

‘This book represents a major advance in the study of regional government and spatial rescaling. It is a fascinating study in its own right, but also an invaluable data set for scholars of comparative government and politics.’

*Michael Keating, Professor of Politics, University of Aberdeen*

‘This book is a must for any scholar, student and politician who want to know more about how governments are structured. It combines cutting-edge methodology with the authors’ deep knowledge of regions.’

*Beate Kohler-Koch, Professor at the International Graduate School of the Social Sciences, Bremen*

‘The Regional Authority Index will shape debates and analysis in the field of regional governance and decentralization for years to come. This book is its definitive exposition and offers a unique rich source for understanding cross-national variation in the role of subnational government.’

*Edward C. Page, Sidney and Beatrice Webb Professor of Public Policy, London School of Economics*

‘This is by far the most thorough attempt to measure the powers of regional governments in a large sample of countries. Given the growing importance of regional authorities around the world, it is a timely contribution to the literature, and the careful documentation of coding decisions will make it a valuable resource to scholars for years to come.’

*Jonathan Rodden, Associate Professor in Political Science, Stanford University*

‘For years, the study of political decentralization has been bedeviled by the paucity of credible, precise measures of how authority is divided among the various levels within the world’s states. In a book sure to become a vital resource for empirical scholars, Hooghe, Marks, and Schakel provide the most meticulous measures available of regional powers in the largest countries. A model of transparency and attention to nuance, the book synthesizes and transcends previous scholarship in this area, and offers the most compelling portrait to date of the current trend towards regional autonomy.’

*Daniel Treisman, Professor of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles*

The study of decentralized governance, multi-level politics and regional governance is of mounting importance in a broad swath of the social sciences. To date, researchers have been stuck with very dissatisfying public finance data from the IMF, horrible indicators from the Polity data set and sundry other sources of dubious value. This book fills a gaping hole in that literature.

*Erik Wibbels, Duke University*



# The Rise of Regional Authority

Most countries around the globe have one or two levels of regional or intermediate government, yet we have little systematic idea of how much authority they wield or how this has changed over time.

This book measures and explains the formal authority of intermediate or regional government in 42 advanced democracies, including the 27 EU member states. It tracks regional authority on an annual basis from 1950 to 2006. The measure reveals wide variation both cross-sectionally and over time. The authors examine four influences – functional pressures, democratization, European integration, and identity – to explain regionalization over the past half-century.

This unique and comprehensive volume will be a vital resource for students and scholars of comparative politics, public administration and public management, federalism, democratization, nationalism, and multi-level governance.

**Liesbet Hooghe** is Zachary Taylor Smith Professor of Political Science at the University of North Carolina and is Chair in multilevel governance at VU Amsterdam.

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**The Rise of Regional Authority**  
A comparative study of 42 democracies

**Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, and  
Arjan H. Schakel**

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## Foreword

Governance is back on the political agenda. At the global level, co-operation is required to mitigate the world's most systemic crisis of the past eight decades, to tackle climate change, to address demographic changes, and to draft a roadmap for economic sustainability with new instruments that measure development beyond GDP. Transnational networking, effective co-operation, shared management, burden sharing, co-responsibility, openness, and integrated horizontal policy making are key notions in the effort to co-govern globalization.

The European Union has a great deal to offer in this respect, both in terms of the values it promotes and as an honest broker at the international level. The EU is well placed to do this because it embraces the rule of law and respects fundamental freedoms, human dignity, equality, and partnership. Since the design of its regional policy in the 1980s, the EU has made partnership legally binding, requiring member states to involve all levels of government together with socioeconomic actors (and recently also social partners) to reflect collectively on the development of a given territory.

The Maastricht Treaty of 1993 was a landmark. First, it made it possible for regional ministers to participate in Council meetings. Second, it enshrined the subsidiarity principle in primary law by stipulating (in Article 3b) that 'the Community shall take action . . . only if and in so far as the objectives . . . cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.' In addition to vertical subsidiarity among various levels of governance, horizontal subsidiarity is gaining in importance. This requires member states to take on board private and societal partners to pursue public objectives. Third, the EU's Committee of the Regions (CoR) was created. According to its mission statement, the CoR is the political assembly of regional and local representatives across the EU. It safeguards the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality so that European decisions are taken and implemented closer to the citizen. The CoR promotes multilevel governance in the European Union by involving territories, regions, cities, and municipalities in the EU policy cycle, thus encouraging deeper public participation. Its actions are motivated by the belief that co-operation between the European, national, regional, and local levels will build an ever closer Union.

It is my conviction that the European Union should be built in partnership. We need to abandon the pyramidal hierarchical approach which places Europe above member states, member states above regions, regions above cities and local communities. We need a new partnership to bridge the gap between Europe and its citizens. Regional and local politicians are also European politicians! They can be a bridge between Europe and its citizens.

Thanks to the innovative thinking of Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks – the founders of multilevel governance (MLG) – the concept has been introduced in the EU lexicon as a form of good governance. MLG refers to a multilevel and multi-actor paradigm. It does not challenge the sovereignty of states directly, but describes how a multilevel structure is being created by various actors at various levels. In other words, MLG removes the grey area between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. It is essentially multi-channelled: regions and cities ought to have the opportunity to choose freely which gateways they use to voice their concerns, ideas, and interests. This idea is closely related to participative democracy. As society becomes more pluralistic, so citizens wish to participate at various levels of government. Decision making is becoming more decentred, and top-down decisions are no longer acceptable. MLG offers an answer by conceptualizing how regions, cities, localities, and, ultimately, citizens, interconnect.

Today we can already identify several new instruments for MLG. One is the Covenant of Mayors. The Covenant expresses the commitment of 900 mayors across Europe to attain the EU's ambitious 20-20-20 climate change and energy goals. Seventy-five percent of Europe's energy consumption takes place in Europe's cities. The EU's ambitions can only be achieved together with Europe's mayors. Under the CoR's political leadership, Europe's Covenant of Mayors is co-ordinating with the US Conference of Mayors on the US Climate Protection Agreement, which mobilizes over 1,000 mayors from across the US. Since 2006, the CoR has supported the Lisbon Climate Change Monitoring Platform, which helps local and regional authorities in the EU acquire local climate knowledge and exchange good practice. Furthermore, the CoR will study opportunities for developing covenants in other policy areas – for example, on migration/integration or the Commission's new 2020 strategy to 'make the EU a smarter, greener social market'.

It is crucial to have regional and local politicians on board from the beginning of the decision-making process, not least because they are responsible for the implementation of international laws and supranational directives on the ground. They are the ones facing pollution, urban congestion, or waste management problems on a daily basis. They need to ensure that immigration and integration go hand in hand. They have to make growth and jobs happen. To provide the necessary political input, the CoR has recently adopted a White Paper on Multilevel Governance with concrete proposals for involving Europe's regions and cities in EU policy making. By creating a scoreboard for MLG, the committee can now monitor, on a three-year basis, the development of MLG within the EU. Hopefully this will lead to the

adoption of a European Charter on Multilevel Governance which would form the basis for inclusive European governance. This commitment is a perfectly logical extension of the CoR, which is itself an incarnation of multi-level governance.

I am against any form of overly strict delineation of competences, or *Kompetenz Abbachnung*. MLG is all about sharing competences, even sharing responsibilities, rather than partitioning competences. The legitimacy of the EU lies in its efficiency, its openness, its participation, accountability, effectiveness, delivery, and coherence. MLG strengthens each of these principles and guarantees their interconnectivity. In a Union of 27 member states (and probably even more in the future) the EU's community method is to be made more inclusive. The EU's open method of co-ordination should also be made more inclusive. There is good hope that the Commission's proposals on the EU's 20-20 Strategy will be based on MLG architecture. The European Parliament also advocates strengthening MLG in policies with a strong territorial impact. Besides, new strategies in relation to functional geographical areas clearly reflect an MLG logic, including for example the Baltic Sea Region Strategy recently adopted by the Council of Ministers. The EU Lisbon Treaty will only strengthen the case for MLG. Indeed, there is simply no other way forward than to involve local and regional representatives better, as well as the CoR, in EU decision making. I have been asked many times whether this represents a call for a 'Europe of regions' in place of a Europe of member states. My answer is that we need a 'Europe *with* regions, *with* cities, and *with* local authorities'.

These arguments are underpinned by the observation that regional authority is rising. In my opinion, this book by Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, and Arjan Schakel is the first scholarly publication that has succeeded in adequately measuring the level of regional authority, and they do this for more than 40 democracies over 50 years. The authors demonstrate that regions are on the rise not only in Europe, but in other parts of the world as well. This suggests that MLG is relevant for world governance. And the World Bank, the UN, and the OECD have all stressed this.

I hope that the CoR's reflections, developed in partnership with the academic world, on multilevel governance in the European Union can inspire other regional blocs. It may even help bring about a genuinely *open and inclusive system of world governance*. If we are to sustain our planet we have to act together: share responsibilities, exchange good practice, and engage all levels of government and socioeconomic partners. This is my vision of an increasingly interdependent, multi-polar and multi-actor world.

I am deeply grateful to the authors for providing politicians with a scholarly basis for promoting a multilevel governance-based world.

Luc Van den Brande  
*President of the Committee of the Regions of the European Union*



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# 1 Measuring regional authority

Mathematical statistics is concerned with the connection between inference and data. Measurement theory is concerned with the connection between data and reality. Both statistical theory and measurement theory are necessary to make inferences about reality.

(Sarle 1997)

The structure of government – the allocation of authority across general-purpose jurisdictions – is perceived to affect political participation, accountability, ethnic and territorial conflict, policy innovation, corruption, government spending, democratic stability, and the incidence of human rights abuse. It has proved easier to formulate hypotheses concerning these and other effects of government structure than to test their validity. Most empirical studies use quite sophisticated, often direct, measures for the phenomena that are said to be affected by government structure (e.g. conflict, participation, government spending), but rudimentary, often indirect, measures for government structure itself.

The most refined data on government structure are financial data provided by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). These data have been used to good effect, but they do not allow one to distinguish among levels of subnational government. Moreover, it is unclear whether or to what extent the authority of an institution is correlated with the amount of money it spends or raises. In several countries, as discussed below, the central state tells subnational governments not just how much they can spend, but on what they must spend it. Alongside these data are direct, but relatively crude, measures of the number of subnational levels, and categorizations, for example, of federal versus non-federal systems, whether or not subnational governments have residual powers, whether or not the central state can veto subnational decisions, whether or not subnational executives are elected, and whether or not subnational governments have revenue-raising authority.<sup>1</sup>

These measures have some serious limitations. They compress regional and local architecture into a centralization/decentralization dichotomy. Such

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measures tap the extent to which the national state monopolizes authority, but they do not tell us how government below the national level is structured. They conceive government within countries in unidimensional terms as the 'other', the '*not* central state'. Centralization/decentralization measures, no matter how accurate, are ill-suited for inquiry into the scale and structure of government below the national state.

Existing measures focus on the fundamental distinction between federal and non-federal countries, but are insensitive to variation among federal countries or among non-federal countries (Rodden 2004).<sup>2</sup> As a consequence, such measures are biased against temporal variation. Most measures estimate a constant for each country over the post-Second World War period or, where they score countries over time, detect little change.<sup>3</sup> This has not stopped social scientists from hypothesizing sources and consequences of institutional change, but it has meant that hypotheses about change have been evaluated against data for different countries at one point in time.<sup>4</sup>

Lack of refined data has undoubtedly reinforced the tendency to treat countries as units for comparison. Variation in subnational government is usually conceived as variation in types of national state: unitary versus federal, Northern versus Southern European, rationalist versus conservative, Napoleonic versus bottom up, with a sprinkling of additional categories such as limited federal, organic federal, or union state. Such categories can serve as useful shorthand, but they are too crude to guide comparison among regions within a country or comparison over time. Regional government varies among – and within – Spain, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Russia, Canada. Countries that are typically categorized as unitary, such as Portugal and Denmark, contain regions that exercise considerable self-rule. Each of these countries, and a great many others besides, has seen considerable reform in subnational government, but one would hardly know this if one examined the categories into which such countries are placed.

Our purpose is to examine variation among regional governments in the knowledge that this is not the same as variation among national states. Methodological nationalism – the presumption that national states are the natural unit for macro-comparison – is demonstrably inappropriate for government within and beyond national states (Jeffery and Wincott 2010; Piattoni 2010; Schmitter 2009).<sup>5</sup> Rather than characterize subnational variation by country type, this study disaggregates to the regional level, and provides both regional and country-wide data on an annual basis.

Our interest in the topic springs from a desire to know more about how governments are structured. At no time in recorded history has a single set of units monopolized authority. Large units – empires and states – have always been several jurisdictional layers deep, and most medium and even small units have not been uni-level. The resulting pattern is far from uniform. There appears to be massive variation – over historical time and cross-sectionally – in the shape of government.

How might one conceive such variation? Individuals are encompassed in

multiple jurisdictions operating at diverse territorial scales from the local to the global. Only in rare cases do borders intersect, so it makes sense to speak of levels or tiers. Government – the exercise of legitimate authority – is structured across multiple levels of non-intersecting jurisdictions. The number of such levels for most people living today is between three and seven, of which between one and five exist within their national state. All have one or two levels of local government and one, two, or three levels of intermediate or regional government below the national level.

Why this structure? Why have what appears to be a convoluted pattern of jurisdictions instead of a simpler set-up, the centralized national state? How does the territorial structure of government vary across time and place, and how might one generalize about it? These are fundamental and difficult questions that lie at the heart of a science of politics, and which have been taken up both by political philosophers, including Aristotle, Rousseau, and Althusius, and by political scientists, such as Karl Deutsch, Daniel Elazar, and Robert Dahl.

The purpose of this book is to measure the authority of intermediate or regional governments in 42 democracies or quasi-democracies on an annual basis over the period 1950–2006. Twenty-nine OECD countries, the 27 countries that are members of the European Union (20 of these are members of the OECD), plus Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Russia, and Serbia and Montenegro are covered.

This chapter defines the unit of analysis – the region – and conceptualizes authority as having two domains – self-rule and shared rule – which are disaggregated along eight dimensions. The following chapter operationalizes these dimensions and sets out rules for interpreting variation along them. The appendices detail coding decisions and provide tables with scores for regions and countries.

Much effort is devoted to laying all of this bare before the reader to maximize the possibility that measurement errors may be detected and corrected. This is all the more important because, until these observations are replicated by others, their reliability cannot be estimated. To what extent would a second, third, or *n*th expert arrive at scores similar to the ones presented here? This question cannot be answered here. What can be done, however, is to compare our observations with those in existing datasets, while making the coding explicit so that others may replicate, amend, or refute our decisions (Marks 2007).

Even when conventional statistical measures of reliability are available, it is worthwhile specifying measurement procedures as precisely as possible. In principle, as Wittgenstein and Lakatos agree, all measurements are questionable. Even a simple laboratory experiment, such as testing the tensile strength of a thread by placing an iron weight on it, cannot produce observations capable of irrefutably disconfirming a hypothesis (Lakatos 1970: 184ff.). Perhaps, Lakatos asks, a magnet or some hitherto unknown force in the ceiling affected the pull of the iron weight; perhaps the tensile strength of the

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thread depends on how moist it is; perhaps the scale for the iron weight was wrong; perhaps the thread did not break, but was only observed to break; perhaps the thread was not a thread, but a 'super-thread' with special properties. The scope for debating the validity of new evidence is no less great than the scope for adjusting a theory to cope with new evidence. However, as Adcock and Collier (2001: 531) note, some measurements are more questionable than others: 'At one extreme are concepts such as triangle, which are routinely understood in terms of a single conceptual systematization; at the other extreme are "contested concepts", such as democracy.' The measurement of regional authority is at least as difficult and contestable as that of democracy.

The implication, as Lakatos recognized, is that scientific observations do not stand in relation to scientific theories as judges to the accused, but are themselves cross-examined or otherwise 'put in the dock'. Observations, such as those made in this book, merely serve as one corner in 'three-cornered fights between experiment and rival theories' (Lakatos 1970: 115). Hence, it is worthwhile considering carefully the theoretical robustness of one's measurement assumptions and expose, rather than shield, one's conceptual decisions.

#### **Region as a unit of analysis**

The region is a rubbery concept stretching above and below the national state. The focus here is on subnational regions, but there is no generally accepted definition that will produce homogeneous units for cross-national comparison. The immediate task, then, is to conceptualize the region in a way that meets, as far as possible, normal linguistic usage while providing the researcher with a meaningful and unambiguous unit of analysis.

- A region refers to a *given territory* having a *single, continuous, and non-intersecting boundary*.
- Subnational regions are *intermediate* between local and national governments.
- A regional government is a *set of legislative and executive institutions responsible for authoritative decision making*.

For the purpose of this study, then, a regional government is the government of a *coherent territorial entity situated between the local and national levels with a capacity for authoritative decision making*.

This definition is a minimal one. It says nothing about the region as an economic, social, or cultural entity. Nor does it encompass possible sources of regional authority, such as regional mobilization, regional identity, or the degree of centralization or decentralization among political parties. We wish to facilitate empirical analysis of the causal relationships between these and regional authority, and so we seek to disentangle regional authority from its hypothesized sources.

Then there is the vexed issue of the possible existence of more than one level of regional government in a country. Local government and national government denote a lower and upper bound within which there may be more than one intermediate level. How does one determine which level is the regional? In previous work, Hooghe and Marks (2001) assessed the most authoritative level of regional government. But this is problematic, for it underestimates regional authority in countries where there are two or more regional levels. So this study encompasses all levels of government below the national level with an average population greater than 150,000.<sup>6</sup>

### **Authority as an aspect of political power**

We wish to measure the extent to which a regional government exercises formal authority. Here standard political science definitions serve our purpose well (Dahl 1968).

- *Formal authority* is authority exercised in relation to *explicit rules*, usually, but not necessarily, written in constitutions and in legislation.
- *Authority is legitimate power* – power recognized as binding because it is derived from accepted principles of governance.
- *Power* is the ability of *A* to get *B* to do something that *B* would not otherwise do.

The distinctions here are important, for the power exercised by a regional government may be different from its formal authority. Formal authority is only one ingredient in the ability of a regional government to exert power – i.e. to get its way in the face of opposition.

To evaluate formal authority, one must delve into the rules of the political game, and hence into constitutions, special statutes, and, in some cases, established norms. But a valid measure of formal authority would not tell us how much power a regional government was able to exert. To do this, one would also have to take into account party structure, partisanship, regional and national leadership, public opinion, and much else besides.

So the measure developed here is merely one step, though a necessary one, in evaluating hypotheses about how regional institutions shape political outcomes. Are the effects of regional authority for economic growth, democratic stability, political violence, or corruption intensified (or moderated) when political parties are decentralized (Riker 1964) or when regions are culturally distinct (Lijphart 1999)? Only by defining authority precisely can one create a conceptual terrain that does not confound empirical analysis of such questions.

### **Disaggregating regional authority**

A regional government has some degree of formal authority over certain actions in a particular jurisdiction. It is therefore necessary to specify (*A*) the

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*territory* over which a regional government exercises authority; (B) the *depth* of that authority; and (C) the *spheres of action* over which it exercises authority.

With respect to *territorial scope of authority* (A), a regional government may exercise authority in its regional jurisdiction or it may do so in the country as a whole. This is the distinction between self-rule and shared rule, and it provides the conceptual frame for this study.

The distinction was coined by Elazar:

When all is said and done, federalism involves the combination of self-rule and shared rule, an arrangement where two or more peoples or polities find it necessary and desirable to live together within some kind of constitutional framework that will allow all the parties to preserve their respective integrities while securing peace and stability through power-sharing in those spheres where it is necessary.

(Elazar 1991b: 8; see also Elazar 1987)

Regional self-rule is the capacity of a regional government to exercise authority autonomously over those who live in its territory. Shared rule is the capacity to co-determine the exercise of authority for the country as a whole.

The distinction is useful because self-rule and shared rule encompass the concept of authority, yet take us an important step closer to the ground – that is, to institutional characteristics that can be empirically evaluated. Moreover, the concepts of self-rule and shared rule travel well; they can be applied across a wide range of countries and historical periods without loss of connotative precision. While Elazar believed that ‘the very essence of federation as a particular form of union is self-rule plus shared rule’, he applied the distinction to ‘federations, confederations, unions, asymmetrical arrangements such as federacies and associated states, nonterritorial consociations, leagues, joint functional authorities, and condominiums’ (Watts 2000: 155; see also Galligan 2008).

Self-rule and shared rule inform the study of federalism, decentralization, and subnational authority. Describing the evolution of federal studies in the post-war period, Watts writes that the ‘federal solution came to be regarded as the way of reconciling simultaneous desires for large political units required to build a dynamic modern state and smaller self-governing political units recognizing distinct identities’ (Watts 2007: 5). Riker (1964) conceives federalism as an institutional bargain in which political communities seek military security in joint governance while safeguarding their autonomy in other spheres. Bednar (2008) unpacks federal structure in three elements: geopolitical division (shared rule based on constitutional guarantees), independence, and shared direct governance (self-rule).

This two-pronged conception of authority taps the basic difference between federal and non-federal systems. Regions in federal systems, as noted in Chapter 4, are distinguished by the extent to which they exercise

both self- and shared rule. But the two are independent: many regions can exert considerable authority in their own domain, but little beyond. Lane and Ersson's (1999) index of institutional autonomy or decentralization and Loughlin's (2000) dimensions of regionalization are attuned to self-rule.<sup>7</sup> Braun (2000) coins the notions of the 'right to decide' (whether a regional government can decide *what* will be done) and the 'right to act' (whether it can decide *how* it will be done) to distinguish between legislative and executive self-rule.<sup>8</sup>

Disaggregating authority into the domains of self-rule and shared rule has the virtue of being conservative; it sits squarely on accepted practice in the fields of federalism and decentralization and is consistent with both functional and political theories of regional authority.

*Depth of authority (B)* refers to the extent to which a government exercises authority that is not constrained by that of other governments and, hence, its relative capacity to make binding decisions. A regional government normally exerts authority in conjunction with, and often in subordination to, the central government, whether in the region or in the country as a whole. One needs, therefore, to evaluate both the extent to which a regional government has an independent executive and legislature (self-rule) and its capacity to co-determine national policy (shared rule), for example, through intergovernmental meetings or a territorial second chamber.

Finally, a government exerts authority over certain *spheres of action (C)*. This is the scope of authority, the portfolio of policies over which authority is exercised. Four policy areas are of particular importance: provision of financial resources, authority over citizenship, exercise of legitimate coercion, and control of the rules of the game. Provision of financial resources depends on a regional government's capacity to tax those living in the region or to claim a share of national taxation. Authority over citizenship allows a government to determine membership of the community and, along with the exercise of legitimate coercion, to constitute the core of (national) sovereignty. Control of the rules of the game – constitutional powers – is the capacity of a government to project authority into the future.

### **Dimensions of regional authority**

These conceptual distinctions provide a frame for disaggregating regional authority into operational dimensions. The institutional expressions of self-rule and shared rule are as different in practice as they are in principle. Table 1.1 lays out four dimensions that summarize regional authority in the region itself and four dimensions that summarize regional authority in the country as a whole.

Self-rule refers to the authority of a regional government in its own terrain. One needs, therefore, to assess the extent to which the regional government is independent from central domination and the scope and character of its authority. Accordingly, self-rule is operationalized as the extent to

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which a regional government has the authority to act autonomously, the scope of its policy competencies, its capacity to tax, and the extent to which it has an independent legislature and executive. Shared rule depends on the capacity of a regional government to shape national decision making. National decision making is disaggregated across four areas: normal legislation, executive policy, taxation, and constitutional reform.

These dimensions are responses to the question ‘How might one disaggregate the abstract quality – regional authority – so that one might estimate it by observing variation among regions across a wide range of societies?’ On the one hand, we seek to encompass what is meant by regional authority; on the other, we seek to disaggregate the concept into dimensions that can be separately assessed. The eight dimensions listed in Table 1.1 are designed to be simple – that is, unidimensional – and observable. Each dimension represents a distinct and interpretable phenomenon that co-varies with regional authority. The Cronbach’s alpha across the eight dimensions for 42 countries in 2006 is 0.94, which suggests that the dimensions can be interpreted as indicators of a single latent construct. Principal components analysis indicates that around 70 per cent of the variance across the dimensions is shared. As one would expect, and as Table 1.2 confirms, the dimensions hang together as

*Table 1.1* Dimensions of regional authority

<i>Self-rule</i>	<i>The authority exercised by a regional government over those who live in its territory</i>	
Institutional depth	The extent to which a regional government is autonomous rather than deconcentrated	0–3
Policy scope	The range of policies for which a regional government is responsible	0–4
Fiscal autonomy	The extent to which a regional government can independently tax its population	0–4
Representation	The extent to which a regional government is endowed with an independent legislature and executive	0–4
<i>Shared rule</i>	<i>The authority exercised by a regional government or its representatives in the country as a whole</i>	
Law making	The extent to which regional representatives co-determine national legislation	0–2
Executive control	The extent to which a regional government co-determines national policy in intergovernmental meetings	0–2
Fiscal control	The extent to which regional representatives co-determine the distribution of national tax revenues	0–2
Constitutional reform	The extent to which regional representatives co-determine constitutional change	0–3

Table 1.2 Factor analysis of regional authority

Components	Single-factor solution	Two-factor solution:	
		Self-rule	Shared rule
Institutional depth	0.89	<b>0.96</b>	0.62
Policy scope	0.92	<b>0.96</b>	0.70
Fiscal autonomy	0.87	<b>0.85</b>	0.71
Representation	0.83	<b>0.96</b>	0.53
Law making	0.85	0.60	<b>0.95</b>
Executive control	0.70	0.60	<b>0.68</b>
Fiscal control	0.85	0.61	<b>0.94</b>
Constitutional reform	0.79	0.55	<b>0.89</b>
Eigenvalue	5.61	4.87	4.70
Chi-squared	353.4	353.4	
Explained variance (%)	70.2	82.8	
Factor correlation		0.64	

Note: Principal components factor analysis, oblimin non-orthogonal rotation, listwise deletion;  $n = 42$  (country scores in 2006). For the two-factor solution, the highest score for each dimension is in bold.

self-rule and shared rule. These are the only constructs having an eigenvalue greater than 1.

### Levels of measurement

Measurement level is not a fixed attribute of a particular dataset, but depends on the purpose to which it is put. The index proposed here can be used

- as an ordinal measure of regional authority;
- as an interval measure of regional authority;
- as an absolute measure of institutional reform.

Authority, like most concepts in political science, has no natural unit of measurement. While we conceive authority as an interval variable, we measure it by rank. If one were to limit inference to *permissible transformations*, i.e. transformations that do not alter the meaning of the measurements, one would be able to make inferences about more or less authority on each dimension while refraining from inferences about relative amounts of authority within or across the dimensions (Stevens 1946).

What would one know, if one knew only that authority varies for each region along eight dimensions scaled as ranks progressing up from the lowest? Would observations aggregate in such a way as to allow (a) statements about change over time, such as ‘Belgian *provincies* have less authority in 2006 than in 1950’, or (b) cross-sectional statements, such as ‘In 2006, Canadian provinces had more authority than US states’?

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That is to say, are observations *wellordered* across time and cross-sectionally? If a set is *wellordered*, any two elements describe *more* or *less* in a coherent way. A set is (*totally*) *wellordered* if its elements can be arranged in a unique rank order which is isomorphic to a unique ordinal number and every non-empty subset has a least member. So, looking at the index, it is permissible to say that Belgian provinces have lost authority from 1950 to 2006, but not that Canadian provinces have more authority than US states.

*Wellordered* sets are ones in which the eight dimensions hang together. The dataset consists of observations along eight dimensions for 89 units (regional tiers, asymmetrical regions, special autonomous regions) in 42 countries for up to 56 years. When we treat the scores on all dimensions for a single region over all years as a set, 80 of the 89 regions form *wellordered* sets – that is, sets where every subset (the eight dimensions) can be permissibly transformed into a simple rank order.<sup>9</sup> One may also check for *wellorder* across dyads at one point in time. Appendix B reveals that *wellorder* is rare in dyads of strong regions, such as the German *Länder* and the Swiss cantons. Here one is dealing with different combinations of self-rule and shared rule, not with Russian dolls that fit into each other. But *wellorder* is common among other dyads. Of the 3,828 dyads of regions in 2006 ( $n = 88$ ; excluding countries with no regional tier, but including special autonomous regions), 66.9 per cent are *wellordered*.<sup>10</sup>

One can transform the ordinal scales into a summated rating scale by combining the scores across the dimensions. On the hypothesis that the ordinal categories represent equal intervals and that error is randomly distributed, the eight dimensions can be summed to a 24-point regional authority index (Appendix B).<sup>11</sup> The index is correlated strongly with an interval measure derived from principal component analysis ( $R = 0.989$ ).<sup>12</sup> This study reports composite index scores on the grounds that they are readily interpretable and express our intention to devise roughly equivalent intervals across dimensions of regional authority.

One cannot escape the fact that our weighting of dimensions is debatable and that we are likely to have made mistakes along the way. So it is useful to try to evaluate the difference our choices make. How much would country scores change if the relative weights of shared rule and self-rule were reversed? How sensitive is the measure to its individual components?

When the data are transformed to interval data, the eight dimensions hang together quite tightly. The Cronbach's alpha (0.94 for 2006) suggests that the index is robust across alternative weightings of its components. When the weights assigned to self-rule and shared rule are reversed, the rank order among regions in 2006 is robust, yielding a Spearman's rho of 0.99 ( $n = 85$ ). Figure 1.1 plots correlations using interval data and shows that the index is robust across alternative weights for self-rule and shared rule.

Finally, the measure can be used as an instrument to detect reform of regional authority. If we define a reform as a change along one of the dimensions for a region or regional level, 384 reforms in 89 regional units are




Figure 1.1 Robustness of regional authority index across alternative weights for shared rule and self-rule.

Note: Calculations are for 2006;  $n = 42$ . The Regional Authority Index weighs self-rule to shared rule in the ratio of 5:3. Spearman's rho is calculated on the ordinal scores, and Pearson's r is calculated on the interval scores.

observed since 1950. If we define a reform as the set of changes along one or more dimensions for a particular region or regional level that take place in a given year, 157 reforms are observed. If we aggregate further to define a reform as the set of changes along one or more dimensions for one or more regional units in a country in a given year, 81 reforms are observed in the dataset. The unit of analysis may vary with the research question, but in each case the level of measurement is absolute.

### *Plan of the book*

The purpose of the following two chapters is to detail the measurement instrument and to develop a set of procedures that may have more general application. Chapter 2 outlines coding schemes for each dimension of regional authority and sets out rules for interpreting ambiguous cases. This is where the measure hits the road, so to speak, and where, as a consequence, the reader will find the explanation of how abstract coding categories can be applied meaningfully across diverse contexts.

Chapter 3 compares the regional authority index (RAI) with seven alternative measures and finds that a common factor underlies the measures.

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Deviation between the index and other measures appears to reflect the fact that the index measures regional authority rather than subnational authority in general, and that it is more sensitive in detecting variation among federations, among non-federations, and among different types of regions within a country.

The concluding chapter theorizes the remarkable increase of regional authority in many countries since 1950 and examines its cross-national and temporal variation.

The appendices consist of detailed documentation of regional reforms in 42 countries over 56 years (Appendix A) and a summary of the coding scheme followed by tables with scores for dimensions, regions, and countries over time (Appendix B).

## 2 Operationalizing regional authority

This chapter sets out a coding scheme for regional authority in 42 developed countries for the period 1950–2006 and applies the scheme to cases that raise coding issues.

Two challenges confront a researcher who wishes to measure regional authority. The first is to navigate from the abstract to the particular. Despite its centrality to political science, authority is an abstract quality that cannot be measured directly. The art of measurement is to disaggregate the abstract concept in such a way that variation on each of its parts (or dimensions) can be reliably evaluated, while sustaining the meaning of the concept. Each step along the way – breaking the concept down into domains, summarizing each domain in a limited number of dimensions, operationalizing the dimensions as rating scales, and, finally, coding cases on these scales – is a step from the abstract to the particular.

A second, related, challenge is to ‘seek a middle ground between a universalizing tendency, which is inattentive to contextual differences, and a particularizing approach, which is skeptical about the feasibility of constructing measures that transcend specific contexts’ (Adcock and Collier 2001: 530). Each case is, in certain respects, unique, yet the purpose here is to score them against a common rubric. This is a tension noted by Weber and diagnosed by Sartori: extending a concept to a greater range of cases by scaling the ladder of abstraction risks connotative imprecision (Sartori 1970; Weber 1949). Here, the challenge is to specify institutional possibilities that have similar connotations for the extent of authority across different contexts.

As detailed in the previous chapter, regional authority is conceived here as having two domains. Self-rule refers to the authority of a regional government over those living in the region. Shared rule refers to the authority a regional government (co-)exercises in the country as a whole. Each is estimated along four dimensions or scales which describe institutional alternatives, and each of these dimensions is in turn specified by three to five items. The items are designed to capture abstract dimensions summarizing the master concept of regional authority, to refer to observable states of the world, and to be unambiguous in their application to particular cases.

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A coding scheme, i.e. a list of items arranged on a limited number of scales, should be intersubjective so that experts can understand and apply it in a consistent way to arrive at convergent observations. However, coding particular cases will usually involve expert judgement, no matter how carefully an item is formulated. Expert coding cannot be reduced to an algorithm, but involves disciplined conceptual problem solving as well as detailed knowledge about the cases themselves. This chapter engages these issues and provides a hands-on guide to the coding scheme.

### Self-rule

#### *Institutional depth*

We conceive institutional depth as a continuous dimension ranging from no autonomy from the central government to complete autonomy. The latter is a conceptual, but not an empirical, possibility. The variation is mostly at the lower end of the scale and the intervals are spaced accordingly.

We distinguish four categories. The first is a null category where there is no functioning general-purpose regional administration. The second is described by the Napoleonic term *déconcentration*, which refers to a regional administration that is hierarchically subordinate to central government. A deconcentrated regional administration has the paraphernalia of self-governance – buildings, personnel, a budget – but is a central government outpost. The final two categories distinguish among regional administrations that exercise meaningful authority. The more self-governing a regional government, the more its relationships with the central government are lateral rather than hierarchical. The fundamental distinction here is whether regional self-government is, or is not, subject to central government veto.

#### *Box 2.1* Institutional depth

<b>0:</b>	No functioning general-purpose administration at the regional level.
<b>1:</b>	A deconcentrated, general-purpose administration.
<b>2:</b>	A non-deconcentrated, general-purpose administration subject to central government veto.
<b>3:</b>	A non-deconcentrated, general-purpose administration not subject to central government veto.

To score more than 0, a region must have a functioning administration. Purely statistical regions do not reach the bar. Hence, the statistical category of *riksområden* in Sweden scores 0. For Hungary, the eight statistical regions, *tervezési-statisztikai régiók*, score 1 only from 1999, when they were reformed into deconcentrated administrations, even though they had been around since 1996 as statistical regions. Statistical regions were created in several EU

countries in order to be eligible for EU structural funding, and only a subset of these (Hungary, Ireland, Romania) evolved into functioning administrations that score 1 or more.

To score more than 0, a region must also be general-, not special-purpose. Regional administrations responsible only for a single policy (e.g. the environment or schooling) score 0. Dutch *waterschappen* (water boards) are an example of a special-purpose jurisdiction, set up to handle a particular problem in a country that lies mainly below sea level.<sup>1</sup>

England and Wales illustrate the distinction between special- and general-purpose government. Regions in England score 0 from 1950 to 1993. Whitehall ministries continued to use their own regional boundaries after a reform in 1964 setting up deconcentrated regions. Until 1979, when they became merely statistical categories, regions in England were special-, not general-purpose. In the late 1980s the government began concentrating functions within consistent boundaries, culminating in 1994 with the creation of deconcentrated general-purpose administrations, which score 1. Wales, by contrast, was treated as a coherent region from 1964, when the secretary of state for Wales headed a general-purpose administration prior to devolution.

Several countries shift from special- to general-purpose regional governments. A 1974 reform in New Zealand replaced special-purpose with general-purpose regions, as did the 1994 reform in England. Irish development regions, set up in 1987, are considered as general purpose: while their primary function was to channel EU structural funds, they also co-ordinated local government activities on behalf of the central government. They were replaced in 1994 with self-governing regional authorities. Regions in Slovakia traverse the first three categories of the scale, going from 0 in 1993, to 1 in 1996, to 2 in 2002. The fall of communism had de-legitimized existing regional governments. In Slovakia, as in some other post-communist regimes, regional governments were abolished initially, then reconstituted as deconcentrated central agents, and, finally, converted to decentralized governments.

Scores at the upper end of this dimension reflect the distinction between regional administrations subject and not subject to central government veto. This turns on whether a region has legally enforceable protection against central government *ex ante* and *ex post* control. Such is the case when regional and central law have equal constitutional status. Federalism is the most common institutional expression of this, but it is neither sufficient nor necessary. Russia is normally categorized as a federation, but since 2000 the president has had authority to dissolve *subwekty* parliaments and dismiss their governments if they disobey federal law. The UK is not a federation, but a secretary of state can refuse to submit a bill from the Scottish Parliament for royal assent only if it has 'an adverse effect on the operation of the law as it applies to reserved matters' or is 'incompatible with any international obligations or the interests of defence or national security' (Scotland Act, Article 35, para.1).

***Policy scope***

Policy scope taps regional authority over policy making. We group policies into three areas: economic, cultural-educational, and welfare:

- economic policy encompasses regional development, public utilities, transport including roads, environment, energy;
- cultural-educational policy encompasses schools, universities, vocational training, libraries, sports and cultural centres;
- welfare policy encompasses health, hospitals, social welfare (e.g. elderly homes, poor relief, social care), pensions, social housing.

These categories aggregate diverse policy responsibilities specified in constitutions and legislation.<sup>2</sup> We differentiate among regional governments that exercise authority in none, one, or more than one of these policy areas.

If more than one policy area, we evaluate whether a regional government also exercises constitutive or coercive authority, i.e. authority that lies close to the core of state sovereignty. Does the regional government control the police? Is it responsible for the organization of local government? Does it exercise residual powers – i.e. is the regional government responsible for policies that are not constitutionally mandated for the central government? Can the regional government determine its own institutional set-up, including, for example, the timing of regional elections and electoral rules?

The final category taps whether a regional government co-exercises authority over membership in its community, i.e. in immigration and citizenship policies. Authority over who can be a member of a self-governing community is conceptually prior to authority over the provision of collective goods to that community. In most countries these competencies are ‘fundamental sovereign attributes’,<sup>3</sup> and it is expected that regions which meet this high hurdle will also meet the criteria for category three.

This dimension estimates the range of policies for which regional governments make authoritative decisions. So we discount policy responsibilities that are not exercised independently by regional governments. Central control can take three forms: a dual structure of regional government in the form of parallel administrations (e.g. *landsting* and *länsstyrelse* in Sweden; *kraje* and *samospravne kraje* in Slovakia); a mixed administration (e.g. a directly elected assembly and government-appointed executive, as in *départements* in France); and a single administration that combines self-government and deconcentration (e.g. *provincies* in the Netherlands).

In Sweden, for example, responsibilities for governing counties (*län*) are divided between elected councils (*landstinge*) and centrally appointed governors. Until 1970, *landstinge* were responsible for the provision of health care (including hospitals and outpatient centres) and had secondary responsibilities for agricultural, craft, and industrial training. Thus, *län* are scored as exercising authority for welfare, but not for economic policy (= 1). In 1971,

## Box 2.2 Policy scope

<b>0:</b>	The regional government does not have authoritative competence over economic policy, cultural-educational policy, or welfare policy.
<b>1:</b>	The regional government has authoritative competence in <i>one</i> of the following areas: economic policy, cultural-educational policy, welfare policy.
<b>2:</b>	The regional government has authoritative competencies in <i>at least two</i> of the following areas: economic policy, cultural-educational policy, welfare policy.
<b>3:</b>	The regional government meets the criteria for <b>2</b> and is endowed with at least <i>two</i> of the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• residual powers</li> <li>• regional police force</li> <li>• authority over own institutional set-up</li> <li>• authority over local government.</li> </ul>
<b>4:</b>	The regional government meets the criteria for <b>3</b> and has authority over immigration or citizenship.

*landstinge* were given responsibility for regional development and public transport, and these are scored as having competence in economic policy in addition to welfare (= 2).

The balance between self-government and deconcentration frequently changes over time. From the 1950s, Dutch *provincies* shared authority with local governments in transport, infrastructure, investment policy, and regional planning, and are scored 1 for economic policy. In the 1970s and 1980s they gained competencies in urban development, housing, culture and leisure, and environmental planning, but these were subject to central supervision. The *provincies* continue to score 1 until a 1994 reform released them from *ex ante* central oversight, from which time they score 2. After 1948, Italian *province* shared control for spatial planning, the environment, highways, education, local economic development, and labour market policies with a government-appointed prefect, and they score 1. Following the 2001 reform, which stripped prefects of policy-making competencies except law and order, emergency powers and *ex post* legal oversight, *province* score 2.

Many regional governments execute aspects of immigration or citizenship policy on behalf of central governments, but few have significant legislative authority on one area, let alone both. Six regions in our dataset meet this criterion: the Australian states, the Canadian provinces, Åland, the entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the two republics of the federation/confederation Serbia-Montenegro, and the Swiss cantons.

While the US constitution grants states some authority to regulate the conduct of ‘aliens’, immigration and naturalization are exclusive federal competencies, and US states score 3 on this dimension. In Canada, immigration is concurrent between provinces and the federal government, except for

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Quebec, which has exclusive competence. Provinces can impose economic criteria to select prospective immigrants; the federal government checks the statutory requirements – health, security, and authenticity of documents – before issuing a Canada immigration visa. This earns Canadian provinces (and Yukon) a score of 4.

The Åland Islands score 4 since the Åland government has exclusive authority to determine right of domicile in the islands. Right of domicile, which allows a Finnish citizen to vote, stand for election, purchase, lease, or inherit property, or open a business on the islands, is granted by the Åland government to all individuals with a parent who has the right of domicile and to others on a case-by-case basis. Finnish citizens who have lived in Åland for five years and have an adequate knowledge of Swedish may apply for the status.

### ***Fiscal autonomy***

No measures of regional authority appear as promising as public spending and tax revenues. None are more complex and deceiving (Rodden 2004; Treisman 2007). The problems one confronts in using these data as proxies for regional authority are that the absolute amount or share of public spending or tax revenues does not tell us a great deal about how much discretion a subnational government exercises; the available OECD and IMF data cover a limited number of countries and few time points; and these data are not broken down by level of government.

The first problem is more serious than one might imagine. Regional governments that spend a large proportion of public funds include several that have little choice about how they spend. Welfare benefits in Scandinavian societies are determined at the central level for the country as a whole but are channelled mainly through subnational authorities, which are best placed to implement the policy in local contexts. Political economists have long described Scandinavian societies as neocorporatist to highlight the role of centralized producer groups in bargaining national public policy. Subnational authorities in these countries spend a lot because they implement expansive welfare systems which are determined at the national level.<sup>4</sup>

So it is not surprising that a league table of subnational public expenditure as a share of the total expenditure has Denmark at the very top, and Sweden, Norway, and Finland above Germany, Austria, Belgium, Italy, or Spain.<sup>5</sup> On both conceptual and face-validity grounds, it makes little sense to use subnational public spending as a measure of subnational authority.<sup>6</sup>

Subnational tax revenues as a share of general government revenues – defined by the OECD as tax-sharing agreements, excluding transfers received from other levels of government – do not do much better because the amount does not tell us which government decides on the level and composition of revenues. Central governments are induced to shift responsibility for collecting taxes to subnational governments, while severely limiting their

discretion. As our discussion of the fundamental distinction between deconcentrated and decentralized government suggests, it is one thing to receive taxes, it is another to *decide* about taxes.<sup>7</sup> Measures of the amount or proportion of subnational taxes are only weakly correlated with measures of tax authority or tax discretion.<sup>8</sup>

Our cure is to assess a regional government's fiscal authority independently of its revenues or spending. We draw on the OECD's schema for evaluating subnational government discretion over revenue. This schema distinguishes two notions of authority (control independent from central government and shared rule with central government) and three areas of control (tax base, tax rate, and revenue split) (OECD 1999).

We simplify the schema in three ways to produce (a) an annual (not decennial) measure, (b) for particular levels of government (not aggregated across all subnational levels) that (c) is conceptually close to the thing to be measured – i.e. authority on fiscal matters. We assess a regional government's tax portfolio as a whole by distinguishing between major and minor taxes and, within these, between the capacity to control base and rate or rate only.<sup>9</sup> Here, we estimate a regional government's capacity to determine its revenues unilaterally (self-rule), and below we estimate a regional government's ability to influence the distribution of national revenues as one component of shared rule.

#### Box 2.3 Fiscal autonomy

<b>0:</b>	The central government sets the base and rate of all regional taxes.
<b>1:</b>	The regional government sets the rate of minor taxes.
<b>2:</b>	The regional government sets the base and rate of minor taxes.
<b>3:</b>	The regional government sets the rate of at least one major tax: personal income, corporate, value added, or sales tax.
<b>4:</b>	The regional government sets the base and rate of at least one major tax: personal income, corporate, value added, or sales tax.

Fiscal authority is operationalized as tax autonomy, co-decision on national tax regimes, and intergovernmental grants (Swenden 2006). It does not include a region's authority to set fees or charges in return for specific services, such as fees for the preparation or deposit of official documents, bus charges, public utility fees, etc., which nearly always make up a negligible part of a regional budget. Thus, when Greek *nomoi* gained the capacity in 1998 to set fees and charge for transport and other services, they retained a score of 0. The Greater London Authority scores 1 because it is able to levy a property tax for which it can set rates (but not the base), not because it can determine tube or bus fares or because it introduced a congestion charge for cars in central London.

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Intergovernmental grant systems are considered in estimating fiscal shared rule (see below) to the extent that they are negotiated (*ad hoc*, as part of the annual budget process, or in the context of constitutional bargaining). If intergovernmental grants are determined by the central government, they are a constraint on, rather than a source of, regional authority and are scored 0.

### **Representation**

We conceive regional authority with respect to representation as the capacity of regional actors to select regional office holders: in the case of legislators, by direct election in the region or, failing that, indirect election by subnational office holders; in the case of an executive, by the regional assembly or, failing that, a mixed system of a regional/central dual executive.

