

1. Introduction: An Analytical Framework for Studying Territoriality of the Vote in Eastern Europe

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1.1 Introduction

Elections are often considered to be one of the core institutions of democracy (Bunce and Wolchik, 2009) and therefore it is not surprising that scholars have taken up an interest in electoral dynamics in post-communist countries (Bakke and Sitter, 2005; Lewis, 2006; Olson, 1998) and competitive elections taking place in authoritarian regimes (Diamond, 2002; Donno, 2013; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009). This scholarship has generally used analytical frameworks and methods imported from studies on elections taking place in genuinely democratic countries. An important contributor to the structuring of party politics in long-standing democracies are processes of nationalization (Jeffery and Wincott, 2010; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Nationalization refers to a 'broad historical evolution toward the formation of national electorates and party systems' and through nationalization processes 'peripheral and regional specificities disappear, and sectional cleavages progressively transfer into nationwide functional alignments' (Caramani, 2004, p.1). What is surprising is that nationalization processes in the West (Caramani, 2004; Chibber and Kollman, 2004; Dandoy and Schakel, 2013; Deschouwer, 2009; Schakel, 2013) have received far more attention than

in the East (two important exceptions are the studies by Bochsler, 2010a and Tiemann, 2012). Furthermore, the analysis of regional elections in Eastern Europe is relatively absent from the literature. Tucker (2002, p.281-3) reviews a decade of election studies (from 1990 to 2000) and finds that only ten out of 101 articles analyzed subnational elections and those ten studies that did include local elections focused exclusively on Russian elections. The picture has not much changed for the 2000s (Romanova, 2013, p.37).

This lack of scholarly attention to territoriality of the vote in Eastern Europe is surprising for two reasons. First, Kopecky and Mudde (2000, p.528-31) point out in their literature review that one of the major challenges for democratization scholars is to increase our understanding of the interplay between processes of state- and nation-building and democratization processes. Nationalization may help the consolidation of party systems while it is generally assumed that when statewide parties compete for votes across the statewide territory they are thought to be able to integrate and assimilate voters across the territory into one party system. In contrast, excessive regionalization of the vote, for example when regional and ethnic parties dominate in particular areas, may lead to violence and secessionism (Bochsler, 2010a). On the other hand, giving voice to territorially concentrated minorities through regional elections might actually help to stabilize the party system (Caramani, 2004, p.292).

Second, many post-communist countries and authoritarian regimes have regional government and hold regional elections. Turkey's provinces date back to the Ottoman Empire and the first provincial elections in the Republic of Turkey, which was established with the adoption of the constitution in 1924, were held in 1930. After communist rule several countries in Eastern Europe introduced regional elections. The federations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia, and Serbia and Montenegro have held regional elections at the same time or very soon after the first national election held after the end of Communist rule.

Croatia, Hungary and Romania introduced regional elections before 1995 but were held after the first or second national election. Poland saw its first regional election in 1998 and the Czech and the Slovak Republics followed in the 2000s.

In this book we set out to study territoriality in the national and regional vote in ten Eastern European countries. By putting the region at the center of the analysis we hope to shed more light on the role of regional elections in post-communist and authoritarian countries. We set out to study territorial heterogeneity in the vote while avoiding what other scholars have labeled as a ‘national bias’ (Swenden and Maddens, 2009, p.4-5) or ‘methodological nationalism bias’ (Jeffery and Wincott, 2010, p.171-3). These critiques describe the tendency of political scientists to take the national level as the unit of analysis and thereby almost exclusively focus on ‘national’ elections and more in particular on lower chamber and presidential elections. As a consequence, important political processes taking place at the regional level or in regional elections may be left unnoticed. For Western European countries a cumulating amount of evidence indicates that territory is important in explaining electoral outcomes and that in various places the regional vote significantly differs from the national vote (Dandoy and Schakel, 2013; Hough and Jeffery, 2006; Swenden and Maddens, 2009). For Eastern European countries we have not a satisfactory empirical overview of how much the vote differs across the territory and we do not know whether explanations for territorial heterogeneity in the vote for the West also apply for the East. This lack of understanding particularly pertains to regional elections but the territorial heterogeneity of the national vote has also received scant attention (Bochsler, 2010a; Tiemann, 2012).

In this book we present ten in-depth country studies on regional and national elections held in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Serbia and Montenegro (until 2006, Serbia and Montenegro are

independent countries since 2006), and Turkey (Table 1.1). We conceive regional government as a coherent territorial entity situated between the local and national levels with a capacity of authoritative decision-making and which serves an average population greater than 150,000 (Hooghe et al., 2016a). Kosovo and Montenegro do not have an intermediate tier of government and *maakunnad* in Estonia, *raionabi* in Russia and *powiaty* in Poland do not meet the population criterion. We exclude Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine and countries which hold no regional elections (Slovenia) or which have regional tiers with an indirectly elected assembly (Albania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Macedonia).

<Table 1.1 about here>

Each of the ten country chapters examines the extent to which national and regional elections are regionalized or nationalized and explores the causes for the observed territorial heterogeneity in the vote. To enhance comparison, the country chapters apply a common framework which distinguishes between five dependent variables which are thought to describe the most important dynamics of regional voting behavior. The authors will discuss congruence between the regional and national vote, turnout in regional and national elections, vote share change between regional and previously held national elections, electoral strength and ideology for non-statewide parties (NSWPs), and the constellation and electoral strength of electoral alliances. With regard to the independent variables we apply a deductive or ‘top-down’ and an inductive or ‘bottom-up’ approach. Within the deductive part of the analytical framework, the authors of the chapters will examine in how far territorial cleavages, regional authority, and electoral rules can explain territorial heterogeneity in the vote. The inductive part of the research strategy asks the contributors to identify factors which may impact on regional voting behavior beyond the set of variables included in the deductive part. In the conclusion to the book we will make an overall assessment of the impact of the various independent variables on nationalization and regionalization of the vote and we will delve

into the question in how far regional elections in Eastern Europe require their own explanatory model.

