.05	0.32	0.04
Party size	0.00	-0.25*	0.16	0.08*	-0.12	0.19	-0.02	-0.06
Number of observations			349				320	
Number of parties			52				57	
Wald chi ²			8995*				933*	
Log pseudolikelihood			-258				-263	
McFadden R ²			0.33				0.29	
Count R ²			0.70				0.67	

Notes: * p < 0.05; P = protectionist; F = federalist; A = ambiguous; S = separatist (see table 1 for a description of the types of parties).

The table displays the results of a multinomial logit model whereby the dependent variable reflects whether the regionalist party is protectionist, federalist, ambiguous secessionist, or openly separatist. Shown are the changes in probabilities for being a type of party when the independent variables go from low to high. The categorical variables go from their minimum to their maximum and the change for continuous variables reflect going from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while all other variables are held at their median (categorical variables) or their mean (continuous variables).

Table 3B. Determinants of the ideology of regionalist parties: probabilities for being radical.

Exclusion of Spain.

	national elections			regional elections		
	low	high	change	low	high	change
Regional authority	0.09	0.07	-0.02	0.01	0.14	0.13*
Regional reform	0.03	0.57	-0.54*	0.06	0.05	-0.01
Reform laggard	0.08	0.11	0.03	0.05	0.10	0.04
Regional language index	0.01	0.19	0.18*	0.04	0.07	0.04
Regional history index	0.08	0.38	0.30*	0.05	0.30	0.25*
Island dummy	0.08	0.19	0.11	0.05	0.18	0.12
Electoral system	0.08	0.86	0.78*	0.05	0.58	0.53*
Number of effective parties	0.16	0.05	-0.10*	0.04	0.07	0.03
Regional government	0.08	0.03	-0.05	0.05	0.03	-0.02
Statewide party competition	0.07	0.09	0.01	0.04	0.08	0.04*
Regionalist party competition	0.04	0.24	0.20*	0.05	0.05	0.00
Party size	0.06	0.11	0.05	0.08	0.03	-0.05*
Number of observations	321			317		
Number of parties	43			53		
Wald chi ²	66*			54*		
Log pseudolikelihood	-124			-137		
McFadden R ²	0.59			0.28		
Count R ²	0.81			0.79		

Notes: * p < 0.05.

The table displays the results of a logit model whereby the dependent variable reflects whether the regionalist party is moderate (=0) or radical (=1). Shown are the probabilities for being a radical party when the independent variables go from low to high. The categorical variables go from their minimum to their maximum and the continuous variables go from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while all other variables are held at their median (categorical variables) or their mean (continuous variables).

Table 4B. Determinants of the ideology of regionalist parties.

Exclusion of Spain.

	national elections				regional elections			
	moderates		radicals		moderates		radicals	
	P	F	A	S	P	F	A	S
Regional authority	-0.08*	0.12*	-0.04*	0.00	-0.37*	0.21	0.00	0.16*
Regional reform	0.04	-0.53*	0.08*	0.40*	-0.11*	0.22	-0.08	-0.03
Reform laggard	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	0.04*	-0.12*	0.07	0.00	0.04
Regional language index	-0.01	-0.10*	0.03	0.08*	0.15*	-0.25*	0.00	0.10*
Regional history index	0.07*	-0.59*	0.03	0.49*	0.18	-0.33*	0.00	0.16
Island dummy	0.16*	-0.29*	0.08	0.05*	-0.04	-0.09	0.00	0.13
Electoral system	-0.01	-0.79*	0.16*	0.65*	-0.11	-0.42*	0.01	0.52*
Number of effective parties	-0.01	0.10*	-0.06*	-0.03*	-0.14	0.10	0.00	0.04
Regional government	-0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.02	0.00	0.04	0.00	-0.04
Statewide party competition	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.07	0.01	0.00	0.06*
Regionalist party competition	-0.02	-0.10	0.07*	0.05*	-0.12	0.13	0.00	-0.01
Party size	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.03*	-0.37*	0.42*	0.00	-0.05
Number of observations	321				317			
Number of parties	43				53			
Wald chi ²	15013*				1172*			
Log pseudolikelihood	-228				-242			
McFadden R ²	0.27				0.25			
Count R ²	0.73				0.62			

Notes: * p < 0.05; P = protectionist; F = federalist; A = ambiguous; S = separatist (see table 1 for a description of the types of parties).

The table displays the results of a multinomial logit model whereby the dependent variable reflects whether the regionalist party is protectionist, federalist, ambiguous secessionist, or openly separatist. Shown are the changes in probabilities for being a type of party when the independent variables go from low to high. The categorical variables go from their minimum to their maximum and the change for continuous variables reflect going from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while all other variables are held at their median (categorical variables) or their mean (continuous variables).