#### *Box 2.4* Representation

<i>Assembly</i>	
<b>0:</b>	The region has no regional assembly.
<b>1:</b>	The region has an indirectly elected regional assembly.
<b>2:</b>	The region has a directly elected assembly.
<i>Executive</i>	
<b>0:</b>	The regional executive is appointed by central government.
<b>1:</b>	Dual executives are appointed by central government and the regional assembly.
<b>2:</b>	The regional executive is appointed by a regional assembly or is directly elected.

An assembly is defined as a self-standing institution with a fixed membership using parliamentary procedures to make decisions. This encompasses all regional assemblies that call themselves such, and excludes ‘committees’, which are subordinate bodies. Therefore we give a score of 0 to grand committees composed of Scottish, Welsh, or Northern Irish members of the House of Commons who meet as caucuses to discuss bills affecting their regions.

We code the predominant principle in regional assemblies, where some legislators are directly elected and some indirectly elected. Hence, Hungarian regional councils score 0 because a majority of their members are central government appointees, while Romanian regional councils score 1 because subnational appointees predominate and, unlike central appointees, can vote on regional legislation.

Indirectly elected assemblies are scored 1 when the selectors are subnational. In most cases these selectors are local governments or local government assemblies, but in Belgium and France the selectors represent

constituencies within each region, though at the national level. In Belgium, regional and community councils consisted until 1995 of national parliamentarians elected for the relevant region (Flanders/Wallonia/Brussels) or community (French/Dutch speaking). From 1972 to 1981, regional councils in France were composed of all nationally elected politicians from the region alongside indirectly elected representatives from subnational governments.

We define an executive as a decision-making body that has the task of putting laws into effect, and we assess whether the head of a regional executive is appointed by central government, the regional government, or both. The last category, the dual executive, characterizes French *départements* and *régions*, Belgian *provincies*, Swedish *län*, Danish *amter*, Slovakian *kraje*, Romanian *judete*, Norwegian *fylke*, and Dutch *provincies*. In these cases, the central government appoints a prefect or governor alongside a regionally appointed executive. While the regional/central balance varies, each is plainly different from the pure case of an executive selected by the centre or by the region alone.<sup>10</sup>

The intermediate category encompasses only cases where it is meaningful to speak of a dual executive – that is, where both the central and the regional appointees have executive authority. In Canada, provincial heads responsible to regional legislatures shared some authority with lieutenant-governors, but the role of the lieutenant-governor was mainly ceremonial and too weak to be considered as diluting the executive power of the provincial head, and therefore too weak to compromise their score of 2 on the index.<sup>11</sup>

As noted above, we code formal authority, not power in a more general sense.

The two diverge most where formal rules tend to be mere formalities, as for regions in contemporary Russia. Russian *subwekty federacii* score 2 on assembly and 0 for executive from 1993 to 1995, 2 and 2 from 1996 to 2004, and 2 and 1 from 2005 to 2006. The changes correspond to Yeltsin's decision in 1996 to allow governors to be directly elected instead of appointed by Moscow, and Putin's decision in 2005 to replace direct election with a system where the president proposes a candidate to each regional legislature. The new system is scored as dual government, since control over the executive is shared by central and regional government and is clearly different from the communist system of centrally appointed governors. We do not control for pressures that the centre is able to exert on regional legislatures to rubber-stamp its choices.

The scoring scheme is responsive to change over time, as in Belgium, where the Flemish-, Walloon-, and German-speaking communities score 0 on both assembly and executive representation in 1970 and end up with the maximum on both measures by 1995. Their different paths are reflected in the scoring. The Flemish and French communities acquired indirectly elected assemblies in 1970 (scoring 1 on assembly), then a regionally responsive executive in 1980 (2 on executive), and, finally, a directly elected assembly in 1995 (2 on assembly). The German community gained a popularly elected

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assembly in 1974 (2 on assembly) and control over its executive in 1984 (2 on executive).

### **Shared rule**

A regional government may exercise authority by co-determining decision making at the national level. We distinguish four avenues. First, a region may participate directly in making national law. This requires that it is represented in the national legislature, usually in the upper chamber. Second, a regional government may share executive responsibility with the national government for implementing policy in the region or in the country as a whole. Third, a region may co-determine the distribution of tax revenues in the country as a whole. Finally, and most importantly, a regional government may exercise authority over the constitutional set-up in the country.

The first, second, and third avenues of power sharing concern the role that regions play in national decision making, and each scores a maximum of 2 points; the final avenue concerns the extent to which regions write the rules of the game, and this scores up to 3 points.

### ***Law making***

The variation to be detected here concerns the role of regions in national legislation. The items on this dimension assess whether regions, *qua* regions, are represented in a chamber of the national legislature, whether regional representatives constitute a majority in that chamber, and whether the regionally constituted chamber has authority to veto ordinary legislation.

If there is a legislative arena in which regions and their governments directly influence national law, it is usually the upper, or second, chamber of the national legislature. Most upper chambers came to serve as bulwarks against one man (one person), one vote. They represented groups that had traditional claims to authority, i.e. lords temporal and spiritual or territorial communities that existed prior to the state. Whereas several upper chambers that survived liberal democracy represent territorial communities – most commonly regions – representation in lower chambers is almost always based on the principle of individual representation. In the dataset, there is only one exception: the short-lived unicameral parliament of Serbia-Montenegro (2003–6).

Regions can shape a legislature in two ways: regions may frame the principle of representation, or regional governments themselves may be directly represented in the legislature. The first is epitomized in the US Senate, where each state, irrespective of population, has two senators. In most cases, the regional principle produces disproportionality from the perspective of one citizen, one vote, but this is not necessarily the case. The distribution of seats in the House of Peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina looks proportional, but this is produced by rules for ethnic representation. The Federation of Bosnia and

## Box 2.5 Law making

<b>0.5</b> is scored for each of the following characteristics; aggregate scores range between 0 and 2:	
•	Regions are the unit of representation in the legislature – i.e. the distribution of representation is determined by regional weights rather than ‘one citizen, one vote’ in the country as a whole.
•	Regional governments designate representatives in the legislature.
•	Regions at a given level have majority representation in the legislature. <sup>a</sup>
•	A legislature with regional representation has extensive legislative authority – i.e. it can veto ordinary legislation or it can be overridden only by a supermajority in the other chamber. <sup>a</sup>

Note: <sup>a</sup>Evaluated if at least one of the first two conditions is met.

Herzegovina (with around 65 per cent of the total population) has ten seats; the Republika Srpska (with around 35 per cent of the population) has five seats. The constitution further stipulates that delegates from the federation must include five Croats and five Bosniacs, alongside five Serbs from the Republika Srpska (Article IV.1).

In some countries, representation is calculated by region on the basis of relative population. These cases are coded as 0. An example is Austria, where each *Land* is allotted seats in the upper chamber, the *Bundesrat*, in relation to the size of its population, and the allotted number of seats is then divided among political parties according to their representation in the *Land* parliament. After each population census, the distribution of seats across *Länder* is adjusted. The upper chamber in the Netherlands is another case where the principle of individual representation determines regional weights. Provincial delegates elect senators in the Netherlands, but the allocation of seats across provinces is proportional to their populations. The representation of regions in the Italian senate is a more ambiguous case which is judged to fall just short of a positive score. Each region receives at least seven deputies in the Italian senate, but this has little effect on the overall distribution which is largely determined by one citizen, one vote. Of 315 seats in the Italian senate, 306 are distributed among 20 regions, and all but seven regions receive deputies purely on the basis of their population.

Direct representation of regional governments in the legislature is epitomized by the German *Bundesrat*, in which a *Land* executive can designate any of its officials to cast its weighted vote. Regional parliaments, not executives, designate representatives in the Austrian *Bundesrat*. In Russia, each *subvekt federacii* sends a delegate from its legislature and one from its executive to sit in the upper chamber, the *Sovet Federatsii*. Each of these variants scores 0.5.

The Spanish *Senado* illustrates that the two principles of regional representation – equality of regional representation and direct government representation – can be present in the same body for different regional levels.

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Each mainland province receives four seats in the *Senado* (large islands have three seats, small islands two). Provincial senators are directly elected in each province. Provinces score 0.5 for the principle of regional representation and 0 for direct government representation. The remaining seats in the upper chamber are divided among *comunidades autónomas* and selected by each *comunidad* assembly on the basis of one seat per million inhabitants, with a minimum of one seat. The overall allocation of seats in the *Senado* is roughly proportional to population (four of 17 *comunidades* have a population below 1 million). *Comunidades* score 0 on the principle of regional representation and 0.5 for direct government representation.

Regions that meet the criterion of regional representation score an additional half point if representatives of a given regional tier constitute a majority of the chamber, as in the US Senate, the German *Bundesrat*, the Austrian *Bundesrat*, and the Dutch *Eerste Kamer*. Belgian provinces, which until 1995 were allocated one-third of the seats in the senate, fall just short, as do *comunidades autónomas* in Spain.

An additional half point is scored if a legislature with regional representation can veto ordinary legislation or if its amendments can be overridden only by supermajority in the other chamber. The Austrian *Bundesrat* scores 0 on this item because it can be overridden by a simple majority in the lower chamber, as can the Chamber of Counties in Croatia, which, until it was abolished in 2001, was a consultative rather than a legislative chamber. The Belgian senate exercises equal legislative powers with the lower chamber on freedom of religion, language use, the judicial system, international treaties, and constitutional change, and scores 0.5.

### *Executive control*

Regional governments may share executive authority with central government in the context of intergovernmental meetings. To score positively on this scale such meetings must be routinized, not *ad hoc*, and to score the maximum 2 points such meetings must be authoritative – they must reach decisions that formally bind the participants.

These distinctions are illustrated in the development of German intergovernmental relations from the early days of the Federal Republic. The first meeting, in 1950, between *Land* premiers (*Ministerpräsidenten*) and the

#### Box 2.6 Executive control

<b>0:</b>	No routine meetings between central government and regional governments to negotiate policy.
<b>1:</b>	Routine meetings between central government and regional governments without legally binding authority.
<b>2:</b>	Routine meetings between central government and regional governments with authority to reach legally binding decisions.

federal chancellor was an *ad hoc* consultative meeting. It was followed from the 1950s by routinized, but still consultative, meetings between *Länder* and federal ministers. These score 1 on this measure. In 1964, the two government levels clinched an agreement on joint policy tasks which were negotiated in routine, authoritative intergovernmental meetings; this scores 2. Spanish *comunidades autónomas*, by contrast, confer with the federal government on an *ad hoc*, bilateral basis and, correspondingly, score 0.

In the USA, executive federalism is often characterized as extensive, but it is rarely binding on the federal government. Executive power sharing is shaped by federal financial incentives which states may accept or reject. Individual states may escape compulsory federal programmes but have limited opportunities to influence, let alone co-decide, such programmes. States tend to shape policy further downstream in the cycle, in bilateral negotiations concerning implementation and funding. There is also extensive horizontal co-operation among states that share problems or policy outlook; while such co-operation may be binding, it does not shape national policy. US states score 1, not 2, on this measure.

Executive power sharing in Germany and the USA highlights an important criterion: routine meetings must be vertical – that is to say, they must include both regional and national government. Horizontal interregional co-ordination does not amount to shared rule in *national* policy making. Inter-cantonal co-operation is extensive in Switzerland and often leads to binding agreements. However, cantonal-federal co-operation is more irregular and almost never leads to binding decisions. So Swiss cantons score 1, not 2, on this measure. By responding to functional pressures for regional co-ordination, Swiss cantons pre-empt federal policy. Here, then, is an example where extensive regional self-rule reduces the incentive for regions to grab a share of national authority. The two most decentralized federations in our dataset – Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro – have no executive shared rule.

### ***Fiscal control***

Shared rule on taxation is a special case of legislative or executive shared rule. Yet fiscal extraction and allocation are consequential enough to be considered separately. Regional governments may influence the distribution of national tax revenues, including intergovernmental grants, directly in the context of intergovernmental meetings, or indirectly via their representatives in a legislature with regional representation. If regional governments negotiate over the distribution of tax revenues via either channel, they score 1; if they have a veto, they score 2.

To score 1 via the legislative route to shared rule on taxes, the legislature in question must have authority over the distribution of tax revenues. If the representatives of a regional level constitute a *majority* in a legislature and the legislature has a *veto* on the distribution of tax revenues, this scores 2.

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### Box 2.7 Fiscal control

<b>0:</b>	Regional governments or their representatives in the legislature are not consulted over the distribution of tax revenues.
<b>1:</b>	Regional governments or their representatives in the legislature negotiate over the distribution of tax revenues but do not have a veto.
<b>2:</b>	Regional governments or their representatives in the legislature have a veto over the distribution of tax revenues.

Dutch *provincies* and Swedish *län* (until the abolition of the upper chamber in 1971) meet the latter conditions: they form or formed a majority in upper chambers with a veto on tax revenue allocation. Spanish *comunidades* score 1 because they are a minority in an upper chamber that can be overridden by a majority in the lower chamber. Belgian provinces were (until 1995) represented in an upper chamber with a tax veto, but they never constituted a majority and, therefore, score 1.

In order to score 1 on executive shared rule on taxes, regional governments must be directly involved in negotiation and, to score 2, they must be able to exercise a veto. Negotiations among peak associations of regional and local governments and the central government in Denmark and Sweden do not fulfil the first criterion. The peak associations cannot legally commit their members and, in both countries, the legislature reserves the right to take unilateral action, and has done so. The process provides the central government with a lever for constraining subnational spending, but gives regional governments little influence over national fiscal policy.

Executive shared rule on public policy often extends to the distribution of tax revenues. However, it need not do so. In Germany, a constitutional amendment granted *Länder* shared rule over taxation in 1966, two years after executive power sharing came into effect. Australian states have engaged in executive power sharing since 1950, but this was extended to taxation only in 1999. Conversely, regional governments in Russia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia-Montenegro have shared rule over taxes, but this is not generalized to other policy areas.

### **Constitutional reform**

Constitutional authority is a special kind of authority, for it concerns control over the rules of the game. The schema distinguishes between regional actors (i.e. electorates or regionally elected representatives) and regional governments. If the assent of regional electorates or their representatives is necessary for constitutional change, this scores 1 point; 2 points are scored if regional governments can raise the barrier for constitutional change, and 3 points if regional governments can veto constitutional change.

We score 0 where regional actors or regional governments cannot formally veto or raise the hurdle for constitutional reform. Until 2001, the Croatian

Box 2.8 Constitutional reform

<b>0:</b>	The central government and/or national electorate can unilaterally change the constitution.
<b>1:</b>	A legislature based on the principle of regional representation must approve constitutional change; or constitutional change requires a referendum based on the principle of equal regional representation (i.e. approval in a majority of regions).
<b>2:</b>	Regional governments are a directly represented majority in a legislature which can do one or more of the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• postpone constitutional reform</li> <li>• introduce amendments</li> <li>• raise the decision hurdle in the other chamber</li> <li>• require a second vote in the other chamber</li> <li>• require a popular referendum.</li> </ul>
<b>3:</b>	A majority of regional governments can veto constitutional change.

upper chamber, composed of *županija*-appointed representatives, had the right to be consulted on constitutional reform, but it could not amend or raise the hurdle. In Spain, *comunidad*-appointed senators make up less than 20 per cent of the *Senado* and are too small a minority to block constitutional reform. Directly elected senators from Spanish *province*, by contrast, can veto constitutional bills and, consequently, score 1. Since the reorganization of the Belgian senate in 1995, the 21 senators elected from community parliaments make up about 30 per cent of the senate and are thus not much more potent than the representatives of Spanish *comunidades* in the face of constitutional reform, which requires a two-thirds majority in both chambers. However, there are also 40 directly elected senators from Belgian communities, and they have the numbers to veto constitutional change, so Belgian communities score 1.

We score 1 where regional governments cannot block constitutional reform but regional voters or their representatives can. The latter requires that preferences are aggregated on the principle of regional, not individual, representation. This is the case, for example, in Switzerland and Australia, where constitutional reform requires a double majority in a referendum – a majority of voters in a majority of regions as well as in the country as a whole. And, as noted above, this is the case in Spain (for provinces) and in Belgium (for communities).

Neither Ireland nor Italy receives a positive score on this measure because constitutional reform is not determined under a regional principle of preference aggregation. In Ireland constitutional amendments require a nation-wide referendum without a regional hurdle. In Italy constitutional amendments need a majority in a senate that allocates seats to regions in proportion to their population.

Regional governments must get into the act to score 2 or 3. This reflects the basic difference between regions as arenas and regions as governments.

Despite their impressive authority, Swiss cantons do not play a direct role in constitutional change. Indeed, as one observer remarks, 'direct democracy has been continuously strengthened at the expense of the influence of cantonal executives and legislatures' (Vatter 2005: 10). In this respect, Austrian and German *Länder* are more authoritative. German *Länder* are represented directly in the *Bundesrat*, which must approve constitutional change by a two-thirds majority. Before 1984, Austrian *Länder* were institutionally represented in the *Bundesrat* and had the power to postpone constitutional reform or raise the impediment of a referendum (= 2); after 1984 they gained a veto over legislation that directly affects the federal-*Land* distribution of competencies and the organization of the *Bundesrat* (= 3).

In some cases, particularly in the UK and its former colonies, the distinction between formal constitutional rules and semi-formal norms is blurred, and this can complicate coding decisions. Canada provides some instructive examples.

Until 1982, the ultimate authority for constitutional change in Canada was vested in the British Parliament, with the understanding (at least in the twentieth century) that no changes would be made unless proposed by the Canadian government. But there was also a precedent, established in 1940, that amendments need the consent of all, or a majority, of provinces. Nevertheless, in 1980, the Canadian prime minister, Pierre Trudeau, sought to repatriate the constitution without provincial consent. Several provinces objected and, in a reference case, the British Law Lords blocked repatriation by ruling that federal unilateralism, though legal in a narrow sense, violated an established constitutional convention. We interpret this to mean that provinces had veto powers on constitutional change between 1950 and 1981. The 1982 Canadian constitution consolidated this precedent in articles 38 and 41.

Formal rules and informal practice diverge in Canada with respect to the inclusion of the Northwest Territories and Nunavut in constitutional negotiation. Neither has a constitutionally guaranteed role (unlike the Yukon, which must be consulted by the federal government concerning changes in its statute), but both were full partners in the Charlottetown negotiations of 1992 concerning federal-provincial relations. Future negotiations may follow this norm, but so far it has not been confirmed in the constitution or by the courts. In this case, the formal rule is judged to be non-inclusion, and the Northwest Territories and Nunavut score 0 on constitutional change before and after 1992.

A final example is the defeat of the Charlottetown accord and the emergence of a norm that federal and provincial governments in Canada legitimate any constitutional reform they negotiate in a popular referendum. After unanimous approval of the 1992 Charlottetown accord by provincial, territorial, and federal governments, the federal government conceded to pressure to hold 11 referendums (Quebec held its own). Although the results were not formally binding (except in Quebec, British Columbia, and Alberta), the

government promised that the accord would be implemented only if it was approved by a majority of voters nationally and by a majority in each province. Formal rules for constitutional amendment require consent among provincial governments (excluding territorial governments) and the federal government, and this is what is coded, but a gap has appeared between what the constitution formally prescribes and what is politically feasible.

### Asymmetrical and special autonomous regions

We speak of an asymmetrical arrangement when a region falls under a country-wide constitutional structure but enjoys different (usually greater) authority.<sup>12</sup> Asymmetrical arrangements may be temporary, as arguably for the historical regions in Spain, or indefinite, as for the *respubliki* in Russia or the Brussels region or German community in Belgium.

Special autonomous regions differ from asymmetrical regions in that their statute is *sui generis*: they are exempt from the country-wide constitutional framework, and they receive special treatment in the constitution and in statutory law.<sup>13</sup> Examples are Åland (Finland), Greenland and the Faroe Islands (Denmark), and the Azores and Madeira (Portugal).<sup>14</sup> Thus, while asymmetrical regions could be described as  $\pm$  typical regions, special autonomous regions are more aptly conceived as opt-outs. Asymmetrical regions belong to a particular regional tier; special autonomous regions are usually *sui generis*.

We apply the same criteria for measuring the authority of asymmetrical regions as for other regions. For special autonomous regions, we use the same criteria for institutional depth, policy scope, fiscal autonomy, and representation. However, we adjust the criteria of shared rule to tap the extent to which a special autonomous region influences national legislation with respect to its territory, rather than for the country as a whole. The source of such authority is mainly executive rather than legislative power sharing – it involves negotiation between the regional and national executive.

#### Box 2.9 Law making

<b>0.5</b> is scored for each of the following characteristics; aggregate scores range between 0 and 2:	
•	The region is the unit of representation in the legislature.
•	The regional government designates representatives in the legislature.
•	The regional government or the regional representatives in the legislature negotiate on national legislation affecting the region. <sup>a</sup>
•	The regional government or the regional representatives in the legislature have veto power over national legislation affecting the region. <sup>a</sup>

Note: <sup>a</sup> Evaluated if at least one of the first two conditions is met.

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#### *Box 2.10* Executive control

<b>0:</b>	No routine meetings between central government and the regional government.
<b>1:</b>	Routine meetings between central government and the regional government without legally binding authority.
<b>2:</b>	Routine meetings between central government and the regional government with legally binding authority.

#### *Box 2.11* Fiscal control

<b>0:</b>	The regional government is not consulted over the distribution of tax revenues affecting the region.
<b>1:</b>	The regional government negotiates with the central government the distribution of tax revenues affecting the region but does not have a veto.
<b>2:</b>	The regional government has a veto over the distribution of tax revenues affecting the region.

#### *Box 2.12* Constitutional reform

<b>0:</b>	The national government or electorate decides unilaterally on constitutional change affecting the region's position in the national state.
<b>1:</b>	The regional government is consulted on constitutional change affecting the region's position in the national state, but consultation is not binding.
<b>2:</b>	The regional government and the central government co-decide constitutional change affecting the region's position in the national state; both have veto power.
<b>3:</b>	The regional government can unilaterally accept or reject constitutional change affecting the region's position in the national state.

The historical *comunidades* in Spain are categorized as asymmetrical regions. The Spanish constitution integrates them in a national framework by conceptualizing them as one of two routes to regional autonomy, even though there are a few special arrangements, e.g. with respect to taxation in the Basque Country and Navarre.

On balance, the German-speaking community in Belgium also appears asymmetrical rather than special. Article 4 of the Belgian constitution recognizes the German community as one of three cultural-linguistic communities, and it does not have a special relationship to the Belgian state. The German community (unlike the French and Flemish communities) has no constitutional shared rule and its status is subject to simple majorities (not supermajorities) in both national chambers. However, the status of the German community is integrated in the Belgian constitutional framework.

Conversely, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland are treated as special autonomous regions because each has a unique status that is not specified in

an overarching set of constitutional norms. Each is regarded as a separate nation with a distinct association to the political centre.

When asymmetry becomes wide-ranging and widespread, a country may begin to resemble a patchwork of special autonomous regions. Is it possible to conceive of a polity where all or most regions are special? Between 1993 and 2000, 51 of 89 *subwekty federacii* took advantage of a provision in the Russian constitution that allowed bilateral arrangements between a *subwekt* and Moscow. If this practice had continued (in 2000 the Duma nullified the provision), Russia would have become a conglomerate of special autonomous regions.

Special autonomous regions often face a sharp trade-off between deciding their own fate and co-determining that of the country. Australian territories can do a bit of the latter and none of the former. The Azores, Madeira, the Faroes, Greenland, Åland, Scotland, Wales, Vojvodina (within Serbia), and the Italian *regioni a statuto speciale* (since 2001) have control over the former, but little to none over the latter. Others, such as the Yukon in Canada or the Italian *regioni a statuto speciale* (until 2001), have some limited input in their own fate and none in the collective framework. Yet others, including Washington, DC, and Corsica, have neither. No special autonomous region has both in full measure.

### Country scores

Country scores are obtained by first calculating a score for each regional tier and then aggregating these scores. Hence, the more regional tiers a country has, the higher is the country score, all other things being equal. The general principle is that decentralization scores are weighted by population. The following aggregation rules are employed:

- horizontal asymmetry – where a tier is composed of regions with different scores, an average score for that tier is calculated by weighting each region's score by its population;
- vertical asymmetry – where lower-level regions exist only in some higher-level regions or where scores for lower-level regions vary between higher-level regions, the lower-level scores are weighted by the population of the higher-level regions of which they are part;
- special autonomy – special autonomous regions are weighted by their population relative to that of the national population.

Detailed country profiles and documentation sources are presented in Appendix A and country and regional scores in Appendix B.

### 3 Validating the regional authority index

The purpose of this chapter is to validate the regional authority index (RAI). One can distinguish between two reasons for assessing (internal) validity of measurements. First, by validating measurements, commonalities come to the fore. In how far do the measures measure the same? This is how one usually understands assessing (internal) validity. Another reason, however, may lie in exploring differences between measurements. When do measures of the same concept disagree? The answer to this question reveals information that might be helpful in deciding when or how to use one or the other measurement. In this chapter the validity of the RAI is assessed by looking at the commonalities as well as the differences between the RAI and other widely used, regionalization and decentralization indices.

Three types of indices exist: those measuring institutional decentralization/regionalization, those of fiscal decentralization/regionalization and those that combine institutional and fiscal components. Institutional indices have been developed by Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson (1999), Arend Lijphart (1999), Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2001), Daniel Treisman (2002), Mohammad Arzaghi and J. Vernon Henderson (2005), and Dawn Brancati (2006). Fiscal indices were introduced by Wallace Oates (1972), Frank Castles (1999), Dietmar Braun (2000), Robert Ebel and Serdar Yilmaz (2002), Jean-Philippe Meloche *et al.* (2004), Dan Stegarescu (2005a), and Ruben Enikolopov and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (2007). Some authors combine the two types into one index, as do Jaap Woldendorp *et al.* (2000).

Despite the abundance of indices, there is little systematic comparison of their validity (an important exception is Rodden (2004)). This chapter focuses on two types of validity (Ray 2007; Bollen 1989).<sup>1</sup>

- *Convergent validity* assesses whether a given indicator is associated empirically with other indicators that conform to theoretical expectations. It involves comparing alternative measures of the same concept (Ray 2007: 12). Measurements of the same concept – in this case, decentralization – should converge – that is, they should correlate across a given set of cases.
- *Content validity* assesses the degree to which an indicator captures the

content of the measured concept (Adcock and Collier 2001: 537). This is a 'qualitative type of validity where the domain of the concept is made clear and the analyst judges whether the measures fully represent the domain' (Bollen 1989: 185). Testing for content validity 'does not involve the comparison of a measure with any other quantitative data, and can be employed even before any data is collected' (Ray 2007: 12). Content validity means that scholars agree on the definition of decentralization or on how decentralization can be broken down into different types. The measurements may differ in their 'content' because different theoretical assumptions underlie them.

Convergent validity for the RAI is assessed by comparing the index with seven institutional-type regionalization and decentralization indices commonly used in the literature. Fiscal indices are not used to examine convergent validity of the RAI because there are major caveats with respect to content validity. We point out two caveats with conceptualizing and operationalizing fiscal decentralization.

The next section introduces and compares seven institutional measures. Can decentralization be conceived as a single, continuous dimension? What is the common structure underlying these measures? Several hypotheses for explaining variation among the different measures are evaluated, and the strongest cases of disagreement are analysed in greater detail. The last section examines the content validity of fiscal indicators of decentralization.

### **Decentralization indices**

Decentralization is conceived of as a single, continuous dimension ranging from centralization, in which the central government monopolizes decision-making authority, to decentralization, in which subnational governments have extensive decision-making authority that falls short of a monopoly over authority. It is important to note that this is a simplification. Some authors differentiate among vertical versus horizontal decentralization, decentralization with respect to decision-making, appointment, elections, fiscal resources, or personnel (Treisman 2002), or between fiscal, political, and administrative decentralization (Schneider 2003).

The RAI is consistent with this in that it too is composed of different components: institutional depth, policy scope, fiscal autonomy, representation, law making, executive control, fiscal control, and constitutional reform. However, the RAI differs from some (but not all) indices in that it focuses on regional tiers – i.e. the intermediate tiers with a minimum average jurisdictional population size of 150,000. Several decentralization indices discussed here consider the dispersion of power across all subnational tiers, thus taking in the local tier, and sometimes they also include dispersion of power to interest groups (i.e. corporatism).

The RAI is compared with seven indices, as enumerated below.

***Arzaghi and Henderson (2005)<sup>2</sup>***

These authors present a ‘nuanced index of “institutional” decentralization, or effective federalism’ (Arzaghi and Henderson 2005: 1176), which they construct by assessing fiscal, political, and administrative responsibilities of subnational government. This index is an average of six indicators, each of which ranges from 0 to 4:

- unitary (0) or federal (4) government structure;
- election of a regional executive: no (0) or yes (4);
- election of a local executive: no (0) or yes (4);
- ability of the centre to suspend lower levels of government or to override their decisions: no (4) or yes (0);
- revenue-raising authority of lower-level governments: no (0), limited (2), or full (4);
- revenue sharing: no (0), limited (2), or full (4).

The dataset consists of scores for five-year intervals between 1960 and 1995 for 16 European and OECD countries that overlap with the RAI dataset.

***Brancati (2006)***

This index measures ‘political decentralization’, which is understood as the vertical division of authority among subnational levels of government that have independent decision-making power over at least one issue area. It consists of three components, which together construct a scale ranging from 0 to 5:

- subnational elections: 1 point when there are subnational elections;
- subnational legislative control over policies: 1 point each for tax authority, education, and public order/police;
- subnational veto over constitutional amendments: 1.

The dataset consists of 40 European, Balkan, and OECD countries for the years 1985–2000.<sup>3</sup>

***Hooghe and Marks (2001)***

This index is the only one of seven which focuses on regional autonomy – rather than decentralization – within a country. This is an additive index of four components, ranging between 0 and 12:

- constitutional federalism (0–4), which taps constitutional or legal provisions relating to regional government in the state;
- special territorial autonomy (0–2), i.e. constitutional or legal provisions

for home rule in special territories. The score is derived by multiplying the score for extent of competencies with the score for population size (Hooghe and Marks 2001: 200):

- scope of competencies (0.5 = weak; 1 = extensive);
- population coverage (1 = less than 10 per cent of the population; 2 = more than 10 per cent);
- role of regions in central government (0–4):
  - legislative power sharing through a chamber in the national legislature composed of representatives of regional governments or parliaments (0 = no chamber; 1 = chamber without wide-ranging veto power; 2 = chamber with wide-ranging veto power);
  - executive power sharing (0 = no regular intergovernmental meetings between central state and regional executives; 1 = regular meetings without authority to reach binding decisions; 2 = regular meetings with authority to reach binding decisions);
- regional elections (0–2):
  - 1 = the regional assembly is indirectly elected;
  - 2 = the regional assembly is directly elected.

The dataset covers 14 West European countries, with four time points of evaluation: 1950, 1970, 1990 and 2000.

#### ***Lane and Ersson (1999)***

This is an index of decentralization which is understood as ‘the territorial location of public decision and implementation functions at various levels of government’ (Lane and Ersson 1999: 207). The index consists of four discrete components for a total of 10 points:

- extent of federalism (0–3);
- special territorial autonomy (0–2);
- functional autonomy (0–2);
- local government discretion (0–3).

The dataset contains scores for 18 West European countries and has 1 data point capturing decentralization in the post-Second World War period.

#### ***Lijphart (1999)***

Lijphart measures federalism and decentralization, which he conceives as one dimension. The index consists of five ordinal categories which construe a scale that ranges from 1 to 5:

- 1 = unitary and centralized;
- 2 = unitary and decentralized;

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- 3 = semi-federal;
- 4 = federal and centralized;
- 5 = federal and decentralized.

This dataset consists of 36 countries, of which 24 West European and OECD countries overlap with the RAI. There is one score which is an average evaluation of the post-Second World War period.

#### ***Treisman (2002)***

Treisman focuses on decentralization and measures different types: vertical, decision-making, appointment, electoral, fiscal, and personnel decentralization.<sup>4</sup> Decision-making decentralization comes closest to the definition of decentralization used in this chapter, and we use it to validate the RAI.

An index of decision-making decentralization can be construed by summing three components of decentralization identified by Treisman, ranging from 0 to 3:<sup>5</sup>

- weak autonomy = 1: the constitution reserves to subnational legislatures the exclusive right to legislate on at least one specific policy area or if subnational legislatures have residual authority in at least one policy area;
- residual autonomy = 1: the constitution gives subnational legislatures the exclusive right to legislate on policy areas not specifically assigned in the constitution;
- subnational veto = 1: there is a regionally elected upper chamber that has the constitutional right to block legislation.

The dataset covers 41 European, Balkan and OECD countries, and the scores reflect the situation in the mid-1990s.

#### ***Woldendorp et al. (2000)***

This autonomy index measures 'how independent the non-central units of government are as regards policy making' (Woldendorp *et al.* 2000: 35). It consists of four components, which combine in a scale from 0 to 8.

- central fiscalization (0–2):<sup>6</sup>
  - 2: if a country has fiscal centralization lower than 75 per cent;
  - 1: if a country has fiscal centralization between 75 and 90 per cent;
  - 0: if a country has fiscal centralization equal to or more than 90 per cent.
- regional autonomy (0–2):
  - 2: if regional autonomy is formally laid down (as is the case in federalist states);
  - 1: if the country is a semi-federalist system;
  - 0: neither.

- centralization (0–2):
  - 2: if the state is not considered to be centralized;
  - 1: if the state is considered to be medium centralized;
  - 0: if the state is considered to be highly centralized.
- local government autonomy (0–2):
  - 2: if a) local self-government and b) a local representative body are guaranteed in the constitution;
  - 1: either a) or b);
  - 0: neither a) or b).

The dataset contains 37 European, Balkan, and OECD countries, and there is one time point of evaluation which reflects the post-Second World War period.

### Factor analysis

To see whether these diverse measures of a single concept – decentralization – have a common structure, a principal axis analysis is employed (Marks *et al.* 2007). Since the number of countries for which we have scores differs per decentralization index, four separate factor analyses are performed to maximize the number of cases.

The factor analyses in Table 3.1 reveal that the indices do indeed have a common structure. In each analysis, the principal axis has an eigenvalue well above 1, and the explained variance is 75 per cent or more. The RAI measure

Table 3.1 Factor analyses of seven decentralization indices with the regional authority index

<i>Decentralization index</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>II</i>	<i>III</i>	<i>IV</i>
Regional authority index (RAI)	0.99	0.93	0.92	0.91
Arzaghi and Henderson (2005)	0.75	–	–	–
Brancati (2006)	0.77	0.84	0.92	0.91
Hooghe and Marks (2001)	0.95	0.92	–	–
Lane and Ersson (1999)	0.81	0.74	–	–
Lijphart (1999)	0.89	0.92	0.93	–
Treisman (2002)	0.82	0.88	0.87	0.91
Woldendorp <i>et al.</i> (2000)	0.92	0.79	0.87	0.8
<i>N</i>	7	14	23	36
Eigenvalue	6.017	5.232	4.072	3.209
Explained variance (%)	75	75	81	80

Note: All indices are standardized. Principal axis analysis was used. The following time periods are compared: RAI: average for 1950–2006; Arzaghi and Henderson: average of eight five-year intervals between 1960 and 1995; Brancati: one score for 1985–2000; Hooghe and Marks: average of four time points over 1950–2000; Lane and Ersson: one score for 1945–95; Lijphart: one score for 1945–96; Treisman: one score for the mid-1990s; Woldendorp *et al.*: one score for 1945–98.

loads strongly on the principal axis in all four analyses. The measures of Lijphart, Hooghe and Marks, and, to a lesser extent, Brancati and Treisman also load heavily on the principal axis.

### **Sources and cases of disagreement**

This section explores the sources of disagreement between the decentralization indices, and close attention is paid to the most important cases of disagreement.

The decentralization indices can be considered as expert judgements, and, as can be seen from each description, each expert uses her or his own criteria. Although there are commonalities in these criteria, there are also many differences. Furthermore, experts differ in their level of knowledge for different countries. One may hypothesize that this all leads to different evaluations of subnational autonomy in countries.

#### *Sources of disagreement*

To explore the structure of disagreement between the RAI and the other measures, the RAI is regressed on each decentralization index. By exploring the residuals from regressing the RAI on one of the other decentralization indices one can see when the measures disagree (Marks *et al.* 2007). What are of interest here are ‘systematic’ sources of bias or error – not random error. Where can one expect to observe larger residuals – that is to say, where can we expect the scores of the RAI to differ systematically from those of one of the other indices?

#### *No regional tier*

One major difference between the RAI and all but one of the alternative seven indices is that the RAI captures intermediate regional tiers and not local government. It also excludes regional tiers with an average population size below 150,000. Six of the seven other indices consider local as well as regional government in assessing decentralization. So the RAI is designed to measure regional government, and this, one would expect, is conceptually distinct from decentralization. It seems reasonable, then, to expect negative residuals for countries which have only one subnational government tier, which are countries with local government only. That is to say, the RAI should underestimate decentralization in countries that have only a local tier.

#### *Federal versus non-federal countries*

The fine-grained character of the RAI allows for capturing graduations in the extent of regional autonomy – even in countries with highly autonomous

regions, such as federal countries. This is different from most indices, which usually employ a sharply discontinuous measure, sometimes simply dichotomous, that distinguishes federal from non-federal countries. Lijphart, for example, assigned all federal countries a score of 5 (except for Austria, which scores 4.5), while non-federal countries are allowed to have more differentiated scores (between 1, 2, and 3).

The RAI is more sensitive to variation within the federal category: the range among federal countries is 14, from around 17 (Austria and Russia) to around 30 (Germany and Bosnia-Herzegovina). This range is about the same as for non-federal countries, which vary between 0 (multiple countries) and 14 (the Netherlands and Sweden).

Other indices, however, work in exactly the opposite way: they tend to treat the non-federal countries more as a homogenous group and allow more variation among the federal countries. Treisman's measure, for example, gives only six out of 33 non-federal countries a score higher than 0, whereas all eight federal countries score between 1 and 3.

Differential sensitivity in measurement should produce systematic differences in scoring – that is to say, for some indices, such as Lijphart's, one would expect the residuals with the RAI to be larger for federal countries than for non-federal countries. Conversely, for other indices, such as Treisman's, the residuals should be smaller for federal countries and larger for non-federal ones.

These different biases in scoring become apparent when one compares, for each index, means, standard deviations, and ranges for federal countries with those for non-federal countries (Table 3.2).

All decentralization indices are able to differentiate between federal and non-federal countries – i.e. the mean score for non-federal countries is significantly different from the mean for federal countries. This means that all decentralization indices pick up 'between-group' differences. But not all measures are equally suited to capture 'within-group' differences.

The ratio measure in Table 3.2 gives a sense of this. The ratio is calculated by dividing the standard deviation of federal countries by that of non-federal countries. A ratio larger than 1 indicates that the decentralization index is biased to capturing variation among federal countries; a ratio smaller than 1 indicates the opposite. One can see that the RAI, Arzaghi and Henderson, and Woldendorp *et al.* differentiate equally between countries 'within each group'. Hooghe and Marks and Lijphart tend to treat the federal countries as a homogeneous group, whereas Brancati, Lane and Ersson, and Treisman tend to treat non-federal countries as a homogeneous group.

One may expect differences in scoring to lead to negative residuals (underestimation by the RAI) for federal countries for the Hooghe and Marks and Lijphart measures, whereas it should lead to positive residuals (overestimation by the RAI) for federal countries for the Brancati, Lane and Ersson, and Treisman measures.

Table 3.2 Federal and non-federal countries according to different decentralization indices: means, standard deviations, ranges

Decentralization index	Federal countries				Non-federal countries				Ratio
	Mean	St. dev.	N	Min-max	Mean	St. dev.	N	Min-max	
	Arzagli and Henderson (2005)	0.87	0.78	5	-0.89-1.40	-0.40	0.83	11	
Brancati (2006)	1.20	0.86	9	-0.32-2.62	-0.35	0.74	31	-2.27-1.64	<b>1.17</b>
Hooghe and Marks (2001)	1.83	0.32	8	1.53-2.13	-0.31	0.70	48	-0.89-1.83	<b>0.42</b>
Lane and Ersson (1999)	1.26	1.03	3	0.66-2.45	-0.25	0.81	15	-1.13-1.26	<b>1.28</b>
Lijphart (1999)	1.54	0.13	6	1.28-1.59	-0.51	0.48	18	-0.92-0.40	<b>0.27</b>
Treisman (2002)	1.40	0.82	8	0.53-2.85	-0.32	0.73	33	-0.64-1.69	<b>1.13</b>
Woldendorp <i>et al.</i> (2000)	1.47	0.69	7	0.62-2.24	-0.34	0.71	30	-1.55-0.62	<b>0.97</b>
Regional authority index (2006)	1.48	0.55	9	0.90-2.34	-0.41	0.65	33	-1.03-1.45	<b>0.84</b>

Note: Values are standardized. The ratio score is calculated by dividing the standard deviation for federal countries by the standard deviation for non-federal countries. A ratio score higher than 1 indicates that federal countries vary more in their scores than non-federal countries. Federal countries: Australia, Austria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Canada, Germany, Russian Federation, Serbia-Montenegro, Switzerland, and the USA.

*Asymmetry and dynamic regionalization*

A last source of disagreement might be expected for countries that, for some reason or another, are complicated to evaluate. This may be so when a country has asymmetrical regions which depart from the general country pattern, or when decentralization in a country has been in flux.

The vertical state structure is not necessarily uniform within a single country at a certain point in time *and* over time. A country might have a special autonomous region which has more autonomy than other subnational units, for example Greenland and the Faroes in Denmark and Åland in Finland. There might also be differences between units of the same subnational tier. Examples are the historic communities versus the other *autónomas comunidades* in Spain and the special statute regions versus the ordinary regions in Italy.

Decentralization is a moving target. Subnational tiers may be created or abolished, autonomy may be deepened or revoked. In France, for example, the *régions* were institutionalized in 1964 and over time were granted more autonomy. How scholars evaluate these differences at a certain point in time may differ, and this, one would expect, should lead to variation in scoring.

*Explaining disagreement*

Testing these expectations requires that disagreement is operationalized. We use as measure the residuals from regressing the RAI on the other decentralization indices.

The first two sources of disagreement – presence or absence of a regional tier and federal or non-federal – are operationalized as dummy variables.<sup>7</sup> To measure asymmetry and dynamic regionalization, an additive index (0–2) is constructed, whereby a value of 1 is allocated to a country that has (had) asymmetric regions<sup>8</sup> and a value of 1 to a country that has experienced radical regionalization<sup>9</sup> in the post-Second World War period. The RAI is regressed on the decentralization indices and the residuals are subsequently regressed on the sources of disagreement variables. The absolute residuals are considered first; the raw residuals (taking the sign into account) second.

The absolute residual analysis in Table 3.3 shows that the sources of disagreement differ across decentralization indices. The strongest predictor of disagreement for Brancati and Treisman is the ‘no regional tier’ variable. The federal–non-federal variable is effective in explaining disagreement with the Treisman index and the asymmetry/regionalized variable explains disagreement with the Lijphart variable. None of the factors appeared significantly associated with the residuals for Arzaghi and Henderson, Hooghe and Marks, Lane and Ersson, and Woldendorp *et al.*

The same analysis is repeated for raw residuals, and the results are reported in Table 3.4. The most striking result is that all beta-coefficients for the ‘no regional tier’ variable are negative, which means that the RAI systematically *underestimates* subnational autonomy of countries without a regional tier.

Table 3.3 Analysis of absolute residuals: regressing the RAI on seven decentralization indices

<i>Sources of disagreement</i>	<i>Arzaghi and Henderson</i>	<i>Brancati</i>	<i>Hooghe and Marks</i>	<i>Lane and Ersson</i>	<i>Liphart</i>	<i>Treisman</i>	<i>Woldendorp et al.</i>
No regional tier	–	0.673*** (0.196)	–	0.321 (0.341)	0.199 (0.154)	0.361*** (0.131)	0.071 (0.160)
Federal	–0.032 (0.128) <sup>a</sup>	0.276 (0.172)	–0.087 (0.245) <sup>a</sup>	0.547* (0.296)	0.044 (0.112)	0.314*** (0.126)	0.012 (0.153)
Asymmetry/dynamic regionalization	–0.046 (0.081) <sup>a</sup>	0.047 (0.109)	–0.051 (0.090) <sup>a</sup>	0.197 (0.139)	0.193*** (0.066)	0.037 (0.077)	0.028 (0.090)
<i>N</i>	98	40	51	18	24	41	37
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.02	0.26	0.02	0.22	0.30	0.23	0.01
Adj. <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	–	0.20	–	0.05	0.20	0.17	–0.08

Note: \*  $p > 0.10$ ; \*\*  $p > 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p > 0.01$ . Absolute residuals are standardized and regressed on the sources of disagreement. The table displays beta-coefficients and standard errors.<sup>a</sup> Standard errors are cluster-corrected.

Table 3.4 Analysis of raw residuals: regressing the RAI on seven decentralization indices

Sources of disagreement	Arzaghi and Henderson	Brancati	Hooghe and Marks	Lane and Ersson	Lijphart	Treisman	Woldendorp et al.
No Regional tier	-	-1.093*** (0.256)	-	-0.221 (0.514)	-0.304 (0.259)	-0.766*** (0.209)	-0.493** (0.238)
Federal	0.413* (0.233) <sup>a</sup>	0.457** (0.225)	-0.232 (0.356) <sup>a</sup>	0.910* (0.446)	-0.144 (0.187)	0.180 (0.201)	0.318 (0.228)
Asymmetry/dynamic regionalization	-0.169 (0.152) <sup>a</sup>	0.133 (0.143)	0.057 (0.156) <sup>a</sup>	0.387* (0.210)	0.289** (0.111)	0.157 (0.123)	0.120 (0.134)
<i>N</i>	98	40	51	18	24	41	37
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.20	0.48	0.05	0.35	0.38	0.38	0.24
Adj. <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	-	0.44	-	0.21	0.29	0.33	0.17

Note: \*  $p > 0.10$ ; \*\*  $p > 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p > 0.01$ . Raw residuals are standardized and regressed on the sources of disagreement. The table displays beta-coefficients and standard errors; a negative sign means underestimation and a positive sign means overestimation of the RAI. <sup>a</sup> Cluster-corrected standard errors.