In the remainder of this introduction chapter we will explain in further depth the analytical framework adopted in this book. Scholars who analyze electoral dynamics in post-communist countries regularly make a comparison to Western European countries (Bielasiak, 2002, 2005; Birch, 2001; McAllister and White, 2007; Sitter, 2008). For Western European election data we can rely on our previous book on *Regional and National Elections in Western Europe* (Dandoy and Schakel, 2013) where we adopt a similar analytical framework and this puts us in an excellent position to contrast electoral outcomes between regions from the East and West. The comparison reveals that explanations which fare well in the West cannot fully account for regional electoral dynamics in the East and below we propose to include additional variables in the analytical framework in order to gain more traction on describing and explaining electoral dynamics in Eastern European regions.

1.2. Exploring territorial heterogeneity of the vote in Eastern Europe

A comparison between regional and national election vote shares is widely used to assess territorial heterogeneity in the vote (see for example Floridaia, 2010; Pallares and Keating, 2003; Jeffery and Hough, 2003, 2009; Skrinis and Teperoglou, 2008; Tronconi and Roux, 2009). Most scholars set out to assess the degree to which electoral results in a specific region diverge from results in another region or from national electoral outcomes. Most studies use a dissimilarity index, sometimes referred to as the Lee index, which is identical to the Pedersen's index (1979) of electoral volatility, but, instead of comparing an election with another election held previously in time, a regional election is compared to a national election. Dissimilarity scores are calculated by taking the sum of absolute differences

between regional and national vote shares for each party and subsequently dividing the sum by two. In this book we apply an adjusted dissimilarity index which allows us to vary vote shares according to the type of election as well as the level of aggregation (Schakel, 2013b):

$$\text{Dissimilarity score} = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n |X_{ijk} - X_{ilm}|$$

whereby X_i is the vote share won by party i in election j or l (dis)aggregated at the territorial level k or m . The type of election as well as the level of aggregation can vary between regional and national. The absolute values are summed and divided by two to avoid double counting (one party's gain is another party's loss). Scores may vary from complete congruence/similarity (0 per cent) to complete incongruence/dissimilarity (100 per cent).

The formula allows one to produce a variety of dissimilarity scores but three measures of congruence are of particular interest (Schakel and Dandoy, 2013a). *Party system congruence* compares national election vote shares aggregated at the national level (X_{iNN}) to regional election vote shares aggregated at the regional level (X_{iRR}). This measure is useful to indicate overall differences between national and regional party systems but it conflates two sources of variation, namely it compares at the same time two different types of elections (national versus regional) and two levels of aggregation (national versus regional). To gain further insight into the causes underlying party system congruence two additional types of dissimilarity scores are produced. First, *electorate congruence* keeps the type of election constant but varies the level of aggregation. In this book we look at electorate congruence for national elections which contrasts national election vote shares aggregated at the national level (X_{iNN}) with vote shares for the same national election but disaggregated at the regional level (X_{iNR}). Second, *election congruence* keeps the level of aggregation constant but

compares between types of elections. This measure allows one to study dual voting or vote switching between regional (X_{iRR}) and national elections (X_{iNR}) within a region. The three dissimilarity indices are compared between thirteen Western and ten Eastern European countries in table 1.2. For party system and election congruence we compare regional to previously held national elections and electorate congruence is assessed for national elections.

<Table 1.2 about here>

The comparison reveals that party system congruence scores for non-federal post-communist countries are comparable to those observed for federal and regionalized West European countries such as Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. A closer look into election and electorate congruence reveals that dissimilarity between party systems in Eastern Europe can be ascribed to vote switching between national and regional elections (election congruence) whereas in federal and regionalized West European countries it can be mainly attributed to different voting behavior between national and regional electorates (electorate congruence). This is a surprising result since high degrees of territorialization of the vote is thought to be supported by decentralized state structures (Dandoy and Schakel, 2013; Hough and Jeffery, 2006) but the comparison suggests that the party systems in the East can be equally or more regionalized without significant decentralization of authority to regional government (Hooghe et al., 2016a).

One should be careful with jumping to the conclusion that dual voting or vote switching between regional and previously held national elections are an indication of regionalized regional elections. Previously, we have argued that one may still speak of nationalization when voters switch their vote between national and regional elections but still base their vote choice on cues taken from the national rather than the regional electoral arena (Schakel and Dandoy, 2013b, p.281-3). This may happen when regional elections are

conceived by voters to be second-order or subordinate to national elections and regional elections are used by voters to voice their discontent with national government policy by casting a 'protest vote' against the party in national government while rewarding parties in national opposition and new and small parties (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). A similar caveat can be raised with regard to taking low dissimilarity scores as an indication of nationalization (Schakel and Dandoy, 2013b, p.281-3). High election congruence is an indication of nationalization when voters cast their vote for the same parties in regional and national elections. But equally, high election congruence may indicate regionalization of the vote because it may be regional and not statewide parties which win similarly sized vote shares in both national and regional elections.

The country chapters in this volume adopt a common analytical framework whereby congruence between regional and national elections (dissimilarity scores) serves a starting point for an exploration into the extent to which the vote is nationalized or regionalized. To gain further insight into the causes underlying vote share differences, and to avoid the above mentioned caveats, the common analytical framework introduces two additional sections in the country chapters. Nationalization of the vote is explored by tracing second-order election effects in regional elections and regionalization of the vote is studied by looking at vote shares won by non-statewide parties and electoral alliances. The analytical framework will be explained in further depth in the following two sections.

1.3. Nationalization of the vote: second-order election effects

Scholars studying regional elections in Western Europe often analyze second-order election effects in regional elections. The second-order election model was introduced by Reif and Schmitt (1980) who studied the first elections to the European Parliament. They compared

the results for the European Parliament to the previously held national elections and they observed that (1) voters turn out less, (2) parties in national government lose vote share and opposition, small and new parties gain vote share, and (3) the extent to which voters behave in these ways depends on the timing of the European election in the national election cycle. An important implication of the second-order election model is that regional elections may be considered to be nationalized when they display second-order election effects (Schakel and Dandoy, 2013b, p.282). In second-order elections, voters take their cues from the national political arena and base their vote choice on the governmental status of parties at the statewide level. A punishment vote for government parties and a reward vote for opposition, new, and small parties leads to dissimilarity between regional and national electoral outcomes but this should not be interpreted as an indication of regionalization.