**Cases of disagreement**

Is disagreement caused by certain countries? What, if any, are the outliers? We define a ‘case of disagreement’ as having a residual score of two standard deviations or more. Table 3.5 shows 13 cases of disagreement involving nine countries. The differences in scoring for Cyprus, Finland, Luxembourg, and Macedonia can be explained by the fact that the RAI does not measure local government while the other decentralization indices do. But the precise scoring of these cases still raises some questions.

Cyprus and Luxembourg score 1 (out of 3) on the Treisman measure, since the constitution of these countries reserves to subnational legislatures the exclusive right to legislate in at least one specific policy area. For Luxembourg this is birth, marriage, and death certificates and for Cyprus it is town planning.<sup>10</sup> This kind of scoring leads to some curious bedfellows: Australia and Russia also score 1 on Treisman’s index, and yet it would be difficult to sustain that the states of Australia and the *federacii subwekty* in Russia have the same autonomy as the municipalities in Cyprus and Luxembourg. Treisman’s index, then, may not be discriminatory enough to tap the full range of variation in decentralization.

A similar observation could be made for the Macedonian score on Brancati’s index. Macedonia scores 3 out of 5, because local governments have authority over taxation (+1) and education (+1) and they have an elected assembly (+1). However, the 1995 law on self-government strongly curtailed these powers, as Brancati noted herself. Macedonia’s score of 3 ranks on par with the *regioni* in Italy, the *comunidades autónomas* in Spain,

Table 3.5 Cases of disagreement between the RAI and seven decentralization indices

<i>Country</i>	<i>Sign</i>	<i>Decentralization index</i>
Belgium	+	Brancati
Belgium	+	Hooghe and Marks
Cyprus	–	Brancati
Cyprus	–	Treisman
Finland	–	Woldendorp <i>et al.</i>
Germany	+	Brancati
Germany	+	Lane and Ersson
Luxembourg	–	Treisman
Macedonia	–	Brancati
Macedonia	–	Woldendorp <i>et al.</i>
Poland	–	Arzaghi and Henderson
Serbia and Montenegro	+	Brancati
Sweden	+	Hooghe and Marks

Note: A case of disagreement is defined as having a residual of two standard deviations or more. A positive sign signifies overestimation and a negative sign signifies underestimation of the RAI. There are no cases of disagreement between the RAI and Lijphart’s measure.

the Australian states, the Russian federal subjects, and the Belgian *gemeenschappen/gewesten*.

Woldendorp *et al.* gave Macedonia a score of 4 (out of 7). The score reflects that local government is mentioned in the constitution in combination with independent rights and its own representative body (+2) and that fiscal centralization is lower than 75 per cent (+2). The latter part of the scoring is contested by several more recent studies which highlight the limited tax autonomy of Macedonian local governments. Woldendorp *et al.* (2000: 32–8) measure fiscal centralization as ‘Central Government Revenues as a % of General Government’, which is 44 per cent for Macedonia (meaning that the local governments collect 66 per cent of general government revenue). Financial governmental data for Macedonia is hard to find, but the new Law on Local Government Finance (2002) assigns the levy of various taxes on property to local government units, together with 3 per cent of the personal income tax and access to an equalization fund equal to 3 per cent of value added taxes. Local government’s share in government expenditures as a percentage of general government expenditures was 7 per cent in 2003 (Davey 2004). In light of these data, the scoring of Macedonia by Woldendorp *et al.* is questionable for the post-2000 period but appears plausible for the 1991–8 period (but see Todorovski 2001 for the late 1990s).

The higher score for Finland by Woldendorp *et al.* has to do with the fact that the RAI does not measure local government. Finland scores high on subnational autonomy, a component of Woldendorp *et al.*’s measure, which brings it on par with the Scandinavian as well as with the federal countries. Unlike its Scandinavian neighbours, Finland had no significant regional (or county) level of government before 1993, which is why the RAI underestimates decentralization in Finland but not in the other Scandinavian countries.

A case where the source of disagreement lies in a different definition of the boundaries of the country is Serbia-Montenegro, which is scored relatively lower on decentralization by Brancati than the RAI. The main reason, it appears, is that Brancati focuses primarily on Serbia during 1985–2000, while the RAI considers Serbia-Montenegro as a unit.

Three cases of disagreement concern differences in whether particular tiers are included or excluded. The first is Belgium, to which Hooghe and Marks gave a lower score than the RAI in 1970 and in 1990. The main reason for this disagreement is that Hooghe and Marks focused on one government tier – the most autonomous tier at a given time point – rather than on all intermediate tiers. In 1970 the most autonomous tier consisted of the provinces, and by 1990 – their next time point – it was the communities. The RAI, on the other hand, evaluates all intermediate tiers of government present at any time point. Belgium is also a case of disagreement with the Brancati measure. The main reason is that Brancati focused on one tier of government, namely the regions/communities, but not the provinces, which results in a lower score.

A third case of divergence, also with the Hooghe and Marks measure, is Sweden, which is scored higher by the RAI in 1950 and in 1970. Hooghe and Marks considered the county governments in the Scandinavian countries as local and exclude them because their measure concerns regional autonomy. Hooghe and Marks therefore do not include the *län* in Sweden, whereas the RAI does, resulting in their lower scoring.<sup>11</sup>

The remaining disagreements cannot be reduced to the local government factor, to country definition, or to inclusion/exclusion of particular tiers.

Two cases pertain to Germany, which Lane and Ersson and Brancati scored significantly lower on decentralization than the RAI. Lane and Ersson give Germany 4 (out of 10), which places it at the same level as Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands. The main reason for this is Lane and Ersson's inclusive operationalization of decentralization, which includes not only local governance (+3 for Denmark and Finland) but also functional, neo-corporatist autonomy (+2 for the Netherlands).

Brancati scored Germany 3 (out of 5), as she estimated that the *Länder* do not have control over public order/police (-1) and constitutional amendments do not require *Länder* approval (-1). Both coding decisions are contestable. Public order/police is actually a concurrent power (Watts 1999; Swenden 2006). On constitutional change, *Länder* approval of constitutional amendments is indispensable on account of their dominance in the *Bundesrat*. Brancati does not measure shared power exercised through an upper chamber, but the RAI does.

Another case of disagreement with the Brancati measure concerns Cyprus. Brancati scored Cyprus 3 out of 5, while the RAI scores it 0. The disagreement lies in the operationalization of decentralization. Brancati included consociational arrangements, laid down in the constitution, that decentralize authority to the Greek and Turkish communities, while the RAI excludes decentralization to non-territorial actors.

A final case of disagreement concerns Poland, which Arzaghi and Henderson score higher than the RAI. The difference in opinion appears to be whether the central government has the ability to suspend or override subnational decisions. According to Arzaghi and Henderson, the answer is no, and so Poland receives a score of 4. The scoring of Poland seems to be incorrect. The highest regional tier, the *województwa*, have gained directly elected councils and more autonomy since the end of communism, but their decisions are still subject to central sanctioning (Appendix A; Council of Europe 2000a: 47–8; Kowalczyk 2000: 228). Central control is even greater for the lower regional tier, *powiaty*, and for local government, the *gminy*, for which the central government has the right to override decisions and has the authority to suspend the councils (Council of Europe 2000a: 46–51; Kowalczyk 2000: 222–8; Glowacki 2002: 113–14; Okraszewska and Kwiatkowski 2002: 201–2).

### **Content validity of fiscal indicators**

Fiscal indicators are employed widely as an overall measure of decentralization (see, for example, Oates 1972; Castles 1999; Lane and Ersson 1999; Braun 2000; Fisman and Gatti 2002; and Stegarescu 2005b). These indicators are based upon two extensively used sources: the Governance Finance Statistics database by the International Monetary Fund and the Historical and/or National Accounts and/or Revenue Statistics of the OECD. Many different operationalizations exist, but the most broadly used operationalizations are the following:

- a) subnational share of total government expenditures;
- b) intergovernmental grant share (i.e. grants from higher tier governments) as a percentage of total subnational revenue;
- c) subnational own revenue (i.e. revenues from taxes plus fees and levies) as a percentage of total subnational revenue;
- d) subnational tax revenue share as a percentage of total subnational revenue;
- e) subnational tax revenue share as a percentage of total government tax revenue.

One can categorize the different operationalizations in two broad classes: expenditure (a and b) and revenue (c, d, and e) aggregate fiscal indicators. Both classes of fiscal indicators raise two main caveats/problems with respect to content validity. First, fiscal indicators do not differentiate very well between decision-making authority and the authority to implement,<sup>12</sup> and therefore cannot be used to measure subnational decision-making authority. The second caveat is that fiscal indicators do not measure effectively differences in subnational implementation powers.

#### ***Caveat 1***

Expenditure and revenue fiscal indicators may not adequately capture how much decision-making authority subnational governments have, and they do not differentiate between decision making and implementation.

Fiscal indicators capture authority to the extent that policy making involves raising or spending money, but not all policy making has budgetary implications. Majone (1994) coined the distinction between ‘regulatory policies and policies involving the direct expenditure of public funds’ to tell apart policies with a direct bearing on the public budget – for example, welfare policies – from those that are not expensive for government budgets but have considerable impact on society through the rules they impose – for example, civil and criminal law. While the cost of expenditure programmes is borne by the public budget, the cost of most regulatory policies is borne by citizens and firms.

To the extent that regions have control over regulatory policies, expenditure fiscal indicators would reveal very little about regional authority. Imagine two countries, one in which subnational governments have the authority to implement expenditure policies (country A) and one in which subnational governments have authority regarding regulatory policies (country B). An expenditure fiscal indicator will score country A higher than country B. However, it would be wrong to conclude that country A is more decentralized than country B or that subnational governments in country A are more autonomous than those in country B. In fact, the reverse may be true, since regulatory policies often have the capacity to affect society deeply.

Fiscal indicators on the *expenditure* side are particularly problematic for capturing decision-making decentralization, since they do not reveal whether the expenditure comes from conditional or unconditional grants, whether the central government determines how the money should be spent, whether it sets the framework legislation within which subnational governments implement, or whether – indeed – subnational governments spend the money autonomously (Panizza 1999; Akai and Sakata 2002; Ebel and Yilmaz 2002; Fisman and Gatti 2002; Breuss and Eller 2004a; Sharma 2006; Barankay and Lockwood 2007).

The argument can be exemplified empirically by comparing the share of subnational authorities in total government expenditures. Subnational governments in Scandinavian countries have the same (or higher) shares of total government expenditures than their peers in federal countries. The range is from 39 per cent and 40 per cent in Norway and Russia to 57 per cent and 60 per cent in Denmark and Canada (averages for 1972–2001; World Bank 2006). To conclude from this that Scandinavian countries are as decentralized as federal countries would be wrong. Subnational governments in Scandinavian countries have less decision-making authority over policies and less taxation power, and they do not enjoy power sharing.<sup>13</sup> The national government decides policies and local and regional governments implement them (Rodden 2004).

One could ‘correct’ the indicator for subnational share by looking at the share of intergovernmental grants (Oates 1972; Akai and Sakata 2002; Breuss and Eller 2004b; Stegarescu 2005a). This indicator measures the amount of central government involvement in subnational provision of policies. Often a distinction is made between conditional (specific) and unconditional (general) grants, whereby it is generally assumed that central government involvement is higher with conditional grants (Shah 2007). A conditional grant ties expenditure to particular strings (conditions) imposed by the central government. But this does not solve the problem. Aside from data availability (Rodden 2004), there is the problem that intergovernmental grants do not seem to differentiate between federal and non-federal countries. This is borne out by a one-way ANOVA analysis regarding the average subnational intergovernmental grant share as a percentage of total subnational revenue ( $n = 35$ ;  $F: 0.50$ ;  $p = 0.482$ ; averages for 1972–2001; World Bank 2006).<sup>14</sup>

Fiscal indicators on the *revenue* side are not biased against direct expenditure or regulatory policies, but they generate their own problems of concept validity. Revenue fiscal indicators do not help us figure out whether authorities that can tax autonomously can also decide autonomously what to do with the money (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 1997; Panizza 1999; Ebel and Yilmaz 2002). While the revenue might be collected freely, it may have to be spent on policies set by the central government. There is no direct theoretical or empirical link between the authority to collect revenues and the authority to decide and implement policies.

This is apparent by comparing the RAI scores with the subnational share of total government tax revenue. The correlation is moderate and significant ( $r = 0.47$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ,  $n = 36$ ; averages for 1972–2001; World Bank 2006). But a closer look at individual countries reveals that Sweden and Denmark (31 and 30 per cent) are ranked at the same level as the USA and Germany (33 and 30 per cent) and not much below Russia and Switzerland (37 and 38 per cent). The counties in Denmark and Sweden may set the rate of income tax within central government parameters, but it would be wrong to conclude that the subnational tiers in Sweden and Denmark have the same policy and institutional autonomy as their peers in the federations of USA, Germany, Russia, and Switzerland.

The fundamental difference is that, in Sweden and Denmark, the central government retains full decision-making rights regarding tax powers – and can unilaterally change the rules if and when it so desires – while it is constitutionally bound to respect regional tax powers in Germany, the USA, Switzerland, and, arguably, even semi-democratic Russia. Moreover, regional authorities in Sweden and Denmark have primarily administrative powers over a broad range of policies within a national legislative framework. In Germany, the USA, Switzerland, and Russia, subnational tiers have principal authority over a swathe of policies.

### ***Caveat 2***

Fiscal indicators do not necessarily measure differences in implementation authority.

There are two reasons. First, one cannot differentiate whether observed differences in fiscal centralization are the result of genuine decentralization or whether they reflect differences in political economy. As Oates argues:

. . . even if there exists an identical allocation of functions among levels of government across two countries, their centralization ratios will generally differ if they do not have the same relative expenditure patterns on these functions. A country, for example, with an unusually large portion of its resources devoted to national defense will have, other things being equal, a relatively high degree of fiscal centralization. . . . centralization

ratios may differ because certain services provided publicly in one economy are provided in the private sector in another.

(Oates 1972: 199–200)

Note that this argument applies to the RAI too but that fiscal indicators, and especially direct expenditure policies, are especially vulnerable to this problem. In the Scandinavian countries, a large proportion of government expenditure is devoted to welfare state policies, and these are often provided by subnational governments. In market-liberal Anglo-Saxon countries, welfare state functions tend to be privatized. So a difference in political economy explains higher expenditure (and revenue) in Scandinavian countries compared to Anglo-Saxon countries, whereas the allocation of functions among levels of government might be identical. The RAI is not wholly invulnerable to the risk of conflating expenditure with authority, but, since it relies on legal documents to gauge the allocation of functions rather than fiscal data, it minimizes this problem.

Second, fiscal measures conflate whether an increase in fiscal numbers is the result of a shift in functions or resources between government tiers, or whether it simply reflects a change in the size of government activities (Stegarescu 2005a). An increase in fiscal decentralization might be due to a relative increase in either the ‘volume’ or the ‘range’ of public goods provided by subnational governments. In the former, authority has not increased; in the latter, it has. Imagine a country in which a subnational government provides unemployment benefits. If, the following year, the subnational government provides sickness pay as well as unemployment benefits, there will have been an increase in authority. This will coincide, presumably, with an increase in subnational expenditure share and/or in subnational tax share (to finance the increased expenditure). However, subnational expenditure (or revenue) could also have increased without an expansion of authority – for example, if unemployment had increased.

### **Conclusion**

A comparison of the RAI with seven decentralization indices in the literature shows a great amount of agreement. A single underlying factor accounts for about three-quarters of the variance. This is remarkable given the diverse ways of operationalizing a fluid concept such as decentralization. A residual analysis identifies three sources of disagreement. The most consistent source stems from the fact that the RAI focuses on regional government while most decentralization indices measure local as well as regional government. The more fine-grained RAI captures also greater variation among both federal and unitary countries than most decentralization indices. Finally, countries on the move, which have undergone major regionalization/federalization in the post-Second World War period, and countries with asymmetrical regions

tend to generate more diverse scores across decentralization indexes than countries with greater architectural stability.

Finally, a content validity analysis casts doubt on the validity of fiscal indicators as measures of subnational authority or decentralization. Fiscal indicators do not capture whether subnational governments can decide autonomously what to do with the money, and they do not discriminate between the effect of genuine political decentralization or of differences in political economy and/or a change in government activities. Their value as proxies for decentralization appears, therefore, limited.

## 4 An era of regionalization

Let diversity flourish! Empower regions! These two statements summarize the experience of regional governments in the 42 countries covered in this volume between 1950 and 2006.

Variation across regions shows no sign of declining over time. Some countries have no regional level (defined as a level of government between the local and the national with an average population greater than 150,000). Others have authoritative regional governments that play a decisive role not only in their respective regions but also in the country as a whole. Of the 42 countries in our dataset, eight have no regional tier, 17 have a single tier, 16 have two regional tiers, and one, Germany, has three.<sup>1</sup> The standard deviation in country scores is as great in 2006 as it was in 1950.<sup>2</sup> There has been no convergence in regional government but, rather, continuing and wide divergence.

Yet this has been an era of regionalization. Not every country has become regionalized but, where reform has taken place, it has generally been in the direction of greater regional authority. Of 31 countries that saw regional reform in the years covered here, 29 became more regionalized. Eighty-six per cent of the reforms of regional government in Figure 4.1 increase regional authority along one or more of the eight dimensions of the regional authority index (RAI).

The scale of change becomes apparent only when one escapes methodological nationalism, which boils regional government down to a limited number of national categories, such as unitary, federal, or confederal. Few countries jumped from one category to another, but many have engineered basic reforms of regional government.<sup>3</sup> In the country/years covered in this volume, 15 additional levels of regional government have been established, and not one disestablished.<sup>4</sup> Fourteen regions in eight countries have been given special autonomous status. The number of elected regional assemblies has increased from 16 to 31.

These two characteristics, wide variation across countries and increasing regionalization, are puzzling. Do they result from distinct causal processes or can they be explained by a single theory? Our research suggests that multi-level governance can be explained by three logics: efficiency, distribution, and




Figure 4.1 Reform of regional authority (1950–2006).

Note: The unit of reform is a shift of one or more categories on one dimension of regional authority. Dark bars refer to reforms increasing authority; light bars refer to reforms decreasing authority;  $n = 393$ .

identity (Hooghe and Marks 2009b; Schakel 2009). Each is related to a distinct conception of the purpose of government.

First, government is a means to provide public goods, such as security or clean air, which would not be provided by the market or by rational citizens acting independently (Hobbes [1651] 1960; Oates 1972). The structure of government will then reflect the efficient production of public goods given their economies of scale and externalities. Pressure for reform arises in the tension between actual and efficient government structure. Second, government is a means to enforce distributional outcomes (Marx 2003; North 1990; Olson 1993). The structure of government will then reflect the distribution of power in society. Pressure for regional reform will respond to change in power relations or change in how rulers are selected. Third, government is an expression of community and the demand for self-rule on the part of normatively distinct, territorially based groups (Connor 1967; Erk 2007b; Kymlicka 1995; Ronen 1979). The structure of government will then reflect the pattern of community.

This builds on functionalist and neofunctionalist approaches to jurisdictional design, but rejects the assumption that efficiency is the prime mover. The causal logics of efficiency, distribution, and community are distinct.

Sometimes they reinforce each other, as when a regional community in a centralized state demands more autonomy. Sometimes they clash – for example, when a dictator centralizes authority in his own hands, reducing efficiency, but making himself more secure. A theory along these lines might be described as *postfunctionalist* because it is based on the premise that, to understand the structure of government, one needs to engage distributional conflict and identity as well as efficiency.

### **An era of regionalization**

Let us take a closer look at change over time. Of the 42 countries in our dataset, 29 saw an increase in the regional authority index over the period of evaluation, eleven saw no change, and two show a decline.

No country has become much less regionalized, though we estimate a decline in two countries. Sweden's regional authority index decreases from 13.5 to 10.0 as a result of the abolition in 1971 of the upper chamber of the *Riksdag*, which was composed of regional (*län*) representatives. This put a stop to shared rule for the *län*, which was offset only partially by increased regional self-rule. Serbia-Montenegro drops 1.5 points, from 25.9 to 24.4, mainly on account of Serbia's loss of Kosovo to the United Nations.

Eight countries begin and finish the time series with an index of 0. The reason points to a functional constraint on regionalization: country size. All eight countries have a population of 2.5 million or less, and their median population is 1.09 million. A country with a small population has little space to squeeze an intermediate level of government between local authorities and the national government. Why pay for a regional level of government if local authorities serve populations of up to 150,000 and the total population of the country is in the low millions?<sup>5</sup> The jurisdictional challenge for these countries lies in creating public goods above the national state, not below it (Hooghe *et al.* 2006).

A second functional constraint is that countries with high levels of regionalization face a ceiling effect. The RAI does not impose a mathematical upper limit on regionalization because it is always possible to create an additional level of regional governance. But this is a logical, rather than a practical, possibility. Two of the eleven countries that saw no change – Switzerland and Bosnia-Herzegovina – had little scope for further regionalization. Countries that were relatively decentralized in the 1950s – Australia, Austria, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and the United States – saw, at most, a small increase in regional authority.

Functional constraints arising from a small population or the ceiling effect cannot account for the remaining country that does not shift – Bulgaria – nor do they explain the UK, where the net increase in regional authority is less than 1 point. Both countries remain considerably less regionalized than other countries of their population size. Bulgaria, with a population of 7.8 million, is the only country over 2.5 million which has so far resisted regionalization,

while Japan, with a population of 127 million, and the UK, with a population of 60 million, is only slightly more regionalized than Poland or Turkey, which are the least regionalized larger countries in the dataset. One must draw on additional factors, including the strength of national versus subnational identities, to explain these cases.

The countries that have changed most are non-federal countries with populations larger than 2.5 million, but here the commonalities end. Regions have been empowered in small countries and in large countries (measured by population and territory), ethnically diverse societies and ethnically homogeneous societies, countries that were centralized in 1950 and countries that were regionalized in 1950, established democracies and new democracies, countries that are members of the European Union and those that are not. Regionalization has taken place, to some degree, in all but a few countries not shielded by their tiny population size or by the fact that they were already highly regionalized. Why?

### **Explaining regionalization**

There are four plausible reasons: (1) the public goods for which governments are now responsible are more efficiently provided with the help of an intermediate level of government; (2) demands on the part of regional communities for more self-rule have strengthened; (3) democratization has lowered the barriers to regional reform; and (4) European integration has reduced the costs of regionalization and has catalyzed reform.

Functional efficiency in the provision of public goods provides a powerful, though incomplete, explanation (Hooghe and Marks 2009a; Piattoni 2010). Functional pressures arise because some collective problems (such as town planning or fire protection) are best handled at a population scale of tens of thousands, some (such as secondary education or hospitals) are best dealt with at a scale of hundreds of thousands, others (such as tourism promotion or transport infrastructure) are best provided at a scale of millions, while yet others require jurisdictions that are vastly larger.<sup>6</sup> In the post-Second World War era, functional pressure for regionalization resulted from a double shift in policy portfolios, away from national war making and towards new policies that are best conducted at diverse territorial scales.

Conventional war making engenders powerful functional pressures to create larger jurisdictions and to centralize authority within existing ones. Recurrent war is closely associated with the development of national states in Europe.

By the late seventeenth century, European wars were fought by centrally controlled, permanent, full-time professional armed forces in the service of the state. The development of state centralization and power made such forces possible. But in a dialectical fashion, these professional forces

also helped centralize the state by providing the means for securing financial and other resources for the state treasury.

(Holsti 1996: 29)

War making and extracting resources necessary for war were decisive in the development of national education, national taxation, conscription, and national ownership or control of mineral extraction, transport, and munitions (Tilly 1990).

The post-Second World War era – the period covered in this volume – is distinguished by the absence of conventional warfare among major powers and the corresponding absence of a powerful functional pressure for centralization. The change was not felt immediately because, in the years following the war, central states were called upon to distribute scarcity and to mobilize resources, human and financial, to rebuild battered economies. Moreover, jurisdictional arrangements are sticky – one must expect a serious lag between change in the environment and change in the structure of government.<sup>7</sup>

However, by the 1960s and 1970s, new functional pressures resulted from an unparalleled expansion of government portfolios to welfare, microeconomic, environmental, educational, health, and transport policies (Agranoff 2008; Loughlin 2007; Sharpe 1993). These policies have enlarged the responsibilities of the central state, but, unlike war, they do not compress policy making to the national level. On the contrary, each of these policies involves activities that have diverse externalities and economies of scale and, as a result, are most efficiently delivered at diverse jurisdictional scales, including a regional level between the local and national. Education, social security, and health have become the most important expenditure categories for subnational government (Braun 2000; Osterkamp and Eller 2003; Ter-Minassian 1997). Over the period that we observe them, regional governments in 19 countries have seen the scope of their authority widened to include economic policy, cultural-educational policy, and/or welfare policy.<sup>8</sup> Whereas national governments take primary responsibility for redistribution, regional and local governments assume responsibility for providing social and physical infrastructure (Peterson 1995: 17–38). As the policy portfolio has expanded, so have the competencies of regional governments.

Consistent with this, Figure 4.1 suggests an almost frozen institutional landscape following the Second World War, which was transformed, from the 1970s, into a torrent of reform. The first moves, in the 1950s, were limited to the creation or strengthening of special autonomous regions – Greenland (1953), Alaska and Hawaii (1959), Northern Territory in Australia (1960), Friuli (1963), and Auckland (1963). The first country-wide reform was in Turkey (1961), giving deconcentrated regional governments directly elected councils. Reform from the 1960s was broader and deeper – establishing communities in Belgium (1970); regional governments in France (1964, 1972); regional councils in New Zealand (1974); *comunidades autónomas* in

Spain (1978 onwards); and regional elections in Denmark (1970), Italy (1972), Norway (1975), and Sweden (1971). Altogether, there were 35 reforms in the 1950s and 1960s combined, and 89 in the 1970s.

A functional explanation assumes that similar policies will be provided at a similar scale in different countries. Comparing public spending data across 14 Western societies, Osterkamp and Eller (2003: 41) find that policies for recreation, culture, religious affairs, housing and community amenities, education, transportation and communication, and public order and safety are decentralized even in relatively centralized countries. Surveys commissioned by the Council of Europe and the Local Government Institute in the late 1990s reveal an even broader pattern of commonality (Schakel 2010). Refuse disposal is local in all 39 countries surveyed; nursery/kindergarten, sewage/water treatment and parks/open spaces are local in 37 of 39 countries. The exceptions are illuminating. Very small countries sometimes conduct policies with only local externalities at the national level (e.g. nursery/kindergarten in Cyprus; sewage in Malta). In Belarus, sewage and parks are regional rather than local. In some cases, a commitment to national unity (often in the face of demands for regional autonomy) sustains centralization. In Turkey, nursery and kindergarten policies are national, as are primary, secondary, and tertiary educational policies. The same logic applies in reverse where there are entrenched regional identities. Road construction, for example, involves the national level in all countries except Azerbaijan and Belgium.

Government is also shaped by demands on the part of communities to rule themselves. Communities – bounded groups of densely interacting humans sharing distinctive cultural norms – may wish to exercise self-rule so that laws are not imposed from the outside.<sup>9</sup> Friction between national law and minority norms can generate potent demands for jurisdictional reform. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) summarize this as a centre–periphery cleavage, a durable and sometimes violent clash between peripheral communities and state-builders (Tarrow *et al.* 1978). Many minority communities have been assimilated into nations, yet most nations continue to co-exist with minority communities that retain distinct norms rooted in language, religion, or ethnicity.<sup>10</sup>

Demands for communal self-rule may reinforce functional pressures in centralized states, but the logics are fundamentally different. Functionally determined regions tend to encompass similar-sized populations within a country; by contrast, regions based on historic communities may be very small or very large compared to other regions in the country.<sup>11</sup> Functional pressures lead to *symmetrical* regionalization, in which regions exercise equal authority; communal self-rule leads to *asymmetrical* regionalization, in which regions exercise unequal authority. Functional pressures for regionalization are non-existent in small countries; demands for communal self-rule may induce regionalization irrespective of a country's size, as in Belgium, Serbia-Montenegro, or Bosnia-Herzegovina. Functional pressures disperse authority

across multiple levels of government; communal self-rule may weaken subcommunal government and thereby concentrate authority at the regional level.

The number of territorially based minority communities has not increased over the past half-century, but demands for self-rule have gained strength. In the 21 countries tracked continuously in the RAI from 1950 to 2006, the number of ethno-regionalist parties contesting national elections increased from nine (in six countries) at the beginning of the period to 20 (in nine countries) at the end. In 2006, the share of the national vote gained by ethno-regionalist parties averaged 6.7 per cent in Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Turkey, and the UK, three times more than the average level in 1950.<sup>12</sup>

While 6.7 per cent of the national vote does not seem much, it can sometimes lead to reform. When regional parties are pivots in national government formation they can demand regional reform as a condition of support. This is what happened in Spain in 1997, when three regionalist parties, led by the Catalan CiU, bargained regional reform from the Partido Popular, despite its official support for centralization (Agranoff and Gallarín 1997; Barberà and Barrio 2006; Llamazares and Marks 2006). The 2001 regional self-governance plan in Slovakia was pressed forward by the ethnic Hungarian minority party (SMK) which was part of an anti-Mečiar government coalition (Brusis 2005; Pridham 2002).<sup>13</sup> The 2002 proposal for regional reform in Italy (subsequently rejected in a referendum) was put on the agenda by the Northern League as part of the Berlusconi coalition government (Hopkin 2009; Ruzza 2006).<sup>14</sup>

The existence of a regional party proposing regional reform may induce a mainstream competitor to try to steal its thunder (Hopkin and Van Houten 2009; Maddens and Swenden 2009; Meguid 2009). A coalition of Christian democrats and socialists empowered communities in Belgium in 1970 to preempt conservative nationalists in the Flemish *Volkswijde* and leftwing regionalists in the *Rassemblement Wallon* (Hooghe 2004; De Winter *et al.* 2006). In Italy governments of the left and right have strengthened regions (e.g. in 1997 and 2001) under pressure from the Northern League (Amoretti 2002; Hopkin 2009). The British Labour Party put devolution on the agenda only after the rise of the Scottish Nationalist Party in the early 1970s (Bogdanor 1999; Dardanelli 2009; Lynch 2006).<sup>15</sup>

Regional parties are ideologically diverse but single-minded. Some, such as the CiU, the SMK, and the Northern League, are on the economic right, while others, such as the Catalan ERC or Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland, are on the left. Some, such as the ERC or the SMK, are GAL (green/alternative/libertarian), while others, such as the NV-A or the Vlaams Belang, are TAN (tradition/authority/nation). But regional parties converge in campaigning for more regional authority and a greater share of resources for their region. This is what they usually demand in return for government support, and this

is what government parties occasionally offer in competition with them (De Winter *et al.* 2006; Jolly 2006).

Democracies are more responsive than autocracies to pressures for regionalization. This results from (a) the relative openness of democratic regimes to the expression of political demands and (b) the absence in democratic regimes of an incentive for rulers to centralize authority in their own hands to make their power (and person) secure. Candidates for office in a democracy compete by offering alternative policies to constituencies. There is no intrinsic reason why candidates proposing to centralize authority should do better than those proposing regionalization. Authoritarian rulers, by contrast, survive by stifling political opposition. Rather than decentralize authority, authoritarian regimes deconcentrate authority in regional outposts which provide information to their masters and put central directives into operation.<sup>16</sup>

Eighteen of the 42 countries covered in this book are new democracies, beginning with Greece, Portugal, and Spain in the 1970s and encompassing the western fringe of the former communist bloc after 1989. With the exception of Bulgaria, every country with a population greater than 2.5 million underwent regionalization in the decade following democratization. The third wave of democratization generated a wave of regionalization.

Finally, there are several reasons for believing that European integration has greased the wheels of regional reform.

- European integration lowers the stakes of regionalization because it insulates market regulation from national or regional control. Regionalization is sometimes resisted on the grounds that, if taken too far, it leads to insulated and inefficient markets, but European integration punctures this line of argument.<sup>17</sup>
- European integration intensifies economic competition at the regional level and induces regions to develop a capacity for strategy. EU rules curbing state aid and prohibiting national discrimination in public procurement make it difficult for national governments to insulate regions from market competition. Authoritative regions are better at exploiting their comparative advantage in the international division of labour.
- The European Commission has strengthened regional government in centralized states through its cohesion policy, which funds economic development in poor EU regions. Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Poland, and Slovakia have regionalized in part to gain access to EU funding.
- European integration has broken the mould of the centralized state. The creation of a new level of government from scratch implies that the allocation of authority is a matter of choice – not of tradition or fate. If certain policies can be shifted from states to the European Union because it is efficient to do so, why cannot others be shifted to regions on the same grounds? In its June 2009 White Paper, the Committee of the

Regions calls for a European Union Charter on Multilevel Governance on these grounds (Committee of the Regions 2009).

### **Patterns of regional government**

The elements of regional authority conceptualized in this book tend to vary together, and so it makes sense to speak of regional authority as a coherent phenomenon. However, valuable information is lost when the elements of regional authority are aggregated into a numerical index or reduced to a common factor. Regional governments have different institutional components, and these reveal a lot about the dynamics of regional reform.

A key distinction is between self-rule and shared rule. A regional government can exert authority over those living in the region itself or it can co-exercise authority in the country as a whole. These two domains of authority tend to go together ( $r = 0.70$  for 42 countries in 2006). Both self-rule and shared rule have increased in recent decades, but not in lockstep.

Self-rule is less path dependent than shared rule. Self-rule is enhanced if a regional government extends its policy responsibilities, becomes more autonomous from central control in executing them, or gains greater autonomy in selecting its office holders. This involves national legislation establishing a regional executive or assembly or legislation extending the competencies of regional government. This is no simple matter, but at least it does not require a change in the constitution. The same cannot be said of shared rule. To increase shared rule, reformers might create or empower a second national legislature that represents regions rather than individual citizens, they might create a forum in which regional governments can co-determine national policies, or they might give regional governments the right to veto amendments to the constitution. These are constitutional endeavours that usually require the backing of supermajorities.<sup>18</sup>

The result is that shared rule usually comes about when a regime is created and is difficult to reform afterwards.<sup>19</sup> Federalism – a constitutionalized system of regional authority which neither the centre nor constituent units can unilaterally change – is classically explained as a grand settlement (Bednar 2008; Elazar 1987; Watts 1999). Previously independent polities are induced to surrender elements of their sovereignty to an overarching government as a matter of survival. They need to produce a public good – national defence – on a scale that is beyond any one of them, yet they wish to sustain their distinct communities (Riker 1964).<sup>20</sup> National defence has been the prime justification for federalism, but the same line of argument applies to extracting taxes, conscription, policing, and market regulation.<sup>21</sup>

This centripetal scenario is plausible for federal regimes created in the nineteenth century or earlier, but it does not explain any reform described in this book. How else might shared rule come about? An alternative route is centrifugal, beginning with increasing levels of self-rule followed by demands for shared rule. Such demands might be articulated by those who want to

tame regions by making them co-responsible for central policy, or they might be made by regionalists themselves. As regions in a country gain more authority in their own jurisdictions, shared rule may stabilize the national polity. The barriers to reform in self-rule are lower than those for shared rule, yet the consequences are potentially more divisive. The ultimate expression of self-rule is the break-up of the country and the creation of an independent state; the ultimate expression of shared rule is the co-existence of regions in a federal polity.

This is the path taken by Belgium and the one in prospect for Spain and Italy. Following two decades of regionalization, in 1993 Belgium adopted a federal constitution enshrining shared rule. By compelling the communities to work closely with the central government through a network of collaborative agreements modelled on German cooperative federalism, reformers hoped to hold the country together. Belgium was also the first EU member to institutionalize regional involvement in EU policy making. Regional representatives lead the Belgian delegation in EU Council meetings in their areas of domestic competence (Alen and Ergec 1994; Hooghe 2004; Swenden 2006).

Shared rule does not immunize a region from reform, but it does tend to produce institutional stability. On average, regions that had substantial shared rule in 1950 had no more and no less in 2006. There are two glaring exceptions: the disempowerment of Belgian provinces in the senate (1995) and the disestablishment of the second chamber of the Swedish *Riksdag*, in which the *län* were represented (1971). In both cases regional government representatives could veto constitutional change, but in neither case did this happen. Community – or rather its long-term decline in motivating these jurisdictions – is an important part of the explanation. In Belgium, provinces gave way to the language communities as foci of communal identity (Erk 2007a). In Sweden, the communal basis of the *län* had been weakening for over half a century as the Swedish welfare state expanded (Stegmann *et al.* 2008).<sup>22</sup> When it came to voting for or against these reforms, political parties ran the show, and most provincial or *län* representatives put on their party hats. Hence regional governments with shared rule can be reined in. Two things happened to make this so: the communal basis of the regional jurisdiction declined, and political parties rather than regional office holders framed the decision.

The upshot is that the regional authority index detects three times as many reforms of self-rule than shared rule (295 to 99) in more than twice as many countries (29 to 12). For the 21 countries for which we have data since 1950, self-rule increased from an average of 7.2 in 1950 to 11.2 in 2006, while shared rule increased from 2.1 to 2.2.

The incidence of reform has been greatest in representation. Elected regional institutions have always been a facet of federal polities, but the idea has spread. Sixteen of 42 countries had directly elected regional assemblies in 1950 or when they became democratic. By 2006, an additional 12 countries

had adopted the principle, and three of the original 16 had extended the principle to a newly created regional tier. This, as Jeffery and Wincott observe, has opened up a new field for comparative inquiry: the regional election.

There were none in Scotland and Wales in the UK before 1999, Belgium before 1995, France before 1982, Spain before 1980, or the fifteen ordinary regions in Italy before 1970 (the five special status regions first held elections over the period 1946–63). Only the three long-standing federal states of Austria, Germany and Switzerland have held regional elections in all parts of the state extending back at least to the Second World War.

(Jeffery and Wincott 2010)

It is implausible to lay this development at the door of efficiency, for the obvious reason that regional representation introduces additional transaction costs in decision making. Demands on the part of regional communities for greater self-rule have contributed, but the spread of representation goes far beyond linguistic or ethno-territorial communities. It extends even to the empowerment of the European Parliament, and suggests the strength of the liberal democratic norm that those who exercise authority in general-purpose jurisdictions – below or above the national state – should compete for election (Rittberger 2005). Regional democracy has the additional virtue of increasing the possibilities of communication between citizens and rulers (Elazar 1972). Surveys show that citizens in a variety of regions prefer government to be closer to them to make it easier to get their voices heard (Jeffery and Wincott 2010). Such arguments feature prominently in the claims of regionalists (Sharpe 1993).

Reform of fiscal authority has been less pronounced. Regional governments in ten countries gained fiscal autonomy, while in two (Germany and the UK) they lost authority. For the 21 countries for which we have the full time series, fiscal autonomy nudged up from a country average of 1.4 in 1950 to 2.1 in 2006.

This modest increase is surprising because regions that can spend without having to raise equivalent taxes may exploit a moral hazard. The IMF, the OECD, and many government advisers recommend fiscal decentralization to impose a regional budget constraint (Rodden 2006). However, reform has proven difficult because it creates winners and losers in a zero-sum game. Fiscal autonomy throws regions back on their own resources, helping rich regions and hurting poor (Bolton and Roland 1997; Van Houten 2003). Moreover, the dynamic effects of fiscal autonomy are contested. Some economists like regional tax autonomy because it sharpens competition among regions and reduces the tax burden, whereas others claim that this will lead to a race to the bottom and inadequate provision of public goods (Musgrave 1997; Oates 2006; Weingast 1995; Wibbels 2006).

Fiscal reform has been most common where the stakes are lowest – i.e. for individual special autonomous regions (territories in Australia and Canada,

Greenland in Denmark, the *regioni a statuto speciale* and the provinces of Bolzano and Trento in Italy, Azores and Madeira in Portugal, Scotland in the UK, and Alaska, Hawaii, and Washington, DC, in the USA) and asymmetrical regions (Greater London Authority in the UK and the Basque Country and Navarre in Spain).<sup>23</sup>

Each dimension of regional reform tells a particular story. Shared rule and self-rule, regional representation and fiscal autonomy, are akin to members of a family who are similar or different depending on the frame of comparison. Statistical tests indicate that the dimensions are closely associated and can be conceptualized as expressions of a single latent variable (see Chapter 1). Reducing the data in this way alerts one to the big picture: an era of regionalization which has reshaped the structure of government in every country that is not small or already regionalized. But it is worth stressing that this is a simplification based on the assumption that the intervals across the dimensions are equal and that error is random. Reducing the data to a single dimension has the virtue of bringing a fundamental development to our attention, but it is worth keeping the diversity of regionalization and its multiple causes in mind.

### Five generalizations

The following hypotheses summarize the discussion and suggest several topics for further research.

- First, an *S-curve* describing the effect of population size on regional authority.

The S-curve results from three functional constraints: (a) regional authority increases in step with the logarithm of population; (b) this effect kicks in only when a country's population reaches a certain level (>2 million); and (c) it diminishes as regional government becomes authoritative.

Figure 4.2 illustrates this.<sup>24</sup> No country in our dataset with a population of less than 2.5 million has regional government. Presumably, the gap between local and national government in such societies is too small to justify the cost of creating and maintaining an additional jurisdictional level. Every country with a population greater than 2.5 million had an intermediate level of government by 2006, and in countries with larger populations these tend to be more authoritative.

- Second, a *heteroskedasticity effect*, in which the variance in regional authority among larger countries is greater than that among smaller countries.

Functional pressures may lead to reform, or then again they may not. Where they exist, functional pressures are mediated by the effects of reform on redistribution and community. These vary widely across countries and give rise to contrasting outcomes.




Figure 4.2 Population, ethnicity, and regional authority.

Note: 42 countries. Solid circles indicate societies where the probability that two randomly selected individuals belong to a different ethnic group is 0.4 or higher; empty circles refer to societies where the probability that two randomly selected individuals belong to a different ethnic group is below 0.4 (Fearon 2003).  $\text{Log}_{10}$  of population: 5 = 100,000, 6 = 1 million, 7 = 10 million, 8 = 100 million, and 9 = 1 billion.

The argument that efficiency gaps produce large standard errors has a temporal implication. Groups of countries *not* subject to functional pressures should have smaller, more homogeneous, rates of change. Australia, Canada, Germany, Iceland, Luxembourg, Sweden, Switzerland, and the USA were not subject to great functional pressure in 1950, either because they have small populations or because their level of regional authority puts them at, or slightly above, the S-curve. Over the following 56 years, these countries experienced, on average, little change in regional authority ( $-0.1$  on the RAI), with little variation (standard deviation = 1.5). The remaining countries witnessed a substantial average increase in regional authority (6.1), but with a large average standard deviation (4.1).<sup>25</sup>

The more closely one examines the particular circumstances of an individual reform, the less it may appear to be determined by efficiency. Efficiency excludes certain possibilities, but rarely specifies a unique optimum. So, for example, a local good such as refuse disposal may be efficiently

provided at the regional – or, arguably, the local – level, but not at the national, continental, or global level. Efficiency takes certain alternatives off the table, and is therefore most evident in aggregation.

- Third, a *community effect*, in which the allocation of authority to a jurisdiction is influenced by the relative strength of a population's identity to the community encompassed by the jurisdiction.<sup>26</sup>

The community effect arises because individuals prefer to choose rulers who share their cultural/linguistic/political norms. This is an impetus for regional self-government in countries that contain distinct ethno-territorial groups, and an impetus towards centralization where a strong national identity confronts weak regional identities (Brubaker 1996; Marx 2003; Smith 1995). Hence, where regional community is strong, one should find more regional authority than one would expect on efficiency grounds. Where national identity is strong, one should find less regional authority.<sup>27</sup>

This appears to be the case in Figure 4.2. Solid circles represent countries where the probability that two randomly selected individuals belong to a different ethnic group is 0.4 or greater. The measure is crude for our purpose because it does not reveal whether an ethnic group is, or is not, territorially concentrated, but it does, nevertheless, distinguish countries that lie above the S-curve. On the same logic, countries located well below the S-curve – Turkey, Poland, Bulgaria, Portugal, the UK, and Japan – are those in which national identity has been a force for centralization.

- Fourth, a *democracy effect*, which leads democracies to have higher levels of regional authority than dictatorships.

A dictator strives to centralize authority in his own hands to sustain his power and extract rent. Power alone is plausibly a sufficient incentive. A dictator rules because he decides who rules. His tenure depends on frustrating or eliminating alternative claimants. Dispersing authority is a dangerous luxury for a dictator if it provides opponents with an alternative power base.

By contrast, democratic governments survive by competing in elections. Whether a regional reform helps or hurts a ruler's electoral chances depends on its consequences for efficiency, distribution, and identity. These are situational. There is no reason why politicians competing in elections should always propose to decentralize authority, but then again there is no reason to believe that they will always resist doing so. Hence dictatorship inhibits regionalism, while democracy lets the chips fall where they may.

The regional authority index is currently restricted to democracies and semi-democracies, and so is censored, but evidence from new democracies is broadly in line with the democracy effect.<sup>28</sup> If dictatorship represses regionalization, then this should be evident following democratization. Figure 4.3 reveals that new democracies have considerably more regionalization than established democracies.




Figure 4.3 Democracy and regional authority.

Source: [www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org) (historical data: comparative scores). The new democracies are Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia-Montenegro (from 2000), Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain.

Note: The y-axis indicates annual change per decade in the regional authority index;  $n = 38$ . The light bars are average scores for countries that are scored 'free' for 1972–2006 by Freedom House; the dark bars are average scores for countries for the decade following a shift from 'not free' to 'partly free' – not including countries that revert to 'not free' (i.e. Russia).

- Fifth, an *integration effect*, which lowers the economic costs of regionalization by providing an overarching framework of rules for economic exchange.

When economic rule making is transnational rather than national, existing patterns of trade are insulated from reform in the allocation of authority within countries. Shifting authority to a region does not then impose economic autarky, and is therefore less costly for the region (Jolly 2006).