To our knowledge, second-order election effects in regional elections taking place in Eastern Europe have been rarely studied (Schakel, 2015) but European election outcomes have been frequently studied for the Eastern European member states. One of the striking findings is that the second-order election model does not seem to apply as well in post-communist Europe as for Western Europe (Hix and Marsh, 2007; Koepke and Ringe, 2006; Schmitt, 2005). In Eastern Europe, government parties do not consistently lose vote share (Koepke and Ringe, 2006) and when they do lose votes (Stefanova, 2008), these losses do not follow the cyclical pattern as we may observe for Western European countries (Schmitt, 2005). These results are puzzling because individual level survey data suggests that voters in the East make their vote choices in second-order elections in similar ways as voters in the West (Van der Brug et al., 2008). In this book we want to assess in how far regional elections in Eastern Europe can be conceived to be second-order. In Table 1.3 we compare turnout for national and regional elections and in Table 1.4 we display vote share changes between

regional and previously held national elections for parties in national government and opposition parties.

<Table 1.3 about here>

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Table 1.3 shows that turnout in Eastern European regions tends to be lower for both national and regional elections when compared to Western European regions. However, turnout gaps between national and regional elections have similar magnitudes apart from the Czech (29 per cent) and Slovak (45 per cent) Republics which have larger turnout gaps than the maximum turnout gap reported for Western Europe (27 per cent in the Netherlands). Aside from these two ‘outliers’, turnout gaps observed for Russia (12 per cent) and Hungary (13 per cent) are comparable to those for Germany (13 per cent) and the United Kingdom (14 per cent). The turnout gap for Romania (9 per cent) is of the same size as for Italy (9 per cent) and there are practically no turnout gaps in Poland and Turkey just as can be observed for Belgium, Spain, and Switzerland. Vote share losses for government parties (Table 1.4) are not different between the East and West but they are exceptionally high for the Czech (18 per cent) and Slovak (16 per cent) Republics; figures which are well beyond those observed for Western European countries except for the United Kingdom (17 per cent). In contrast to expectations both government and opposition parties lose vote share (Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia) or only opposition parties face a vote share loss (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Russia).

It appears that the second-order election model does not seem to fare well in explaining regional electoral dynamics in Eastern Europe. Research shows that volatility between elections is much higher for the Eastern than for Western European countries (Birch, 2003; Lane and Ersson, 2007; Olson, 1998). It appears that a large part of volatility in the East is not caused by vote transfers between existing parties. Rather, volatility arises because

parties split or merge or parties disappear from the party system and new parties enter the electoral arena (Powell and Tucker, 2014; Sikk, 2005; Tavits, 2008). For this reason, we have amended the framework for looking into second-order election effects (Dandoy and Schakel, 2013) and in addition to vote transfers for government and opposition parties we also look at two other types of (often small) parties (Schakel, 2015). First, 'new' parties which are defined as parties which did not participate in the previous national election and which make their first appearance in the regional electoral arena. Second, 'no representation' parties which are parties which participated in the previous national election but did not manage to win a seat in the national parliament. In this book we also explore the regionalization of the vote and these indicators are discussed in the next section.

1.4. Regionalization of the vote: non-statewide parties and electoral alliances

Dissimilarity in vote shares between elections and across regions do not necessarily indicate regionalization. As explained above, incongruence may arise from second-order election effects whereby parties in national government lose vote share whereas opposition, small and new parties gain vote share. This raises the questions what, then, signals regionalization of the vote? Ideally, one would have access to surveys whereby voters are asked for the motives underlying their vote. Unfortunately, national election surveys cannot be used because they tend not to ask questions on the regional vote and a regional breakdown is often not possible while the total number of respondents is too low and respondents are not selected to be representative for regions. Furthermore, different questions are asked in different countries which put severe limits on the comparability of survey data across countries. In addition, regional election surveys are particularly rare for Eastern European regions. The strategy of

this book is to focus on two indicators: the electoral strength and ideology of non-statewide parties and the electoral strength and constellation of electoral alliances.

Non-statewide parties

The relationship between regionalization of the vote and the presence of non-statewide parties is immediately clear: electoral politics will be confined to the region to the extent that non-statewide parties increase their vote share. We prefer to adopt the term non-statewide party for two reasons. First, a non-statewide party is defined as a party which participates in elections in only one part of the country in contrast to statewide parties which participate in elections across the territory. Often, regional parties are defined by winning vote shares in one region only (Brancati, 2008). However, this operationalization would exclude parties which compete in more than one institutionally defined region. In Eastern Europe ethnic minorities tend to be dispersed across the territory but are still concentrated in a small number of regions. These parties would not be on our 'radar' when we would apply a very strict definition and, as a result, we would underestimate the territorial heterogeneity of the vote.

In Table 1.5 we compare non-statewide party strength in regional and national elections between Eastern and Western European regions. Non-statewide parties win equally sized vote shares in regional and national elections across Europe and this result seems to suggest that subnational interests are to a similar degree electorally mobilized with the exception of the United Kingdom where regional parties tend to be exceptionally strong (38.8 per cent in regional and 31.8 per cent in national elections). Average vote share won by the strongest non-statewide parties is comparable in size between East and West European regions. The vote share won by non-statewide parties in Romanian (10.1 and 10.6 per cent), Vojvodinan (18.7 and 6.7 per cent), and Slovakian (12.0 and 11.0 per cent) regions is comparable to average non-statewide party electoral strength in regions within Belgium (11.4 and 12.8 per

cent), Italy (9.4 and 7.4 per cent) and Spain (14.5 and 8.7 per cent). In both Eastern and Western Europe non-statewide parties tend to win vote share in every country and they generally win more vote share in regional than in national elections.