Assessing this effect is complicated because European integration may increase regionalization for other reasons (Börzel 2002). Several member states have created regional levels in order to conform with EU rules on cohesion funding (Bache 2007; Brusis 2005; Hooghe 1996; Hughes *et al.* 2004). Regions in several European countries have sought to bolster their powers in education, research, transport, and trade – including forming international partnerships – to compete more effectively in the single market. Within an

individual country, a weak region does not suffer a competitive disadvantage because it is just one among similarly weak regions. Except in asymmetrical regionalization, jurisdictional reform does not affect the competitive situation of a region relative to others in the same country. The European Union, however, integrates previously insulated subnational systems and, hence, brings regional governments into competition. The perception is that weak regions are at a disadvantage (Jeffery 2000).

Countries experience slightly higher rates of regionalization when they are members of the EU. The mean rate of change for EU members is 1.13 shifts per decade, where a shift is a movement towards regionalization along one of the eight dimensions of the RAI. That for non EU members is 0.75. The two populations – EU members and non-EU members – vary in several ways that have a bearing on this, but an integration effect survives multivariate controls (Schakel 2009).

## **Conclusion**

Regional government in 42 advanced industrial societies over the past half-century can be summarized under two headings. The first is that change is mostly in one direction. We detect 56 reforms that weaken regional authority and 337 reforms that strengthen regional authority – a ratio of 1:6. Twenty-nine countries surveyed have regionalized, two have become less regionalized, and eleven are unchanged.

We suspect that one-sided change is not unique to the post-Second World War period. A prior era of state-building, which lasted for considerably more than a century, was characterized by similar consistency in the direction of change, but with the opposite sign. So an era of centralization has been followed by an era of decentralization.

Second, there is wide variation across countries in the level of regional authority. Eight countries have no regional level of government, even after more than half a century of regionalization, and a further four score less than 5 on the regional authority index. Thirteen countries have regions that exert considerable authority, scoring more than 15 on the index. So the variation is wide. The standard deviation for 42 countries in 2006 is 9.1, which is almost as large as the average score, 10.8. This variation appears historically robust. Although many polities became more centralized in the first half of the twentieth century, relatively decentralized federal polities continued to co-exist with highly centralized polities.<sup>29</sup>

Imre Lakatos argues that scientists should put the necks of their theories on the block by making falsifiable predictions. Our chief goal has been to provide carefully constructed data on a basic political phenomenon. But we wish also to take Lakatos's advice, knowing that our own necks are likely to be safe irrespective of the fate of our theory.

Casting aside timidity: countries above the S-curve will, in the next few decades, experience much less regionalization on average and much more

homogeneity with respect to change than those below the S-curve. One would then expect little or no regionalization in Bosnia-Herzegovina or in Belgium (barring their possible break-up into entities with low or middling levels of regional authority), or in Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, Germany, and the USA. Conversely, Bulgaria, Turkey, Poland, Romania, the UK, and Japan are subject to functional pressures that will lead to a large average shift towards regional authority, but with a large standard deviation.

Countries that democratize will regionalize; those that become autocratic will centralize. So, for example, if Turkey further democratizes it will regionalize; if Russia continues on a non-democratic path one can expect it to become more centralized.

The data gathered here, if extended into the future, will be useful in evaluating such claims – or ‘guesses’, in the words of Richard Feynman. But fundamental questions remain. How are efficiency, distribution, and community expressed in the politics of jurisdictional reform? How do the components of regionalization affect each other? What are the policy consequences of regionalization and of variation in the components of regionalization? How robust are generalizations about regional authority for multilevel governance among as well as within states? To make headway with these questions we need not only better theory, but better information about the structure of government from the local and regional levels to the national, international, and global.

## Appendix A

### Profiles of regional reform in 42 countries (1950–2006)<sup>1</sup>

#### Self-rule

##### *Institutional depth and policy scope*

###### *Albania*

Albania was one of the most centralized communist countries in Europe until the regime fell in 1992 and the first free local elections were held. The country had a three-tier local government structure topped by 36 district councils (*rrhethë*). *Rrhethe* survived the transition to democracy in March 1992 but, with an average population of around 100,000, they are too small to be considered a regional tier.

Under pressure from the Albanian association of municipalities backed by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe, the government enacted a reform in 2000 which created twelve regions (*qarku*), reduced *rrhethë* to deconcentrated subdivisions, and strengthened local government. The average population of a *qark* is about 250,000. *Qarku* were granted little authority over policy. They are concerned with regional planning, co-ordinating actions of regional interest, and delivering public services delegated by the central government or by the constituent municipalities and communes.

#### CODING

Albania scores 0 for 1992–9. *Qarku* score 1 (depth) and 0 (scope) for 2000–06.

###### *Australia*

Australia is a federation with a strong regional tier consisting of six states and, since 1978 and 1989, two territories which are treated as special autonomous regions. Throughout its history Australia has also had second-tier counties in some states (for example, in New South Wales), but their average population is just over 120,000, too small to be considered a regional tier.

The constitution enumerates federal legislative powers in trade and commerce, taxation, defence, banking, census and statistics, currency, weights

and measures, naturalization, marriage and divorce, copyright and patents, foreign affairs, railways, and immigration. These federal powers are concurrent with state powers, in that states may exercise such powers as long as state law is not inconsistent with Commonwealth law. States and territories legislate on all other policies, including health, education, social welfare, criminal and civil law, local government, and citizenship. The difference between a state and a territory is that the powers of the territories are not constitutionally guaranteed and the governor-general may withhold assent or recommend amendments to proposed territory laws. Also, the Commonwealth parliament retains authority over uranium mining and Aboriginal lands – powers it does not possess with respect to the states. Notwithstanding these limitations, the territories have extensive authority over a range of policies similar to the states. The Northern Territory gained quasi-state status in 1978 and the Australian Capital Territory (Canberra) in 1989. Territories do not enjoy control over immigration or citizenship.

## CODING

Australian *states* score 3 (depth) and 4 (scope) for 1950–2006. The *territories* score 1, 0 before self-government (*Northern Territory*: 1950–77; *Australian Capital Territory*: 1950–88), and 2, 3 thereafter.

*Austria*

Austria is a federation with a strong regional tier of nine *Länder*. Ninety-nine *Bezirke* operate as decentralized state and *Land* administrations, but their average population is too small to classify as regional.

There have been no major legislative changes in policy scope since 1955, when the Austrian federation of 1929 was reinstated after Allied occupation. The constitution details the extensive legislative powers of the federal level and the more limited legislative powers of *Länder*. *Länder* exercise residual powers and have extensive executive authority over housing, health policy, poverty policy, land reform, labour law, and public schools. The federal government has authority over immigration law and sets the legal framework for citizenship, while *Länder* have executive competence for nationality and right of citizenship. *Länder* are also responsible for their own administrative procedures and the composition and organization of *Länder* parliaments.

## CODING

*Länder* score 3 (depth) and 3 (scope) for 1955–2006.

*Belgium*

Belgium was transformed from a decentralized unitary state with one relatively strong regional tier (*provincies/provinces*) in 1950 to a decentralized

federal state with two strong regional tiers of government by 1993. *Regions* and *communities* form the upper tier, *provinces* the lower.

The constitution of 1830 enshrined the principle of local and provincial autonomy, but it did not enumerate provincial competencies. Provinces administer secondary education, roads, and social welfare and are responsible for implementing national laws and, since federalization, communal and regional laws as well.

The constitutional reform of 1970 created a new, higher-level intermediate tier in response to autonomist demands. Two models of devolved government were instituted. To accommodate demands for cultural autonomy, the constitution defined three communities (*Communauté française*, *Vlaamse Gemeenschap*, *Deutsche Gemeinschaft*). The Francophone community encompasses the Walloon region and French speakers in Brussels; the Dutch-speaking community encompasses the Flemish region and Dutch speakers in Brussels; and the German-speaking community encompasses the eastern cantons. So the communities have somewhat fluid territorial boundaries. Law makers also wrote the principle of regional autonomy into the constitution to accommodate demands for socioeconomic autonomy. In contrast to the communities, these regions – *Vlaams Gewest*, *Région wallonne*, *Bruxelles-Région-Capitale/Brussel Hoofdstedelijk Gewest* – have identifiable, though contested, boundaries.

A limited form of cultural autonomy was put into effect in 1971, when a special law set up two cultural councils consisting of Flemish- and French-speaking members of the national parliament, respectively. The councils monitored small executive cells within the national government and had authority to pass ‘decrees’ on narrowly defined aspects of culture, education, and language. The German cultural council was directly elected from 1974.

The 1980 reform created separate executives and administrations for regions as well as communities, but no directly elected councils (except for the previously established German council). Brussels remained under national tutelage. Regions had responsibility for regional development and environmental, water, and infrastructural policy, while the competencies of the communities were expanded to include welfare policy, vocational training, and education. The institutions of community and region were merged on the Flemish side, but they remained separate on the Francophone side. In 1989 devolution was deepened for both regions and communities to include regional economic policy, local government, education, health policy, public utilities, transport, and limited taxation powers. Regional and community councils were still indirectly elected except in Brussels, which now obtained its own institutions, including a directly elected regional council.

The constitutional reform of 1993 declared Belgium a federation of three communities and three regions. However, five constituent units are recognized legally: the Walloon region, the Brussels region, the German community, the Francophone community, and the Flemish community (this last combines community and regional competencies). The 1993 constitutional

revisions, which came into force in 1995, put in place institutions that are typical of modern federations: directly elected assemblies; a senate representing territorial interests; residual competencies residing with the constituent units; fiscal federalism; constitutional autonomy for each level with respect to its own administration; and machinery for intergovernmental co-ordination and conflict resolution. In addition, communities and regions have the authority to make international treaties on issues within their competence. The regional competencies of the German community were initially exercised by the Walloon region. The German community absorbed responsibility for social aid and anti-poverty policy in 1993, rural planning and natural protection in 1994, employment policy in 2000, and local government in 2005.

Regions exercise competencies over regional economic development (including employment policy, industrial restructuring, the environment, nature conservation, and rural development), housing, land-use planning and urban renewal, water resources and sewage, energy policy (except for national infrastructure and nuclear energy), roads, waterways, regional airports and public local transport, and, since 2001, local government, agriculture, and external trade. Framework legislation remains mostly federal. The communities have responsibility for matters related to individuals: culture (including arts, youth policy, tourism), language policy (except in local authorities with a special language regime), education, and health and welfare (including hospitals but not social security), with far-reaching international competencies in these areas. The communities set the legislative framework for culture and for secondary and tertiary education. The list of exclusive federal competencies is short: defence, justice and national security, social security, fiscal monetary policy, citizenship, and immigration.

While the formal competencies of the provinces have not been weakened, the principal intermediate units of government are the regions and the communities. With the partition of Brabant in 1993, there are ten instead of nine provinces, and administrative oversight lies with the regions rather than the federal state.

#### CODING

Country scores use the highest score on each dimension for the relevant community or region to avoid double-counting where regional authority is exercised by overlapping jurisdictions. For example, the Francophone community encompasses the Walloon region and Francophones in Brussels. The competencies exercised by the Francophone community, the Walloon region, and the Brussels region are combined in scoring the Francophone community. From 1980 to 1988 the Francophone community scores 2 (depth), because it is a decentralized general-purpose administration subject to central government veto, and 1 (scope), because it exercises significant authority in one major policy area – cultural–educational policy. The Walloon region also

scores 2 (depth) and 1 (scope), and its 1 (scope) reflects the fact that it has significant authority in economic policy. The Brussels region, however, falls under national control, and therefore scores 1 (depth) and 0 (scope). This is aggregated as 2, 2, but, since about 19 per cent of Francophones (those living in Brussels) have self-government only in cultural-educational matters and not in economic policy, the policy score is adjusted downwards. Hence, the final score is 2 (depth) and  $2 \times 0.814 + 1 \times 0.186$  (scope), which equals 2 (depth) and 1.8 (scope).

Raw scores: The scores for the five upper-tier subnational units are as follows. The *Vlaamse Gemeenschap* scores 2 (depth) and 1 (scope) for 1970–79; 2, 2 for 1980–88; and 3, 3 for 1989–2006. The *Communauté française* scores 2, 1 for 1970–88 and 3, 2 for 1989–2006. The German community scores 2, 1 for 1970–88; 3, 2 for 1989–99; and 3, 3 for 2000–06. The *Région wallonne* scores 2, 1 for 1980–88, 3, 2 for 1989–94; and 3, 3 for 1995–2006. The *Brussels region* scores 1, 0 for 1980–88; 3, 2 for 1989–94; and 3, 3 for 1995–2006.

Aggregated scores: The *Vlaamse Gemeenschap* scores 2 (depth) and 1 (scope) for 1970–79; 2, 2 (1.97) for 1980–88; and 3, 3 for 1989–2006. The *Communauté française* scores 2, 1 for 1970–79; 2, 1.8 for 1980–88; and 3, 3 for 1989–2006. The *Deutsche Gemeinschaft* scores 2, 1 for 1970–88; 3, 2 for 1989–99; and 3, 3 for 2000–06. *Provincies/provinces* score 2, 2 for 1950–2006.

#### *Bosnia-Herzegovina*

The confederation of Bosnia-Herzegovina contains two upper level units ('entities'), the *Republika Srpska* and the *Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine*. There are also cantons in the constitutive entity of the *Federacija*. Under the auspices of the United Nations the culturally mixed Brčko district has had a special statute since 2000. Its autonomy status is not recognized in the constitution of the confederation or in that of the entities, and depends on the protection of the high representative of the United Nations. The Brčko district is not coded here.

The confederation was the product of the Dayton Agreement of 1995, which put an end to several years of civil war in post-Yugoslavia. Confederal competencies are limited to foreign policy, trade, customs, monetary policy, international and inter-entity criminal law enforcement, regulation of inter-entity transportation, and air traffic control. The two constituent entities have their own military forces and have independent budgets. They are responsible (concurrently with the confederal government or, in the case of the *Federacija*, also with the cantons) for the police, environmental policy, social policy, agriculture, refugees, reconstruction, justice, taxation, and customs. Immigration, refugee, and asylum policy are confederal competencies, but citizenship is primarily an entity competence. Once a citizen has obtained citizenship in *Republika Srpska* or *Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine* she or he automatically acquires confederal citizenship. Within the *Federacija*, citizenship is a federal competence.

The entities have starkly different structures of government. *Republika Srpska* has no intermediate tier. *Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine* has an authoritative intermediate tier consisting of ten cantons (*županije*). Five cantons have a Bosniac majority, three have a Croat majority, and two are mixed Bosniac and Croat. The average population size of a canton is about 230,000. These cantons have their own basic laws (constitutions) and their own governments, as well as ministries. Hence the *Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine* is a relatively loose federation in which the federal level has powers in taxation, defence, foreign affairs (concurrent with the confederation and the cantons), citizenship, and the right to authorize cantons to conclude agreements with states and international organizations. Virtually all other competencies lie at the cantonal level.

## CODING

The *entities* score 3 (depth) and 4 (scope), and the *cantons* in the *Federacija* score 3 (depth) and 3 (scope) for 1995–2006.

*Bulgaria*

Bulgaria is a unitary state with a regionally deconcentrated administration. In 1991 its first democratic constitution continued to deconcentrate central administration in nine regions (*oblasti*). A reform in 1999 reinstated the 28 regions that existed before 1987. Although *oblasti* have a basis in the constitution, they do not exercise autonomous authority. They co-ordinate activities of state bodies, preserve and protect state property, and exert administrative and legal control over local governments and territorially deconcentrated state bodies.

## CODING

*Oblasti* score 1 (depth) and 0 (scope) for 1991–2006.

*Canada*

Canada has ten provinces and three territories. Some provinces have a lower-level intermediate tier. The territories are treated as special autonomous regions.

Provinces and territories differ greatly in population, ranging from 31,000 in Yukon and Nunavut to 11.4 million in Ontario. The major difference between a Canadian province and a territory is that a province receives powers directly from the crown (or, since 1982, the constitution), while a territory's powers are granted by federal law. Hence, the constitution, which was repatriated from the UK in 1982, enumerates federal and provincial

competencies but not those of the territories. Another difference is that the formal head of the territories, the commissioner, is a representative of the federal government, in contrast to their counterpart in the provinces, the lieutenant-governor, who is a representative of the queen. The Acts of the Northwest Territories and Nunavut (but not Yukon) also stipulate that the legislatures exercise their powers 'subject to any other Act of Parliament'. However, in recent decades the commissioner has been under federal instruction to act like a provincial lieutenant-governor – that is to say, to interpret their role as ceremonial and symbolic rather than substantive. Therefore, like provinces, the territories score 3 on institutional depth.

Provinces have extensive competencies in education, agriculture, tax, finance, immigration, pensions, local government, and natural resources. Residual powers, as well as naturalization and citizenship (but not immigration), are retained by the federal government. Quebec has somewhat more extensive competencies in immigration, pensions, health, and education. Over the past three decades there has been intense debate concerning whether Quebec should be constitutionally recognized as a 'distinct society'. On 30 October 2003 the National Assembly of Quebec voted unanimously to affirm 'that the Quebecers form a nation', and on 27 November 2006 the federal House of Commons passed a symbolic motion declaring that 'this House recognize[s] that the Québécois form a nation within a united Canada'. However, there is considerable uncertainty over what this means. One tangible element of Quebec's special status is that it has acquired opt-outs or special arrangements on matters that are deemed central to its identity. Legally, opt-outs are extended to all provinces if they so wish, though only Quebec has made use of them. These distinctions are too fine to be captured by this scale, so Quebec is given the same score as other provinces.

The territories were treated initially as quasi-colonies governed from Ottawa, but over the years their competencies have been extended. The Northwest Territories obtained some devolved authority in education, housing, and social services in 1967 and extensive self-rule with the Act of 1985, and now have authority over essentially the same set of policies as provinces (except for mineral resources, immigration, and citizenship). Yukon became self-governing in 1978, when its executive was made responsible to the elected legislative assembly and took control over all budgetary and policy issues. But it was given only formal provincial-type powers (including immigration, but not criminal prosecution) with the Act of 2002. Nunavut, formerly a part of the Northwest Territories, was granted autonomy in 1999, at which point it received extensive policy competence (excluding immigration and citizenship).

Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia (since 1965) have second-tier governments. Ontario has 22 regions and eight counties (in the south) which have an average population of about 230,000. These governments have extensive responsibilities in economic development, urban planning, and

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social services, and are run by councils of mayors and municipal councillors. Quebec has also three *communautés urbaines*, with an average population of just above 800,000, which are not included here since they are more appropriately considered as associations of local government. Second-tier councils in British Columbia (145,000) and counties in Quebec (70,000) fall shy of the population criterion.

### CODING

*Provinces* score 3 (depth) and 4 (scope) for 1950–2006. The *Northwest Territories* score 1, 0 for 1950–66; 2, 2 for 1967–85; and 3, 3 for 1986–2006. *Yukon* scores 1, 0 for 1950–77; 2, 3 for 1978–2001; and 3, 4 for 2002–6. *Nunavut* scores 3, 3 for 1999–2006. *Counties* and *regions* in Ontario score 2, 2 for 1950–2006.

### Croatia

Croatia is divided into 21 cantons (*županije*) with an average population of about 200,000. Cantons were set up after the first subnational elections of 1993, two years after independence. Cantons implement policy in the domains of education, health care, zoning and town planning, economic development, and transport and transportation infrastructure.

### CODING

Croatia scores 0 for 1991–2, and *županije* score 2 (depth) and 2 (scope) for 1993–2006.

### Cyprus

Cyprus became independent from the UK in 1960. The republic has six districts (*eparchies*) with district officers who are responsible for applying central government policies. With an average population of 105,000, they are too small to qualify as regional.

One district and parts of two other districts are controlled by the Turkish-Cypriot government. After two decades of Greek-Turkish tensions on the island, the northern part proclaimed independence in 1983 as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, but among the international community the only country to recognize the republic was Turkey. The Greek-Cypriot government continues to claim authority over the whole island, and EU funds and policies apply to Turkish – as well as Greek – Cypriots.

### CODING

Cyprus scores 0 for 1960–2006.

*The Czech Republic*

The Czech Republic became independent in 1993 as one of the two successor states of Czechoslovakia. Until 2003 the country had 77 districts (*okres*), which had been established in 1990 as deconcentrated state administrations, but their population size is too small to classify as regional. In 1997, 14 regions (*kraje*) were conceived at a superordinate level. According to the Act on Regions, they have limited economic competencies in the areas of development, transport, and tourism. Special laws give *kraje* some powers in secondary education, health, and environmental protection. *Kraje* began functioning in 2000 after several rounds of discussions concerning the division of tasks between municipalities, districts, and regions.

## CODING

The Czech Republic scores 0 for 1993–9, and *kraje* score 2 (depth) and 1 (scope) for 2000–06.

*Denmark*

Denmark has had counties (*amtskommuner*, later renamed *amter*) from 1950: 25 before 1970, 16 thereafter. Both before and after 1970, the average population of Danish counties exceeds 150,000. Denmark has also two special autonomous regions, the Faroe Islands (in Faroese: *Føroyar*; in Danish: *Færøerne*) and Greenland (in Greenlandic: *Kalaallit Nunaat*; in Danish: *Grønland*).

Before the reform of 1970, counties formed the intermediate tier between rural municipalities and the national government (except for cities and towns, where there was a single lower tier) and had authority over major roads, hospitals, secondary schools, courthouses, and prisons. Since 1970 counties have acquired administrative powers in welfare provision, hospitals, secondary education, nature protection and the environment, economic development, spatial planning, and regional transport.

In 2007 *amter* were replaced by five regions which have responsibility mainly for health policy, while the number of municipalities was reduced from 270 to 98. The enlarged municipalities have taken over most of the *amter* policies.

The Faroe Islands, or Faroes, were an integral part of Denmark until home rule in 1948. The Home Rule Act contained an extensive list of *de jure* competencies which the Faroese government could repatriate at its choosing, as well as a shorter list for possible negotiation. Residual powers remained with the Danish government. The Faroese repatriated most matters on both lists over the following decades. In 2005 two new constitutional agreements granted the Faroes residual powers, while Danish authority was limited to a 'negative list' of national competencies which includes the Danish

constitution, citizenship, the Supreme Court, monetary and currency policy, and foreign, security, and defence policy. The agreement lists 12 policy areas, among them immigration and border control and passports, to be devolved by mutual agreement. The government of the Faroes was allowed to join international organizations and to conclude or renounce international agreements on exclusive Faroese affairs without prior Danish consent. In December 2006 the constitutional committee of the Faroese parliament submitted a draft constitution with provisions for a future referendum on secession from Denmark.

Greenland was a Danish colony until 1953, when it became a Danish county, and in 1979 it gained home rule under stipulations similar to those for the Faroes. In 2003 a committee on self-governance published a report recommending deepening self-governance.

Both territories have their own legislative and executive bodies, and they have extensive authoritative competencies for local government, taxation, social welfare, education, culture, health, and local development, as well as authority to conduct international relations on home-rule matters. Policy decisions are not subject to central veto. The Danish government remains responsible for immigration and citizenship in both territories. The Faroe Islands were never part of the European Economic Community/EU, and Greenland severed membership ties in 1985.

#### CODING

*Amter* score 2 (depth) and 1 (scope) for 1950–69 and 2, 2 for 1970–2006. The *Faroe Islands* score 3, 3 for 1950–2006. *Greenland* scores 1, 0 as colony; 2, 1 as an ordinary Danish county for 1953–69; 2, 2 for 1970–78; and 3, 3 under home rule for 1979–2006.

#### *Estonia*

Estonia has a deconcentrated intermediate tier of government between local and national government consisting of 15 counties (*maakonnad*). These are too small to be classified as regional.

#### CODING

Estonia scores 0 for 1992–2006.

#### *Finland*

Finland has two levels of intermediate governance: provinces (*läänit*) and, from 1993, regions (*maakuntien*; sing. *maakunta*). It has also a special autonomous region, the Åland Islands.

Finland's provinces were created in 1634 and enlarged in 1997, when the

number was reduced from 12 to six. However, *läänit* were never equipped with significant authority, and the 1997 reform reduced their role to deconcentrated outposts of state ministries. *Läänit* are headed by a centrally appointed governor.

In 1993, 19 regions were created, with an average population of 279,000. The main tasks of the regions are regional planning, economic development, and education.

Home rule is practised on the predominantly Swedish-speaking Åland Islands, which were granted autonomy in 1920 after a tense period that nearly led to war between Sweden and Finland. Autonomy was reinforced in 1951 and again in 1991 (coming into force in 2004). The Åland government is responsible to its directly elected assembly. The Finnish government has authority over foreign affairs, defence, civil and criminal law, the court system, customs, taxation, and immigration. The most important Åland competencies, enumerated in the 1991 Act, are education, culture and preservation of ancient monuments, health and medical care, environment, industry promotion, internal transport, local government, policing, postal communications, and radio and television. The Åland government controls right of domicile on the islands, which gives it concurrent control over citizenship. The right of domicile (*hembygdsrätt/kotiseutu-oikeus*), or regional citizenship, is a prerequisite for the right to vote or stand in elections to the Åland parliament, own real estate, or exercise a trade or profession. Right of domicile is acquired at birth if possessed by either parent. Finnish citizens who have lived in Åland for five years and, since the 1991 Act, can prove adequate knowledge of Swedish may apply for the status, but the procedure is restrictive. Those who have lived outside Åland for more than five years lose their right of domicile. The Åland government can grant exemptions.

The Finnish president's right to veto Åland laws is highly circumscribed. He or she can do so only if the parliament has exceeded its legislative authority or if the bill would affect Finland's security, and after having obtained an opinion from the Åland Delegation (half Åland-, half Finnish-appointed) and, in rare cases, the Finnish Supreme Court.

#### CODING

*Läänit* score 1 (depth) and 0 (scope) for 1950–2006; *maakuntien* score 2, 1 for 1993–2006; the *Åland Islands* score 3, 4 for 1950–2006.

#### France

France has two tiers of regional government, *régions* and *départements*, as well as, since 1982, a special autonomous region, Corsica.

Ninety-six *départements* have long-standing administrative competencies in education, environment, town planning, health, and regional planning. Before 1982 each was headed by a prefect, appointed by the central state.

After the reform of 1982, most prefectural powers were transferred to presidents of elected *département* councils. The prefect is now responsible mainly for mandating the legality of *département* actions. Hence, *départements* are both decentralized authorities and deconcentrated divisions of the state.

In 1955, 22 planning regions (*circonscriptions d'action régionale*) were set up as part of a top-down economic strategy. Initially, these regions were purely administrative categories, but after 1964 they were headed by a prefect who co-ordinated public investment decisions within a national economic plan. Two advisory bodies assisted the prefect: one composed of state officials representing the various national ministries, and one composed of experts, local politicians, and socioeconomic elites. A regional reform in 1972 renamed the *circonscriptions* as '*régions*', and gave them legal status, a limited budget that included some autonomous taxation power, limited competencies in regional development, and regional consultative councils composed of national parliamentarians elected from the *région* alongside those representing *départements* and local governments. However, *régions* remained in the shadow of *départements*.

Regionalization was deepened considerably with the Defferre reforms of 1982 and 1983, which established directly elected regional assemblies with accountable regional presidents. *Régions* gained authority over education (excluding tertiary education), career training, planning and economic development, urban planning, the environment, and transport. The reforms came on line in 1986 after the first regional elections. However, as with *départements*, central state deconcentration lingered alongside regional authority. The post of regional prefect was reduced, rather than abolished, thus creating a two-headed regional executive.

The constitutional reform of 2003 established the principle of subnational devolution. Legislation in the same year consolidated regional competencies in vocational training, secondary schools and school transport, regional and town planning, rail transport, the environment, and culture.

Corsica (*Corse*) became a separate region in 1975 with the same limited authority as mainland *circonscriptions*. In 1982, four years ahead of the rest of France, Corsica became a *région* with directly exercised competencies, a budget, a directly elected assembly, and an executive elected by the assembly. In 1991 its special statute was deepened when it was recognized as a *collectivité territoriale spécifique*, whereby its institutional set-up was reorganized along the lines of the *départements d'outre mer*. Corsica was granted extensive powers around the two pillars of the statute: economic, social, and cultural development; and preservation of Corsican identity and environment. Corsican self-rule was strengthened further in 2002, when it gained entitlement to additional state subsidies and some enhanced authority (beyond that of other *régions*) over education, culture, the environment, agriculture, housing, transport, and social policy. These do not include authority for local government, regional political institutions, police, immigration and citizenship, or residual powers.

France's four overseas regions (*régions/départements d'outre mer*) are not included.

## CODING

*Régions* score 1 (depth) and 0 (scope) for 1964–85 and 2, 2 for 1986–2006. *Départements* score 2, 1 for 1950–81 and 2, 2 for 1982–2006. *Corsica* scores 2, 2 for 1982–2006.

*Germany*

Germany has two-tiered regional government consisting of *Länder* and (*Land*) *Kreise*. Several *Länder* have a third tier between these two, *Regierungsbezirke* (administrative districts).

The 1949 Basic Law of the German Federal Republic granted 11 *Länder* extensive competencies, which include legislative powers for culture, education, universities, broadcasting/television, local government, and the police. *Länder* exercise residual competencies. In addition, the Basic Law states that *Länder* are responsible for the implementation of most federal laws. The federal government exercises sole legislative authority in foreign policy, defence, currency, and public services. It also has exclusive authority over immigration and citizenship, though *Länder* administer inter-*Land* immigration and have concurrent competence on residence. The federal government may legislate to preserve legal and economic unity with respect to justice, social welfare, civil law, criminal law, labour law, and economic law, and it has authority to establish the legislative framework in higher education, the press, environmental protection, and spatial planning. This constitutional division of authority was extended to the five new German *Länder* after unification in 1990.

The next level down of regional government consists of *Regierungsbezirke*, re-established in the larger states of West Germany in 1945. *Regierungsbezirke* currently exist in Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, North-Rhine Westphalia, and Saxony, and were abolished in Rhineland-Palatinate (1999), Saxony-Anhalt (2003), and Lower Saxony (2004). They have served mainly as deconcentrated administrations with an executive (*Regierung*, *Regierungspräsidium*, or *Bezirksregierung*) appointed by the *Land*. There is considerable debate about the future role of *Regierungsbezirke*. While some *Länder* have recently abolished this level, others have devolved more powers, and in 2001 one *Land* (North-Rhine Westphalia) set up regional consultative assemblies composed of communal representatives (*Regionalräte*).

All *Länder*, except Hamburg and Berlin, are subdivided in *Landkreise* and *Kreisfreie Städte*. The average population of the *Kreise* is 187,000. They have limited self-government in cultural activities, student exchange, public libraries, adult education, and promotion of tourism. In addition, they imple-

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ment many federal and *Land* policies, including those concerned with social welfare, hospitals, secondary schools, waste collection, and roads. *Kreise* assemblies are directly elected every four or five years.

Most *Länder* also have an upper tier of local government (below the regional threshold) consisting of *Verbandsgemeinde* (Rhineland-Palatinate), *Gesamtgemeinde* (Lower Saxony), *Amter* (Schleswig-Holstein and the eastern *Länder*), *Landschaftsverbände* (North-Rhine Westphalia), and *Bezirke* (Bavaria).

### CODING

*Länder* score 3 (depth) and 3 (scope) for 1950–2006. *Regierungsbezirke* score 1, 0 and (*Land*)*kreise* and *Kreisfreie Städte* score 2, 1 for 1950–2006. Where relevant, scores are adjusted for unification.

### Greece

Greece's regional tier of government was established in 1950 and continued to function under the military junta of 1967–73. Since the 1980s this regional government has been empowered and an additional regional tier has been established.

The pre-existing regional tier consists of 54 prefectures (*nomoi*) with an average population of 185,000. *Nomos* government is headed by a prefect (*nomarches*), a central government appointee. Representation in prefectural councils that govern *nomoi* was widened in 1982 to take in representatives of interest groups (farmers, trade unions, professionals, and chambers of commerce) as well as of local government. In 1994 the councils and the prefect became directly elected and were given competencies over development funding, education, health, roads and transport, hospitals, and the right to establish agencies. Central oversight remains extensive, and prefects continue to double as central state agents in, for example, urban planning and administering sanitation.

Since 1986 Greece has had a tier of 13 development regions (*periphereies*; sing. *periphéria*) between the *nomoi* and the central state. *Periphereies* were set up to implement development programmes, mainly funded by the EU. They are deconcentrated administrations, headed by a centrally appointed secretary general who consults *nomoi* and local governments. In 1997 various state functions were bundled in *periphereies*, which remained subdivisions of the central government.

### CODING

*Nomoi* score 1 (depth) and 0 (scope) for 1950–93 and 2, 2 for 1994–2006. *Periphereies* score 1, 0 for 1986–2006.

*Hungary*

Hungary has had a two-tier system of intermediary government since the transition to democracy.

Under communism, Hungary was composed of 19 directly elected counties (*megyék*) and 22 cities with county status (*megyei jogú város*). Counties had been the basic units of Hungarian intermediate government since the twelfth century and were retained after 1990. They perform broad functions in the social sector, with responsibility for hospitals, secondary schools, old people's homes, museums, and libraries, as well as in economic policy, including the environment, tourism, and spatial planning.

A major reform in 1996 set up a three-tier system of county, regional, and national advisory development councils in response to the European Commission's call for subnational interlocutors for its structural funding. The councils, which consist of representatives of central and local public bodies alongside central ministries, advise national ministries on regional development policies and the administration of EU funds.

At first, the new councils lacked permanent administrations, but this changed for the regional level in 1999, when seven planning regions (*tervezési-statisztikai régiók*) were established. Three super-regions are statistical categories.

At the *megyék* level, these councils compete with already existing, directly elected *megyék* assemblies. While the president of the *megyék* assembly is an *ex officio* member of the county development council, *megyék* are not represented in the higher-level regional development council. Local interests, on the other hand, are represented at both levels.

## CODING

Counties (*megyék*) score 2 (depth) and 2 (scope) for 1990–2006. Regions (*tervezési-statisztikai régiók*) score 1, 0 for 1999–2006.

*Iceland*

Iceland has a regional level of government (*landsvæðun*) created for statistical purposes. The average population of the regions is about 35,000. Until 1988 the country had 23 counties (*sýslur*), which were responsible for intermunicipal co-operation.

## CODING

Iceland scores 0 for 1950–2006.

*Ireland*

Ireland had no regional tier until the establishment of regions in the late 1980s. At independence in 1921 there were 26 counties, which constituted the upper tier of local government. There are now 29 county councils and five city councils with an average population size of 119,000, short of the regional criterion. Counties have progressively lost authority to central state bodies.

In 1987, in response to EU structural policy, seven (later, eight) development regions were established. These administrations were primarily central government outposts, though EU cohesion policy rules obligated them to consult local representatives and interest groups. In 1994 development regions became regional authorities, a genuinely decentralized form of governance. Regional authorities co-ordinate local provision of public services and monitor implementation of EU structural funding. Their members are nominated from among elected members of local authorities in the region. Each regional authority has a director and permanent staff, and its budget comes from the local authorities. Regional authorities are, then, primarily creatures of the local governments that constitute them; legislative authority remains vested with the local authorities.

In 1999 an additional layer of two regional assemblies was set up to structure feedback from subnational authorities on EU structural funding. The assemblies are composed of elected representatives nominated by local authorities from each region, and they do not have their own budgets.

## CODING

Ireland scores 0 for 1950–86. *Development regions* score 1 (depth) and 0 (scope) for 1987–93, and their successors, *regional authorities*, score 2, 1 for 1994–2006.

*Italy*

Italy has developed into a quasi-federal state with two tiers of regional governance: a lower tier of provinces (*province*) and a higher tier of regions (*regioni*). Until the early 1970s intermediate governance consisted of provinces, as well as four – later, five – special statute regions, which are considered here as special autonomous regions.

Italy's 1948 constitution mandated directly elected regional governments (*regioni*) with enumerated powers for the whole of Italy, but these provisions were put into practice only for five regions with a special autonomous statute (*regioni autonome a statuto speciale*): *Sicilia*, *Sardegna*, *Valle d'Aosta/Vallée d'Aoste*, *Friuli-Venezia-Giulia* (since 1963), and *Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol*. The competencies of the regions and, from 1972, the two autonomous provinces were narrowly defined, but guaranteed in constitutional law.

The statute of *Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol* was revised in 1972 to devolve

cultural, educational, welfare, and economic policies, the police, and control over the provincial political institutions to the provinces of *Bolzano-Bozen* and *Trento*. *Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol* retained legislative responsibility for economic development, hospitals and health matters, registry, and local government.

In 1970 a constitutional revision paved the way for regionalization throughout Italy. Fifteen ordinary-statute regions (*regioni a statuto ordinario*) were created, each with a directly elected regional council and an executive responsible to it. These provisions came into force in 1972. In 1977 a law provided *regioni* with competencies in urban planning, regional development, urban and rural policing, health and hospital assistance, education and culture, communications, environment, and craft industry. *Regioni* could also exercise some direct administrative control over local government.

Regionalization was considerably deepened after the collapse of the first republic in the early 1990s. A law of 1997 gave *regioni* residual administrative powers in most policy areas with respect both to central government and to provinces and local authorities. A constitutional reform in 2001 consolidated the principle of residual powers and extended it to legislative competencies concurrent with the central government in international and EU relations, foreign trade, job protection and industrial safety, education, scientific research, health, food, sport, civil protection, town planning, ports and airports, cultural and environmental resources, transport, and energy. The 2001 reform ended the central government's power to suspend regional legislation and refers disputes between *regioni* and the central government to the constitutional court.

The competencies of ordinary regions now approximate those of special statute regions in a quasi-federal state. In 2005 the central government proposed another constitutional reform which would have shifted significant authority on health and education to *regioni*, but the proposal was rejected in a popular referendum in June 2006 by a margin of 62 per cent to 38 per cent.

Since 1948, Italy has had provinces (*province*; sing. *provincia*), numbering 109 in 2006. They are responsible for decentralized implementation of central (and regional) government policies, but they also co-ordinate local policies. Their primary responsibilities have to do with spatial planning, the environment, highways, education, local economic development, and labour market policies. The 2001 constitutional reform strengthened provincial autonomy by abolishing *ex ante* controls on provincial acts.

#### CODING

*Regioni a statuto ordinario* score 2 (depth) and 1 (scope) for 1972–6; 2, 2 for 1977–2000; and 3, 3 for 2001–6. *Regioni a statuto speciale* score 2, 3 for 1950–2000 (since 1963 for *Friuli-Venezia-Giulia*), and 3, 3 for 2001–6. *Province* score 2, 1 for 1950–2000, and 2, 2 for 2001–6. *Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol* scores 2, 3 for 1950–71, 2, 1 for 1972–2000, and 3, 2 for 2001–6. The provinces

of *Bolzano-Bozen* and *Trento* score 2, 1 for 1950–71, 2, 3 for 1972–2000, and 3, 3 for 2001–6.

### *Japan*

Japan has one level of intermediate government: 47 prefectures (*todofuken*) which have an average population of about 2.7 million. There are also eight regions which serve as statistical categories.

Japan's post-war jurisdictional architecture was laid down in the constitution and the Local Autonomy Law (1947), which empowered prefectures and installed prefectural governors and directly elected assemblies. *Todofuken* had administrative responsibility for economic development, social assistance, child care, public health, agriculture, environment, policing, and primary and secondary education. However, the extent of subnational authority was determined by the centre, which specified uniform laws for the country as a whole. Subnational competencies were formally described as 'agency-delegated functions' for which governors were agents of the national government under the relevant central ministry's supervision.

In 1999 the National Diet amended 475 laws in the Omnibus Decentralization Act which (a) established the principle that central state control of subnational government policy requires an explicit statutory basis, with the goal of constraining the informal pressures that central ministries had previously exerted on subnational governments; (b) increased subnational autonomy over more than half of the previously deconcentrated agency-delegated functions which became 'inherent functions' of subnational government; and (c) abolished the central government's ability to remove a popularly elected prefecture leader if he or she defied a government order.

#### CODING

*Prefectures* score 2 (depth) and 1 (scope) for 1950–99, and 2, 2 for 2000–06.

### *Latvia*

Latvia has no regional tier. The Latvian constitution recognizes four cultural and historical regions (*reģioni*), but they do not function as an administrative level. The highest government tier below the state consists of 26 districts (*rajoni*) and seven cities (*lielpilsētas*), with an average population of 70,000.

#### CODING

Latvia scores 0 for 1990–2006.

*Lithuania*

Lithuania has 44 regions and 11 city regions that were set up under communism. These are too small to register on the regional authority index. A 1995 local government reform (modified in 2000 to meet EU requirements) created ten higher-tier counties (*apskritis*). *Apskritis* serve both as outposts of central administration and as self-governments. Each *apskritis* is led by a government-appointed governor and deputy, with an advisory council of elected local government mayors. Advisory councils oversee the implementation of economic, welfare, and cultural-educational policies, including vocational and technical education, hospitals, civil protection, welfare homes, social security, town and spatial planning, environmental protection, parks, sports and cultural facilities, regional development, and agriculture. They also oversee local governments and their implementation of national policy.

## CODING

Lithuania scores 0 for 1992–4 and *apskritis* score 2 (depth) and 1 (scope) for 1995–2006.

*Luxembourg*

Luxembourg has three tiers of subnational government: districts, cantons, and municipalities. The three districts are deconcentrated means to supervise municipalities rather than general-purpose authorities. The average population of the 12 cantons does not meet the regional threshold.

## CODING

Luxembourg scores 0 for 1950–2006.

*Macedonia*

Macedonia, officially named the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, has a single tier of subnational government with 84 municipalities. Before 2004 municipalities were grouped in local government districts, but with an average population of less than 100,000 these do not meet the criterion for regional government.

## CODING

Macedonia scores 0 for 1991–2006.

*Malta*

Malta, which became independent from Britain in 1964, had no subnational tier before the creation in 1994 of directly elected local councils (*kunsilli*) grouped in three regions. One of these regions, the island of Gozo, has its own administration and a minister in the national cabinet, but the remaining two regions are statistical categories. The 1994 law does not specify the division of labour between local councils and regions, which leaves open the possibility for future regionalization. Thus far, subnational authority rests with the local councils.

## CODING

Malta scores 0 for 1964–2006.

*Netherlands*

The Netherlands has one regional tier: *provincies*. The principle of provincial and municipal autonomy was entrenched in the 1851 constitution, which grants provinces and municipalities (*gemeenten*) a general right to run their ‘own household’ under central supervision. There are currently 12 *provincies* (11 until 1986), with an average population size of 1.3 million.

Provincial competencies are detailed in the Provinces Act (1851, subsequently revised). *Provincies* share authority with local governments over transport, infrastructure, investment policy, regional planning, and, from the 1970s and 1980s, urban development, housing, culture and leisure, and environmental planning. Local governments are the senior partners in the relationship. *Provincies* are also responsible for financial oversight of local governments. In 1994 a revision of the Provinces Act abolished *ex ante* central controls and limited central government supervision to *ex post* legality controls. The minister for internal affairs has ‘powers of substitution’ if a *provincie* fails to take decisions deemed mandatory by the central government.

Since the 1970s there has been a debate about grouping *provincies* in larger regions, but no such reform has been passed into law. The Netherlands has a higher-level intermediate tier – *landsdelen* – and a lower-level tier – *COROP-regio* (*Coördinatie Commissie Regionaal Onderzoeks Programma*) – which are statistical divisions.

## CODING

*Provincies* score 2 (depth) and 1 (scope) for 1950–93 and 2, 2 for 1994–2006.

*New Zealand*

New Zealand has one tier of intermediate government, *regions*, established in 1974. Territorial authorities, of which there are 73, are the lowest tier of government and do not meet the regional criterion.

Until the 1970s regional matters were dealt with by special-purpose bodies under direct state control. The first general-purpose regional government – the Auckland regional authority – was created in 1963, and this model was generalized with the Local Government Act of 1974, when 22 regions were created. The number of regions was reduced to 14 in 1989 and adjusted to 16 in 1992. Twelve of these are intermediate governments; four are unitary authorities. Regional authority relates primarily to public transport, civil defence, and environmental policy, including air, land and marine pollution, river and coastal management, and harbour navigation.

## CODING

New Zealand scores 0 for 1950–62; Auckland scores 2 (depth) and 1 (scope) for 1963–73, and *regions* score 2, 1 for 1974–2006.

*Norway*

Norway has a single intermediate tier: counties (*fylker*), which came into existence with Norwegian unification in the ninth century. Their contemporary structure was laid down in the 1837 Local Government Act, which created a dual regional administration consisting of government-appointed prefects (*fylkesmenn*) and county councils of municipal representatives. In 1975 indirectly elected county councils were replaced by directly elected assemblies, and *fylker* were generalized to include urban Norway. *Fylker* have limited legislative authority but, as is common in Scandinavia, have acquired extensive responsibilities for implementing economic and cultural-educational policy. Before 1970 they were responsible mainly for regional roads and transport, regional development, and public health and social welfare services. From the 1970s they took over secondary education and hospitals and were also given new tasks in cultural policy.

## CODING

*Fylker* score 2 (depth) and 1 (scope) for 1950–74 and 2, 2 for 1975–2006.

*Poland*

Poland has one regional tier (*województwa*) that meets the regional population criterion.

The end of communism initially reinforced state centralization because

regional administrations were perceived as tools for Communist Party influence. The first post-communist government in 1990 brought regions under central control and made elected regional councils advisory. The administrative map of the country consisted of 49 deconcentrated regions (*województwa*) and more than 2,400 elected local governments (*gminy*). In 1999, two decentralized tiers of intermediate government were created: 16 elected regions (*województwa*) and 378 elected county governments (*powiaty*). The latter, with an average population of about 100,000, do not meet the population criterion for regional government. Beginning in 1999, *województwa* have had executive authority for regional development policy, spatial planning, health care planning, higher education, EU structural funds, social and labour market policy, regional roads, and environmental protection.

## CODING

*Województwa* score 1 (depth) and 0 (scope) for 1990–98 and 2, 2 for 1999–2006.

*Portugal*

Portugal has two tiers of intermediate governance, *planning regions* and *districts*, alongside two special autonomous regions, the Azores (*Açores*) and Madeira.

The 1976 constitution envisioned three types of regions – autonomous regions, planning regions, and administrative regions – but did not specify their competencies. Only special autonomous regions for the Azores and Madeira were set up immediately. Their special statute – lightly revised in 1987 (Azores) and 1991 (Madeira), and more substantially in 1999 – grants them principal authority over a wide range of economic and cultural-educational policies, including agriculture, transport, tourism, regional planning, natural resources, culture, sport, local government, and taxation. Immigration and citizenship remained firmly in the hands of the central government. Until 1999 a minister of the republic in each region could veto legislation. Thereafter, the veto could be overturned by an absolute majority in the regional assembly. Special regional authority was consolidated in a constitutional revision (2005). However, the autonomous regions do not have primary responsibility for police or regional political organization, nor do they have residual power, so they fall short of the maximum score on policy scope.

In 1979, five planning regions were set up on the mainland. They are administered by deconcentrated outposts of the central state, the *comissões de cooperação e desenvolvimento regional*. Planning regions are responsible for regional development and oversee local governments on behalf of the central government. A plan to create eight decentralized ‘administrative

regions' (*regiões administrativas*) with elected assemblies, as the constitution had foreseen, was rejected by referendum in 1998.

Portugal has a longstanding lower-level intermediate tier of 18 districts (*distritos*). The districts are deconcentrated authorities concerned primarily with the co-ordination of educational and cultural activities and with supervising the legality of municipal acts. They consist of an indirectly elected district assembly, an advisory council, and a governor appointed by the central government. This level is scored as deconcentrated government.

#### CODING

*Comissões de cooperação e desenvolvimento regional* score 1 on depth and 0 on scope for 1979–2006. *Distritos* score 1, 0 for 1976–2006. The Azores and Madeira score 2, 2 for 1976–98 and 3, 2 for 1999–2006.

#### Romania

Romania has two tiers of intermediate governance: counties (*judete*) and development regions (*regiuni de dezvoltare*).

Forty-two *judete* existed under communism. The 1991 constitution established the principles of county self-government and decentralization of public services. *Judete* double as institutions of self-governance and state agents. They are governed by a directly elected council with a chairman elected by the council. Each county also has a prefect, appointed by the central government, who checks the legality of county and local acts and oversees deconcentrated state services. *Judete* provide economic, welfare state, and educational services encompassing regional transport, social assistance, the environment, secondary education, and regional planning, but they do so within central guidelines.

Eight *regiuni de dezvoltare* were created in 1998. Each consists of four to six *judete*. *Regiuni de dezvoltare* are a deconcentrated level of government with a tiered structure consisting of a regional development council composed of local government representatives, presidents of *judet* councils, and *judet* prefects, and a regional development executive appointed by the regional development council. Regional development councils and their executives were set up to prepare and implement EU structural programming and to collect EU-mandated regional statistics. Final authority for allocating EU funds remains with a national development board composed of the chairpersons of the regional boards and government representatives.

#### CODING

*Judete* score 2 (depth) and 1 (scope) for 1991–2006. *Regiuni de dezvoltare* score 1, 0 for 1998–2006.

*Russia*

The Russian Federation has two (in some areas, three) tiers of regional government: 86 federal units or 'subjects' (*subwekty federacii* or *subwekty*), which since 2000 have been encompassed in seven federal districts (*federalnyye okruga*); and, in most *subwekty federacii*, districts or *raionabi*. *Raionabi* are too small for inclusion as regional.

The most powerful intermediate tier are the *subwekty federacii*, which are composed of 21 republics (*respubliki*), 48 provinces (*oblasti*), seven territories (*kraya*), seven autonomous districts (*avtonomnyye okruga*), one autonomous province (*avtonomnaya oblast*), and the two federal cities (*federalnyye goroda*) of St Petersburg and Moscow. Russia began in 1993 with 89 units, but three have since been merged and more mergers are planned. Each boundary change requires the consent of the affected *subwekt* as well as of the federal government. *Subwekty federacii* have equal constitutional status and equal representation (two representatives each) in the upper house, the Federation Council (*Sovet Federacii*). However, their degree of autonomy differs. The seven *avtonomnyye okruga* are in the unusual position of being supervised by both the federal government and another subject.

The 1993 Russian constitution specifies three types of competencies: exclusive federal competencies, concurrent federal-subject competencies, and residual competencies for the *subwekty federacii*. The federal government has exclusive competence over the jurisdictional architecture of the federation, the single market, monetary policy, foreign and defence policy (including defence procurement), trade policy, the legal system, accounting standards, citizenship and immigration; it sets framework legislation on the economy, the environment, the socio-cultural fabric of Russia, and energy policy; and it is responsible for the federal-wide infrastructure in transport, communications, and energy. Policies concurrent between the federal state and the federal entities include protection of rights and freedoms, law and order, natural resource management, the environment, taxation, local government, education and research, emergency services, the judiciary and law enforcement, minority rights, and co-ordination of external economic relations. Each federal subject determines its own internal organization, though federal law lays down basic principles of local government.

The constitutional division, then, is heavily biased in favour of the centre, and comes closest to scoring 2 for policy scope on our index. Two additional features of Russian federalism qualify this. On the one hand, the constitution enables *subwekty federacii* to negotiate greater devolution in bilateral deals with Moscow, and 51 *subwekty federacii* took advantage of this between 1993 and 2000. Russia became the leader in asymmetrical federalism. The upshot was a general increase in the policy scope of the *subwekty federacii*. On the other hand, the fact that the executive head was appointed by the Russian president constrained regional autonomy until 1996, when Yeltsin allowed direct elections for the governors and presidents of all *subwekty federacii*. The

21 republics had always been able to elect their own president. The scoring for republics and other *subwekty federacii* for the period 1993–9 reflects these three elements – constitutional division of powers (2), devolution through bilateral agreement (+1), and appointed governors or presidents (–1).

In 2000, the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, pushed through several reforms that reasserted federal authority, including the creation of a deconcentrated super-tier of seven federal districts (*federalnyye okruga*), each of which encompasses several *subwekty*. Their population ranges between 6.6 million (Far East) and 38 million (Central). Each federal district is headed by a presidential envoy, who co-ordinates federal agencies in the region, supervises law and order, and determines whether regional law is consistent with Russian law. The boundaries of each district correspond exactly with the interior ministry's security regions and almost exactly with those of the ministry of defence. Five of the seven initial presidential envoys were former generals.

In addition, the president was given the right to dissolve *subwekt* parliaments and dismiss their governments if they disobeyed federal law. The federal government revoked nearly all bilateral agreements providing special autonomy, and the Duma consolidated this by ordering each *subwekt* to bring its legislation in line with the constitution and federal law. In the event of disputes between the federation and *subwekty federacii*, the federation president can suspend *subwekt* executive decisions pending court adjudication. Finally, governors of *subwekty* were barred from sitting in the upper chamber; instead, they could send a delegate.

In 2005, in the wake of the Chechen hostage crisis, President Putin also replaced the direct election of governors and presidents with a system whereby a presidential appointee is approved by the regional assembly, thereby re-creating the dual regional administration that had existed until 1996.

In most *subwekty federacii*, the next level down is the district (*raion*; pl. *raionabi*) or the city (*gorod*). These typically enjoy some self-governance in the form of a popularly elected district council with an elected or appointed chief executive. *Raionabi* are responsible for local service delivery, but they exercise authority under strict control of *subwekty*. The average population size of *raionabi* and *goroda* varies considerably, but in no *subwekt* is the average higher than 150,000.

#### CODING

Federal districts (*federalnyye okruga*) score 1 (depth) and 0 (scope) for 2000–06. Republics (*respubliki*) score 3, 3 for 1993–9 (elected president, bilateral agreements); 2, 2 for 2000–04 (no bilateral agreements); and 2, 1 for 2005–6 (appointed president). Other *subwekty federacii* score 2, 2 for 1993–5 (bilateral agreements, appointed governor); 3, 3 for 1996–9 (elected governor); 2, 2

for 2000–04 (no bilateral agreements); and 2, 1 for 2005–6 (appointed governor).

### *Serbia-Montenegro*

Serbia-Montenegro, the legal successor of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was a federation between 1992 and 2002 and a confederation between 2003 and 2006, and became two independent states in June 2006. The federation and confederation consisted of two republics: Serbia (*Republika Srbija*) and Montenegro (*Republika Crna Gora*). Serbia contains two autonomous regions, *Kosomet* (or Kosovo) and *Vojvodina*.

The 1992 constitution of the federation of Serbia and Montenegro listed federal competencies and granted the constituent republics residual powers. Among federal competencies were civil rights, regulation of the single market (including standard setting on agricultural, health, and pharmaceutical products), the environment, health, regional development, science and technology, transportation, territorial waters, property rights, social security and labour standards, foreign relations, customs, immigration, and defence. All other matters fell within the jurisdiction of the republics, notably the right to conduct foreign relations and enter into treaties on matters within their competence. Citizenship is a competence of the entities, with the proviso that citizens of a member state are automatically citizens of Serbia-Montenegro and enjoy equal rights and duties (except for the right to vote and be elected) in the other member state. The constitutional revision of 2003 restricted confederal competencies to defence, immigration, international law, standardization, intellectual property, and free movement of people. All other competencies, including foreign policy and citizenship, rested with the republics.

Serbia has two special autonomous regions: *Kosomet* (*Kosovo i Metohija*) and *Vojvodina* (*Autonomna Pokrajina Vojvodina*). According to the Serbian constitution, these regions implement, but do not legislate, policy in the fields of culture, education, language, public information, health and social welfare, environmental protection, urban and country planning, and regional economic development. They do not control local government, nor do they have residual powers. In 1990 the Serbian president, Slobodan Milošević, stripped Vojvodina and Kosovo of most powers, though the provinces kept their parliament and executive. The constitution was unchanged.

Violence escalated in Kosovo from 1995, and in 1999 Kosovo was brought under United Nations administration, though Serbia retained nominal sovereignty. Kosovo is not coded for the duration of UN guardianship.

After the fall of Milošević in late 2000, the new democratically elected government began negotiations with Vojvodina, which led to the 2002 Law on the Establishment of Competencies of the Autonomous Province, also known as the omnibus law. This gave Vojvodina some financial autonomy and expanded its self-rule in the areas of culture, education, language policy,

media, health, welfare, the environment, construction and urban development, employment, economy, mining, agriculture, tourism, and sport.

Serbia is divided in 29 districts (*okruzi*) plus the district of Belgrade – 18 in Central Serbia, seven in Vojvodina, and five in Kosovo (six under UN rule). The average population of these deconcentrated administrations is 300,000. Montenegro has no internal tier that meets the population criterion.

#### CODING

Serbia-Montenegro scores 3 (depth) and 4 (scope) for 1992–2006. In Serbia, *okruzi* score 1, 0 for 1992–2006; *Kosovo* scores 2, 1 for 1992–8; *Vojvodina* scores 2, 1 for 1992–2001, and 2, 2 for 2002–6.

#### *Slovakia*

Slovakia has one tier of regional government, regions (*kraje*), established as deconcentrated units in 1996 and reformed into decentralized institutions in 2002.

After the partition of Czechoslovakia, which came into effect in January 1993, the new constitution of Slovakia established the principles of local and regional self-government. Law makers gave priority to deepening local self-government. The initial post-communist years saw a weakening of regional authority, with the abolition of regional soviets, the creation of 38 deconcentrated district offices and 121 subdistrict offices, and the establishment of specialized state agencies at the district level for education, environmental protection, fire prevention, and health care. With an average population of 141,500, district offices fall just below the regional criterion.

In 1996 district offices were replaced by eight regions (*kraje*) and 79 districts (*okresy*, which fall below the regional threshold). While *kraje* and *okresy* absorbed functions formerly performed by the specialized state agencies, both remained under central state control.

In 2001 the legislature passed a constitutional amendment strengthening regional autonomy by creating directly elected councils with a directly elected chairperson, and legal equality between regional and national legislation (with conflicts to be settled by the constitutional court). There is no constitutional list of regional competencies. A series of implementation laws in 2001 filled in the details. The result is a dual structure of state-controlled regional offices, headed by a government appointee, alongside self-governing regions (*samosprávne kraje*), which have primary responsibility for regional development and co-responsibilities for road management, transport, civil protection and emergencies, social welfare, secondary education, sport, theatres, museums, health centres, and hospitals.

CODING

Slovakia scores 0 for 1993–5. *Kraje* score 1 (depth) and 0 (scope) for 1996–2001 and *samosprávne kraje* 2, 1 for 2002–6.

*Slovenia*

Slovenia's constitution recognizes regions as a level of self-government, but until 2006 the 12 regions remained statistical categories (*statistična regije*).

CODING

Slovenia scores 0 for 1991–2006.

*Spain*

Spain has two tiers of regional government: 50 *provincias*, which date from 1833, and 17 *comunidades autónomas* (19 since 1995), which came into being with Spain's transition to democracy in 1978. Nine *comunidades autónomas* are single provinces (Asturias, the Balearic Islands, Cantabria, Ceuta, Madrid, Melilla, Murcia, Navarre and La Rioja), and in these cases there is a single regional government, the *comunidad*.

The constitution of 1978 guarantees the right to self-government for all nationalities and regions and lists 23 areas of competence for *comunidades autónomas*, including city and regional planning, health, housing, public works, regional railways and roads, ports and airports, agriculture and fishing, environmental protection, culture, tourism, social welfare, economic development within the objectives set by national economic policy, and regional political institutions. Residual competencies could be claimed by *comunidades* in autonomy statutes submitted to the *Cortes Generales*. The national government has exclusive jurisdiction over foreign policy, defence, justice, criminal and commercial law, customs and trade, and the currency, as well as citizenship and immigration.

The constitution lays out two routes to regional autonomy. The four historical nationalities were granted a fast track and gained autonomy in 1979 (the Basque Country and Catalonia) or in 1981 (Galicia and Andalusia). The remaining 13 regions were required to negotiate a limited transfer of powers with the central government, which could be extended later. By 1983 all had taken the first step. Valencia, the Canary Islands, and Navarre demanded and received additional competencies, and the remaining regions obtained new powers in 1993, narrowing the gap with the historical communities. In 1998 Catalonia and Galicia gained additional competencies for labour market policies, and in June 2006 Catalonia passed a referendum that ratified increased Catalan control over justice and taxation.

Competencies among *comunidades autónomas* vary because they reflect

the two-track system which requires separate negotiations with the central government. However, most are based on the constitutional list above, with the exception of health and education, which are regional responsibilities only in the Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia, Andalusia, the Canary Islands, Valencia and Navarre. The Basque Country and Navarre, and from 2007 also Catalonia, have additional taxation powers (noted below).

Until 1995, Ceuta and Melilla were special autonomous regions having extensive administrative powers, but were administered as part of the provinces of Cadiz and Malaga, respectively. In 1995 both enclaves received the status of *comunidad autónoma*.

The primary functions of *provincias* are in mental health and elderly homes, orphanages, and fairs. They share with municipalities responsibility for culture, solid waste treatment, co-ordinating municipal services, delivering rural services, technical assistance to municipal councils, and investment planning for small municipalities.

#### CODING

Each *comunidad autónoma* scores 3 (depth) and 3 (scope) from the year in which it negotiated a special statute. *Provincias* score 2, 1 for 1978–2006. *Ceuta* and *Melilla* score 2, 2 for 1978–94, and 3, 3 for 1995–2006.

#### Sweden

Sweden has one intermediate tier of government: 21 counties (*län*) which combine self-government and deconcentrated state authority. There has never been a clear-cut separation of functions between self-governing county councils (*landstinge*) and regional state authorities (*länsstyrelsen*), headed by a *landshövding*, though in recent years *landstinge* have gained some authority.

Between 1950 and the county reform of 1971, *landstinge* owned hospitals and outpatient centres, were responsible for the provision of health care, and had secondary responsibilities for agricultural, craft, and industrial training. *Länsstyrelsen* had primary responsibility for law and order, local government supervision, and implementation of state legislation in the fields of health, education, labour, housing, town planning, and social affairs.

From 1971, *landstinge* were directly elected, with executives accountable to them. They were given responsibility for implementing regional development, cultural activities, and public transport, and they extended their role in health provision. The dual structure was retained. There is still a centrally appointed governor, but the majority of the executive, the *länsstyrelser*, are now selected by the *landsting*. The *länsstyrelser* has primary responsibility for coordinating social planning.

To facilitate implementation of EU cohesion policy, the Swedish government recently created eight larger statistical regions (*riksområden*).

## CODING

*Län* score 2 (depth) and 1 (scope) for 1950–70, and 2, 2 for 1971–2006.

*Switzerland*

Switzerland has 26 (before 1979, 25) *cantons*, which have an average population of about 280,000. They have wide-ranging competencies in education, environment, culture, health, and local government, and exercise residual competencies in areas not specified in the constitution as federal or joint federal–cantonal. Immigration and asylum is a federal competence, but citizenship is primarily cantonal. Since the 1999 constitutional revision, cantons have had the right to participate in foreign policy.

Sixteen cantons have a lower subregional tier. There are 12 *Bezirke* in the canton of Zürich, 26 *Bezirke* in the canton of Berne, five *Ämter* in the canton of Luzern, and 19 (ten from 2006) *districts* in the canton of Vaud. However, the average population of these governments is below the regional threshold.

## CODING

*Cantons* score 3 (depth) and 4 (scope) for 1950–2006.

*Turkey*

Turkey has one regional tier consisting of 81 provinces (*iller*). There are also 923 deconcentrated districts (*ilçe*) with an average population of 72,000.

Until 1961, *iller* were deconcentrated state administrations. The constitution of 1961 set out the principle of decentralization, mandating provincial administrations with directly elected councils and executives elected by the provincial council. A powerful, centrally appointed governor chairs the provincial council and co-ordinates the network of deconcentrated provincial offices. *Iller* have competencies for economic development, roads, bridges, ports, water management, provision of natural gas, hospitals and other health services, primary and secondary schools, public order, and culture.

A higher level of seven to ten regions has been on the agenda since 1961, when the constitution explicitly permitted the establishment of public institutions ‘in areas that comprise more than one province’. In 1983 the government proposed to create eight regional governments, but the proposal remains under discussion.

## CODING

*Iller* score 1 (depth) and 0 (scope) for 1950–60, and 2, 1 for 1961–2006. The scorings are extrapolated through periods of military rule (1960–61, 1970, 1980–83 and 1997).

*United Kingdom*

The UK has a two-tier system of intermediate government: *regions* and *counties/districts/boroughs*. From 1999, Scotland and Wales came to exercise significant policy competencies, as did Northern Ireland in periods of home rule. Because devolution varies across Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, they are treated as special autonomous regions.

Until the 1990s, the only intermediate level in England (with around 80 per cent of the population) consisted of *counties, districts, or boroughs*. Their competencies are in the areas of culture, education, social services, libraries, museums, parks, transport and roads, fire services, law and order, and urban planning. Each has a directly elected council. In England, boundaries of counties, districts, and boroughs were redrawn in 1974. Councils in metropolitan counties (i.e. cities) were abolished in 1986. In 1996 nearly half of all counties were merged with local governments into unitary authorities. Counties were abolished in Northern Ireland in 1973 and in Scotland and Wales in 1996.

There was no regional government above counties in 1950, except in Northern Ireland and Scotland. In 1964, new interest in regional planning spurred the creation of 11 *regions*: eight in England, plus Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. These regional administrations were assisted by two consultative bodies, one composed of civil servants from relevant ministries, the other nominated by local authorities. In England, in contrast to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, regional institutions were ignored by central government departments, which used their own regional boundaries.

In 1979 English regions were formally reduced to statistical categories. In the late 1980s the Conservative government reversed course, and began to concentrate various functions in regional bodies with consistent boundaries. This led to the creation in 1994 of *Government Regional Offices*, which were designed to strengthen central co-ordination at the regional level, particularly in relation to EU and domestic regional funds.

In 1998 the new Labour government transformed these into *Regional Development Agencies* with consultative regional assemblies. Regional development agencies are responsible for attracting investment, building infrastructure, improving skills, and co-ordinating economic development and regeneration policies. The head of the executive is a government appointee, answerable to central ministries and to a regional assembly composed of representatives from local authorities, regional business, and public groups, including community organizations.

The law allowed for referendums on whether to set up directly elected regional assemblies to which regional development agencies would be accountable. The first referendum, held in the North-East of England in November 2004, rejected such a proposal. Referendums in other regions were cancelled.

Plans to devolve power to London – from 2000, the ninth region – were

more successful. In 1999 a referendum mandated a *Greater London Development Authority* with responsibility for regional development, transport, fire and civil protection, police, environment, and culture.

After the secession of Ireland in 1922, Northern Ireland was granted home rule – that is, a directly elected government accountable to the Stormont parliament. In March 1972, after Catholic–Protestant riots, direct rule from Westminster was introduced. In 1998 the Good Friday agreement devised a new power-sharing structure and paved the way for reinstating home rule after it was approved in a referendum. However, disagreement between Ulster Unionists and Sinn Fein pushed forward the starting date until the end of 1999. Home rule hobbled along over the next year and a half, until it was again suspended in October 2002. It was finally reinstated in May 2007. The legislative and executive powers of the parliament of Northern Ireland are similar to those of the Scottish Parliament.

Scotland (from 1892) and Wales (from 1964) had deconcentrated administrations run by secretaries of state in the British cabinet. Secretaries of state had responsibilities which, in the rest of the UK, were assumed by Whitehall.

In 1999, following referendums, Scotland and Wales each gained an autonomous executive accountable to a directly elected legislature, the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh National Assembly. Welsh powers are executive powers within UK framework legislation and do not extend to the authority to write primary legislation. Scotland, in contrast, has legislative powers with respect to all policies except those designated as exclusive UK matters, which encompass immigration and citizenship. After the 2007 elections in Wales, a revised Government of Wales Act is moving Wales closer to the Scottish statute.

From 1973 to 1998 the secretary of state for Northern Ireland could refuse to submit legislation by the Northern Irish assembly for royal assent, but refer it to the Privy Council. After 1998 the secretary of state could refer such legislation to the House of Commons. For Scotland and Wales, the secretary of state may refuse to submit a bill for royal assent only if he or she ‘has reasonable grounds to believe [that the bill] would be incompatible with any international obligations or the interests of defence or national security’ or if the bill ‘make[s] modifications of the law as it applies to reserved matters and which the Secretary of State has reasonable grounds to believe would have an adverse effect on the operation of the law as it applies to reserved matters’. The Welsh Act contains a similar text.

#### CODING

*Counties* score 2 (depth) and 2 (scope) for 1950–2006. When calculating the country score, the phasing out of intermediate government in Northern Ireland from 1973, and in Scotland, Wales, and parts of England from 1996, is taken into account. English *regions* score 1, 0 for 1994–8 and 2, 1 for 1999–2006, except for the *Greater London Authority*, which scores 2, 2 for 2000–06.

*Northern Ireland* scores 2, 3 for 1950–71 and 2000–02, and 1, 0 for 1972–99 and 2003–6, when deconcentrated government replaced home rule. *Scotland* scores 1, 0 for 1950–98 and 3, 3 for 1999–2006. *Wales* scores 1, 0 for 1964–98 and 3, 2 for 1999–2006.

### *United States*

The USA has, for the most part, two regional tiers: *states* and, in the more populous and older states, *counties*. Counties fall under the jurisdiction of state governments. Until 1959 there were also two territories, Alaska and Hawaii. The District of Columbia has a special status as capital district. They are classified as special autonomous regions. The unincorporated organized territories of Guam, Puerto Rico, the United Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands are not included in the index.

The US constitution contains a list of ‘expressed’ federal competencies, encompassing taxation, the military, currency, interstate and foreign commerce, and naturalization. In addition, an elastic clause gives the federal government authority to pass any law ‘necessary and proper’ for the execution of its express powers. Competencies not delegated to the federal government and not forbidden to the states are reserved to the states (Amendment X). States have extensive competencies, among them primary responsibility for education, social welfare, regional development, local government, civil and criminal law, and health and hospitals. The federal government has near exclusive authority over citizenship (including naturalization) and immigration. The power of Congress to admit ‘aliens’ into the country under whatever conditions it lays down is exclusive of state regulation. Congress, with the help of the courts, has eroded state authority to regulate the conduct of aliens residing in the country.

The 50 states of the US include Alaska and Hawaii, former territories that were granted statehood in 1959. As territories, each had an elected legislature, a governor appointed by Washington, and self-government over a broad set of policies. The Organic Acts establishing the territories made their legislation subject to congressional veto and did not provide them with power sharing. Their authority was similar in scope to that of states.

In 1973, the District of Columbia Home Rule Act ended direct congressional rule of Washington, DC, and ceded authority to a directly elected district council and mayor. Congress has ultimate power over the district, which gives it the right to review and overrule local laws. Home rule was suspended between 1995 and 2000 and a federal control board took over management of the district’s finances. In 2001, after a revision of the Home Rule Act, control was handed back to the elected government of the city.

Counties constitute a lower-level intermediate tier in 24 states. In the remaining 26 states, counties are rural and are the lowest unit of local government, and are therefore not included in the index. In ten of the 24 states where counties are an intermediate tier, they are both general purpose and large

enough to meet the population criterion. These are Arizona (15 counties), California (58), Connecticut (8 until 1960), Delaware (3), Florida (66), Maryland (23), New Jersey (21), New York (57), Pennsylvania (66), and Washington (39). Counties play a role in providing education, justice, health, environmental, planning, and regional development, with variation from state to state. In the 1980s, Connecticut created regional councils with limited authority over land use, infrastructure, and regional planning. Massachusetts reduced its counties from 14 to seven in 1997 and replaced them with regional councils. Counties in Rhode Island meet the population criterion but lack authoritative competencies.

## CODING

*States* score 3 (depth) and 3 (scope) for 1950–2006. *Alaska* and *Hawaii* under their territory status score 2, 3 for 1950–58. Washington, DC, scores 1, 0 for 1950–72; 2, 3 for 1973–94; 1, 0 for 1995–2000; and 2, 3 for 2001–6. *Counties* (and *regions* in Massachusetts) score 2, 2 for 1950–2006 for states and periods detailed above. *Regional councils* in Connecticut score 2, 1 for the 1980s–2006. Scoring for counties is weighted according to state population.

***Fiscal autonomy****Albania*

*Qarku* are dependent on intergovernmental grants.

## CODING

Albania scores 0 for 1992–9, and *qarku* score 0 for 2000–06.

*Australia*

The tax system is unusually centralized for a federation. The federal government emphasizes uniformity of public services across the country and uses conditional grants to achieve that purpose. Tax administration and collection are centralized, representing 80 per cent of revenues. According to the constitution, states have concurrent tax authority with the federal government on personal income tax, company tax, and sales tax, but federal tax legislation is paramount over state tax legislation. Territories derive similar fiscal powers from their Acts. Centralization came about in the Second World War, when the federal government appropriated control over income tax for persons, enterprises, and non-residents. Subsequent court decisions eliminated states' rights to control sales and excise taxes. The federal government sets base and rate for major taxes after consultation with the states. In return, states receive conditional and unconditional grants, which together constitute over half of

their revenues. In 1999 states agreed to scrap some of their own taxes in return for a greater share of unconditional grants.

States and territories have tax authority over non-major taxes, including payroll taxes (since 1971) and property, motor vehicle, gambling, and insurance taxes, for which they can set the base and the rate.

## CODING

*States* score 2 for 1950–2006; the *Northern Territory* scores 0 for 1950–77 and 2 for 1978–2006; and the *Australian Capital Territory* scores 0 for 1950–88 and 2 for 1989–2006.

*Austria*

Major taxes (customs/excise, corporate and personal income) as well as tax sharing are determined at the federal level. The *Finanz-Verfassungsgesetz* 1948, a federal law with constitutional status, sets out a framework for tax sharing, intergovernmental transfers, and cost sharing between the federation, *Länder*, and *Gemeinde*. *Länder* receive more than 95 per cent of their revenues from tax sharing and can set the tax base and rate for the remaining 5 per cent of their tax income, but the federal government can impose a ceiling.

## CODING

*Länder* score 2 for 1955–2006.

*Belgium*

*Provincies* set base and rate for several regional taxes. The precise list of taxes has varied over the years, and from province to province, to include taxes on dog licences, bicycles, productive energy, surface water protection, employees, hunting and fishing licences, motorcycles and mopeds, boats, dangerous unsanitary establishments, and water collection. Over the past 15 years, most special provincial taxes have been replaced by a general provincial tax, which consists of a tax on business establishments and on residential occupancy. General provincial tax generates around 20 per cent of provincial revenues. The bulk of provincial revenues come from a surtax on the property tax – between 55 and 65 per cent – and government grants through the *provinciefonds* – 10 to 15 per cent. Until 1990 the *provinciefonds* was financed by the central government, but, with devolution, provincial oversight has shifted to the regions.

Until 1989, communities and regions were financed almost exclusively from central government transfers. Demographic criteria determined the size of grants to communities. Communities received also part of the radio and

television tax, for which base and rate were set by the central government. Grants to regions were calculated in relation to population, revenues from personal income tax, and surface area.

Since 1989, communities have a tax-sharing arrangement whereby the central government refunds a proportion of value added tax and income tax. Communities do not set rate or base. Between 1993 and 2001, radio and television tax was entirely refunded to the communities; after 2001 this became a regional tax, but it remained earmarked to fund communities (not regions). The German community receives federal grants.

In 1989, regions obtained authority over eight regional taxes with varying degrees of autonomy: control over base and rate (e.g. gambling taxes), rate only (e.g. inheritance tax), rate within limits (e.g. registration fees on property transfer), or no control (e.g. vehicle registration). In the ensuing years, several environmental taxes were also transferred to the regions. Yet the majority of regional revenues came from a tax-sharing arrangement on personal income tax which had a built-in equalization mechanism. Since 1995 regions have been able to levy additional taxes or rebates on personal income tax within strict limits, which provides them with important fiscal autonomy.

Fiscal arrangements for regions and communities were revised in 2001. The distribution of VAT and income tax among the two larger communities is no longer calculated on demographic criteria but on the principle of *juste retour*, which implies that tax receipts should correspond to a community's contributions to the shared tax. Regions acquired extensive authority over 12 taxes, including setting base and rate, though a few were made subject to prior agreement among the regions. Almost one-third of regional revenues come from own taxes. Regional authority to adjust the rate of personal income tax has also been broadened, though it remains bound by federal limits, such as the principle that the tax must be progressive.

#### CODING

Raw scores: *Communities* score 0 for 1970–2006; *regions* score 0 for 1980–88, 2 for 1989–94, and 3 for 1995–2006; the *Deutsche Gemeinschaft* scores 0 for 1970–2006.

Aggregated scores: The two large communities score 0 for 1970–88, 2 for 1989–94, and 3 for 1995–2006. The *Deutsche Gemeinschaft* scores 0 throughout. *Provincies* score 2 for 1950–2006.

#### *Bosnia-Herzegovina*

Tax power lies exclusively with the *Federacija* and the *Republika Srpska* and their constituent units. Tax power in the *Federacija* is concurrent between federal government and the cantons. The bulk of federal income comes from customs duties and sales and excise taxes. Cantons receive their revenues from personal income taxes, for which they can set the rate.

## CODING

The *entities* score 4 for 1995–2006. *Cantons* in the *Federacija* score 3 for 1995–2006.

*Bulgaria*

Bulgaria has a deconcentrated regional tier of *oblasti* without independent tax authority.

## CODING

*Oblasti* score 0 for 1991–2006.

*Canada*

The constitution gives both the federal government and the provinces the right to tax. Income taxes are divided between these levels. Before 1962 this took place via cash transfers or tax ‘rentals’, whereby provinces received a portion of income and corporate tax revenues levied in their territories, along with a supplementary equalization payment. Both base and rate were set by the federal government. In 1962 this system was replaced by one in which each province received a standard uniform rate of taxes collected by the federal government within the province, and could, in addition, set its own rate above the standard rate. Quebec does not take part in this but sets the base and rate of its personal income tax. Provinces set the rate of corporate income tax, but the base is set by the federal government, except in Ontario, Quebec, and Alberta, which set both base and rate.

Provinces have their own sales tax, and there are province-specific exemptions for certain goods, services, or types of purchases. So provinces have control over both rate and base of this major tax. The provincial goods and services tax (‘retail sales tax’) is the second most important revenue source for provinces. Provinces may also tax natural resource extraction. This accounts for around one-quarter of Alberta’s revenue and one-tenth of Saskatchewan’s.

Until the advent of self-governance the territories’ fiscal situation was controlled by the central government, either directly from Ottawa or indirectly through the government-appointed executive in the territories. When the territories became self-governing, they acquired the same legal authority to levy taxes as the provinces. The one exception is that, since public land (‘crown land’) remains in the hands of the federal government, royalties on non-renewable resources are levied by and accrue to the federal government. Only Yukon has, since 2002, obtained tax authority over non-renewable resources.

Counties and regions in Ontario rely on intergovernmental grants from municipalities.

CODING

*Provinces* score 4 for 1950–2006. The *Northwest Territories* score 0 for 1950–85 and 4 for 1986–2006; *Yukon* scores 0 for 1950–77 and 4 for 1978–2006; *Nunavut* scores 4 for 1999–2006. *Counties* and *regions* in Ontario score 0 for 1950–2006.

*Croatia*

*Županije* (cantons) receive their revenue from own and shared taxes. Own taxes include taxes on inheritance and gifts, motor vehicles, vessels, and the organization of games and sports events. Cantons are free to set the rate, within centrally determined limits, of the inheritance and gifts tax. The base and rate of other taxes are set in the Law on the Financing of Self-government and Administration Units. This law also distributes part of the centrally collected income tax and profits tax to the cantons.

CODING

Croatia scores 0 for 1991–92; *županije* score 1 for 1993–2006.

*Cyprus*

No regional tier of government: 0 for 1960–2006.

*The Czech Republic*

*Kraje* receive a proportion of centrally collected taxes, for which the base and rate are set by the central government.

CODING

The Czech Republic scores 0 for 1993–9; *kraje* score 0 for 2000–06.

*Denmark*

*Amter* receive over 90 per cent of their revenues from a share of personal income tax. The remainder of their income comes from a land tax for which the rate and base are set by the central government. In 1973 *amter* gained the authority to adjust the rate of local income tax.

The home rule statutes of the Faroe Islands and Greenland provide the

two special autonomous regions with authority over base and rate of direct and indirect taxes.

## CODING

*Amter* score 0 for 1950–72 and 3 for 1973–2006. The *Faroe Islands* score 4 for 1950–2006. *Greenland* scores 0 for 1950–72, 3 for 1973–8, and 4 for 1979–2006.

*Estonia*

No regional tier of government: 0 for 1992–2006.

*Finland*

The deconcentrated *läänit* depend entirely on government funds. *Maakuntien* have no own income sources; they depend on contributions from member municipalities and/or central state contributions. Finnish taxation laws apply in *Åland*, and the base for income, corporate, and sales taxes is set by the central government, though *Åland* authorities have discretion over the rate. *Åland* has also the right to impose additional regional taxes.

## CODING

*Läänit* score 0 for 1950–2006. *Maakuntien* score 0 for 1993–2006. *Åland* scores 3 for 1950–2006.

*France*

The central government collects all taxes and sets the base. *Départements* can set the rate for self-employed tax, mining dues, town planning tax, electricity tax, gambling tax, and, since 1982, motor vehicle tax. Since 1972 *régions* have been able to set the rate for self-employed tax, and, since 1982 and in conjunction with *départements*, the motor vehicle tax.

Corsica is subject to the same rules as *régions*, except that setting the rate of motor vehicle tax remains an exclusive regional competence. Corsica receives also special development grants, which are unilaterally determined by the central government, and Corsican residents benefit from lower rates on a range of national taxes, including income tax, VAT, corporate tax, and inheritance tax.

## CODING

*Départements* score 1 for 1950–2006; *régions* score 1 for 1972–2006; and *Corsica* scores 1 for 1982–2006.

*Germany*

Before 1966, *Länder* set base and rate of income, corporate, inheritance, property, and vehicle taxes, while the federal government set customs and excise, VAT, and consumption taxes. The Basic Law gave the federal government the right to request a share of *Länder* income and corporate taxes.

The constitutional reform of 1966 divided the major taxes (income, corporate, value added) about evenly between the federal government and *Länder*. The federal government sets the general framework, including base and rate, while *Länder* administer tax collection. There is extensive power sharing between *Länder* and federal government on taxation.

The Basic Law assigns some taxes exclusively to the federal government (customs duties, highway freight tax, taxes on capital transactions, levies imposed by the EU) and some exclusively to the *Länder* (taxes on property, inheritance, motor vehicles, beer, gambling). Exclusive *Länder* taxes constitute less than 10 per cent of *Land* revenue sources.

*Kreise* receive a share of income revenue and value added tax. They also levy and determine the rates for local business tax and property tax. Both tax competencies are specified in the Basic Law. In addition, *Kreise* have some capacity to levy other taxes. These rules differ by *Land*, and the amounts involved amount to less than 2 per cent of total *Kreise* government revenue.

## CODING

*Länder* score 4 for 1950–65 and 2 for 1966–2006; (*Land*)*kreise* score 1 for 1950–2006; *Regierungsbezirke* score 0 for 1950–2006.

*Greece*

*Peripherei*es are dependent on transfers from the central state and the EU. The budget of *nomoi* consists mainly of their share of centrally collected value added taxes, tax on buildings, traffic duties, and car registration taxes, for which the central government determines base and rate. From 1998 *nomoi* gained some limited capacity to set fees and charges for transport and other services, but not to levy taxes.

## CODING

*Nomoi* score 0 for 1950–2006; *peripherei*es score 0 for 1986–2006.

*Hungary*

The 1990 Act on Local Taxes grants counties (*megyék*) authority over five taxes: business tax, the communal tax (poll or payroll tax), urban land tax, property tax, and tax on tourism. The central government sets the base, while

the regional government determines which (if any) of the taxes it will levy and sets the rate up to a centrally determined ceiling. However, county revenue comes mostly from national grants financed from nationally collected personal income tax. Regions (*tervezési-statisztikai régiók*) are dependent on intergovernmental transfers and have no tax authority.

CODING

*Megyék* score 1 for 1990–2006; *tervezési-statisztikai régiók* score 0 for 1999–2006.

*Iceland*

No regional tier of government: 0 for 1950–2006.

*Ireland*

Development regions and their successors, regional authorities, are dependent on intergovernmental transfers and have no tax authority. Their working budget comes primarily from national and EU grants, while operational costs and non-structural funds operations are financed by local authorities.

CODING

Ireland scores 0 for 1950–86. *Development regions/regional authorities* score 0 for 1987–2006.

*Italy*

Provinces (*province*) had limited fiscal autonomy until the 1974 tax reform centralized control of the base and rate of all taxes and reduced own taxes to a marginal share of provincial revenue. So, at the same time that it devolved competencies, the central state strengthened control over the purse on grounds of equity. A major overhaul of the fiscal system in 1993 gave *province* greater revenue autonomy. Provincial taxes consist now of a supplemental fee on waste disposal services, vehicle registration, and the use of public land and a surcharge on electricity consumption, but the rate is nationally constrained.

Regions (*regioni*) were dependent on government transfers from 1974 to 1992. The amount a region received was determined by how much it spent – not by its revenues. In 1993 regional governments obtained the right to raise several own taxes, including vehicle tax, an annual surtax, a special tax on diesel cars, health taxes and a university fee. *Regioni* set the rate within centrally determined limits. The 1997 reform allowed ordinary regions to set

their rate of personal income tax up to a nationally determined ceiling, and since 2001 they have also been able to set the rate on their share of value added taxes. The 2001 constitutional reform enshrined the principle of fiscal autonomy for regions and established an equalization fund that obliges the state to subsidize poorer regions.

The five special regions (and Bolzano-Bozen and Trento) have particular arrangements whereby they receive a share of taxes collected in their jurisdictions. While the central government sets the base of these taxes, the rate is negotiated bilaterally between the region and central government. This is scored as fiscal shared rule. Like ordinary regions, special regions had, until 1993, no tax autonomy.

## CODING

*Regioni a statuto ordinario* score 0 for 1972–92, 1 for 1993–6, and 3 for 1997–2006. *Regioni a statuto speciale* (including Bolzano-Bozen and Trento) score 0 for 1950–92, 1 for 1993–6, and 3 for 1997–2006. *Province* score 1 for 1950–73, 0 for 1974–92, and 1 for 1993–2006.

*Japan*

Prefectures (*todofuken*) administer budgets amounting to around 35 per cent of general government expenditure, but they have relatively limited authority over revenues. About 25 per cent of *todofuken* revenues consist of shared income and national value added taxes, plus a local allocation tax, for which base and rate are set by the central government. Around 20 per cent comes from earmarked central grants. Both types of revenue are designed to redistribute income across the prefectures.

Prefectures also have 13 of their own taxes, specified in the Local Tax Law. Prefectures can adjust base and rate of certain corporation taxes and the rate on eight of the remaining taxes. Government restrictions were made less onerous in 1998, and in 2000 new tax regulations considerably tightened the conditions under which central government can veto new prefectural taxes. The last five years have seen debate about further fiscal decentralization, including prefectural control over the rate of income tax. Among the most important prefectural taxes are an enterprise tax, an inhabitant tax, and a local consumption tax. Own taxes cover some 40 per cent of revenues.

## CODING

*Todofuken* score 1 for 1950–99 and 2 for 2000–06.

*Latvia*

No regional tier of government: 0 for 1990–2006.

*Lithuania*

*Apskritis* are dependent on intergovernmental transfers and have no tax authority.

CODING

Lithuania scores 0 for 1992–4; *apskritis* score 0 for 1995–2006.

*Luxembourg*

No regional tier of government: 0 for 1950–2006.

*Macedonia*

No regional tier of government: 0 for 1991–2006.

*Malta*

No regional tier of government: 0 for 1964–2006.

*Netherlands*

*Provincies* have limited fiscal autonomy. Central grants account for over 90 per cent of provincial revenues. Such grants are either unconditional contributions from the *provinciefonds*, in which the central government deposits a share of annual income taxes, or are conditional grants for public transport, youth policy, and the environment. *Provincies* have some tax authority over minor taxes. They collect fees on water pollution, a ground water tax, a surcharge on the television and radio licence fee, and a surcharge on the motor vehicle tax. *Provincies* can adjust the rates for these taxes up to a maximum fixed by the central government.

CODING

*Provincies* score 1 for 1950–2006.

*New Zealand*

Regions finance their operations primarily from property taxes, for which they can set base and rate within centrally determined limits. They can also levy special taxes on environmental services.

CODING

New Zealand scores 0 for 1950–73; *regions* score 2 for 1974–2006.

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*Norway*

From 1975, *fylker* have received a share of income tax, for which they may increase or lower the rate within centrally determined limits. Before 1975, *fylker* received central grants.

CODING

*Fylker* score 0 for 1950–74 and 3 for 1975–2006.

*Poland*

*Województwa* receive a share of personal income tax and corporate income tax, for which the central government sets base and rate. The transition from deconcentrated to decentralized governance in 1999 did not appreciably alter the fiscal autonomy of the *województwa*.

CODING

*Województwa* score 0 for 1990–2006.

*Portugal*

Deconcentrated *comissões de cooperação e desenvolvimento regional* depend on national and EU grants and have no autonomous tax authority. *Distritos* are deconcentrated state administrations. The autonomous regions of the Azores and Madeira have the right to tax within the framework of national law. They can levy regional taxes and, since 1999, set the rate of income, corporate, and consumption taxes.

CODING

*Comissões de cooperação e desenvolvimento regional* score 0 for 1979–2006. *Distritos* score 0 for 1976–2006. The *Azores* and *Madeira* score 2 for 1976–98 and 3 for 1999–2006.

*Romania*

The financial position of counties (*judete*) was uncertain until the passage of the 1994 law on public finance. From 1994 to 2003, *judete* had some fiscal autonomy. They set the rate, within a range specified by law, of property taxes (land, vehicles, buildings) and local fees (permits, etc.), and they could also establish, within the limits of national law, new regional taxes. In addition, *judete* received an annually determined share of national income tax. In

2003 central grants were made more predictable, but *judete* lost the power to set tax rates.

Development regions (*regiuni de dezvoltare*) are entirely dependent on national, local, or EU transfers and have no tax authority.

## CODING

*Judete* score 0 for 1991–3, 1 for 1994–2002, and 0 for 2003–6. *Regiuni de dezvoltare* score 0 for 1998–2006.

*Russia*

Federal subjects (*subwekty federacii*) have limited fiscal autonomy, though they spend about half of the general government budget.

The 1993 constitution stipulates that taxation is concurrent between the federation and the *subwekty federacii*, but the 1991 Law on the Basic Principles of Taxation gave the federal government authority over the base and rate of most major taxes. Exclusively federal taxes consisted of value added tax, export taxes (abolished in 1996), alcohol and vehicle excises, taxes on bank and insurance profits, taxes on currency exchange and securities, and customs duties. The federal government also set the base and rate of shared taxes, including personal income tax, corporate income tax, and excise taxes (except those on motor vehicles and alcohol). *Subwekty* set the rate, but not the base, of a tax on enterprise profits, on sales and assets, on forestry, and on water usage. The federal government and *subwekty* had concurrent powers on natural resource taxes. The implementation of this law was contested by *subwekty* and the federal government during the first half-decade of post-communist Russia, resulting in a series of bilateral tax arrangements. In almost all cases, however, *subwekty* set the rate of at least one major tax, the sales tax.

Legislation in 1997 and 1998 classified taxes into federal, regional, and local revenue sources, clarified revenue sharing, and required the federal government and *subwekty* to establish an equalization scheme for lower-level jurisdictions. The federal government retains the power to set base and rate for the most important taxes, including income tax and VAT; *subwekty federacii* can determine the rate on natural resource extraction and levy a surtax on corporate income tax and sales taxes, for which they control the rate.

Federal districts (*federalnyye okruga*) are financed by the central government.

## CODING

*Subwekty federacii* score 3 for 1993–2006. *Federalnyye okruga* score 0 for 2000–06.

*Serbia-Montenegro*

Under the 1992 constitution of the Yugoslav Federal Republic, both the federal government and the republics of Montenegro and Serbia had full authority over all taxes except for some portion of sales taxes and customs and excise taxes. The constitutional revision of 2003, which created a confederation, transferred all fiscal powers to the republics.

In Serbia, tax authority is highly centralized, and *okruzi* and the autonomous provinces are dependent on central government transfers. The 2002 omnibus law devolved some limited financial autonomy to Vojvodina, which is entitled to a share of corporate income and personal income tax, the base and rate of which are set annually by the central government. Vojvodina has also the right to introduce certain own revenues, such as administrative or service fees, non-fiscal revenues, interest revenues from its provincial bank savings, revenues from the sale or rental of provincial property, etc., but not the right to introduce provincial taxes. About 70 per cent of Vojvodina's budget comes from government transfers.