<Table 1.5 about here>

A second advantage of using the concept of non-statewide party is that it is neutral with regard to the ideology of the party. This allows the authors of the country chapters to differentiate non-state parties according to their ideology. Szöcik and Zuber (2015) identify two important components for evaluating party positions on an (ethno)national dimension of competition. The first is the degree of congruence parties seek to achieve between the boundaries of the state and the boundaries defining ethnonational groups. 'In this constellation, the extreme poles of the ethnonational dimension consist in seeking full congruence between the majority ethnonational identity category and the current state on the one hand, and seeking full congruence between a minority ethnonational identity category and a new nation-state on the other.' The second component concerns parties' stances on the principles of cultural and territorial autonomy. Through cultural and territorial autonomy 'national minorities can realize the goal of self-determination to a certain extent within the state, and therefore often demand the devolution of decision-making competencies to their own rulers, either in certain policy areas that are vital to their ethno-cultural survival or on the basis of a certain territory where they constitute the regional majority' (Szöcik and Zuber, 2015, p.3). We adopt the framework developed by Szöcik and Zuber (2015) and the contributors will discuss the (ethno)national ideology of non-statewide parties.

Electoral alliances

One of the differences scholars have noted when they analyzed elections in post-communist countries is the relevance and frequent occurrence of pre-electoral alliances (Marek and

Bingham Powell, 2011). Indeed, electoral alliances are virtually absent in Russia and Turkey, but they involve more than half of the vote shares in Croatia (58 per cent) and the Slovak Republic (59 per cent), about a third of the vote shares in the Czech Republic (38 per cent), Hungary (33 per cent) and Romania (33 per cent), and close to one fifth of the vote shares in Poland (18 per cent) and one tenth of the party vote shares in Vojvodina (8 per cent). Electoral alliances are rare in elections taking place in Western European countries and, furthermore, when parties coalesce, they present the same electoral alliance to all voters across the whole territory (Dandoy and Schakel, 2013). This is also the case for Bosnia and Herzegovina where electoral alliances are common but because of full simultaneity of holding elections the partners in an alliance do not change across the territory. This in stark contrast to the other post-communist countries mentioned above where the participants of electoral alliances frequently change across the regions and between regional and national elections. This has practical and theoretical implications.

At a practical level, the presence of electoral alliances complicates the comparison of vote shares across regions and types of election. Vote shares won by an electoral alliance can often not be broken down to the partners of the alliance. In many countries electoral alliances present one candidate list whereby seat shares are allocated at the party list level whereby the party affiliation of candidates who win a seat is often not administered. Very often electoral alliances are formed around a large statewide party which partners up with different junior partners across regions. For example, in the 1997 county assembly elections in Croatia the Croatian Democratic Union (*Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica*, HDZ), as a major statewide party in various electoral alliances with junior parties, won absolute or relative majorities in 20 out of 21 regions (Ivanisevic et al., 2001). Since most electoral alliances involves the same major statewide parties we decided to assign the vote share won by an electoral alliance to the major party of the coalition. Major parties are parties which obtained the largest vote

share in the previous national or regional election compared to the other, minor parties involved in the electoral alliance. Dissimilarity in the vote increases when parties participate in an electoral alliance in one type of election or in one region but present their own list in another type of election or in another region. In the conclusion to the book (Chapter 12) we analyze how much of the variance in the dissimilarity in the vote can be attributed to electoral alliances.

At the theoretical level, it is difficult to determine beforehand whether electoral alliances can be perceived as nationalization or as regionalization of electoral politics. Statewide parties may engage in an alliance because they would like to secure their electoral presence in a region while non-statewide parties may want to partner up with a statewide party to gain access into national parliament because they can be large parties in the regional electoral arena but are often small actors at the statewide level. We think that for many instances electoral alliances will signal regionalization because statewide parties cannot be expected to be willing to form an electoral alliance unless they are electorally weak in a region and non-statewide parties are not willing to coalesce with statewide parties unless they get policy concessions.

1.5. Explaining regional electoral dynamics in Eastern European countries

Examining second-order election effects, non-statewide parties and electoral alliances will provide insights into the question whether elections are nationalized or regionalized. In order to explain what underlies territorial heterogeneity in the vote we adopt a ‘stakes-based’ approach. This approach stipulates that regional-scale factors and processes will play a larger role when the regional electoral arena becomes more relevant for voters and parties. Country studies provided by Jeffery and Hough (2009) and Dandoy and Schakel (2013) show that

territorial cleavages, regional authority, and electoral rules may increase the stakes of regional elections. In this section we will discuss these three sets of independent variables and we develop hypotheses for explaining regional electoral dynamics in Eastern Europe.

Territorial cleavages

Regional elections may increase their relevance to the extent voters may want to express region-specific preferences which are often linked to territorial cleavages based on, for example, history, language, and ethnicity. The basis of territorial cleavage theory lies in sociological approaches which explain dissimilarity of party systems by the extent to which territorial cleavages are politicized (Lijphart, 1977; Livingston, 1956). Several scholars analyzing regional elections in Western Europe have observed that if subnational elections are held in areas with distinctive territorial identities, voters are more likely to disconnect themselves from the first-order arena and make different vote choices in the subnational context (Dandoy and Schakel, 2013; Jeffery and Hough, 2009). It is generally believed that political cleavages that formed West European party systems (that is, the class, the rural-urban, the church-state and the center-periphery cleavages) are of limited relevance in post-communist countries (Bielasiak, 1997; McAllister and White, 2007). However, as Bochslers (2010b, p.811-2) argues, ethnic divisions are salient in Eastern Europe and in many cases ethnic minorities tend to vote for 'their' party.