CODING

*Serbia-Montenegro* scores 4 for 1992–2006. In Serbia, *okruzi* score 0 for 1992–2006. *Kosovo* scores 0 for 1992–8 and *Vojvodina* scores 0 for 1992–2006.

*Slovakia*

Until 2001, *kraje* were state administrations and depended on state funding. Since 2002, *samosprávne kraje* have been self-governing, but they have no fiscal autonomy. They are dependent on intergovernmental transfers.

CODING

Slovakia scores 0 for 1993–5. *Kraje* score 0 for 1996–2001. *Samosprávne kraje* score 0 for 2002–6.

*Slovenia*

No regional tier of government: 0 for 1991–2006.

*Spain*

There are two tax regimes for *comunidades autónomas*: a special foral tax regime for Navarre and the Basque Country, and a common regime for the remaining *comunidades*. The power of *comunidades autónomas* to spend has been greater than their power to raise their own revenues.

Under the *foral* regime, which was established in the constitution of 1978, Navarre and the Basque Country collect income, corporate, inheritance, and wealth taxes and are able to set the rate and base within centrally determined limits. Taxes are collected at the regional level, and a portion is remitted to the central government after negotiations.

The common tax regime for *comunidades autónomas* ceded extensive regional control over spending but little control over revenue until the reform of 1997, which transformed a tax transfer regime into a tax-sharing regime, allowing regions to set rates for income, wealth, inheritance and gifts, real estate, and stamp tax, and both base and rate on gambling. *Comunidades autónomas* can introduce new taxes if not already levied by central government. Legislation in 2001 gave *comunidades* one-third of the income tax and 35 per cent of tobacco, electricity, and transportation tax.

*Provincias* control property tax, a surcharge on the municipal business tax, and a motor vehicle tax. They also have the right to tax buildings, facilities, and urban property.

Ceuta and Melilla are entitled to an additional share of state taxes and an additional 50 per cent of the fiscal portion of municipal taxes levied by the two enclaves. In other respects, their fiscal regime is similar to that of other *comunidades*.

#### CODING

*Comunidades autónomas*, including *Ceuta* and *Melilla*, score 2 from 1978–96 and 3 for 1997–2006. The Basque Country and Navarre score 4 for 1978–2006. *Provincias* score 2 for 1978–2006.

#### *Sweden*

The main income source for *län* is local income tax, which accounts for about 75 per cent of county revenues. The tax base is set by central government, but the *län* can determine the level of the flat rate they levy.

#### CODING

*Län* score 3 for 1950–2006.

#### *Switzerland*

The constitution grants fiscal autonomy primarily to the *cantons* and only secondarily to the confederation. Cantons are largely free to structure and frame their tax system. The only restrictions are prohibitions on double taxation, on indirect taxation (VAT and special consumption taxes, which are exclusively federal), and on intercantonal tariff barriers. Personal income, wealth, and corporate income tax are concurrent between cantons and the

federal government, with the understanding that changes in federal taxation are subject to cantonal agreement, constitutional amendments, and, therefore, popular referendum. While there has been some harmonization of cantonal taxation regimes, cantons still define their own bases and rates, as well as the amounts of allowances and deduction, and so there remain widely varying taxation levels throughout Switzerland. In addition, cantons have the exclusive right to tax motor vehicles.

CODING

Swiss *cantons* score 4 for 1950–2006.

*Turkey*

Provinces (*iller*) self-generate only 1 or 2 per cent of their revenue; for the rest they depend on central funding. Base and rate of *iller* taxes are determined by the central government.

CODING

*Iller* score 0 for 1950–2006.

*United Kingdom*

Counties receive income from a property tax and conditional and unconditional government grants. Between 1950 and 1983, counties could set the rate of a property tax on the notional rental value of a dwelling. In 1984 central government capped the rate, and in 1990 it tried to replace the property tax with a community charge, better known as the poll tax, which was a uniform tax per individual designed to cover the cost of community services. Counties could determine the level of the tax. The community charge became deeply unpopular because it varied wildly from county to county and yet affected rich and poor equally. Public discontent regarding the poll tax precipitated Prime Minister Thatcher's resignation, and her successor replaced the unpopular tax with the council tax, which is similar to the old property tax.

Regions in England are dependent on central government grants. However, the Greater London Development Authority has some discretion to set the rate of regional taxes and can introduce fees and charges, such as the congestion charge.

In the special autonomous regions, only the Scottish Parliament has some fiscal autonomy: Scotland has the power to vary the basic rate of income tax by up to 3 pence in the pound. The devolved administrations in Wales and Northern Ireland have no tax-varying powers and remain reliant on central government grants.

## CODING

*Counties* score 1 for 1950–2006. *Regions* score 0 for 1994–2006, except for the Greater London Authority, which scores 1 for 2000–06. *Scotland* scores 0 for 1950–98 and 3 for 1999–2006; *Wales* and *Northern Ireland* score 0 for 1964–2006 and 1950–2006, respectively.

*United States*

Taxes are concurrent between the federal government and *states*. Both levy personal income, general sales, corporate income, and selective sales taxes. At the federal level, personal income and payroll taxes are the most important revenue source, whereas for state governments it is usually the sales tax. Each state has its own tax system. Congress fixed the base and rate of taxes in Alaska and Hawaii when they were territories.

Since 1973, Washington, DC, has had similar taxation powers to the states, even though Congress retains ultimate authority. From 1995 to 2000 home rule was suspended and a federal control board took over the budget and, with it, the management of most city projects. The elected DC government regained budgetary control in 2001.

Counties and their equivalents rely on property taxes for around 70 per cent of their revenue. The base is determined by the state and the tax is collected by the state before being transferred to counties. In some states, they receive a share of sales and income taxes which are usually collected by the state, and then transferred.

## CODING

*States* score 4 for 1950–2006. *Territories* score 0 for 1950–58. *Washington, DC*, scores 0 for 1950–72, 4 for 1973–94, 0 for 1995–2000, and 4 for 2001–6. *Counties, regions, and regional councils* score 1 for 1950–2006 for applicable states/years.

**Representation***Albania*

Since their creation in 2000, regional *qark* councils have been indirectly elected from communal and municipal representatives of the respective region's jurisdiction; mayors of the municipalities and the chairmen of communal councils are *ex officio* members. Executive power is exercised by the prefect, who is appointed by the national government.

CODING

Albania scores 0 (assembly) and 0 (executive) for 1992–9; *qarku* score 1, 0 for 2000–06.

*Australia*

States and territories hold elections at least once every four years, except Queensland, which has a three-year parliamentary term. Each state and each territory has a parliament and an executive appointed by, and accountable to, the assembly. There is also a (mostly ceremonial) governor appointed by the queen on the recommendation of the Australian federal government.

The Australian Capital Territory held its first direct elections in 1989, and its executive was appointed by its assembly. From 1947 the Northern Territory had an assembly, the majority of which consisted of government appointees. Directly elected members became the majority in 1960, and from 1965 the executive head was elected by the assembly. In 1974 the assembly of the Northern Territory became entirely elected with a fully accountable executive.

CODING

*States* score 2 (assembly) and 2 (executive) for 1950–2006. The *Australian Capital Territory* scores 0, 0 for 1950–88 and 2, 2 for 1989–2006. The *Northern Territory* scores 0, 0 for 1950–59; 2, 0 for 1960–64; and 2, 2 for 1965–2006.

*Austria*

*Länder Landtage* are directly elected every five or six years depending on the *Land*. The *Landtag* elects its own *Landeshauptmann* and government.

CODING

*Länder* score 2 (assembly) and 2 (executive) for 1955–2006.

*Belgium*

Provincial councils have been directly elected since 1830 on a six-year cycle in conjunction with local elections. The provincial executive is dual: the executive head, the governor, is appointed by the regional government (until 1994, the national government), and the remainder of the executive is elected by the provincial council.

From 1970 to 1980, communities had indirectly elected councils consisting of the members of the lower and upper house of the relevant linguistic community; the executive was lodged in the national government. From 1980

the same principle was applied to the regions, which acquired indirectly elected councils. Pressure for popularly elected councils increased in the following years. The Brussels Capital Region became directly elected in 1989, and the Flemish Council, Walloon Regional Council, and French Community Council followed in 1995. Since that year, regional and community assemblies have been elected on a five-year cycle coinciding with European elections. A constitutional revision in 2005 renamed these councils as parliaments.

The German community followed a separate path: direct elections of the council from 1974, and an executive elected by the council from 1984.

## CODING

Raw scores: The *Vlaamse Gemeenschap* and *Communauté française* score 1 (assembly) and 0 (executive) for 1970–79; 1, 2 for 1980–94; and 2, 2 for 1995–2006. The *Deutsche Gemeinschaft* scores 0, 0 for 1970–73; 2, 0 for 1974–83; and 2, 2 for 1984–2006. The *Région wallonne* scores 1, 2 for 1980–94 and 2, 2 for 1995–2006. The *Brussels region* scores 0, 0 for 1980–88 and 2, 2 for 1989–2006.

Aggregated scores: The *Vlaamse Gemeenschap* and *Communauté française* score 1 (assembly) and 0 (executive) for 1970–79; 1, 2 for 1980–88; 1.1, 2 (Flemish) or 1.4, 2 (French) for 1989–94; 2, 2 for 1995–2006. The *Deutsche Gemeinschaft* scores 0, 0 for 1970–73; 2, 0 for 1974–83; and 2, 2 for 1984–2006. *Provincies* score 2, 1 for 1950–2006.

*Bosnia-Herzegovina*

Elections for the parliaments of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and *Republika Sprska* are held every four years. Elections for the cantonal parliaments in the *Federacija* are every four years. All parliaments elect their own executives.

## CODING

The *Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine*, the *Republika Sprska*, and the *cantons* score 2 (assembly) and 2 (executive) for 1995–2006.

*Bulgaria*

Central government appoints the governor of each *oblast*, and there is no regional assembly.

## CODING

*Oblasti* score 0 (assembly) and 0 (executive) for 1991–2006.

*Canada*

Provinces have a unicameral parliament which is directly elected every four years. The queen appoints a ceremonial government representative, the lieutenant-governor, in each province. Provincial governments are elected from and responsible to the provincial parliaments.

Territories evolved from quasi-colonial status without democratic representation to directly elected parliaments with responsible executives. From 1897 to 1905 the Northwest Territories had an elected government resembling that of a province. However, when Saskatchewan and Alberta were created the rump of the Northwest Territories slipped back into quasi-colonial status, and for the next half century they were run by an Ottawa-appointed commissioner and council. This began to change in the 1950s, when the proportion of directly elected council members was gradually increased. By 1966 the majority of council members were popularly elected, while the executive remained appointed by Ottawa. Responsible government – an executive elected or appointed by a popularly elected regional assembly – gradually developed. The first two elected representatives were appointed to the commissioner’s ‘executive committee’ in 1975. Fully responsible government arrived in 1979, when a premier elected within the legislature replaced a federally appointed commissioner. Yukon had a popularly elected council from 1909; from 1970 the government-appointed executive was assisted by two elected representatives, and in 1978 its executive became fully responsible to the council. When Nunavut (carved out of the Northwest Territories) was set up in 1999, it received a directly elected council with a government responsible to it.

Only Ontario has a second-tier intermediate level large enough to be incorporated in the index. Counties and regions have councils composed of mayors and/or councillors elected by and from the constituent municipalities’ councils. The council doubles as the executive (counties) or can establish committees with executive powers (regions).

## CODING

*Provinces* score 2 (assembly) and 2 (executive) for 1950–2006. The *Northwest Territories* score 0, 0 for 1950–65; 2, 0 for 1966–74; 2, 1 for 1975–8; and 2, 2 for 1979–2006. *Yukon* scores 2, 0 for 1950–69; 2, 1 for 1970–77; and 2, 2 for 1978–2006. *Nunavut* scores 2, 2 for 1999–2006. *Counties* and *regions* score 1, 2 for 1950–2006.

*Croatia*

*Županije* assemblies are directly elected every four years. The prefect is elected by the assembly.

CODING

Croatia scores 0 (assembly) and 0 (executive) for 1991–92; *županije* score 2 (assembly) and 2 (executive) for 1993–2006.

*Cyprus*

No regional institutions.

*The Czech Republic*

*Kraje* assemblies are directly elected every four years. Deputies elect the *kraje* executive.

CODING

The Czech Republic scores 0 (assembly) and 0 (executive) for 1993–9; *kraje* score 2, 2 for 2000–06.

*Denmark*

From 1950 to 1969, the councils of the *amtskommuner* were indirectly elected by municipal councils. The executive head of the *amtskommun* was a centrally appointed state official. This changed in 1970, when the council became directly elected on a four-year electoral cycle (and *amtskommuner* were renamed *amter*). The executive is elected by the council, except for the prefect, who remains a government appointee.

The special autonomous regions of the Faroe Islands and Greenland have always had directly elected assemblies, which choose their own executives. Elections are held every four years.

CODING

*Amtskommuner/amter* score 1 (assembly) and 0 (executive) 1950–69 and 2, 1 for 1970–2006. *Greenland* scores 0, 0 for 1950–52 as a colony; 1, 0 for 1953–69 and 2, 1 for 1970–78 for its tenure as an *amtskommun/amt*; and 2, 2 for 1979–2006 under home rule. The *Faroe Islands* score 2, 2 for 1950–2006.

*Estonia*

No regional institutions.

*Finland*

*Läänit* are deconcentrated administrations. The councils of the level below, the *maakuntien*, consist of municipal representatives in the region, who elect

their executive board. Currently, the only region with a popular election for the council is Kainuu.

The Åland Islands have a parliament (*lagting*) which is popularly elected every four years. The parliament elects its government.

## CODING

*Läänit* score 0 (assembly) and 0 (executive) for 1950–2006. *Maakuntien* score 1, 2 for 1993–2006. *Kainuu* scores 2, 2 for 2004–6. The *Åland Islands* score 2, 2 for 1950–2006.

*France*

The general councils of *départements* are directly elected every six years on a three-year rotation. Since 1982 the president has been elected by the general council and presides over the executive. There is also a government-appointed departmental prefect who, since 1982, has been primarily responsible for *post hoc* legal oversight.

From 1964 each *région* had a centrally appointed prefect. 1972 saw the establishment of indirectly elected regional councils composed of all nationally elected politicians from the region alongside indirectly elected representatives from subnational governments. The regional executive was headed by a government-appointed prefect. From 1982 regional councils elected their own president, and from 1986 regional assemblies were popularly elected on a six-year cycle. The regional prefect remains responsible for *post hoc* legal oversight and some limited policy tasks.

Corsica has had its own direct elections and an executive elected by the assembly since 1982. As in other regions, executive power is shared with a government-appointed prefect.

## CODING

*Départements* score 2 (assembly) and 0 (executive) for 1950–81 and 2, 1 for 1982–2006. *Régions* score 0, 0 for 1964–71; 1, 0 for 1972–81; 1, 1 for 1982–5; and 2, 1 for 1986–2006. *Corsica* scores 2, 1 for 1982–2006.

*Germany*

*Land* and *Kreis* assemblies are directly elected every four or five years. *Land* and *Kreis* executives are elected by their assemblies.

*Regierungsbezirke* are appointed by *Land* governments. They have no representative bodies, except in North-Rhine Westphalia, where since 2001 they have had a consultative assembly composed primarily of locally elected politicians from *Gemeinde* and *Kreise*.

## CODING

*Länder* and *Landkreise* score 2 (assembly) and 2 (executive) for 1950–2006. *Regierungsbezirke* score 0, 0 (and 1, 0 in *North-Rhine Westphalia* from 2001).

*Greece*

Before 1994, *nomoi* were deconcentrated administrations, though there was also a weak advisory council composed of interest groups and local representatives. Since 1994, popular elections on a four-year cycle have elected a council, which also selects a prefect from the council's majority.

*Peripherei*es were deconcentrated administrations until the introduction in 1996 of a consultative body composed of *nomos* prefects in the jurisdiction, representatives of local authorities, the executive head of the *periphéria*, and representatives of various regional-level public interest groups. The executive head is appointed by the national government.

## CODING

*Nomoi* score 0 (assembly) and 0 (executive) for 1950–93 and 2, 2 for 1994–2006. *Peripherei*es score 0, 0 for 1986–96 and 1, 0 for 1997–2006.

*Hungary*

From 1990 to 1993, assemblies of *megyék* (counties) were indirectly elected by municipalities, and these assemblies elected their executive. Since 1994, *megye* councils have been directly elected and the president of the council is elected by, and responsible to, the assembly.

Consultative councils at the regional level were established in 1999. They are composed mainly of government appointees and *ex officio* members, a minority of whom represent local authorities. The executive of the regional development council is centrally appointed.

## CODING

*Megyék* score 1 (assembly) and 2 (executive) for 1990–93 and 2, 2 for 1994–2006. *Regional development councils* score 0, 0 for 1999–2006.

*Iceland*

No regional institutions.

*Ireland*

Development regions had no indirect or direct representation, but their successors since 1994, the regional authorities, have a council composed of

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representatives from local authorities. Each regional authority council appoints its own executive.

CODING

Ireland scores 0 (assembly) and 0 (executive) for 1950–86. *Development regions* score 0, 0 for 1987–93; *regional authorities* score 1, 2 for 1994–2006.

*Italy*

Elections for provincial councils are direct and take place every five years. Until 1993, the council elected the president of the *provincia*, and thereafter the president became directly elected. Each *provincia* had also a government-appointed prefect with considerable executive authority. Since the 2001 constitutional reform, the prefect's office has been redefined. His tasks have been limited to responsibility for law and order, emergency measures, and *ex post* control over local and provincial decisions.

Since 1972, regional assemblies of ordinary *regioni* have been directly elected, and elections take place every five years. The regional president has been directly elected since 1999, except where a regional statute provides otherwise. Special statute *regioni* have had directly elected assemblies and executives elected by the assembly since 1950 (for *Friuli-Venezia-Giulia* since 1963). *Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol* has had an indirectly elected council composed of the elected councillors of the provinces of *Bolzano-Bozen* and *Trento* since 1972.

CODING

*Province* score 2 (assembly) and 1 (executive) for 1950–2006. *Regioni a statuto ordinario* score 2, 2 for 1972–2006, *regioni a statuto speciale* score 2, 2 for 1950–2006, *Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol* scores 2, 2 for 1950–71 and 1, 2 for 1972–2006. The provinces of *Bolzano-Bozen* and *Trento* score 2, 1 for 1950–71 and 2, 2 for 1972–2006.

*Japan*

The prefectural assembly as well as the governor are directly elected every four years.

CODING

*Todofuken* score 2 (assembly) and 2 (executive) for 1950–2006.

*Latvia*

No regional institutions.

*Lithuania*

*Apskritis*, created in 1995, have an advisory council composed of the governor, deputy governor, and mayors of municipalities in the county. The governor is appointed by central government.

CODING

Lithuania scores 0 (assembly) and 0 (executive) for 1992–4; *apskritis* score 1, 0 for 1995–2006.

*Luxembourg*

No regional institutions.

*Macedonia*

No regional institutions.

*Malta*

No regional institutions.

*Netherlands*

Provincial elections take place every four years. The head of the executive, the queen's commissioner, is appointed by the central government upon a proposal of the provincial assembly. The other members of the executive are elected by the provincial assembly.

CODING

*Provincies* score 2 (assembly) and 1 (executive) for 1950–2006.

*New Zealand*

From 1974 to 1988 regions had indirectly elected regional councils consisting of representatives from territorial authority councils, except for Auckland and Wellington, which had directly elected councils and executives responsible to them. Direct elections have taken place since 1989, and the directly elected council doubles as the executive.

CODING

*Regions* score 1 (assembly) and 2 (executive) for 1974–88 and 2, 2 for 1989–2006. *Auckland* and *Wellington* score 2, 2 for the whole period.

*Norway*

Until 1974, *fylke* councils were composed of municipal representatives and the executive led by the governor (*fylkesmann*) was appointed by the central government. From 1975, *fylke* councils became directly elected on a four-year cycle, and they select their executives. However, the government-appointed *fylkesmann* remains in place, and his authority was strengthened in the 1990s.

CODING

*Fylker* score 1 (assembly) and 0 (executive) for 1950–74 and 2, 1 for 1975–2006.

*Poland*

From 1990 to 1998, *województwa* had an advisory council composed of delegates from municipalities, while the executive head was appointed by the central government. Since 1999 *województwa* have had popularly elected councils, and the executive, including the head or *marszałek*, is elected by and responsible to the council. Elections take place every four years.

CODING

*Województwa* score 1 (assembly) and 0 (executive) for 1990–98 and 2, 2 for 1999–2006.

*Portugal*

Planning regions (*comissões de cooperação e desenvolvimento regional*) have no democratic representation, though they are advised by two consultative chambers – one for sectoral interests and one for municipal interests. Elected local representatives do not constitute a majority in these councils.

*Distritos* have a district assembly which is dominated by local interests. It is comprised of representatives of municipal councils, municipal assemblies, and parish councils. Executive power is in the hands of a civil governor, appointed by the central government, who is assisted by an advisory body consisting of four members elected by the district assembly and four policy specialists appointed by the central government.

In the Azores and Madeira, assemblies are directly elected on a four-year cycle, and the regional government is responsible to the assembly.

CODING

*Comissões de cooperação e desenvolvimento regional* score 0 (assembly) and 0

(executive) for 1979–2006. *Distritos* score 1, 0 for 1976–2006. The *Azores* and *Madeira* score 2, 2 for 1976–2006.

### *Romania*

*Judet* councils are directly elected every four years and elect their own executives. Each *judet* has also a government-appointed prefect.

Each development region (*regiuno de dezvoltare*) has an advisory council composed of the chairs of the *judet* councils, *judet* prefects, and elected representatives from local government. Government-appointed *judet* prefects have no voting power. The council appoints the agency that exercises executive authority.

#### CODING

*Judete* score 2 (assembly) and 1 (executive) for 1991–2006. Development regions (*regiuni de dezvoltare*) score 1, 2 for 1998–2006.

### *Russia*

*Subwekty federacii* have had popularly elected assemblies since 1993. There have been major changes on the executive side represented by governors (or, in republics, presidents). Between 1993 and 1996, governors of *subwekty* were appointed by the Russian president, except in the republics, where presidents were either chosen by the assembly or directly elected. Governors and presidents of all *subwekty federacii* became popularly elected in 1996. From 2005, direct election of regional executives was replaced by a system under which regional legislatures confirm candidates nominated by the Russian president. This is scored as a dual executive because the executive needs support from both the central government and the regional assembly.

Federal district presidential envoys are appointed by the central government, and there is no assembly at this level.

#### CODING

21 republics (*respubliki*) score 2 (assembly) and 2 (executive) for 1993–2004 and 2, 1 for 2005–6. Remaining *subwekty federacii* score 2, 0 for 1993–5, 2, 2 for 1996–2004, and 2, 1 for 2005–6. Federal districts (*federalnyye okruga*) score 0, 0 for 2000–06.

### *Serbia-Montenegro*

The parliaments of Serbia and Montenegro and, within Serbia, the assemblies of the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo are directly

elected on a four-year cycle. All assemblies choose their executives. *Okruzi* in Serbia do not have self-government.

CODING

*Serbia, Montenegro and Vojvodina* score 2 (assembly) and 2 (executive) for 1992–2006. *Kosovo* (or *Kosomet*) scores 2, 2 for 1992–8. *Okruzi* score 0, 0 for 1992–2006.

*Slovakia*

*Samosprávne kraje*'s predecessors, *kraje*, were state organs. Since 2002, *samosprávne kraje* have had directly elected councils, and the chairperson of the executive is also directly elected. Elections take place every four years. Yet the deconcentrated *kraje* state offices remain, which makes Slovakia's regional government dual.

CODING

Slovakia scores 0 (assembly) and 0 (executive) for 1992–5. *Kraje* score 0, 0 for 1996–2001. *Samosprávne kraje* score 2, 1 for 2002–6.

*Slovenia*

No regional institutions.

*Spain*

Provincial councils are elected by and from municipal councillors, and the president of the executive is elected by the provincial council.

Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia, and Andalusia hold direct elections on a date set by their assembly. The first elections took place in Catalonia and the Basque Country in 1980, followed by Galicia in 1981 and Andalusia in 1982. Direct elections were introduced in all other *comunidades autónomas* in 1983 and take place every four years. The special autonomous regions of Ceuta and Melilla have had a popularly elected council since 1978. In all *comunidades* and special autonomous regions, executives are elected by and from the councils.

CODING

*Provincias* score 1 (assembly) and 2 (executive) for 1978–2006. *Catalonia* and the *Basque Country* score 2, 2 for 1979–2006; *Galicia* scores 2, 2 for 1981–2006 and *Andalusia* for 1982–2006; the other *comunidades autónomas* score 2, 2 for 1983–2006. *Ceuta* and *Melilla* score 2, 2 for 1978–2006.

*Sweden*

Between 1950 and 1970 *landsting* assemblies were composed of indirectly elected local representatives and the executive head was a government appointee (*landshövding*). Since 1971, *landsting* assemblies have been directly elected and the assembly chooses its own executive. Elections take place every four years in conjunction with municipal and national elections. At the same time, *landsting* share authority with deconcentrated *länsstyrelser* under the direction of government-appointed governors.

## CODING

*Län* score 1 (assembly) and 0 (executive) for 1950–70 and 2, 1 for 1971–2006.

*Switzerland*

Popular elections for cantonal parliaments take place every four years. The parliaments elect executives.

## CODING

*Cantons* score 2 (assembly) and 2 (executive) for 1950–2006.

*Turkey*

Until 1960, *iller* constituted deconcentrated government. Since 1961, the councils of the *iller* have been popularly elected every five years. The central government appoints governors.

## CODING

*Iller* score 0 (assembly) and 0 (executive) for 1950–60 and 2, 0 for 1961–2006.

*United Kingdom*

There are currently popularly elected assemblies in four of the country's 12 regions. Northern Ireland has had an elected assembly and responsible government since 1921, except when devolution was suspended, as it was for the years 1972–99 and from October 2002 to May 2007. Scotland and Wales acquired directly elected assemblies in 1999. Scotland also obtained an executive responsible to the assembly, while the role of the Scottish secretary of state in the national government was scaled back to that of a liaison officer. The Welsh Assembly was invested with some executive powers, but had to share these with the Welsh secretary of state in the central government. In 2006 the Welsh Act was revised to provide Wales with its own self-governing executive; this arrangement came into effect after the Welsh 2007 elections. A dual executive arrangement is also in place for Northern Ireland.

Since 2000, Greater London has had a popularly elected council and mayor. The eight remaining English regions have consultative councils in which local government representatives predominate. The executive head is a government appointee.

Counties have popularly elected councils, which appoint their own executive. Reforms in 1996 replaced counties in Scotland, Wales, and half of England with unitary authorities, which no longer meet the criterion of intermediate government.

## CODING

*Northern Ireland* scores 2 (assembly) and 1 (executive) for 1950–71 and 2000–02 and 0, 0 for the years under suspension, 1972–99 and 2003–6. *Scotland* scores 0, 0 for 1950–98 and 2, 2 for 1999–2006. *Wales* scores 0, 0 for 1950–98 and 2, 1 for 1999–2006. *Greater London* scores 2, 2 for 2000–06. *English regions* score 0, 0 for 1994–7 and 1, 0 for 1998–2006. *Counties* score 2, 2 for applicable years and parts of the UK.

*United States*

State assemblies and governors are directly elected every four years. As territories, Alaska and Hawaii had a government-appointed governor and directly elected senate (every four years) and house (every two years). Washington, DC, has had a popularly elected council and mayor since 1973. The powers of the mayor were controlled by a Congress-appointed board during the time that home rule was suspended. This is scored as dual government.

Counties have directly elected councils. Sometimes the executive is directly elected, and sometimes the county council combines legislative and executive tasks. Regions in Massachusetts and Connecticut have similar institutions.

## CODING

*States* score 2 (assembly) and 2 (executive) for 1950–2006. *Alaska* and *Hawaii* score 2, 0 for 1950–58 and 2, 2 for 1959–2006. *Washington, DC*, scores 0, 0 for 1950–72; 2, 2 for 1973–94; 2, 1 for 1995–2000; and 2, 2 for 2001–6. *Counties* and *regions* score 2, 2 for 1950–2006 for relevant states and years.

**Shared rule**

Four types of shared rule or power sharing – summarized in Table A.1 – are scored. Scoring is cumulative for law making and ordinal for the other types of shared rule. With minor adjustments, the same coding scheme applies to special autonomous regions. The scoring is summarized in a country table at the end of each profile.

Table A.1 Coding shared rule for regional tiers and special autonomous regions

<i>Regions and asymmetrical regions</i>	<i>Special autonomous regions</i>
<i>A. Law making</i>	<i>A. Law making</i>
Regions are the unit of representation in the national legislature.	<b>0.5</b> The region is the unit of representation in the national legislature.
Regional governments designate representatives in the legislature.	<b>0.5</b> The regional government designates representatives in the legislature.
Regions at a given level have majority representation in the legislature.	<b>0.5</b> The regional government or regional representatives in the legislature are consulted on national legislation affecting the region.
A legislature based on regional representation has extensive legislative authority.	<b>0.5</b> The regional government or regional representatives in the legislature have veto power over national legislation affecting the region.
<i>B. Executive control</i>	<i>B. Executive control</i>
No routine meetings between central government and regional governments to discuss national policy.	<b>0</b> No routine meetings between central government and regional government to discuss national policy affecting the region.
Routine meetings between central government and regional governments <i>without</i> legally binding authority.	<b>1</b> Routine meetings between central government and the regional government <i>without</i> legally binding authority.
Routine meetings between central government and regional governments <i>with</i> legally binding authority.	<b>2</b> Routine meetings between central government and the regional government <i>with</i> legally binding authority.
<i>C. Fiscal control</i>	<i>C. Fiscal control</i>
Regional governments or their representatives in the legislature are not consulted over the distribution of national tax revenues.	<b>0</b> The regional government is not consulted over the distribution of tax revenues affecting the region.
Regional governments or their representatives in the legislature negotiate with the central government over the distribution of national tax revenues, but do not have a veto.	<b>1</b> The regional government negotiates with the central government the distribution of tax revenues affecting the region, but does not have a veto.
Regional governments or their representatives in the legislature have a veto over the distribution of tax revenues.	<b>2</b> The regional government has a veto over the distribution of tax revenues affecting the region.

*Table A.1* Continued

<i>Regions and asymmetrical regions</i>	<i>Special autonomous regions</i>
<i>D. Constitutional reform</i>	<i>D. Constitutional reform</i>
The central government and/or national electorate can unilaterally change the constitution.	<b>0</b> The national government or electorate decides unilaterally on constitutional change affecting the region's position in the national state.
A legislature based on regional representation must approve constitutional change; or constitutional change requires a referendum based on equal regional representation.	<b>1</b> The regional government is consulted on constitutional change affecting the region's position in the national state, but consultation is not binding.
Regional governments are a directly represented majority in a legislature that can raise the decision hurdle, but not veto constitutional change.	<b>2</b> The regional government and central government co-decide constitutional change affecting the region's position in the national state; both have veto power.
Regional governments are a directly represented majority in a legislature that can veto constitutional change.	<b>3</b> The regional government can unilaterally accept or reject constitutional change affecting the region's position.

***Albania***

No regional power sharing.

***Australia****Law making*

States and territories monopolize representation in the directly elected Senate, which can veto proposals from the lower house. In cases of legislative deadlock, the governor-general can dissolve one or both chambers. Each state is represented in the Senate by six or more senators, and territories have two senators each. The Australian Capital Territory gained Senate representation in 1973 and the Northern Territory in 1978. Territories are consulted on legislation that affects their region, but cannot exert a veto.

*Executive control*

The first conferences of the premiers of Australian states took place after the First World War. The first Commonwealth–state intergovernmental forum was the Loan Council (1927) to manage public debt and borrowing. Soon thereafter ministerial councils were created for agriculture, transport, immigration, education, and regional development. These councils met regularly and could reach binding decisions leading to federal or federal–state legislation. In 1992 ministerial councils were brought under the umbrella of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG), which includes the prime minister, state premiers, territory chief ministers, and the president of the Australian Local Government Association (ALGA). By 2006 there were over 40 Commonwealth–state ministerial councils and forums. Decisions are usually taken by unanimity.

*Fiscal control*

Fiscal intergovernmental relations have always been highly institutionalized, but until 1998 there was no formal binding mechanism. The premiers' conference is the most senior forum and meets at least once a year to deliberate fiscal transfers, but it does not reach binding decisions on finance. The Loan Council was set up in 1927 to co-ordinate federal and state borrowing and its decisions can be binding. It also assists the premiers' conference in its fiscal discussions. Since 1933 the Commonwealth Grants Commission, a standing body of independent experts, has advised the federal government on equalization transfers.

In 1999 the ministerial council for Commonwealth–state financial relations was set up to oversee implementation of the intergovernmental agreement which changed base and rate of a new general sales tax. Decisions are taken by unanimity, and representatives of the territories have equal voting rights.

*Constitutional reform*

Constitutional amendments require absolute majorities in both chambers of parliament and then must pass referendums in a majority of states/territories. The percentage of yes votes must represent a majority of the Australian electorate. If there is disagreement between the chambers, the objections of one chamber can be overridden if the amendment passes the other chamber by absolute majority after a reflection period of at least three months and after passing a national referendum.

Territorial governments are not consulted and do not have a veto when their Acts are amended.

*Box A.1* Australia

<i>Region</i>	<i>Years</i>	<i>Law making</i>				<i>Executive control</i>	<i>Fiscal control</i>	<i>Constitutional reform</i>
		<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>			
States	1950–1998	0.5	0	0.5	0.5	2	1	1
	1999–2006	0.5	0	0.5	0.5	2	2	1
Northern Territory	1950–1977	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1978–1998	0.5	0	0.5	0	2	1	0
	1999–2006	0.5	0	0.5	0	2	2	0
Australian Capital Territory	1950–1972	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1973–1988	0.5	0	0.5	0	0	0	0
	1989–1998	0.5	0	0.5	0	2	1	0
	1999–2006	0.5	0	0.5	0	2	2	0

***Austria****Law making*

The upper chamber (*Bundesrat*) is composed of representatives elected by *Land* parliaments (not *Land* executives). Each *Land* is allotted a number of seats proportional to its population, and these are divided among political parties according to their representation in the *Land* parliament. The *Bundesrat* can initiate and vote on most legislation, but it can be overridden by a simple majority in the lower house.

*Executive control*

Federal and *Land* governments hold regular intergovernmental meetings. While the norm is to decide by consensus, even unanimity among *Länder* does not formally bind the federal government, which can use constitutional ‘escape clauses’ to override *Länder* requests for participation in national and European policy making.

*Fiscal control*

*Länder* can influence the base and rate of shared taxes, since they are represented in the upper chamber. However, the upper chamber has no veto over taxation.

*Constitutional reform*

Up to 1984, the *Bundesrat* did not have a veto over constitutional amendments, though its consultation was required. It had also the power to postpone constitutional reform and could require a popular referendum if there was a ‘total revision’ (*Gesamtänderung*) of the constitution. A 1984 constitu-

tional change gave the *Bundesrat* the authority to veto constitutional changes that directly affect the federal–*Land* distribution of competencies or the organization of the *Bundesrat*. Constitutional amendments now require a majority or supermajority (depending on the issue) in the *Bundesrat*.

*Box A.2 Austria*

<i>Region</i>	<i>Years</i>	<i>Law making</i>				<i>Executive control</i>	<i>Fiscal control</i>	<i>Constitutional reform</i>
		<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>			
Länder	1955–1983	0	0.5	0.5	0	1	1	2
	1984–2006	0	0.5	0.5	0	1	1	3

***Belgium***

Over the course of the past five decades, power sharing has shifted from provinces to communities and, to a lesser extent, regions.

*Law making*

Until 1994, provincial assemblies appointed one-third of the upper chamber (*Senaat/Sénat/Senat*), whereby seats were allocated roughly proportional to the population in each province. The Senate had equal powers with the lower chamber. Since 1995 it has been composed of 40 popularly elected senators in electoral districts encompassing the two large language communities (25 Flemish and 15 Francophone), 21 community senators elected by and from community councils (ten Flemish, ten Francophone and one German), ten co-opted senators elected by the previous two categories of senators convening by language group (six Flemish, four Francophone), and three senators by right (the three adult children of the king). For each senatorial category and each language group, the constitution requires a specific number of senators to be resident in the Brussels Capital region.

At the same time, the Senate was stripped of its right to control the government, as well as of some of its former legislative powers, though it remains a strong upper chamber. It retains equal legislative powers on a range of issues, including freedom of religion, language use, the judicial system, international treaties, and constitutional change. On other matters, it can invoke a ‘reflection period’ if requested by 15 of its members.

*Executive control*

Provinces have never had executive control. Regions and communities have had shared executive power since 1989, when the first interministerial conferences between regional or community governments and federal governments were set up, modelled on German *Politikverflechtung*. These negotiations can

reach binding decisions, and the norm is unanimity. In 1993 a formal arbitration system was introduced and power sharing was extended to European issues.

#### *Fiscal control*

Until 1995, provinces could influence the national distribution of revenues and the tax regime by virtue of their institutional representation in the Senate.

Between 1970 and 1995, communities and regions (after 1980) had a veto on fiscal control by virtue of their institutional representation in both houses, the so-called double mandate. National parliamentarians wore two hats in addition to their national mandate: as members of a community council (linguistic affiliation) and of a regional council (residence based). Since changes to laws regulating the finances of communities and regions required a majority in each linguistic group in either chamber, this gave communities as well as regions a veto. The German community never benefited from the double mandate.

The double mandate was abolished in 1995. Since the senators appointed by the community councils constitute a minority in the reformed Senate, they can no longer block decisions.

Since 1989, taxation has been a regular topic of intergovernmental deliberations among communities, regions, and the federal government. Initially, the legal status of intergovernmental agreements was uncertain, but over the years the parameters governing fiscal intergovernmental relations have tightened. Regions, communities, and federal government are legally bound to reach agreement on changes on the 1989 Double Majority Act on Financing Communities and Regions. The constitutional revision of 2001, which increased subnational fiscal autonomy, made autonomy conditional upon 'compulsory agreements' among the entities, in which basic fiscal ground rules to constrain fiscal competition are specified.

#### *Constitutional reform*

Constitutional change requires a two-thirds majority in both chambers. In 1970, the rules were tightened to require a double supermajority: a two-thirds majority in each chamber and an absolute majority within the Dutch- and the French-speaking linguistic groups in each chamber.

From 1950 until 1994, provincial delegates controlled a third of the Senate seats and could, therefore, theoretically block constitutional change.

Communities and regions did not exert formal constitutional authority until the 1970 constitutional reform. When the double mandate was introduced in that year, communities acquired a veto over constitutional change, as did regions when the double mandate was extended to regional councils in 1980.

Since 1995, the three community (but not regional) councils have sent

representatives to the Senate, where they comprise less than one-third of the total; they are consulted on constitutional change, but they cannot raise the decision hurdle or exert a veto. The 40 senators elected to represent the two large language groups (and whereby there is a minimum representation for the Brussels region) constitute a majority and can therefore veto constitutional change. At no point did regions have more shared rule than communities and so aggregated scores for the regional/communal tier correspond to the raw scores of the communities in Box 5.3.

*Box A.3 Belgium*

<i>Region</i>	<i>Years</i>	<i>Law making</i>				<i>Executive control</i>	<i>Fiscal control</i>	<i>Constitutional reform</i>
		<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>			
Provincies	1950–1994	0	0.5	0	0.5	0	1	3
	1995–2006	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vlaamse Gemeenschap & Communauté française	1970–1988	0	0	0	0	0	2	3
	1989–1994	0	0	0	0	2	2	3
	1995–2006	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	2	2	1
Deutsche Gemeinschaft	1970–1988	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1989–1994	0	0	0	0	2	1	0
	1995–2006	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	2	2	0
Région wallonne	1980–1988	0	0	0	0	0	2	3
	1989–1994	0	0	0	0	2	2	3
	1995–2006	0	0	0	0	2	2	1
Brussel Hoofdstedelijk Gewest/Bruxelles- Région-Capitale	1980–1988	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1989–1994	0	0	0	0	2	2	3
	1995–2006	0	0	0	0	2	2	1

***Bosnia-Herzegovina***

*Law making*

The upper house of Bosnia-Herzegovina (House of Peoples) contains 15 delegates: ten from the *Federacija* (five Croats and five Bosniacs) and five from the *Republika Srpska* (five Serbs). The delegates are chosen by the parliaments of the entities. All legislation, including constitutional amendments, requires the approval of both chambers, giving the upper house veto power. The working of the confederation has consociational elements, including requirements that at least three members of each ethnic group be present for an upper-house quorum and that legislation has the assent of at least one-third (i.e. two) of the representatives of each entity or fewer than four voting against.

Cantons do not share legislative power within the confederation, though they have extensive law making within the *Federacija*, where they send delegates from the cantonal parliament to the upper chamber. Cantonal representation follows ‘one man, one vote’.

*Executive control*

There are no formal regular intergovernmental meetings between the confederal authority and subnational governments, or between cantons and the *Federacija*.

*Fiscal control*

The confederation depends on annual contributions from the two constituent units. This gives these units a veto on the distribution of tax revenues. Cantons have no say at the confederal level, but they can veto tax laws in the *Federacija* through their representation in the upper house.

*Constitutional reform*

The upper house of the confederation has a veto on constitutional amendments. Moreover, a majority of the representatives of an ethnic group can invoke an alarm bell procedure on the grounds that proposed legislation is destructive of its vital interest. In that case, legislation must be approved in the upper house by a majority of the representatives of each entity present and voting. Constitutional change therefore requires a supermajority in the upper house.

Cantons do not participate directly in confederal constitutional politics, but they can veto constitutional change in the *Federacija*. Constitutional amendments require a two-thirds majority in the lower house and a double majority in the upper house – an absolute majority of all members and a majority in each of the two ethnic groups.

*Box A.4* Bosnia-Herzegovina

<i>Region</i>	<i>Years</i>	<i>Law making</i>				<i>Executive control</i>	<i>Fiscal control</i>	<i>Constitutional reform</i>
		<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>			
Cantons	1995–2006 <sup>a</sup>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1995–2006 <sup>b</sup>	0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0	2	3
Entities	1995–2006	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0	2	3

Notes: <sup>a</sup> Power sharing in the confederation; <sup>b</sup> power sharing in the *Federacija*.

***Bulgaria***

No regional power sharing.

***Canada****Law making*

Provinces and territories do not select representatives in the upper house of parliament (Senate). The Senate has a regional basis: Quebec (24 senators),

the Maritime Provinces and Prince Edward Island (24), the Western Provinces (24), Newfoundland (six), Yukon Territory (one), the Northwest Territories (one) and Nunavut (one). Senators must be resident in the relevant province/territory, and they are appointed by the governor-general for life upon the recommendation of the Canadian federal government without prior provincial consultation. The upper house is the product of federal rather than provincial choice, notwithstanding that the region is the unit of representation.

#### *Executive control*

The absence of law making has encouraged extensive intergovernmental relations. Labels for this – para-diplomacy and interstate federalism – reflect that negotiations take place among quasi-sovereign entities. Intergovernmental relations have always been a feature of Canadian politics, but the number and range of meetings mushroomed in the 1970s. Both federal and provincial governments have ministries for intergovernmental relations.

As their authority increased, starting in the 1980s, territories were included in intergovernmental relations. They became full players in intergovernmental relations as of the Charlottetown Accord of 1992. Intergovernmental summits in Canada rarely take binding decisions, and, when they do, they usually take them by unanimity or allow individual provinces to opt out.

#### *Fiscal control*

The distribution of tax revenues is subject to intergovernmental federal–provincial bargaining. However, decisions taken at intergovernmental meetings of finance ministers and first ministers are rarely binding. On equalization, ultimate authority remains with the federal government. Territories became regular invitees to intergovernmental meetings on taxation from 1992.

#### *Constitutional reform*

Until 1982, constitutional change was decided by the British Parliament. Following acrimonious federal–provincial negotiations, the Canadian constitution was repatriated in 1982 and adopted by every province except Quebec. The Canada Act says that constitutional amendments require approval by the federal parliament and two-thirds of the provincial legislatures representing at least 50 per cent of the Canadian population or, for some amendments, approval by the federal parliament and unanimity among provincial legislatures.

Provinces shared constitutional power before the Canada Act of 1982 by virtue of the norm of unanimous provincial consent. The precedent was established in 1940, when the prime minister, MacKenzie King, waited to

introduce an amendment on the federalization of unemployment insurance until all provinces (including Quebec) were agreed. When Prime Minister Trudeau challenged the norm after the defeat of the separatism referendum in Quebec in 1980 and sought to bring home the constitution without provincial consent, he suffered an effective veto by the British Law Lords. In a reference case brought by several provinces, the Law Lords ruled that federal unilateralism was legal but violated an established constitutional convention.

Except for Yukon, territories have no formal consultation or decision right with respect to their own statute. The federal government (jointly with provincial governments since 1982) determines changes in territorial boundaries or the granting of provincial status. Only the Yukon government acquired, in 2002, the right to be consulted on future amendments of the Act. Incidentally, despite their weak formal powers, territories did participate in the 1992 Charlottetown federal–provincial constitutional negotiations, which tried to resolve longstanding disputes on the division of powers between the federal, provincial, and territorial governments. The accord foundered after several negative referendums, and the status of the territories remained unchanged.

*Box A.5* Canada

<i>Region</i>	<i>Years</i>	<i>Law making</i>				<i>Executive control</i>	<i>Fiscal control</i>	<i>Constitutional reform</i>
		<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>			
Counties and regions	1950–2006	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Provinces	1950–2006	0	0	0	0	1	1	3
Yukon	1950–1991	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1992–2001	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
	2002–2006	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Northwest Territories	1950–1991	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1992–2006	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
Nunavut	1999–2006	0	0	0	0	1	1	0

***Croatia***

*Law making*

Until 2000, each *županija* had three directly elected representatives in the upper house, the Chamber of Counties (*Županijski dom*). The upper house was the junior legislative partner. It could give its opinion on proposed legislation and send the proposal back to the lower house, which could then legislate by absolute majority. A proposal that passed the lower chamber with a two-thirds majority could circumvent consultation of the upper house. The upper house was abolished in 2001.

*Executive control*

None.

*Fiscal control*

None.