We contend that the extent to which territorial cleavages may lead to territorial heterogeneity in the vote depends on intervening factors such as whether territorial cleavages are mobilized by non-statewide parties. The ability of non-statewide parties to mobilize the regional voter in great part depends on the territorial concentration of ethnic minorities. When the boundaries of electoral district and regional government are drawn so that the ethnic group members are distributed across different territorial units, the expression of

‘regional voice’ may be significantly hampered because the ethnic group constitutes a minority in each of the units (Treisman, 2007). Another possible intervening factor is the presence of special rules for ethnic minority representation in national parliaments. Some countries in Eastern Europe (for example Romania) have reserved seats for specified ethnic minorities in national parliament. The ethnic group members are the only eligible voters for these seats which secures a regional or ethnic ‘voice’ no matter the territorial distribution of that ethnic group across the country.

Territorial cleavages can be measured according to infinite number of dimensions such as ethnicity, language, religion, history or economy but geographical distance, a history of independent statehood and the presence of minority languages are among the most mentioned cleavages (Fitjar, 2010; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Rokkan and Urwin, 1983; Van Houten, 2007). Hooghe et al. (2016b) define Rokkan regions according to whether a region is an island (distance), has a history of independent statehood (statehood) or when a majority in the region speaks a language other than the majority in the country as a whole (language). In Table 1.6 we report the proportion of regional elections taking place in Rokkan regions. In contrast to Western European countries, Rokkan regions are relatively absent in Eastern European countries except for the three federations and Turkey. However, in the remaining six unitary countries the territorial boundaries of regional government have been significantly redrawn during and after communist rule. As a result, Rokkan regions and territorially concentrated minorities therein may have been divided up into a number of institutional regions. Therefore, we have asked the authors of the country chapter to analyze the territorial heterogeneity of the vote according to ‘historical-cultural’ regions in addition to the current institutional regions.

<Table 1.6 about here>

Regional authority

A significant decentralization trend since the 1970s across Western European countries (Hooghe et al., 2016a) has induced a number of scholars to investigate in how far increased regional authority has led to a regionalization of elections (Hough and Jeffery, 2006; Pallarés and Keating, 2003). Decentralization is thought to affect parties and voters by providing incentives and opportunities to mobilize locally based preferences. This may produce variation in voter and party alignments even up to the point of ‘unique’ party systems at the regional level (Thorlakson, 2007, 2009). When regional government has independent policy making capacities voters may base their vote according to their evaluation of the performance of regional government instead of national government. This, in turn, may induce regional branches of statewide parties - which compete for votes with regionally based parties in the regional electoral arena - to deviate their policies from the party at the national level especially when adhering to statewide party policies involves electoral risks in the regional arena (Hough and Jeffery, 2006; Maddens and Libbrecht, 2009).

In Table 1.7 we present minimum and maximum regional authority index (RAI) scores for Eastern and Western European countries. The RAI measures regional authority according to self-rule - the extent of authority exercised by the regional government over citizens within the region - and shared rule - the extent of authority exercised by the regional government in the country as a whole. Both self-rule and shared rule are measured by five indicators. Self-rule is assessed by institutional depth, policy scope, fiscal autonomy, borrowing autonomy, and representation and shared rule is measured by legislative control, executive control, fiscal control, borrowing control, and constitutional reform (Hooghe et al., 2016a). Not surprisingly, the (con-)federal countries of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia and Serbia and Montenegro score high on the regional authority index. The seven non-federal countries score on the low end of the regional authority index especially when compared to

unitary countries in Western Europe. For example, the counties in Scandinavian countries, which are described as local governments by some scholars, have RAI scores above 10.

Despite strong expectations that decentralization should lead to a regionalization of the vote, the empirical evidence on the relationship between federalism/decentralization and party nationalization in post-communist countries is mixed. Tiemann (2012) finds no effect but Bochsler (2010a, 2010b) does. It is important to note that both scholars have only looked at national elections. Caramani (2004, p.291-2) observes a nationalization trend for national elections in Western Europe even in countries with a strong centre-periphery cleavage and he offers an interesting hypothesis for this counter-intuitive finding: ‘rather than being a cause of territorialization of voting behavior, federal structures reduce the expression of regional protest in the party system by opening up institutional channels of voice’. In this view, one would expect to observe nationalization for national elections but regionalization for regional elections.

<Table 1.7 about here>

Electoral rules

Research on second-order election effects in regional elections has revealed that the timing of elections matters. Second-order election effects are amplified when regional elections are held mid-term of the national election cycle but second-order election effects decline when regional elections are held close to or at the same time as national elections (Jeffery and Hough, 2001, 2003; Schakel and Dandoy, 2014). Next to vertical simultaneity of elections, one may also hypothesize that holding several (or all) regional elections simultaneously (that is, horizontal simultaneity) amplifies their second-order qualities by giving them collective nationwide reach and resonance (Jeffery and Hough, 2006; Schakel and Dandoy, 2013a, 2013b). In Table 1.7 we present vertical and horizontal simultaneity for regional elections

with national, local and other regional elections. Vertical simultaneity with national elections is rare in both Eastern and Western European countries and only regional elections taking place in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia, and Sweden are very often or always held concurrently with national elections. Vertical simultaneity with local elections and horizontal simultaneity with (other) regional elections is the norm in Eastern Europe. The high turnout gaps for the Czech and Slovak Republics (Table 1.3) may be explained by non-simultaneity between regional and local elections which decreases the stakes of regional elections (Schakel and Dandoy, 2014). Compulsory voting increases voter turnout and second-order election effects should decrease as a result but in Eastern Europe voting is obligatory in Turkey only.

In addition to electoral cycles we also consider the impact of rules translating votes into seats. Bochsler (2010c) and Bernauer and Bochsler (2011) have shown that legal thresholds in national elections in Eastern Europe can moderate the extent to which ethno-regional parties are excluded from the party system because these tend to be small parties. However, when these parties contest regional elections they will contribute to a regionalization of the vote. Dissimilarity between the regional and national vote may be a direct result of differences in electoral systems because majoritarian and mixed systems tend to be more restrictive for parties than proportional rule. Under plurality rule successful performance requires cooperative behavior from parties whereas proportional rule generates very weak incentives for electoral cooperation (Cox, 1997; Lijphart, 1984). With plurality rule, only parties with large support can win a majority of the votes and seats and, therefore, parties have incentives to jointly field candidates. In contrast, with proportionality the relatively fair allocation of seats encourages voters to support their most preferred party. Hence, differences between the national and regional vote may arise out of an inclusive regional but an exclusive national electoral system or *vice versa*. Table 1.7 presents the

electoral rules for national and regional elections and it becomes clear that electoral systems differ widely between countries and between national and regional elections.