*Constitutional reform*

A constitutional amendment requires a two-thirds majority vote of all representatives in the lower chamber. Until its abolition in 2001, the upper chamber was consulted but could not amend or block.

*Box A.6 Croatia*

<i>Region</i>	<i>Years</i>	<i>Law making</i>				<i>Executive control</i>	<i>Fiscal control</i>	<i>Constitutional reform</i>
		<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>			
Županije	1993–2000	0.5	0	0.5	0	0	0	0
	2001–2006	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

*Cyprus*

No regional tier of government.

*The Czech Republic*

The upper chamber does not represent *kraje*, but is directly elected by citizens. There is no regional power sharing.

*Denmark*

Except for some input on taxes, *Amtter* do not play a role in central state decision making. Denmark had a bicameral system until 1953, but the upper chamber did not have subnational representation. The Faroe Islands and Greenland, however, enjoy extensive power sharing.

*Law making*

Each autonomous region has two directly elected representatives in parliament. According to the statute of special autonomous regions, all national bills, administrative orders, and statutes of importance to the home-rule authorities must be sent to them for their opinion before they can be introduced in the Danish Parliament. In case of disagreement, the question is put

before a board consisting of two members nominated by the Danish government, two members nominated by the home-rule authorities, and three judges of the Supreme Court nominated by its president. This arrangement falls just short of giving the islands a veto on legislation.

#### *Executive control*

While the statutes do not detail routine intergovernmental meetings, the Faroe Islands and Greenland have a strong legal basis in the statutes which guarantees their involvement in decisions on issues of interest to them. This includes the appointment of attachés on Danish foreign missions, the right of home-rule governments to state their interests in third-party negotiations, and, if authorized by the Danish government, the right to negotiate directly with third parties.

#### *Fiscal control*

The Faroe Islands and Greenland have full control over taxation, and they have a veto on changes in the distribution of resources that might affect their region.

Since the 1970s, *amter* have had some influence over the distribution of tax revenues in the context of non-binding negotiations between the central government and peak associations of *amter* and municipalities. The Danish Parliament preserves the right to take unilateral action, and has occasionally withheld tax revenue, reduced grants, restricted loan access, or frozen liquidity.

#### *Constitutional reform*

Amendments to the home-rule statute must be approved by both island and Danish Parliament.

#### *Box A.7 Denmark*

<i>Region</i>	<i>Years</i>	<i>Law making</i>				<i>Executive control</i>	<i>Fiscal control</i>	<i>Constitutional reform</i>
		<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>			
Amter	1950–2006	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Faroe Islands	1950–2006	0.5	0	0.5	0	1	2	2
Greenland	1950–1978	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1979–2006	0.5	0	0.5	0	1	2	2

***Estonia***

No regional tier of government.

***Finland***

Neither provinces (*läänit*) nor regions (*maakuntien*) share legislative, executive, tax, or constitutional power. The Åland Islands, however, enjoy extensive power sharing.

*Law making*

The special autonomous region is the unit of representation in the lower chamber. The constitution stipulates that Åland has one directly elected representative (out of a total of 200). There is no upper chamber. Åland is consulted on matters that affect it. The Finnish Parliament is required to obtain an opinion from the Åland government on any act of special importance to the islands, but there is no provision that makes this legislation conditional upon its assent. The regional government also has the right to participate in the preparation of Finnish positions preceding European Union negotiations if the matter falls within its powers or has special significance for Åland. The parliament of Åland must give its consent to international treaties in areas under its competence, and Åland has a representative in the permanent representation of Finland to the EU.

*Executive control*

Financial and taxation matters, as well as some sensitive issues (such as shipping around the islands), are subject to binding and equal negotiation between representatives of the Åland government and the Finnish government in the Åland Delegation. But on most matters the constitution stipulates consultation – not binding executive control.

*Fiscal control*

The distribution of the Åland share of income, corporate, and sales taxes is subject to binding negotiation through the Åland Delegation, which provides the islands with a veto on the distribution of tax revenues affecting the region.

*Constitutional reform*

Åland shares control over its constitutional fate with the Finnish Parliament. The revision of the Act on the Autonomy of Åland requires a two-thirds majority in the Finnish and in the Åland Parliament.

*Box A.8* Finland

<i>Region</i>	<i>Years</i>	<i>Law making</i>				<i>Executive control</i>	<i>Fiscal control</i>	<i>Constitutional reform</i>
		<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>			
Läänit	1950–2006	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Maakuntien	1993–2006	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Åland Islands	1950–2006	0.5	0	0.5	0	1	2	2

**France**

*Régions, départements*, and the special autonomous region of Corsica have limited power sharing.

*Law making*

Although the French constitution states that the upper chamber (*Sénat*) shall ensure the representation of the territorial entities of the Republic, *régions* and *départements* are not units of representation. Senators are indirectly elected by a college of 150,000 elected officials (*grands électeurs*), including mayors, city councillors, and National Assembly deputies, who convene by *département*. *Départements* are allocated seats in rough proportion to their populations. In 2004, the term for senators was reduced from nine years to six. According to the constitution, the upper house has the same powers as the lower house. However, when the *Sénat* and the *Assemblée nationale* cannot agree on a bill, the government can decide, after a procedure called *commission mixte paritaire*, to refer the final decision to the *Assemblée*.

The 1982 reforms gave the assembly of Corsica the right to consult the government or to be consulted by it on all matters concerning the island. The revised special statute of 1991 loosens the requirement for mandatory consultation by stating that the French prime minister may consult the Corsican assembly on draft laws or decrees which directly affect Corsica.

*Executive control*

Formal executive control for *régions* and *départements* is virtually non-existent, though the French practice of *cumul des mandats* – combining an elected mandate in local or regional government with a national mandate – has provided a channel for regional influence on national policy making. There are no regular intergovernmental meetings between the Corsican executive and the national government.

*Fiscal control*

None.

*Constitutional reform*

No regional power sharing.

*Box A.9 France*

<i>Region</i>	<i>Years</i>	<i>Law making</i>				<i>Executive control</i>	<i>Fiscal control</i>	<i>Constitutional reform</i>
		<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>			
Départements	1950–2006	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Régions	1964–2006	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Corsica	1982–1990	0	0	0.5	0	0	0	0
	1991–2006	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

***Germany***

*Länder* monopolize power sharing with the federal government.

*Law making*

*Land* governments (not parliaments) are directly represented in the upper chamber, the *Bundesrat*, and thereby have a firm grip on federal policy making. The *Bundesrat* has wide-ranging authority. It can initiate and veto legislation affecting *Land* competencies and has a suspensive veto on most other legislation.

*Executive control*

An elaborate system of executive federalism (*Politikverflechtung*) ensures that *Länder* are intimately involved in the execution and implementation of federal policy.

Beginning in 1951, the federal chancellor invited *Land* premiers (*Ministerpräsidenten*) for informal consultation. This spurred *Ministerpräsidenten* to meet first to prepare common positions. Such conferences quickly became regularized, though meetings with the chancellor remained more irregular. Specialist ministers also began to meet regularly on more circumscribed topics. While the original idea was to pre-empt national encroachment on *Land* competencies, *Länder* co-ordination has arguably facilitated federal harmonization.

In 1964, growing co-operation among *Länder* paved the way for joint policy making and financing in post-secondary education, regional development, agriculture, etc. This was formalized in a constitutional revision of 1969. Federal–*Länder* negotiations are now routinized and reach binding decisions.

*Fiscal control*

*Länder* did not have power sharing until a constitutional revision in 1966 gave the *Bundesrat* power to co-decide the base and rate of taxes, as well as their distribution between *Länder* and the federal level. *Länder* also determine the annual financial equalization package (*Finanzausgleich*) for redistribution among *Länder*.

*Constitutional reform*

*Bundesrat* approval is mandatory for constitutional amendments. Constitutional change requires a two-thirds majority in both legislative chambers.

*Box A.10 Germany*

<i>Region</i>	<i>Years</i>	<i>Law making</i>				<i>Executive control</i>	<i>Fiscal control</i>	<i>Constitutional reform</i>
		<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>			
Kreise	1950–2006	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regierungsbezirke	1950–2006	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<i>Länder</i>	1950–1963	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	1	0	3
	1964–1965	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	2	0	3
	1966–2006	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	2	2	3

***Greece***

No regional power sharing.

***Hungary***

No regional power sharing.

***Iceland***

No regional tier of government.

***Ireland***

No regional power sharing.

***Italy***

*Province* do not share law-making, executive, fiscal, or constitutional power. *Regioni* and special-statute *regioni* have acquired limited executive and fiscal control, and special-statute *regioni* and the two autonomous provinces are consulted on amending their statutes.

*Law making*

The upper house of the Italian Parliament has the same powers as the lower house and is directly elected. All but nine of the 315 constituencies are distributed proportionately among regions on the basis of their population, each region receiving at least seven deputies. The distribution of seats is determined chiefly by population, not region, and regions are not directly represented.

*Executive control*

The first intergovernmental conference between the central government and *regioni* took place in 1983. Since 1989, *regioni* have met biannually with the central government in a standing conference on state–regional relations. *Regioni* use this intergovernmental body to suggest guidelines for EU policies. But the central government rarely makes binding commitments. The system was strengthened in 1997 and given added legitimacy in the 2001 constitutional revision, but agreements generally remain non-binding. This right of participation was extended to the autonomous provinces of Bolzano-Bozen and Trento.

*Fiscal control*

There are no provisions for fiscal control for ordinary-statute *regioni*. For special-statute *regioni* (and Bolzano-Bozen and Trento), the statutes detail the revenue split under tax sharing. Because these regions must be consulted by the central government on changes in the special statute, they must also be consulted on changes in the basic tax distribution affecting the region. Since 2001, changes to the statute, and thus the tax distribution, have required the consent of both the special region and the national parliament.

*Constitutional reform*

Amending the constitution and other constitutional acts requires adoption by each chamber twice within no less than three months and needs approval of a majority in each chamber in the second voting. In case of a majority short of two-thirds, the issue goes to popular referendum if requested by one-fifth of the members of a chamber, 500,000 electors, or five regional councils. Aside from the latter option, the constitution gives *regioni* no role in amending the constitution. Special-statute *regioni* and the two autonomous provinces have the right to initiate the amendment procedure, but until 2001 the final word remained with the national parliament. Since 2001, a revision of the special statute has required the consent of both the region or autonomous province and the national government.

*Box A.11 Italy*

<i>Region</i>	<i>Years</i>	<i>Law making</i>				<i>Executive control</i>	<i>Fiscal control</i>	<i>Constitutional reform</i>
		<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>			
Province	1950–2006	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regioni a statuto ordinario	1972–1988	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1989–2006	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Regioni a statuto speciale, Bolzano-Bozen, and Trento	1950–1988	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
	1989–2000	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
	2001–2006	0	0	0	0	1	2	2

***Japan***

The upper house (House of Councillors) combines representatives elected in the prefectures by single transferable vote and senators elected on national party lists. Until 1998, the prefectural representatives constituted the majority of the upper chamber. Seats are strictly allocated in proportion to the population, which means that the Japanese upper house does not meet our minimum standards for law making (nor does the lower house). There is also no executive, fiscal, or constitutional power sharing.

***Latvia***

No regional tier of government.

***Lithuania***

No regional power sharing.

***Luxembourg***

No regional tier of government.

***Macedonia***

No regional tier of government.

***Malta***

No regional tier of government.

***Netherlands****Law making*

The Netherlands has a bicameral system in which the upper house (*Eerste Kamer*) represents provinces. Senators in the upper house are elected by

members of the provincial assemblies drawn from national party lists submitted separately in each province. Each provincial delegate casts a vote for a candidate, and his or her vote is weighted by provincial population so that the final distribution of seats across provinces is proportional to their populations. Before 1983, the members of the provincial assemblies elected a third of the members of the Senate every two years. Since 1983, the elections have taken place every four years following provincial elections. The upper house has a veto on all legislation.

*Executive control*

None.

*Fiscal control*

The *Eerste Kamer* votes on the annual national budget with an up or down vote, which provides *provincies* with a collective veto over the distribution of tax revenues. There are no intergovernmental meetings between provinces and the national government.

*Constitutional reform*

The *Eerste Kamer* has a veto on constitutional amendments. Constitutional change requires two rounds of voting, separated by new elections. The threshold in the second round is a two-thirds majority.

*Box A.12* The Netherlands

<i>Region</i>	<i>Years</i>	<i>Law making</i>				<i>Executive control</i>	<i>Fiscal control</i>	<i>Constitutional reform</i>
		<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>			
Provincies	1950–2006	0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0	2	3

***New Zealand***

No regional power sharing.

***Norway***

No regional power sharing.

***Poland***

No regional power sharing.

***Portugal***

*Distritos* and *comissões de cooperação e desenvolvimento regional* do not exercise law making, executive, fiscal or constitutional power sharing, but there is shared rule for the autonomous regions of Madeira and the Azores.

*Law making*

The autonomous regions are not special electoral units in the unicameral Portuguese Parliament. The regional representatives (five for the Azores and six for Madeira) are directly elected. However, the assemblies of Madeira and the Azores can influence – though not co-decide – national policies that may affect the region. The Portuguese Parliament is constitutionally bound to consult the regional assemblies, and each regional assembly can submit amendments or legislative drafts with respect to taxation, environmental policy, criminal law, law and order, regional planning, and social security. If the national parliament approves these drafts, they become law in the region.

*Executive control*

There are several mechanisms for regional input in executive policy making, but none of these enable special regions to bind the central government. The presidents of the Azores and Madeira governments sit on the Council of State, which gives non-binding advice to the president of Portugal on his discretionary powers, including dissolution of the national or regional assemblies and declaration of war. More consequential for day-to-day policy making is that the constitution obliges the Portuguese government to consult the government of an autonomous region on issues that might affect it. This obligation has been extended in successive constitutional reforms, and it also encompasses EU policy making.

*Fiscal control*

Assemblies of the autonomous regions are consulted on the distribution of revenues with respect to the Azores and Madeira.

*Constitutional reform*

Ultimate authority for the statutes of the autonomous regions lies with the Portuguese Parliament. However, the regional assembly has agenda-setting power, since it must initiate the process by submitting a draft statute. If the national assembly amends the draft, it is sent back to the regional assembly for consultation.

*Box A.13* Portugal

<i>Region</i>	<i>Years</i>	<i>Law making</i>				<i>Executive control</i>	<i>Fiscal control</i>	<i>Constitutional reform</i>
		<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>			
Distritos	1976–2006	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Comissões de cooperação	1979–2006	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Azores, Madeira	1976–2006	0	0	0.5	0	1	1	1

**Romania**

No regional power sharing.

**Russia**

Only *subwekty federacii* have power sharing.

*Law making*

The upper house of the Russian Parliament, the Federation Council (*Sovet Federatsii*), represents regional interests. Each *subwekt federacii* is represented by two delegates, one selected by the *subwekt* legislature and one by the *subwekt* executive. Since 2000, the executive heads of the *subwekty*, the governors, can no longer sit in the upper house. The Federation Council must be heard on laws concerning taxation, customs regulations, credit monitoring, and treaties, and it has special powers on border change between *subwekty*, as well as on federal court appointments, impeachment, martial law, states of emergency, and war. It cannot block federal laws, but it can raise the decision hurdle in the lower house (Duma) to a two-thirds majority. The Federation Council is classified as having wide-ranging legislative authority.

*Executive control*

There are no formal provisions for regular executive control. President Putin set up a State Council in 2000 to compensate regional governors who no longer have a seat in the federal parliament. It is composed of all governors and presidents of the *subwekty federacii*, as well as some presidential appointees, and meets quarterly at the request of the Russian president to discuss issues ‘of the highest importance to the state as a whole’, such as economic and social reforms and the development of governmental institutions. The State Council is not involved in normal policy making and does not reach binding decisions.

*Fiscal control*

*Subwekty federacii* influence federal tax legislation through the Federation Council. Budgetary legislation begins in the Duma and is submitted to the Federation Council for approval. If the Federation Council votes down a proposal, representatives from the two chambers meet in a conciliation committee. Failing compromise, the Duma can overrule the Federation Council with a two-thirds majority.

*Constitutional reform*

A federal constitutional law is considered adopted if it is approved by at least three-quarters of the members of the Federation Council and two-thirds of the Duma.

*Box A.14 Russia*

<i>Region</i>	<i>Years</i>	<i>Law making</i>				<i>Executive control</i>	<i>Fiscal control</i>	<i>Constitutional reform</i>
		<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>			
Subwekty federacii	1993–2006	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0	1	3
Federalnyye okruga	2000–2006	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

*Serbia-Montenegro*

There was considerable power sharing between the republics in the (con) federation. Within Serbia, there is some power sharing with the special autonomous regions but none with the *okruzi*.

*Law making*

Under the 1992 constitution, the upper house (Chamber of Republics; *Vece Republika*) of Serbia-Montenegro was made up of 20 deputies from each member republic. In general, the two houses voted, by simple majority, on all matters within the jurisdiction of the federal legislature, except that a two-thirds majority in the upper house was necessary for single market legislation, regulation in the socioeconomic field, and regional development.

The 2003 reform introduced a unicameral parliament in which Serbia had 91 and Montenegro 35 deputies. During the first two years following the adoption of the new constitution, deputies were elected indirectly from the national assemblies of Serbia and Montenegro. This is considered an example of institutional representation. This one chamber functioned in all but name as an upper chamber. In line with the much reduced authority of the confederation, the scope of parliamentary authority was narrowed, and each republic had a veto. Laws and constitutional amendments required a double

majority: a majority of representatives of each republic and an overall absolute majority. Following a three-year waiting period specified in the constitution, the Montenegrin parliament initiated secession by calling for a referendum, which was held in June 2006.

The autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo and Metohija (until it became a UN protectorate in 1999) do not have law making in Serbia or in the confederation.

#### *Executive control*

No power sharing.

#### *Fiscal control*

The republics had a veto over the distribution of revenues in the (con)federation through their role in the (con)federal parliament. Since 2001, Vojvodina has had a share in personal and corporate income tax, but base and rate are set by the Serbian government.

#### *Constitutional reform*

The republics had a veto on constitutional change. Between 1992 and 2002, constitutional change required a two-thirds majority in both chambers. Constitutional articles, including those relating to federal accession, secession, and federal and republic competencies, required legislative majorities in each republic and a two-thirds majority in the lower house of the federation. From 2003, constitutional change required the consent of both republics' legislatures.

The Serbian constitution states that the statutes of the autonomous provinces can be changed only with the approval of the assembly of the autonomous province. Vojvodina and Kosovo have a veto on constitutional change within Serbia (though not within the confederation), but cannot unilaterally alter their statute.

#### *Box A.15 Serbia-Montenegro*

<i>Region</i>	<i>Years</i>	<i>Law making</i>				<i>Executive control</i>	<i>Fiscal control</i>	<i>Constitutional reform</i>
		<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>			
Serbia-Montenegro	1992–2002	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0	2	3
	2003–2006	0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0	2	3
Okruzi	1992–2006	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kosovo and Metohija	1992–1998 <sup>a</sup>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1992–1998 <sup>b</sup>	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Vojvodina	1992–2006 <sup>a</sup>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1992–2006 <sup>b</sup>	0	0	0	0	0	0	2

Notes: <sup>a</sup> Power sharing in the confederation; <sup>b</sup> power sharing in Serbia.

***Slovakia***

No regional power sharing.

***Slovenia***

No regional tier of government.

***Spain***

*Provincias* and *comunidades* have limited power sharing. Power sharing is counted from the time that a *comunidad* established its autonomy statute.

*Law making*

The 1978 constitution transformed the *Senado de España* into a chamber of territorial representation in which *provincias* have 208 members and *comunidades autónomas* 51 members. Provincial senators are popularly elected: four per province on the mainland, three for the larger islands, and two for the smaller islands. The assembly of each *comunidad autónoma* selects at least one member up to a limit of one senator per million inhabitants. In the current *Senado*, the number of seats ranges from one for La Rioja, Cantabria, the Balearic Islands, and Navarre to seven for Catalonia and eight for Andalusia. While the aggregation rule clearly falls between the ideal-typical ‘one region, one vote’ and ‘one person, one vote’ criteria, it appears closer to the latter than the former. Provincial senators constitute a majority of the *Senado*, and *comunidad* representatives a minority.

Under their special autonomy status, Ceuta and Melilla each had three representatives, one directly elected deputy in the lower house and two directly elected senators, but they did not have special arrangements for law making. Since 1995, they have had two directly elected provincial senators.

The *Senado* has some reserved powers over constitutional appointments, but can be overridden by a majority in the lower house on normal legislation.

*Executive control*

The dominant pattern of negotiation between the national government and the *comunidades autónomas* is bilateral, though there are occasional intergovernmental conferences. A conference on European Affairs was established in 1994 and policy-specific conferences meet several times a year, but these are *ad hoc* and take the form of informational sessions.

*Fiscal control*

*Comunidades autónomas* can influence national tax policy through their institutional representation in the *Senado*, but the latter can be overridden by a

majority in the lower house. There is also some attention to fiscal matters in the intergovernmental meetings – in fact, the first sectoral conferences in 1982 dealt with fiscal policy – but their decisions are rarely binding.

*Provincias* do not have institutional representation in the *Senado* and are not involved in intergovernmental negotiations.

### *Constitutional reform*

Constitutional reform requires a three-fifths majority in both the upper and the lower house on the first vote and – failing agreement – a two-thirds majority in the lower house and absolute majority in the *Senado* in a subsequent vote before the proposal can be submitted for ratification in a referendum. The directly elected provincial senators can therefore veto constitutional change. Senators representing the assemblies of the *comunidades* are too few in number (just under 20 per cent of the *Senado*) to be able to raise the decision hurdle.

The lack of collective *comunidad* control over the constitution of the Spanish state is somewhat balanced by the fact that each *comunidad* has a veto over amendments to its own statute. A revised statute requires a supermajority in the *comunidad's* assembly (two-thirds to three-fifths, depending on the *comunidad*) and a majority in the Cortes, as well as ratification by regional referendum. This is not reflected in the scoring, since Spanish *comunidades* are conceived as asymmetrical regions rather than special autonomous regions.

According to the Spanish constitution, Ceuta and Melilla may become autonomous communities when their councils so decide and when the national parliament approves it. This means that Ceuta and Mellila had a veto during the years 1978–94, when no special arrangements for executive or fiscal control existed. Both cities became autonomous communities in 1995.

Box A.16 Spain

Region	Years	Law making				Executive control	Fiscal control	Constitutional reform
		a	b	c	d			
Provincias	1978–2006	0.5	0	0.5	0	0	0	1
Comunidades autónomas	1978–2006	0	0.5	0	0	0	1	0
Ceuta, Melilla	1978–1994	0.5	0	0	0	0	0	2
	1995–2006	0.5	0	0.5	0	0	1	0

### *Sweden*

#### *Law making*

Until 1971, *län* had institutional representation in the upper chamber of the Swedish *Riksdag*, which was composed of members selected for six-year

terms by *län* councils. Each *län* was allocated a number of seats proportional to its population size. The upper chamber and lower chamber had equal powers. In 1971, Sweden became unicameral.

#### *Executive control*

There are no formal provisions for executive control.

#### *Fiscal control*

Until it was abolished, the upper chamber provided *län* with a veto over the distribution of tax revenues. From the 1970s, the Swedish central government concluded non-binding agreements with peak organizations of municipalities and counties. This practice was abandoned in 1982, when the *Riksdag* resorted to unilateral measures to constrain regional and local spending.

#### *Constitutional reform*

The upper chamber had equal powers regarding all legislation, including constitutional laws. Constitutional provisions required a simple majority in both chambers.

#### *Box A.17 Sweden*

<i>Region</i>	<i>Years</i>	<i>Law making</i>				<i>Executive control</i>	<i>Fiscal control</i>	<i>Constitutional reform</i>
		<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>			
Län	1950–1970	0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0	2	3
	1971–2006	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

### ***Switzerland***

#### *Law making*

Each canton has two representatives, and each half-canton one, in the upper chamber, the Council of States (*Ständerat; Conseil des Etats; Consiglio degli Stati; Cussegl dals Stadis*). Some cantonal governments selected their representatives to the upper house, but from the 1970s all upper house members came to be directly elected. The upper house has veto powers on all issues, though federal laws can be challenged by referendum.

Individual cantons can also affect federal legislation directly through the cantonal initiative, which gives cantons the right to submit written proposals to parliament.

*Executive control*

The federal executive (Federal Council) depends heavily on cantons for the implementation of federal policy. This has encouraged routine consultative cantonal participation in both formulating and implementing policy.

Cantons are regularly involved at the pre-parliamentary stage in expert commissions to assess the need for federal legislation, and they are formally consulted during the legislative process. However, the Federal Council is not required to invite cantons to participate and is not required to follow their advice. The constitutional revision of 1999 established the right of cantons to be consulted in foreign policy. The federal executive can set cantonal preferences aside, but must justify why it does so.

Over the past decades, dense intergovernmental co-operation on implementation has emerged. Intercantonal agreements – *concordats* – are usually negotiated among cantonal executives, or a subset of them, and subsequently approved by cantonal parliaments. Such agreements originally co-ordinated cantonal implementation of federal laws and now also serve as means for cantons to fend off federal intervention. Cantonal agreements are common in education policy, religious policy, economic policy, health policy, and environmental protection. They are binding and decisions are taken by unanimity.

In addition, there are currently 16 conferences of cantonal directors, responsible for co-ordination in particular policy fields. The first, the Conference of Education Directors, was established in 1897. The latest is the Conference of Cantonal Governments, set up in 1993 to co-ordinate foreign and European policy. Intercantonal conferences have their own secretariats, meet several times a year, and have decision rules varying from majority rule to unanimity. They produce guidelines, benchmarks, recommendations, or concordats, but do not bind the federal government, which is represented only by observers.

*Fiscal control*

Cantons influence federal decisions on the distribution of tax revenues through the Conference of Cantonal Finance Ministers, which co-ordinates canton positions prior to non-binding negotiation with the federal government.

*Constitutional reform*

Constitutional change, whether introduced by parliamentary amendment or by citizen initiative, requires referendum approval by a double majority: a majority of the citizens in the country as a whole, and majorities of citizens in a majority of cantons. Switzerland is unique in that both the government and citizens can take a constitutional initiative, but the decision is made entirely

by citizens in a referendum. Incidentally, cantonal constitutions are also subject to amendment by and majority approval of the cantonal population.

*Box A.18* Switzerland

<i>Region</i>	<i>Years</i>	<i>Law making</i>				<i>Executive control</i>	<i>Fiscal control</i>	<i>Constitutional reform</i>
		<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>			
Cantons	1950–2006	0.5	0	0.5	0.5	1	1	1

***Turkey***

No regional power sharing.

***United Kingdom***

The special autonomous regions of Scotland, Wales, and, to a lesser extent, Northern Ireland have power sharing arrangements. Counties, regions, and the Greater London Authority have no power sharing.

*Law making*

The House of Lords consisted of hereditary peers (until 1999, when most were removed) and peers appointed by the central government. In neither the House of Commons nor the Lords is the region the unit of representation, nor is there institutional representation.

Regional representatives are consulted on regional aspects of UK legislation. The Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Irish members in the House of Commons meet as caucuses in ‘grand committees’ to discuss bills affecting their countries. The committees have continued to function after devolution, though much consultative power sharing has shifted from the caucuses to the devolved institutions. The Government of Wales Act (1998) and the Scotland Act (1998) stipulate that the Welsh Assembly and the Scottish Executive must be consulted on relevant UK and EU laws.

*Executive control*

There was no executive control before devolution. Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland had centrally appointed secretaries of state (from 1885, 1964, and 1972, respectively) who represented their regions in central government. The Scotland Act and Government of Wales Act set up joint ministerial committees, which allow the regional governments to consult with the UK government on legislation that impinges on them. In addition, the Scottish first minister is entitled to represent Scotland (and the UK) in the EU Council of Ministers on a subset of issues.

*Fiscal control*

None. The Scotland Act set up a consolidated fund in which the central government disburses Scotland's share of income taxes and additional grants. The Act does not detail power sharing on this fund. The grants received by Wales and Northern Ireland are decided in Westminster.

*Constitutional reform*

The Northern Ireland Act requires that the secretary of state consult the Northern Irish Assembly before submitting a bill to the UK Parliament. This consultation is non-binding.

The Government of Wales Act states that no recommendation shall be made to parliament to revoke or vary the act 'unless such a draft has also been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, the Assembly'. The Scotland Act has a similar provision.

*Box A.19 United Kingdom*

<i>Region</i>	<i>Years</i>	<i>Law making</i>				<i>Executive control</i>	<i>Fiscal control</i>	<i>Constitutional reform</i>
		<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>			
Counties	1950–2006	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regions	1964–2006	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Greater London Authority	2000–2006	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Northern Ireland	1950–1971	0	0	0.5	0	0	0	1
	1972–1999	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2000–2002	0	0	0.5	0	0	0	1
	2003–2006	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scotland	1950–1999	0	0	0.5	0	0	0	0
	1999–2006	0	0	0.5	0	1	0	2
Wales	1964–1998	0	0	0.5	0	0	0	0
	1999–2006	0	0	0.5	0	1	0	2

*United States*

States, alone, have power sharing with the federal government.

*Law making*

Each state has two directly elected senators in the upper house. The Senate is a supermajoritarian legislature with veto power on all legislation. As territories, Alaska and Hawaii had no senators. Each territory had one directly elected, non-voting representative in the House of Representatives. Since 1971, Washington, DC, has been represented by a non-voting representative

in the House, who sits on committees and participates in debates. It has no representation in the Senate.

#### *Executive control*

Exclusive policy competencies have been diffused by extensive, ‘marble-cake’ federal–state collaboration.

Executive control is shaped by federal financial incentives which states may accept or reject. From the 1960s, these incentives took the form of conditional grants to induce states (and local governments) to implement federal policy priorities. Legislative proposals are subject to state lobbying and, once hammered into law, are submitted to states, which decide whether or not to participate. Bilateral agreements specify funding and implementation details. In the 1970s, around one-quarter of state budgets came from conditional federal grants, declining to around 15 per cent by the late 1990s.

#### *Fiscal control*

The federal government is not required to consult states concerning the distribution of tax revenues. State governments are not represented in the Senate.

#### *Constitutional reform*

Article 5 of the constitution gives a minority of states a veto over constitutional amendments. Two-thirds of both Houses of Congress and three-quarters of the legislatures of states must ratify an amendment. Territories do not have a role in constitutional change. The statute of Washington, DC, can be unilaterally changed by Congress.

*Box A.20* United States

<i>Region</i>	<i>Years</i>	<i>Law making</i>				<i>Executive control</i>	<i>Fiscal control</i>	<i>Constitutional reform</i>
		<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>			
Counties, regions	1950–2006	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
States	1950–2006	0.5	0	0.5	0.5	1	0	3
Alaska and Hawaii	1950–1958	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Washington, DC	1971–2006	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

**Most commonly used sources by country**

**Albania:** Dabla-Norris and Wade (2002); Gurraj, Hoxha, Pasha, Ruli, Talka and Tanku in Högye (2002: 103–54); Harloff (1987: 9–11); Hoxha in Kandeva (2001: 41–88); World Bank (2004).

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**Austria:** Bauer in Hesse (1991: 387–408); Bolleyer and Bytzeck (2009); Bullman in Loughlin *et al.* (2001: 117–41); Committee of the Regions (2005); Council of Europe (2000); Elazar (1991a: 30–36); Erk (2007a); Filippov *et al.* (2004); Harloff (1987: 12–16); Hooghe and Marks (2001: 189–212); Hueglin and Fenna (2006); Humes and Martin (1969: 505–9); Joumard and Kongsrud (2003); Morass in Jeffery (1997: 76–95); OECD (1997: 93–106; 1999: 19–21); Pernthaler in Rose and Traut (2002: 126–39); Sturm in Griffiths (2002: 44–57); Swenden (2006); Wastl-Walter in Bennett (1993: 155–66); Watts (1999).

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**Bulgaria:** Bogetić in Ter-Minassian (1997: 615–33); Committee of the Regions (2005); Council of Europe (1997); Dabla-Norris and Wade (2002); Drumeva in Kandeva (2001: 141–78); Harloff (1987: 23–5); Hughes *et al.* (2004: 30–60); Humes and Martin (1969: 516–18); Pitschel

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Humes and Martin (1969: 523–6); John (2001); Joumard and Kongsrud (2003); Lidström in Loughlin *et al.* (2001: 343–63); Lotz in Shah (2006: 223–63); Nisson in Batley and Stoker (1991: 190–97); OECD (1997: 165–77; 1999: 31–4; 2002); Picard (1983); Thomas in Jones and Keating (1995: 281–8); Thor Andersen (2008); Van Ginderachter (1993: 56–9).

**Estonia:** Committee of the Regions (2005); Council of Europe (1999); Dabla-Norris and Wade (2002); Elazar (1991a: 263–81); Harloff (1987: 147–51); Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon in Keating and Hughes (2002: 79–80); Hughes *et al.* (2004: 30–60); Humes (1991: 81–93); Humes and Martin (1969: 628–32); Kettunen and Kungla (2005); Mältseemes in Horváth (2000: 61–114); OECD (2001, 2002); Pitschel and Bauer (2009); Smith (2002); Sootla, Kasemets, and Künnapuu in Högye (2000); Sootla and Toots in Soós (2006: 163–350); Sootla, Jaansoo, Tammert, Ainsoo, Pedastsaar, Tüür, Milt, and Surva in Högye (2002: 273–328); Trasberg (2009); Ushkalov in Bennett (1993: 292–306); Vanags and Vilka (2006).

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- New Zealand:** Asquith (2009); Bush in Symons (1984: 126–32); Dollery in Shah (2006: 189–222); Elazar (1991a: 177–81); Humes and Martin (1969: 645–8); Joumard and Kongsrud (2003); OECD (1997: 349–61; 1999: 52–6).
- Norway:** Arter (2001); Bjørnå and Jenssen (2006); Blom-Hansen (1999); Bogason (1996, 1998); Council of Europe (1998); Fevolden and Sørensen in Page and Goldsmith (1987: 29–45); Hansen in Hesse (1991: 211–40); Hansen in Sharpe (1993: 154–81); Hansen and Stigen (2007); Harloff (1987: 103–7); Humes and Martin (1969: 583–7); John (2001); Joumard and Kongsrud (2003); Lodden in Batley and Stoker (1991: 198–229); Lotz in Shah (2006: 223–63); OECD (1997: 363–74; 1999: 57–60).
- Poland:** Baldersheim and Swianiewicz in Keating and Hughes (2002: 121–45); Bialasiewicz (2002); Bindebir (2004); Christopoulos (2006); Committee of the Regions (2005); Council of Europe (1998, 2000); Czernielewska *et al.* (2004: 461–95); Dabla-Norris and Wade (2002); Ferry (2003); Ferry and McMaster (2005); Filas, Levitas, and Piszcek in Högye (2002: 397–464); Glowacki in Marcou (2002: 103–40); Harloff (1987: 108–12); Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon in Keating and Hughes (2002: 82–3); Hughes *et al.* (2004: 30–60, 129–38); Humes and Martin (1969: 588–93); Illner (1998: 7–42); Joumard and Kongsrud (2003); Kowalczyk in Horváth (2000: 216–54); Kukliński and Swianiewicz in Sharpe (1993: 182–209); Mync in Rose and Traut (2002: 235–58); O'Dwyer (2006); OECD (1999: 61–2; 2001; 2002); Okraszewska and Kwiatkowski in Soós *et al.* (2002: 181–204); Pitschel and Bauer (2009); Regulski in Bennett (1993: 197–207); Shah (1997); Swianiewicz (2006); Yoder (2003, 2007).

- Portugal:** Baum and Freire (2003); Committee of the Regions (2005); Council of Europe (1998, 2006); Council of Europe (1998a: 133–48); Elazar (1991a: 8–11); Freire and Baum (2003); Harloff (1987: 113–19); Hooghe and Marks (2001: 189–212); Humes and Martin (1969: 594–9); John (2001); Joumard and Kongsrud (2003); Lewis and Williams (1994); Loughlin in Loughlin *et al.* (2001: 255–70); Nanetti *et al.* (2004); OECD (1997: 375–86; 1999: 63–4); Pedroso de Almeida in Hesse (1991: 497–516); Pereira in Batley and Stoker (1991: 134–45); Pereira in Jones and Keating (1995: 267–80); Van Ginderachter (1993: 93–6).
- Romania:** Batt (2002); Batt in Keating and Hughes (2002: 161–81); Cismaru, Alexandru, Dragan, Grosu, Teodorof, Popoviviu, and Ialou in Högye (2000: 289–348); Coman, Crai, Radulescu, and Stanculescu in Kandevea (2001: 351–416); Committee of the Regions (2005); Council of Europe (1999); Dabla-Norris and Wade (2002); Dobre (2005, 2007, 2008, 2009); Harloff (1987: 120–23); Hughes *et al.* (2004: 30–60); Humes and Martin (1969: 600–01); Keating and Hughes (2002: 83–4); OECD (2002); Pitschel and Bauer (2009); Pop in Soós *et al.* (2002: 285–369); Popa, Antonevici, Gosan, and Pop in Högye (2002: 465–520); Shah (1997).
- Russia:** Bird (2003); Craig, Norregaard, and Tsibouris in Ter-Minassian (1997: 680–701); Council of Europe (2000); Dabla-Norris and Wade (2002); De Figueiredo, Jr., *et al.* (2007); Elazar (1991a: 263–81); Filippov *et al.* (2004); Harloff (1987: 147–51); Hughes (2001); Humes (1991: 81–93); Humes and Martin (1969: 628–32); Jackson and Lynn (2002); Kamenskaya in Rose and Traut (2002: 273–84); Konitzer and Wegren (2006); Kourliandskaia, Kandelaki, and Golovanova in Munteanu and Popa (2001: 161–264); Kuzmin, Kachanova, Pykhova, Pushkarev, and Osintsev in Högye (2002: 521–71); Lavrov *et al.* (2000); Lynn and Novikov (1997); Lysenko in Bennett (1993: 278–91); Martinez-Vazquez (2002); Martinez-Vazquez and Boex (1999); Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2006); Nelson and Kuzes (2002); Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1997); Petrov (2002); Pinnick (2005); Popov (2004); Shah (1997); Smith in Smith (1995: 157–79); Söderlund (2005); Stoner-Weiss (2002); Stoner-Weiss in Amoretti and Bermeo (2004: 301–26); Timerbulatov in Rose and Traut (2002: 299–306); Ushkalov in Bennett (1993: 292–306); Wilson in Griffiths (2002: 249–69).
- Serbia-Montenegro:** Batt (2002); Batt in Keating and Hughes (2002: 161–81); Crnobrnja in Griffiths (2002: 372–86); Dabla-Norris and Wade (2002); Elazar (1991a: 349–55); Harloff (1987: 161–6); Humes and Martin (1969: 633–7); Popovski in Smith (1995: 180–207); Sevic in Kandevea (2001: 417–70); UNDP (2005: 166–94); Vujacic in Rose and Traut (2002: 259–70).
- Slovakia:** Bitušiková (2002); Brusis (2005); Brusis in Keating and Hughes (2002: 85–105); Buček in Keating and Hughes (2002: 147–60); Buček in Marcou (2002: 141–77); Committee of the Regions (2005); Council of Europe (1999); Dostál and Hampl in Bennett (1993: 259–77); Elazar

- (1991a: 88–92); Harloff (1987: 31–34); Hughes *et al.* (2004: 30–60); Kaiser in Smith (1995: 208–36); Kára and Blazek in Bennett (1993: 246–58); Nemeč, Bercik, and Kuklis in Horváth (2000: 297–342); O’Dwyer (2006); OECD (2002); Pitschel and Bauer (2009); Shah (1997); Sopóci, Hrabovská, and Bunčák in Soós (2006: 351–472).
- Slovenia:** Committee of the Regions (2005); Council of Europe (1998); Elazar (1991a: 349–55); Harloff (1987: 161–6); Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon in Keating and Hughes (2002: 86–7); Hughes *et al.* (2004: 30–60); Humes and Martin (1969: 633–7); OECD (2002); Pitschel and Bauer (2009); Popovski in Smith (1995: 180–207); Setnikar-Cankar, Vljaj, and Klun in Horváth (2000: 385–421).
- Spain:** Agranoff (2004); Agranoff and Gallarín (1997); Aja in Loughlin *et al.* (2001: 229–53); Alfonso in Hesse (1991: 463–98); Almendral (2002); Beramendi and Máiz in Amoretti and Bermeo (2004: 123–54); Bolleyer (2006a); Christopoulos (2006); Clegg in Page and Goldsmith (1987: 130–55); Colino (2009); Colomer (1999); Committee of the Regions (2005); Council of Europe (1997); Council of Europe (1998a: 149–72); Cuchillo in Sharpe (1993: 210–46); Dobre (2005); Elazar (1991a: 8–11, 227–40); Filippov *et al.* (2004); Guibernau in Smith (1995: 239–54); Harloff (1987: 124–9); Harty in Griffiths (2002: 296–313); Hooghe and Marks (2001: 189–212); Hueglin and Fenna (2006); Humes and Martin (1969: 602–7); John (2001); Joumard and Kongsrud (2003); Keating (2001a, 2001b); Lopez in Mény and Wright (1985: 236–72); López-Laborda and Monasterio (2006); López-Laborda *et al.* (2006); Mateo in Batley and Stoker (1991: 146–54); Morales and Molés in Rose and Traut (2002: 179–92); Morata in Jones and Keating (1995: 114–33); Moreno (2001); OECD (1997: 387–402; 1999: 65–69; 2002); Onrubia (2006); Orte and Wilson (2009); Pedraja-Chaparro *et al.* (2006); Sorens (2009); Swenden (2006); Van Ginderachter (1993: 70–74); Watts (1999, 2005).
- Sweden:** Bjørnå and Jenssen (2006); Blom-Hansen (1999); Bogason (1996, 1998); Committee of the Regions (2005); Council of Europe (1997); Council of Europe (1998a: 173–94); Gustafsson in Batley and Stoker (1991: 170–89); Gustafsson in Hesse (1991: 241–60); Hammarlund (2004); Hansen in Sharpe (1993: 315–18); Harloff (1987: 130–35); Hooghe and Marks (2001: 189–212); Humes and Martin (1969: 608–11); John (2001); Jones and Chandler (1993: 118–37); Joumard and Kongsrud (2003); Lane and Magnusson in Page and Goldsmith (1987: 12–28); Lidström in Loughlin *et al.* (2001: 319–42); Lotz in Shah (2006: 223–63); OECD (1997: 403–19; 1999: 70–71; 2002); Olsson in Högye (2000: 401–28); Svensson and Östhol (2001).
- Switzerland:** Bächtiger and Steiner in Amoretti and Bermeo (2004: 27–54); Bolleyer (2006a; 2006b); Bolleyer and Bytzeck (2009); Boschler (2009); Braun (2003, 2009); Church and Dardanelli (2005); Council of Europe

(1998); Council of Europe (1998a: 195–215); Dafflon (2004, n.d.); Elazar (1991a: 250–57); Erk (2007a); Erk and Gagnon (2000); Filippov *et al.* (2004); Fleiner (2002); Fleiner in Rose and Traut (2002: 71–96); Harloff (1987: 136–9); Hueglin and Fenna (2006); Humes and Martin (1969: 612–16); John (2001); Joumard and Kongsrud (2003); Kriesi (1999); Linder (1987, 1999); Linder and Vatter (2001); Linder in Hesse (1991: 409–28); McRae (1983); Obinger (1998); OECD (1997: 421–42; 1999: 72–81); Papadopoulos (1997); Spahn in Ter-Minassian (1997: 324–41); Stauffer, Töpferwien, and Thalmann-Torres in Griffiths (2002: 314–28); Swenden (2006); Vatter (2005); Vatter and Sager (1996); Wälti (1996); Watts (1999, 2003, 2005).

**Turkey:** Altintas *et al.* (2002); Angrist in Amoretti and Bermeo (2004: 387–416); Bindebir (2004); Committee of the Regions (2005); Council of Europe (1999); Harloff (1987: 140–46); Heper in Hesse (1991: 579–600); Humes and Martin (1969: 494–502); Joumard and Kongsrud (2003); OECD (1997: 443–61).

**United Kingdom:** Agranoff (2004); Anderson in Smith (1995: 279–93); Ayres and Pearce (2004); Bache (2005); Benz and Hesse (1990); Berrington in Mény and Wright (1985: 171–206); Cairney (2006); Casey (2002); Christopoulos (2006); Cole (2001); Committee of the Regions (2005); Council of Europe (1998a: 217–37; Council of Europe (2000); Davies in Bennett (1993: 80–94); Denton and Flinders (2006); Elazar (1991a: 286–303); Goldsmith and Page in Page and Goldsmith (1987: 68–87); Hainsworth in Keating and Jones (1985: 109–32); Harloff (1987: 152–60); Hooghe and Marks (2001: 189–212); Horgan (2004); Humes (1991: 104–20); Humes and Martin (1969: 617–27); Humphrey and Shaw (2006); Jeffery (2009); John (2001); John in Batley and Stoker (1991: 58–72); John in Jeffery (1997: 131–44); John *et al.* (2005); Jones in Hesse (1991: 167–210); Joumard and Kongsrud (2003); Keating (2001a, 2001b); Keating in Amoretti and Bermeo (2004: 155–79); Keating and Jones (1985: 89–108, 133–59); Keating and Jones in Jones and Keating (1995: 88–113); King in Shah (2006: 265–312); Kingdom in Chandler (1993: 7–27); Loughlin in Loughlin *et al.* (2001: 37–60); McCall (2001); McEvoy (2006); OECD (1997: 461–79; 1999: 82; 2002); Paterson (2002); Pearce (2001); Potter in Ter-Minassian (1997); Rhodes in Mény and Wright (1985: 33–78); Sandford (2006); Sharpe in Sharpe (1993: 247–95); Sharpe in Rose and Traut (2002: 155–70); Sorens (2009); Sutcliffe (2007); Swenden (2006); Van Ginderachter (1993: 97–101); Webb and Webb (1963); Wilford *et al.* (2003).