Electoral systems may also indirectly increase incongruence between regional and national elections through its impact on the formation of electoral alliances. Kostadinova (2006) links the high occurrence of pre-election coalitions in post-communist countries to the incentives produced by mixed electoral systems. Mixed electoral systems combine the use of plurality or majority run-off procedures in single member constituencies for election of some representatives, and proportional rule for elections of the remaining representatives in the same chamber of parliament. The choice of party coalition strategies is determined by how parties assess their chances for success. In mixed-system elections, parties have four available options for participation (Kostadinova, 2006, p.125): 'first, they may decide to run completely on their own; second, party strategists may decide that it would be better for their organization to participate in coalition with other parties in the list tier and on their own in the nominal tier; third, parties may run in coalition in the SMD part and on their own in the PR part; and fourth, a party may prefer to run in coalition in both tiers.' In analogy, the choice of party coalition strategies may vary to similar extent across national and regional elections especially when the electoral rules are different between the two levels.

1.6. Structure of the book

The discussion above reveals that quantitative numbers need to be interpreted with care and need to be considered alongside qualitative evidence. For example, non-statewide party strength may be an indication of regionalization of the vote but it may also signal nationalization because non-statewide parties may be the recipients of the vote share losses incurred by government parties (that is, a second-order election effect). Similarly, it may be

difficult to disentangle the effects of the explanatory variables. For example, regional authority tends to coincide with vertical simultaneity between regional and national elections because the three (con-)federal countries hold all or many elections at the same date. Therefore, we study regional and national elections in ten Eastern European countries in depth according to a comprehensive analytical framework whereby we combine a ‘top-down’, nationalization approach with a ‘bottom-up’, regionalization approach.

The main research question in each chapter is to what extent are national and regional elections regionalized or nationalized and what are the causes for territorial heterogeneity in the vote? The first step in each chapter is to examine congruence between regional and national elections. Dissimilarity in the vote does not necessarily mean that the vote is regionalized, therefore, in a second and third step, the authors will look at specific indicators for nationalization of the vote (second-order election effects) and regionalization of the vote (regional election effects). To account for different degrees of nationalization and regionalization of the vote between regions and over time the authors may turn to three sets of independent variables: territorial cleavages, regional authority, and electoral rules (deductive approach). In addition, authors may propose any independent variable they think impacts on the regional vote (inductive approach).

The country studies adopt a similar chapter structure which reflects the analytical framework. The introduction to the chapter discusses the transition to democracy and the introduction of regional government and regional elections. When available, authors will also summarize research on regional elections. The second section presents an overview on ‘regional government and regional elections’. The analytical part of the country chapters is divided into three sections. One section discusses ‘congruence of the vote’ which is followed by a section which looks at ‘second-order election effects’ where the authors analyze turnout and vote transfers between regional and previous national elections. The fifth section looks

specifically for evidence of ‘regionalization of the vote’ by examining the electoral strength and ideology of non-statewide parties and by examining the constellation of and vote shares won by electoral alliances. The authors will propose explanatory factors (territorial cleavages, regional authority, and electoral rules) which, according to them, may account for the observed electoral dynamics. In the conclusion to the chapter, the authors address the question whether regional elections are regionalized or nationalized.

This book present ten in depth country studies on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Serbia and Montenegro (until 2006, Serbia after 2006), and Turkey. The country chapters are presented in alphabetical order. We have assembled data on the five aspects of regional election behavior, and the full variation across regions and parties, and over time, are provided in country Excel files, which include 5 figures and 17 tables. The Excel files and the codebook are published on a webpage to accompany this book on the website (www.arjanschakel.nl) of one of the editors (A.S.). The authors of the country chapters reflect upon the most interesting figures and tables, which means that not all figures and tables are discussed. Readers who would like access to the data or would like more detail are advised to download the country Excel files. In Chapter 12 (conclusion to the book) we will draw cross-country comparisons and we will develop an explanatory model for regional electoral dynamics in Eastern European countries.

Table 1.1 Countries, regional tiers and regional elections included in this book

Country Name	Regional tier Name	Regional tier English name	N	Regional elections Years	N
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine	Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina	2	1996-2014	14
	Republika Srpska	Republika Srpska			
	Kantoni/Županije	Cantons	10	1996-2014	69
Croatia	Županije	Counties	21	1993-2013	126
Czech republic	Kraje and Hlavní město Praha	Regions	14	2000-2012	56
Hungary	Megyék	Counties	20	1994-2014	120
Poland	Województwa	Provinces	16	1998-2014	80
Romania	Județe and București	Counties	42	1996-2012	210
Russia	Subyekty federacii	Subjects of the federation	89	2001-2015	204
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/ Serbia and Montenegro	Republika/Država članica Crna Gora	Republic/Member State of Montenegro	1	1998-2012	6
	Republika/Država članica Srbija	Republic/Member State of Serbia	1	2000-2014	6
	Autonomna Pokrajina Vojvodina	Autonomous Province of Vojvodina	1	2000-2012	4
Slovak republic	Samosprávne kraje	Self-governing regions	8	2001-2013	32
Turkey	İller	Provinces	81	1963-2014	799
Total			306		1726

Notes: Kantoni/Županije constitute a regional governmental tier in one of the entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina (*Federacija Bosne i Hercegovina*). *Autonomna Pokrajina Vojvodina* is a special autonomous region in Serbia. *Subyekty federacii* in Russia do not include *raionabi*. The 2000 elections for one *kanton/županija* in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 1992 elections for Romanian *județe* are missing and *subyekty federacii* elections before 2001 in Russia are not included (see Chapters 2, 7 and 8 for more details).

Table 1.2 Congruence between regional and national elections

Countries	Party system		Electorate		Election		Number of	
	congruence		congruence		congruence		Elections	Regions
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD		
Austria	19.2	7.7	9.7	5.8	13.7	6.7	39	9
Belgium	51.0	11.3	52.6	11.3	8.2	5.9	17	4
Denmark	28.3	34.0	23.9	36.0	25.0	35.4	67	22
France	23.1	7.3	10.1	5.7	20.5	8.3	88	22
Germany	21.1	10.4	16.7	8.1	9.9	6.1	87	16
Greece	15.4	10.3	6.0	3.3	15.7	10.1	209	62
Italy	23.8	12.2	15.3	12.3	17.6	11.3	95	20
Netherlands	14.0	3.6	8.3	3.1	10.0	3.1	72	12
Norway	15.4	5.5	11.7	4.6	10.4	3.3	114	19
Spain	22.3	12.1	17.0	8.4	9.2	6.0	111	19
Sweden	10.9	4.5	9.2	4.4	4.9	2.1	132	27
Switzerland	28.7	11.3	31.6	18.7	18.6	17.4	120	26
United Kingdom	28.5	12.8	23.4	14.8	12.0	5.6	15	4
Western Europe	20.1	13.9	14.7	15.1	13.7	13.3	1166	262
Bosnia and Herzegovina	38.5	9.0	37.9	8.4	6.1	7.9	14	2
Cantons in FBiH	33.4	19.2	33.3	19.4	–	–	69	10
Croatia	32.7	10.3	14.8	7.9	28.7	10.0	126	21
Czech Republic	26.4	8.1	6.2	3.5	24.2	8.5	56	14
Hungary	18.4	6.2	6.1	2.8	16.8	6.0	120	20
Poland	22.3	7.4	10.4	3.9	18.9	6.9	80	16
Romania	33.7	11.0	17.9	12.7	27.4	7.6	210	42
Russia	23.3	11.8	12.8	9.0	20.3	12.7	204	87
Serbia and Montenegro	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Vojvodina in Serbia	23.1	9.0	9.6	4.8	19.6	10.2	4	1
Slovak republic	39.7	8.6	13.3	4.5	35.7	8.9	32	8
Turkey	24.4	10.4	20.4	10.6	16.3	8.1	397	81
Eastern Europe	26.9	12.1	16.4	12.0	21.0	10.5	1312	304

Notes: Shown is average congruence (Mean) and its standard deviation (SD) per country for elections held since 1990. Serbia and Montenegro have two completely separated party systems which means that party system and electorate congruence is 100 per cent and election congruence is 0 per cent.

Party system congruence: dissimilarity between the national vote at the national level and the regional vote in the region (NN-RR).

Electorate congruence: dissimilarity between the national vote at the national level and the national vote in the region (NN-NR).

Election congruence: dissimilarity between the national vote at the regional level and the regional vote in the region (NR-RR).

Source: Western European election data is obtained from Dandoy and Schakel (2013).

Table 1.3 Turnout in regional and national elections

Countries	Regional turnout		National turnout		Turnout gap	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Austria	76.5	8.2	81.8	5.9	-5.4	8.2
Belgium	89.3	3.7	90.1	2.3	-0.8	1.8
Denmark	76.0	7.9	81.3	8.9	-5.2	11.8
France	60.0	8.9	65.5	4.0	-5.5	7.5
Germany	64.8	7.6	77.8	5.0	-13.2	7.2
Greece	70.1	9.1	73.7	8.9	-3.7	6.5
Italy	74.1	8.9	82.8	6.6	-8.7	6.0
Netherlands	51.5	5.4	78.8	3.9	-27.4	5.1
Norway	57.9	4.2	77.2	3.7	-19.3	3.5
Spain	67.0	6.3	67.6	6.5	-0.6	2.3
Sweden	81.2	3.0	83.8	2.9	-2.6	0.7
Switzerland	44.5	9.9	45.1	9.3	-0.7	9.7
United Kingdom	49.4	10.7	63.5	5.1	-14.2	10.8
Western Europe	66.0	13.4	73.4	12.8	-7.5	10.0
Bosnia and Herzegovina	56.0	1.7	–	–	–	–
Cantons in FBiH	54.5	4.9	–	–	–	–
Croatia	53.9	12.1	66.2	7.0	-19.4	8.0
Czech Republic	35.5	4.8	64.6	7.0	-29.2	6.9
Hungary	50.7	4.9	64.1	5.8	-13.4	6.4
Poland	46.1	3.1	46.4	5.6	-0.3	5.5
Romania	54.5	5.3	63.0	14.2	-8.5	15.1
Russia	50.0	15.8	61.6	12.4	-11.6	10.1
Serbia and Montenegro	65.8	8.9	–	–	–	–
Vojvodina in Serbia	52.6	12.3	60.0	2.4	0.3	0.5
Slovak republic	21.7	5.0	67.1	11.7	-45.4	11.4
Turkey	86.1	6.3	84.4	5.6	1.7	4.3
Eastern Europe	61.1	20.0	69.3	14.9	-8.0	13.6

Notes: Shown is average turnout (Mean) and its standard deviation (SD) across regions for national and regional elections. The turnout gap is derived by subtracting national turnout from regional turnout. See table 1.1 for included regions and turnout is included is for elections held since 1990.

Source: Western European election data is obtained from Dandoy and Schakel (2013).

Table 1.4 Vote share swings between regional and national elections

Countries	Government parties		Opposition parties	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Austria	0.4	9.3	0.2	8.7
Belgium	-2.2	4.1	1.0	3.9
Denmark	1.4	6.0	-2.2	5.3
France	-7.5	8.8	2.0	3.3
Germany	2.0	3.9	-2.8	2.7
Greece	-3.6	7.3	0.9	3.9
Italy	-1.6	2.8	-1.3	2.8
Netherlands	-2.9	2.6	1.7	2.1
Norway	-4.3	3.7	2.3	4.8
Spain	-7.9	9.2	-0.4	9.3
Sweden	0.0	4.0	-0.4	3.4
Switzerland	-8.3	21.0	-1.1	5.7
United Kingdom	-17.2	9.4	2.3	7.3
Western Europe	-3.6	9.8	0.1	5.2
Bosnia and Herzegovina	-0.6	2.2	-1.9	2.7
Cantons in FBiH	1.7	12.6	-4.2	12.2
Croatia	-3.3	8.9	2.2	8.7
Czech Republic	-18.0	8.1	8.8	6.2
Hungary	-3.7	9.3	-6.8	9.0
Poland	-5.1	7.9	1.6	9.8
Romania	-1.8	13.9	-1.7	11.8
Russia	-0.5	12.9	-4.1	16.3
Serbia and Montenegro	–	–	–	–
Vojvodina in Serbia	-6.9	9.9	5.8	7.1
Slovak republic	-15.7	9.0	-3.9	10.0
Turkey	-4.6	10.3	1.4	7.9
Eastern Europe	-3.8	11.7	-0.8	11.3

Notes: Shown are average vote share swings (Mean) and its standard deviation (SD) between regional and preceding national elections. Vote share changes are summed for parties in national government and parties in national opposition. See table 1.1 for included regions and vote share swings are included for elections held since 1990.

Source: Western European election data is obtained from Dandoy and Schakel (2013).

Table 1.5 Non-statewide party electoral strength

Countries	Non-statewide party strength	
	regional elections	national elections
Austria	0.1	0.0
Belgium	11.4	12.8
Denmark	6.5	6.0
France	1.6	0.0
Germany	9.1	7.9
Greece	6.4	0.0
Italy	9.4	7.4
Netherlands	2.0	0.0
Norway	0.5	0.2
Spain	14.5	8.7
Sweden	0.8	0.0
Switzerland	0.8	0.7
United Kingdom	38.8	31.8
Western Europe	5.6	3.1
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2.3	0.1
Cantons in FBiH	0.4	0.0
Croatia	5.8	1.9
Czech Republic	2.3	0.0
Hungary	3.7	0.0
Poland	3.0	0.8
Romania	10.1	10.6
Russia	1.1	0.0
Serbia and Montenegro	–	–
Vojvodina in Serbia	18.7	6.7
Slovak republic	12.0	11.0
Turkey	6.0	6.3
Eastern Europe	5.2	4.1

Notes: Shown is average non-statewide party strength (per cent of votes) in regional and national elections held since 1990.

Source: Western European election data is obtained from Dandoy and Schakel (2013).

Table 1.6 Territorial cleavages: Rokkan regions

Countries	Rokkan regions	Distance	Statehood	Language
Austria	0.4	0.0	0.4	0.0
Belgium	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.5
Denmark	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2
France	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.2
Germany	0.4	0.0	0.4	0.1
Greece	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0
Italy	0.5	0.0	0.3	0.3
Netherlands	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.1
Norway	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Spain	0.5	0.2	0.3	0.4
Sweden	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Switzerland	1.0	0.0	1.0	0.8
United Kingdom	0.8	0.3	0.5	0.0
Western Europe	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.2
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.5
Cantons in FBiH	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Croatia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Czech Republic	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Hungary	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Poland	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Romania	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Russia	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.1
Serbia and Montenegro	–	–	–	–
Vojvodina in Serbia	1.0	0.0	1.0	0.0
Slovak republic	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Turkey	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.2
Eastern Europe	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1

Notes: Shown is the proportion of elections taking place in Rokkan regions which are defined according to whether a region is an island (distance), has a history of independent statehood (statehood) or when a majority in the region speaks a language other than the majority in the country as a whole (language).

Source: Data is obtained from Hooghe et al. (2016b).

Table 1.7 Regional authority index (RAI) scores and electoral institutions

Countries	RAI		Compulsory voting	Simultaneity with elections			Electoral system	
	Min	Max		Local	Regional	National	Regional	National
Austria	22	23	No/Yes	No	No	No	PR	PR
Belgium	11	24	Yes	No	Yes	No	PR	PR
Denmark	7	25	No	Yes/No	Yes/No	No	PR	PR
France	10	12.5	No	No	Yes	No	PR/MIX	MAJ
Germany	26	27	No	No/Yes	No	No	MIX	MIX
Greece	9	9	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	MAJ	MIX
Italy	9	12	No/Yes	Yes/No	Yes/No	No	PR	PR/MIX
Netherlands	16.5	17.5	No	No	Yes	No	PR	PR
Norway	11	12	No	Yes	Yes	No	PR	PR
Spain	20.5	25.5	No	Yes/No	Yes/No	No	PR	PR
Sweden	12	13	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	PR	PR
Switzerland	24.5	26.5	No/Yes	No	No	No	PR/MIX/MAJ	PR
United Kingdom	1	20.5	No	No/Yes	No/Yes	No	MIX	MAJ
Western Europe	1	27	No/Yes	Yes/No	Yes/No	No	PR	PR
Bosnia and Herzegovina	18	26	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	PR	PR
Cantons in FBiH	13	15	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	PR	PR
Croatia	8	9	No	Yes	Yes	No	PR/MIX	PR/MIX
Czech Republic	8	9	No	No	Yes	No	PR	PR
Hungary	8	8	No	Yes	Yes	No	PR	MIX
Poland	8	8	No	Yes	Yes	No	PR	PR
Romania	7	8	No	Yes	Yes	No	PR/MIX	PR/MIX
Russia	19	24	No	Yes	Yes/No	No/Yes	MIX/PR/MAJ	PR/MIX
Serbia and Montenegro	26	27	No	No	No	–	PR	–

Vojvodina in Serbia	8	8	No	Yes	No	No/Yes	MIX/MAJ	PR
Slovak republic	7	8	No	No	Yes	No	MAJ	PR
Turkey	6	7	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	PR	PR
Eastern Europe	6	27	No/Yes	Yes/No	Yes/No	No	PR	PR

Source: Western European election data is obtained from Dandoy and Schakel (2013). Data on regional authority index (RAI) scores are provided by Hooghe et al. (2016a).