**United States:** Benz and Hesse (1990); Bolleyer (2006b); Bolleyer and Bytzek (2009); Chandler in Chandler (1993: 138–58); Conlan (1988); De Figueiredo, Jr., *et al.* (2006); Donahue and Pollack (2001); Elazar (1991a: 304–38); Fabbrini and Sicurelli (2004); Filippov *et al.* (2004); Gunlicks in Hesse (1991: 77–108); Hueglin and Alan (2006); Humes

(1991: 121–31); Humes and Martin (1969: 356–64); Joumard and Kongsrud (2003); OECD (1997: 481–98); Scheiber in Rose and Traut (2002: 51–70); Schram in Griffiths (2002: 342–57); Schroeder in Shah (2006: 313–58); Shah (1997); Stotsky and Sunley in Ter-Minassian (1997: 359–86); Watts (1999, 2005); Wright (1988).

## **Appendix B**

### **Country and regional scores**

Tables B.1 and B.2 set out the coding schemes for self-rule and shared rule, which together constitute regional authority. Table B.3 aggregates scores for all regional units to the country level for 42 countries. Eight dimensions of regional authority are coded on an annual basis for years in which a country was independent and (semi-)democratic from 1950 to 2006. The algorithm for combining regional scores is described in Chapter 2. Table B.4 provides disaggregated scores – scores for all regional levels below the national level having an average population greater than 150,000, scores for asymmetrical arrangements, and scores for special autonomous regions. The population of countries/years is the same for Table B.3 and Table B.4.

Table B.1 Self-rule

<i>The authority exercised by a regional government over those who live in the region</i>	
<i>Self-rule</i>	
Institutional depth	<p>The extent to which a regional government is autonomous rather than deconcentrated</p> <p><b>0–3</b></p> <p><b>0</b> No functioning general-purpose administration at regional level.  <b>1</b> Deconcentrated, general-purpose administration.  <b>2</b> Non-deconcentrated, general-purpose, administration subject to central government veto.  <b>3</b> Non-deconcentrated, general-purpose administration not subject to central government veto.</p>
Policy scope	<p>The range of policies for which a regional government is responsible</p> <p><b>0–4</b></p> <p><b>0</b> No authoritative competencies over economic policy, cultural-educational policy, welfare policy.  <b>1</b> Authoritative competencies in one area: economic policy, cultural-educational policy, welfare policy.  <b>2</b> Authoritative competencies in at least two areas: economic policy, cultural-educational policy, welfare policy.  <b>3</b> Authoritative competencies in at least two areas above, and in at least two of the following: residual powers, police, authority over own institutional set-up, local government.  <b>4</b> The regional government meets the criteria for <b>3</b>, and has authority over immigration or citizenship.</p>
Fiscal autonomy	<p>The extent to which a regional government can independently tax its population</p> <p><b>0–4</b></p> <p><b>0</b> Central government sets base and rate of all regional taxes.  <b>1</b> Regional government sets the rate of minor taxes.  <b>2</b> Regional government sets base and rate of minor taxes.  <b>3</b> Regional government sets the rate of at least one major tax: personal income, corporate, value added, or sales tax.  <b>4</b> Regional government sets base and rate of at least one major tax: personal income, corporate, value added, or sales tax.</p>
Representation	<p>The extent to which a region is endowed with an independent legislature and executive</p> <p><b>0–4</b></p> <p>Assembly:  <b>0</b> No regional assembly.  <b>1</b> Indirectly elected regional assembly.  <b>2</b> Directly elected assembly.  Executive:  <b>0</b> Regional executive appointed by central government.  <b>1</b> Dual executives appointed by central government and regional assembly.  <b>2</b> Regional executive appointed by a regional assembly or directly elected.</p>

**Table B.2 Shared rule<sup>a</sup>**

<i>Shared rule</i>	<i>The authority exercised by a regional government or its representatives in the country as a whole</i>	
Law making	The extent to which regional representatives co-determine national legislation	<p><b>0–2</b> Regions are the unit of representation in the legislature.  <b>0.5</b> Regional governments designate representatives in the legislature.  <b>0.5</b> Regions have majority representation in the legislature.  <b>0.5</b> The legislature with regional representation has extensive legislative authority.</p>
Executive control	The extent to which a regional government co-determines national policy in intergovernmental meetings	<p><b>0–2</b> No routine meetings between central and regional governments to negotiate policy.  <b>1</b> Routine meetings between central and regional governments <i>without</i> legally binding authority.  <b>2</b> Routine meetings between central and regional governments <i>with</i> authority to reach legally binding decisions.</p>
Fiscal control	The extent to which regional representatives co-determine the distribution of national tax revenues	<p><b>0–2</b> Regional governments or their representatives in the legislature are not consulted over the distribution of tax revenues.  <b>1</b> Regional governments or their representatives in the legislature negotiate over the distribution of tax revenues, but do not have a veto.  <b>2</b> Regional governments or their representatives in the legislature have a veto over the distribution of tax revenues.</p>
Constitutional reform	The extent to which regional representatives co-determine constitutional change	<p><b>0–3</b> The central government and/or national electorate can unilaterally change the constitution.  <b>1</b> A legislature based on the principle of regional representation must approve constitutional change; or constitutional change requires a referendum based on the principle of equal regional representation.  <b>2</b> Regional governments are a directly represented majority in a legislature which can do one or more of the following: postpone constitutional reform, introduce amendments, raise the decision hurdle in the other chamber, require a second vote in the other chamber, require a popular referendum.  <b>3</b> A majority of regional governments can veto constitutional change.</p>

Note: <sup>a</sup> Shared rule criteria are adjusted for special autonomous regions, as detailed in Appendix A.

Table B.3 Regional authority index (RAI) scores aggregated by country

Country	Year <sup>a</sup>	Institutional depth	Policy scope	Fiscal autonomy	Representation	Self-rule	Law making	Executive control	Fiscal control	Constitutional reform	Shared rule	RAI
Albania	1992-1999	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	2000-2006	1.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0
Australia	1950-1977	2.9	3.9	1.9	3.9	12.7	1.5	1.9	1.0	1.0	5.3	18.0
	1978-1988	3.0	3.9	2.0	3.9	12.8	1.5	2.0	1.0	1.0	5.4	18.2
	1989-1998	3.0	4.0	2.0	4.0	12.9	1.5	2.0	1.0	1.0	5.5	18.4
	1999-2006	3.0	4.0	2.0	4.0	12.9	1.5	2.0	2.0	1.0	6.5	19.4
Austria	1955-1983	3.0	3.0	2.0	4.0	12.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	2.0	5.0	17.0
	1984-2006	3.0	3.0	2.0	4.0	12.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	6.0	18.0
Belgium	1950-1969	2.0	2.0	2.0	3.0	9.0	1.0	0.0	1.0	3.0	5.0	14.0
	1970-1979	4.0	3.0	2.0	4.0	13.0	1.0	0.0	3.0	6.0	10.0	23.0
	1980-1988	4.0	3.9	2.0	6.0	15.9	1.0	0.0	3.0	6.0	10.0	25.9
	1989-1994	5.0	5.0	4.0	6.2	20.1	1.0	2.0	3.0	6.0	12.0	32.1
1995-2006	4.8	4.8	4.8	6.7	21.1	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	7.0	28.1	
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1995-2006	5.0	6.0	6.0	6.6	23.6	2.0	0.0	2.0	3.0	7.0	30.6
Bulgaria	1991-2006	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
Canada	1950-1985	3.8	4.8	4.0	5.1	17.6	0.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	5.0	22.6
	1986-2006	3.8	4.8	4.0	5.1	17.7	0.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	5.0	22.6
Croatia	1991-1992	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	1993-2000	2.0	2.0	1.0	4.0	9.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	10.0
2001-2006	2.0	2.0	1.0	4.0	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.0
Cyprus	1960-2006	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Czech Republic	1993-1999	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	2000-2006	2.0	1.0	0.0	4.0	7.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.0
Denmark	1950-1969	2.0	1.0	0.0	1.0	4.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	4.1
	1970-1972	2.0	2.0	0.0	3.0	7.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	7.1
	1973-1978	2.0	2.0	3.0	3.0	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	10.1
1979-2006	2.0	2.0	3.0	3.0	10.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	10.2	
Estonia	1992-2006	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Finland	1950-1992	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1
	1993-2006	3.0	1.0	0.0	3.0	7.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.1

Table B.3 Continued

Country	Year <sup>a</sup>	Institutional depth	Policy scope	Fiscal autonomy	Representation	Self-rule	Law making	Executive control	Fiscal control	Constitutional reform	Shared rule	RAI
France	1950-1963	2.0	1.0	1.0	2.0	6.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.0
	1964-1971	3.0	1.0	1.0	2.0	7.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.0
	1972-1981	3.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.0
	1982-1985	3.0	2.0	2.0	5.0	12.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	12.0
	1986-2006	4.0	4.0	2.0	6.0	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	16.0
Germany	1950-1963	5.8	3.9	4.9	7.8	22.4	2.0	1.0	0.0	3.0	7.0	28.4
	1964-1995	5.8	3.9	4.9	7.8	22.4	2.0	2.0	0.0	3.0	7.0	29.4
	1966-1989	5.8	3.9	2.9	7.8	20.4	2.0	2.0	2.0	3.0	9.0	29.4
	1990-2000	5.7	3.9	2.9	7.8	20.3	2.0	2.0	2.0	3.0	9.0	29.3
	2001-2002	5.6	3.9	2.9	8.0	20.5	2.0	2.0	2.0	3.0	9.0	29.5
	2003	5.6	3.9	2.9	8.0	20.4	2.0	2.0	2.0	3.0	9.0	29.4
	2004-2006	5.5	3.9	2.9	8.0	20.3	2.0	2.0	2.0	3.0	9.0	29.3
	1950-1985	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
Greece	1950-1985	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
	1986-1993	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0
	1994-1996	3.0	2.0	0.0	4.0	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.0
	1997-2006	3.0	2.0	0.0	5.0	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.0
Hungary	1990-1993	2.0	2.0	1.0	3.0	8.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.0
	1994-1998	2.0	2.0	1.0	4.0	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.0
	1999-2006	3.0	2.0	1.0	4.0	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.0
Iceland	1950-2006	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	1950-1986	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Ireland	1987-1993	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
	1994-2006	2.0	1.0	0.0	3.0	6.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.0
Italy	1950-1962	2.3	1.4	1.0	3.5	8.2	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.3	8.5
	1963-1971	2.3	1.5	1.0	3.6	8.4	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.3	8.7
	1972-1973	4.0	2.3	1.0	7.0	14.3	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.3	14.6
	1974-1996	4.0	2.3	0.0	7.0	13.3	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.3	13.6
	1977-1988	4.0	3.2	0.0	7.0	14.1	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.3	14.5
	1989-1992	4.0	3.2	0.0	7.0	14.1	0.0	1.0	0.2	0.2	1.4	15.5
	1993-1996	4.0	3.2	2.0	7.0	16.1	0.0	1.0	0.2	0.2	1.4	17.5
	1997-2000	4.0	3.2	4.0	7.0	18.2	0.0	1.0	0.2	0.2	1.4	19.5
2001-2006	5.0	5.0	4.0	7.0	21.0	0.0	1.0	0.3	0.3	1.7	22.7	

Notes: <sup>a</sup> Reform/years are listed as separate rows when the shared-rule score and/or the self-rule score changes by 0.1 or more. Scores are rounded to one decimal place, causing occasional summing inequalities.



Table B.3 Continued

Country	Year <sup>a</sup>	Institutional depth	Policy scope	Fiscal autonomy	Representation	Self-rule	Law making	Executive control	Fiscal control	Constitutional reform	Shared rule	RAI
Slovakia	1993-1995	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	1996-2001	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
Slovenia	2002-2006	2.0	1.0	0.0	3.0	6.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.0
	1990-2006	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Spain	1978	2.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	8.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	2.0	10.0
	1979	2.6	1.6	2.5	3.0	9.8	1.1	0.0	0.2	1.0	2.3	12.1
1980	1980	2.6	1.6	2.5	3.8	10.6	1.1	0.0	0.2	1.0	2.3	12.9
	1981	3.4	2.4	3.0	4.0	12.8	1.2	0.0	0.5	1.0	2.7	15.5
1982	1982	4.1	3.2	3.5	4.6	15.3	1.3	0.0	0.8	0.9	3.0	18.3
	1983-1996	4.5	3.8	3.6	6.3	18.2	1.3	0.0	1.0	0.8	3.0	21.2
1997-2006	1997-2006	4.5	3.8	4.6	6.3	19.1	1.3	0.0	1.0	0.8	3.0	22.1
	1950-1970	2.0	1.0	3.0	1.0	7.0	1.5	0.0	2.0	3.0	6.5	13.5
Sweden	1971-2006	2.0	2.0	3.0	3.0	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.0
	1950-2006	3.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	15.0	1.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	4.5	19.5
Switzerland	1950-1960	1.0s	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
Turkey	1961-2006	2.0	1.0	0.0	2.0	5.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.0
	1950-1963	2.1	2.1	1.0	4.1	9.3	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	9.4
UK	1964-1971	2.2	2.1	1.0	4.1	9.4	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	9.5
	1972	2.2	2.0	1.0	4.0	9.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	9.2
1973-1993	1973-1993	2.1	1.9	1.0	3.9	8.9	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	9.0
	1994-1995	3.1	1.9	1.0	3.9	9.9	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	9.9
1996-1997	1996-1997	1.9	0.8	0.4	1.6	4.6	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	4.7
	1998	1.9	0.8	0.4	2.5	5.6	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	5.6
1999	1999	3.1	2.1	0.6	3.0	8.9	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.3	0.5	9.3
	2000-2002	2.9	2.2	0.8	3.3	9.2	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.3	0.5	9.7
2003-2006	2003-2006	2.9	2.1	0.8	3.2	9.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.3	0.5	9.5
	1950-1958	3.8	3.8	4.4	5.6	17.6	1.5	1.0	0.0	3.0	5.5	23.1
USA	1959	3.8	3.8	4.4	5.6	17.7	1.5	1.0	0.0	3.0	5.5	23.2
	1960-1979	3.8	3.8	4.4	5.6	17.6	1.5	1.0	0.0	3.0	5.5	23.1
1980-2006	3.8	3.8	4.4	5.7	17.7	1.5	1.0	0.0	3.0	5.5	23.2	

Notes: <sup>a</sup> Reform/years are listed as separate rows when the shared-rule score and/or the self-rule score changes by 0.1 or more. Scores are rounded to one decimal place, causing occasional summing inequalities.

Table B.4 Regional authority index (RAI) scores by region

Country	Region	Type <sup>a</sup>	Year	Institutional depth	Policy scope	Fiscal autonomy	Representation	Self-rule	Law making	Executive control	Fiscal control	Constitutional reform	Shared RAI		
Albania	—		1992–1999	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.0		
Australia	Qarku States	I	2000–2006	1.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
		I	1950–1998	3.0	4.0	2.0	4.0	2.0	13.0	1.5	2.0	1.0	1.0	5.5	
	Australian Capital Territory	C	1999–2006	3.0	4.0	2.0	4.0	2.0	13.0	1.5	2.0	2.0	1.0	6.5	
		C	1950–1972	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
	Northern Territory	C→A	1973–1988	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	
		C	1989–1998	2.0	3.0	2.0	4.0	2.0	11.0	1.0	2.0	1.0	0.0	4.0	
		C	1999–2006	2.0	3.0	2.0	4.0	2.0	11.0	1.0	2.0	2.0	0.0	5.0	
		C	1950–1959	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	
		C	1960–1964	1.0	0.0	0.0	2.0	2.0	3.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	
		C	1965–1977	1.0	0.0	0.0	4.0	4.0	5.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.0	
Austria	Länder	C→A	1978–1998	2.0	3.0	2.0	4.0	2.0	11.0	1.0	2.0	1.0	0.0	4.0	
		C	1999–2006	2.0	3.0	2.0	4.0	2.0	11.0	1.0	2.0	2.0	0.0	5.0	
	I	1955–1983	3.0	3.0	2.0	4.0	2.0	12.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	2.0	5.0		
	I	1984–2006	3.0	3.0	2.0	4.0	2.0	12.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	6.0		
	I	1950–1969	2.0	2.0	2.0	3.0	3.0	9.0	1.0	0.0	1.0	3.0	5.0		
	I→II	1970–1994	2.0	2.0	2.0	3.0	3.0	9.0	1.0	0.0	1.0	3.0	5.0		
Belgium	Communauté française	I	1970–1979	2.0	1.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	4.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	3.0	5.0	
		I	1980–1988	2.0	1.0	0.0	3.0	3.0	6.0	0.0	0.0	2.0	3.0	5.0	
	Vlaamse Gemeenschap	I	1989–1994	3.0	2.0	0.0	3.0	3.0	8.0	0.0	2.0	3.0	3.0	7.0	
		I	1995–2006	3.0	2.0	0.0	4.0	2.0	9.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.0	16.0	
	Deutsche Gemeinschaft	>I	1970–1979	2.0	1.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	4.0	0.0	0.0	2.0	3.0	9.0	
		>I	1980–1988	2.0	2.0	0.0	3.0	3.0	7.0	0.0	0.0	2.0	3.0	12.0	
Belgium	Deutsche Gemeinschaft	>I	1989–1994	3.0	3.0	2.0	4.0	2.0	11.0	0.0	2.0	3.0	3.0	7.0	
		>I	1995–2006	3.0	3.0	3.0	4.0	2.0	13.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.0	20.0	
	Deutsche Gemeinschaft	>I	1970–1973	2.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	
		>I	1974–1983	2.0	1.0	0.0	2.0	2.0	5.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.0	
	Belgium	Deutsche Gemeinschaft	>I	1984–1988	2.0	1.0	0.0	4.0	4.0	7.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.0
			>I	1989–1994	3.0	2.0	0.0	4.0	2.0	9.0	0.0	2.0	1.0	0.0	12.0
Belgium	Deutsche Gemeinschaft	>I	1995–1999	3.0	2.0	0.0	4.0	2.0	9.0	2.0	2.0	0.0	0.0	15.0	
		>I	2000–2006	3.0	3.0	0.0	4.0	2.0	10.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	0.0	16.0	

Table B.4 Continued

Country	Region	Type <sup>a</sup>	Year	Institutional depth	Policy scope	Fiscal autonomy	Representation	Self-rule	Law making	Executive control	Fiscal control	Constitutional reform	Shared RAI
Belgium (cont.)	Région wallonne	I	1980–1988	2.0	1.0	0.0	3.0	6.0	0.0	0.0	2.0	3.0	5.0
			1989–1994	3.0	2.0	2.0	3.0	10.0	0.0	2.0	2.0	3.0	7.0
			1995–2006	3.0	3.0	3.0	4.0	13.0	0.0	2.0	2.0	1.0	5.0
		Brussel Hoofdstedelijk Gewest/Bruxelles-Région-Capitale	> I	1980–1988	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
				1989–1994	3.0	2.0	2.0	4.0	11.0	0.0	2.0	3.0	7.0
				1995–2006	3.0	3.0	3.0	4.0	13.0	0.0	2.0	2.0	1.0
				1995–2006	3.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	15.0	2.0	0.0	2.0	3.0
				1995–2006	3.0	3.0	3.0	4.0	13.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
				1991–2006	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
				1995–2006	2.0	2.0	0.0	3.0	7.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.0
Bosnia-Herzegovina	in Federacija: Cantons	I	1995–2006	3.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	15.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	5.0
		II	1995–2006	3.0	3.0	3.0	4.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
Bulgaria	Oblasti	II	1950–2006	2.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	15.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	20.0
	Provinces	I	1950–2006	3.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
Canada	Northwest Territories	C	1950–1965	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0
			1967–1974	2.0	2.0	0.0	2.0	6.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.0
			1975–1978	2.0	2.0	0.0	3.0	7.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.0
			1979–1985	2.0	2.0	0.0	4.0	8.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.0
		C→A	1986–1991	3.0	3.0	4.0	4.0	14.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	14.0
			1992–2006	3.0	3.0	4.0	4.0	14.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	0.0	16.0
Yukon		C	1950–1969	1.0	0.0	0.0	2.0	3.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0
			1970–1977	1.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	4.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.0
		C→A	1978–1991	2.0	3.0	4.0	4.0	13.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	13.0
			1992–2001	2.0	3.0	4.0	4.0	13.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	0.0	15.0
Croatia	Nunavut	A	1999–2006	3.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	15.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	3.0
			1991–1992	–	–	–	–	14.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	0.0	2.0
			1993–2000	2.0	2.0	1.0	4.0	9.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
			2001–2006	2.0	2.0	1.0	4.0	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.0
Cyprus			1960–2006	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.0
Czech Republic	Kraje	I	2000–2006	2.0	1.0	0.0	4.0	7.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.0

Notes: <sup>a</sup> Legend for type: I = highest regional tier; II = second-highest regional tier; III = third-highest regional tier; A = special autonomous region; C = colony, dependency; → indicates a change in status over the time period; > indicates a region that is scored separately from its tier.



Table B.4 Continued

Country	Region	Type <sup>a</sup>	Year	Institutional depth	Policy scope	Fiscal autonomy	Representation	Self-rule	Law making	Executive control	Fiscal control	Constitutional reform	Shared rule	RAI		
Hungary	Megyék	I	1990–1993	2.0	2.0	1.0	3.0	8.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.0		
			1994–1998	2.0	2.0	1.0	4.0	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.0	
Iceland	Tervezési-statisztikai régiók	I	1999–2006	2.0	2.0	1.0	4.0	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.0	
			1999–2006	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	
Ireland	Regional authorities	I	1950–2006	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.0		
			1950–1986	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.0	
Italy	Province	I	1987–1993	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	
			1994–2006	2.0	1.0	0.0	3.0	6.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.0	
			1950–1971	2.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	7.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.0	
			1972–1973	2.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	7.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.0	
			1974–1992	2.0	1.0	0.0	3.0	6.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.0	
			1993–2000	2.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	7.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.0	
		2001–2006	2.0	2.0	1.0	3.0	8.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.0		
		>I	1950–1971	2.0	2.0	0.0	3.0	7.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	2.0	9.0	
		I→A	1972–1988	2.0	3.0	0.0	4.0	9.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	2.0	11.0	
		Bolzano-Bozen/Trento <sup>b</sup>	I	1989–1992	2.0	3.0	0.0	4.0	10.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	12.0
				1993–1996	2.0	3.0	1.0	4.0	10.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	13.0
				1997–2000	2.0	3.0	3.0	4.0	12.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	15.0
2001–2006	3.0			3.0	3.0	4.0	13.0	0.0	1.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	5.0	18.0		
1972–1976	2.0			1.0	0.0	4.0	7.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.0		
1977–1988	2.0			2.0	0.0	4.0	8.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.0		
Regioni a statuto ordinario	I	1989–1992	2.0	2.0	0.0	4.0	8.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	9.0		
		1993–1996	2.0	2.0	1.0	4.0	9.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	10.0		
		1997–2000	2.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	11.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	12.0		
		2001–2006	3.0	3.0	3.0	4.0	13.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	14.0		
		1950–1988	2.0	3.0	0.0	4.0	9.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	2.0	11.0		
		1989–1992	2.0	3.0	0.0	4.0	9.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	12.0		
Regioni a statuto speciale <sup>c</sup>	A	1993–1996	2.0	3.0	1.0	4.0	10.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	13.0		
		1997–2000	2.0	3.0	3.0	4.0	12.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	15.0		
		2001–2006	3.0	3.0	3.0	4.0	13.0	0.0	1.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	5.0	18.0		
		1950–2006	3.0	3.0	3.0	4.0	13.0	0.0	1.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	5.0	18.0		

Notes: <sup>a</sup> Legend for type: I = highest regional tier; II = second-highest regional tier; III = third-highest regional tier; A = special autonomous region; C = colony, dependency; → indicates a change in status over the time period; > indicates a region that is scored separately from its tier. <sup>b</sup> The autonomous provinces of Bolzano and Trento constitute the autonomous region of Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol. <sup>c</sup> Sardegna, Sicilia, Valle d'Aosta/Vallée d'Aoste and, since 1963, also Friuli-Venezia-Giulia. Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol is scored separately.

Table B.4 Continued

Country	Region	Type <sup>a</sup>	Year	Institutional depth	Policy scope	Fiscal autonomy	Representation	Self-rule	Law making	Executive control	Fiscal control	Constitutional reform	Shared rule	RAI
Italy (cont.)	Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol	> A	1950-1971	2.0	3.0	0.0	4.0	9.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	2.0	11.0
			1972-1988	2.0	2.0	0.0	3.0	7.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	2.0	9.0
			1989-1992	2.0	2.0	0.0	3.0	7.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	10.0
			1993-1996	2.0	2.0	1.0	3.0	8.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	11.0
			1997-2000	2.0	2.0	3.0	3.0	10.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	13.0
			2001-2006	3.0	2.0	3.0	3.0	11.0	0.0	1.0	2.0	2.0	5.0	16.0
Japan	Todofuken	I	1950-1999	2.0	1.0	1.0	4.0	8.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.0
			2000-2006	2.0	2.0	2.0	4.0	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.0
Latvia			1990-2006											0.0
Lithuania		I	1992-1994											0.0
Luxembourg	Apskritijs		1995-2006	2.0	1.0	0.0	1.0	4.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.0
Macedonia			1950-2006											0.0
Malta			1991-2006											0.0
Netherlands	Provincies		1964-2006											0.0
New Zealand		I	1950-1993	2.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	7.0	1.5	0.0	2.0	3.0	6.5	13.5
			1994-2006	2.0	2.0	1.0	3.0	8.0	1.5	0.0	2.0	3.0	6.5	14.5
Norway		I	1950-1962											0.0
			1974-1988	2.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	8.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.0
Poland			1989-2006	2.0	1.0	2.0	4.0	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.0
		> I	1963-2006	2.0	1.0	2.0	4.0	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.0
Portugal		> I	1974-2006	2.0	1.0	2.0	4.0	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.0
		I	1950-1974	2.0	1.0	0.0	1.0	4.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.0
Portugal		I	1975-2006	2.0	2.0	3.0	3.0	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.0
		I	1990-1998	1.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0
Portugal		I	1999-2006	2.0	2.0	0.0	4.0	8.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.0
		I	1976-1978	1.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0
Portugal		I→II	1979-2006	1.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0
		I	1979-2006	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
Portugal		A	1976-1998	2.0	2.0	2.0	4.0	10.0	0.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	3.5	13.5
			1999-2006	3.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	12.0	0.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	3.5	15.5

Table B.4 Continued

Country	Region	Type <sup>a</sup>	Year	Institutional depth	Policy scope	Fiscal autonomy	Representation	Self-rule	Law making	Executive control	Fiscal control	Constitutional reform	Shared rule	RAI	
Romania	<i>Județe</i>	I	1991–1993	2.0	1.0	0.0	3.0	6.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.0	
		I→II	1994–1997	2.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	7.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.0
Russia	<i>Regiuni de dezvoltare Respublici</i>	I	1998–2002	2.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	7.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.0
		I	2003–2006	2.0	1.0	0.0	3.0	6.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.0
		I	1998–2006	1.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	4.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.0
		I	1993–1999	3.0	3.0	3.0	4.0	13.0	2.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	6.0	19.0
		I→II	2000–2004	2.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	11.0	2.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	6.0	17.0
		I	2005–2006	2.0	1.0	3.0	3.0	9.0	2.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	6.0	15.0
Serbia and Montenegro	<i>Subveky federacii</i>	I	1993–1995	2.0	2.0	3.0	2.0	9.0	2.0	0.0	1.0	3.0	6.0	15.0	
		I	1996–1999	3.0	3.0	3.0	4.0	13.0	2.0	0.0	1.0	3.0	6.0	19.0	
		I→II	2000–2004	2.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	11.0	2.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	6.0	17.0
		I	2005–2006	2.0	1.0	3.0	3.0	9.0	2.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	6.0	15.0
Slovakia	<i>Okruga Republicas</i>	I	2000–2006	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	
		I	1992–2002	3.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	15.0	2.0	0.0	2.0	3.0	7.0	22.0	
		II	1992–2006	3.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	15.0	1.5	0.0	2.0	3.0	3.0	6.5	
		A	1992–2001	2.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
Slovenia	<i>in Serbia: okruzi in Serbia: Vojvodina</i>	A	2002–2006	2.0	2.0	0.0	4.0	8.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.0	
		A	1992–1998	2.0	1.0	0.0	4.0	7.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.0
Slovenia Spain	<i>Kraje Samospravnne kraje Provincias</i>	I	1993–1995	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.0	
		I	1996–2001	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
Spain	<i>Provincias</i>	I	1978–1981	2.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	8.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	2.0	10.0	
		I→II	1982–2006	2.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	8.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	2.0	10.0	

Notes: <sup>a</sup> Legend for type: I = highest regional tier; II = second-highest regional tier; III = third-highest regional tier; A = special autonomous region; C = colony, dependency; → indicates a change in status over the time period; > indicates a region that is scored separately from its tier.



Table B.4 Continued

Country	Region	Type <sup>a</sup>	Year	Institutional depth	Policy scope	Fiscal autonomy	Representation	Self-rule	Law making	Executive control	Fiscal control	Constitutional reform	Shared rule	RAI
UK	Countries	I	1950–1993	2.0	2.0	1.0	4.0	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.0
		I→II	1994–2006	2.0	2.0	1.0	4.0	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.0
	Regions	I	1994–1997	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
			1998	1.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0
			1999–2006	2.0	1.0	0.0	1.0	4.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.0
		> I	2000–2006	2.0	2.0	1.0	4.0	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.0
	Greater London Authority													
	Northern Ireland	A	1950–1971	2.0	3.0	0.0	3.0	8.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.5
			1972–1999	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
			2000–2002	2.0	3.0	0.0	3.0	8.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.5
USA	Scotland	A	1950–1998	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5
			1999–2006	3.0	3.0	3.0	4.0	13.0	0.5	1.0	0.0	2.0	3.5	16.5
	Wales	A	1964–1998	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5
			1999–2006	3.0	2.0	0.0	3.0	8.0	0.5	1.0	0.0	2.0	3.5	11.5
	Countries	II	1950–2006	2.0	2.0	1.0	4.0	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.0
	Regional councils	II	1980–2006	2.0	1.0	1.0	4.0	8.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.0
	States	I	1950–2006	3.0	3.0	4.0	4.0	14.0	1.5	1.0	0.0	3.0	5.5	19.5
	Alaska, Hawaii	A	1950–1958	2.0	3.0	0.0	2.0	7.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.0
		A→I	1959–2006	3.0	3.0	4.0	4.0	14.0	1.5	1.0	0.0	3.0	5.5	19.5
	Washington, DC	C	1950–1972	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
	C→A	1973–1994	2.0	3.0	4.0	4.0	13.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	13.0	
		1995–2000	1.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	4.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.0	
		2001–2006	2.0	3.0	4.0	4.0	13.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	13.0	

Notes: <sup>a</sup> Legend for type: I = highest regional tier; II = second-highest regional tier; III = third-highest regional tier; A = special autonomous region; C = colony, dependency; → indicates a change in status over the time period; > indicates a region that is scored separately from its tier. <sup>b</sup> La Rioja, Murcia, Valencia, Aragón, Castilla la Mancha, Canary Islands signed their autonomy statute in 1982, and the Balearic Islands, Castilla y León, Extremadura and Madrid signed in 1983.

**Postscript to the tables**

There are some minor differences between these tables and the ones published in Hooghe, Liesbet, Marks, Gary, and Schakel, Arjan H. (2008) 'Appendix B: country and regional scores', *Regional and Federal Studies*, 17(2/3): 259–74. These pertain to errors of aggregation or rounding adjustments; none is greater than 0.9 at the country level. The differences are listed below.

**Table B.3 – country scores**

Belgium: 1970–88: +0.1 (rounding)  
 1995–2006: –0.9 (aggregation correction for Brussels, which no longer falls under provincial jurisdiction)

Bosnia-Herzegovina: 1995–2006: +0.1 (rounding)

Germany: 1950–2002: +0.1 (rounding)  
 2003: new row

Italy: 1950–71: +0.1 (adjustment of Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol)

New Zealand: 1963–74: –0.2 (aggregation corrections for Auckland and Wellington)  
 1974–88: +0.3 (aggregation corrections for Auckland and Wellington)  
 1989–2006: +0.4 (aggregation corrections for Auckland and Wellington)

Portugal: 1999–2006: –0.1 (rounding)

Spain: 1981, 1982: adjustment of –0.4 (aggregation correction for *provincias* that coincide with the *comunidad* boundaries)

UK: 1964–71: new row  
 1972: –0.1 (rounding)  
 1998: –0.2 (rounding)  
 1999: +0.1 (rounding)  
 2000–02: –0.2 (rounding)  
 2003–4: –0.1 (rounding)

USA: 1950–58: +0.3 (aggregation correction for counties)  
 1959: +0.2 (aggregation correction for counties)  
 1960–79: +0.2 (aggregation correction for counties)  
 1980–2006: +0.2 (aggregation correction for counties)

**Table B.4 – regional scores**

Italy: 1950–71: +1 for representation (assembly) for Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol

Belgium: *Vlaamse Gemeenschap*, *Deutsche Gemeinschaft*, and Brussels-Capital Region are now categorized as 'scored separately from their tier'.

# Notes

## Foreword

- 1 [www.cor.europa.eu/pages/EventTemplate.aspx?view=folder&id=53788fb1-937b-44ce-bd39-b20f3313bc83&sm=53788fb1-937b-44ce-bd39-b20f3313bc83](http://www.cor.europa.eu/pages/EventTemplate.aspx?view=folder&id=53788fb1-937b-44ce-bd39-b20f3313bc83&sm=53788fb1-937b-44ce-bd39-b20f3313bc83)

## 1 Measuring regional authority

- 1 For example, Castles (1999) employs a dichotomous federalism variable, and Treisman (2006) disaggregates decentralization into several dichotomous variables. The veto points literature usually relies on simple measures of federalism or decentralization. See, for example, Schmidt (2002), who includes a four-category evaluation of decentralization in his index.
- 2 Rodden (2004: 482) notes that  

Distinctions between various shades of decentralization and federalism have not been taken seriously. Questions about the design, content, and form of decentralization are glossed over not because the theories and hypotheses of interest are undifferentiated, but because more refined data are difficult to collect. The bluntness of these measures is often acknowledged but defended as the cost of achieving a large enough sample to make reliable inferences. . . . But do the favored indicators of decentralization actually measure the concepts addressed in the relevant theories?
- 3 The measure by Brancati (2006) scores eight countries for 1985 to 2000, while that by Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) has eight time points, and that of Hooghe and Marks (2001) has four decade-interval time points.
- 4 The most comprehensive quantitative survey to date of the consequences of government structure notes that, 'as there is little variation over time in governance indicators . . . panel regressions are inappropriate: valid inferences are only available from the sample's cross-section variation' (Inman 2008: 15). Numerous country studies, however, detail considerable variation in government structure over time and suggest that the appearance of stability across time reflects the imprecision with which the phenomenon has been measured.
- 5 '[D]ue to differing forms of complexity and degrees of interdependence, as well as the compound product of these two, it has become less and less possible to rely on the properties of sovereignty and nationality to identify equivalent units' (Schmitter 2009: 47).

[I]f we were to reflect on the relevance of territory for cultural, economic, social and political activities, we would find no qualitative difference between a region, a state, and a supra-state. . . . Unless we can convincingly argue that

there exist physical and relational thresholds below or above which certain activities cannot be sustained, the distinction between state, sub-state, and supra-state would appear as wholly unjustified on purely theoretical (as opposed to historical and institutional) grounds.

(Piattoni 2010: 43)

- 6 A population of 150,000 is the dividing line between regional and local government in the *nomenclature d'unités territoriales statistiques*, which is a geocode standard for referencing the administrative divisions of countries for statistical purposes. This figure happens also to be a conservative estimate of the size of a community in which 'it is well-nigh impossible for anyone otherwise eligible to participate in political life not to know (in the sense of being personally acquainted with) a very high percentage of the political decision-makers simply in the course of living in the community' (Elazar 1972: 24). Elazar relaxes the figure to 250,000, which he claims 'is the very maximum when it comes to political communication' (ibid.: 55). Regional government is government run by those who are not intimately acquainted with one another.
- 7 Lane and Ersson (1999) distinguish the degree of federalism, special territorial autonomy, functional autonomy, and local government discretion. Loughlin (2000) distinguishes legal position (defined constitutionally or through ordinary legislation), range of policy competencies, right to conclude foreign treaties, political/legal control over other subnational governments, and right to participate in national policy making.
- 8 See also Keman (2000). Self-rule and shared rule underpin the analysis of local governments by Page and Goldsmith (1987; see also Goldsmith and Page forthcoming) in terms of the scope of their tasks and functions, the discretion they have in performing them, and their access to central decision making.
- 9 Regions that are not *wellordered* are German *Länder*, Swedish *län*, Ceuta and Melilla in Spain, Russian *subwekty federacii*, and four regions in Belgium: the *Vlaamse gemeenschap*, *Communauté française*, *Région wallonne*, and the Brussels region. These cases are characterized by an increase on one dimension and a decline on another from one year to the next. Without being able to measure whether a decline on one dimension is larger or smaller than an increase in another (the ordinal constraint), one cannot estimate whether regional authority has increased, decreased, or remained the same.
- 10 Kosomet is excluded in 2006 and the *comunidades autónomas* are counted as one tier.
- 11 We do not know the true scores, and so cannot evaluate the validity of these assumptions. Monte Carlo tests suggest that regression models are quite robust to distortions that could arise from smooth monotone transformations, including summation of ordinal scores across rating scales (see, for example, Shevlin *et al.* 1997).
- 12 We prefer to use an additive index because it is transparent with respect to its construction and is robust across alternative sets of countries and years. Factor scores have the virtue of allowing the weighting of the components to vary to produce a common factor, but the scores will then depend on the sample.

## 2 Operationalizing regional authority

- 1 *Waterschappen* pass binding regulations, levy taxes and are directly elected. Their origins go back at least as far as the twelfth century. Safeguarding dykes, controlling and adjusting the water level, and ensuring clean drinking water are important in a country which is mostly below sea level. However, the sole function of *waterschappen* is water management. The *waterschappen* are type 2

- jurisdictions, i.e. functionally specific jurisdictions designed around a limited set of policy problems (Hooghe and Marks 2003).
- 2 These categories bundle policies in conventional containers. A potentially more accurate approach would be to evaluate policy scope at the level of individual policies. That task is, however, complicated because we currently lack a systematic hierarchical categorization of policy, e.g. along the lines of the International Standards Classification of Occupations (ISCO).
  - 3 US Supreme Court, in *Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong*, 426 US 88, 101 n. 21 (1976).
  - 4 Christensen (2000: 393) observes that Danish local authorities are keenly aware that ‘the transfer of functional and fiscal responsibilities from central to local governments does not say much about local government autonomy’. ‘As in Sweden and Norway, the increasing importance of subnational governments led to a central government interest in greater financial control. The instruments to be used in Denmark . . . resembled those used in Sweden in the 1970s, i.e. control was pursued through the corporatist arena’ – that is to say, through ‘agreements between the central government and the associations of counties and municipalities’, which made subnational spending conditional upon central government approval (Blom-Hansen 1999: 55).
  - 5 Data are for 2001 (OECD). A perverse theory of fiscal decentralization might expect the share of public expenditure to be related *negatively* to subnational discretion on the grounds that central actors allow subnational administration to spend only when that spending is dictated by the centre.
  - 6 The same applies to share of subnational public employment. On this measure, Luxembourg comes out top, followed by Greece. Subnational employment is a larger share of public employment in Turkey than it is in Austria, Italy, or Spain – countries which are far more decentralized.
  - 7 A league table for share of government revenue suggests this. Canada and the United States, where subnational governments have extensive discretion in setting base and rate of taxes, are at the top, but they are followed by Ireland, Finland, Germany, and Sweden – where subnational governments are much more constrained in determining the level and composition of the taxes they receive. Spain and Belgium would face relegation if this were a football league.
  - 8 Here is an instance where the reliability of the data, which is high, is no guide to their validity, which is low. The correlation between *subnational tax revenues* as a percentage of all taxes with a measure of *tax discretion* is 0.19 ( $p = 0.46$ ,  $n = 19$ ) (Joumard and Kongsrud 2003). Yet, ‘There seems to be consensus that the share of expenditures of subnational governments in consolidated government expenditures is the best proxy for the degree of decentralization’ (Breuss and Eller 2004b: 42). Chapter 3 details the limitations of tax revenues as a measure of regional authority.
  - 9 A tax is a ‘pecuniary burden upon individuals or property to support the government . . . a payment exacted by legislative authority . . . [It is] an enforced contribution . . . imposed by government whether under the name of toll, tribute, tallage, gabel, impost, duty, custom, excise, subsidy, aid, supply, or other name’ (Campbell 1979: 307). Coding taxes must navigate national particularities in labelling. The income tax on profits made by companies or associations is labelled corporate tax in the United States, corporation tax in the UK and Ireland, and tax on enterprise profits in Russia. In Japan, it goes by several names depending on who is in charge of particular components; at the prefectural level, it is called the enterprise tax. This ranking of categories does not allow for the possibility that a regional government may control the tax base but not the tax rate. However, this occurs only twice in an OECD dataset covering all taxes for 35 subnational governments in 19 countries; in Poland it accounts for 1 per cent of local govern-

ment revenue, and in the Czech Republic it accounts for 3 per cent of local government revenue.

- 10 Treisman (2007) makes the same distinction.
- 11 Commissioners were actively involved in territorial policy making in the Northwest Territories until 1978, Yukon until 1977, and Nunavut until 1998. After these dates, the job description of the commissioner was rewritten to resemble that of his counterpart in the provinces. At the provincial level, lieutenant-generals became slightly more influential once they were appointed by the Canadian federal government, but not enough in our judgement to be considered as sharing executive authority.
- 12 Asymmetry is coded only to the extent that it is reflected in the constitutional and legal framework. This differs from political asymmetry, which ‘arises from the impact of cultural, economic, social and political conditions affecting the relative power, influence and relations of different regional units with each other and with the federal government’ (Watts 1999: 63).
- 13 This notion of special autonomous region is consistent with the three special arrangements which Elazar (1991b: 398), in order of declining autonomy, defines as associated state, federacy, and home-rule territory. An ‘associated state’ is an arrangement whereby a larger power and a smaller polity are linked asymmetrically in a federal relationship in which the latter has substantial autonomy and in return has a minimal role in the governance of the larger power; like a confederation, it can be dissolved unilaterally by either party under pre-arranged terms. A ‘federacy’ is similar to an associated state in terms of internal autonomy, except that, as in a federation, the relationship between them can be dissolved only by mutual agreement. Finally, a ‘home-rule territory’ has significant powers of self-government, but, unlike the federacy and associated state relationships, the central government typically plays an active role in some areas of its internal government, such as internal security, judicial matters, and economic and monetary matters.
- 14 Many special autonomous regions do not meet the 150,000 population criterion. They are, in descending order of population (latest year available, usually 2006): Aosta Valley (123,978) (Italy); Ceuta (76,861) and Melilla (66,871) (Spain); Greenland (57,100) and Faroe Islands (48,500) (Denmark); Northwest Territories (42,425), Nunavut (31,127), and Yukon (31,115) (Canada); and Åland Islands (26,711) (Finland). The following special autonomous regions meet the criterion: Australian Capital Territory and Northern Territory (Canada); Corsica (France); Friuli-Venezia-Giulia, Sardinia, Sicily, Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol (Italy); Vojvodina and Kosovo (until 1998) (Serbia); Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales (UK); and Alaska (until 1958), Hawaii (until 1958) and Washington, DC (USA).

### 3 Validating the regional authority index

- 1 Ray (2007) and Bollen (1989) distinguish four types of validity. In addition to the two mentioned types they identify criterion validity and construct validity. Criterion validity ‘involves the comparison of a measure with some other generally accepted measure of the same concept’ (Ray 2007: 12). A given measure is compared to a ‘golden standard’. Since there is no ‘golden standard’ for decentralization, criterion validity cannot be assessed. Construct validity ‘assesses whether a measure relates to other observed variables in a way that is consistent with theoretically derived predictions’ (Bollen 1989: 188). Construct validity is not assessed because theoretically derived predictions relating to the effects of regionalization and decentralization are imprecise.

- 2 The dataset from which the Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) scores are derived was kindly provided by Christine A. Kearney.
- 3 Seventeen country scores were provided by Brancati (2006) herself (i.e. Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Canada, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the UK, and the USA). Twenty-three countries were scored by the author on the basis of information provided by Brancati in personal communication.
- 4 Vertical decentralization is operationalized as the number of tiers in a country (Treisman 2002: 5, 14). The Pearson correlation with the RAI is 0.546 ( $p < 0.01$ ;  $n = 38$ ). Appointment decentralization is conceptualized as the extent to which executive appointments are made by actors at the same (or lower) tier, rather than from above ('for each appointment that was made by an actor at a higher tier, one point is assigned for each tier that the appointer was above the appointee'; *ibid.*: 17). Electoral decentralization is operationalized as the extent to which subnational officials are elected ('percentage of subnational tiers at which the executive was chosen by direct election or selected by a directly elected legislature'; *ibid.*: 18). Appointment and electoral decentralization appear to have affinity with the representation dimension of the RAI, i.e. 'executive' and 'assembly', respectively. The Pearson correlations are low:  $-0.144$  (not significant;  $n = 38$ ) and  $0.215$  (not significant;  $n = 39$ ), respectively. Fiscal decentralization is the share of subnational government in total tax revenues or the share of subnational government in public expenditures. Both are fiscal indicators and, as argued below, raise important concept validity concerns. Personnel decentralization is the share of subnational governments in total government administration employees. The Pearson correlation between this indicator and the RAI is  $0.562$  ( $p < 0.01$ ;  $n = 32$ ).
- 5 The decision to sum three types of decision-making decentralization is ours. Treisman is reluctant to combine the various measures of decentralization into a single index. For example, he noted that 'the right of subnational actors to interfere in central legislative decisions will not necessarily coincide with their autonomy from central interference, so it makes more sense to use [the] different types of indicators separately than to combine them' (Treisman 2002: 9–10). This is a defensible position: theoretically or empirically, it is perfectly possible that these different decentralization rights do not coincide. Our starting point is that decentralization is a multifaceted phenomenon which is best captured by combining measures of diverse components. The RAI differentiates between self-rule and shared rule, and these concepts resemble Treisman's notions of subnational autonomy from central interference and subnational actors' right to interfere in central legislative decisions, respectively. Just as the RAI is a summation of self-rule and shared rule, it seems sensible to combine the two indicators of decision-making decentralization into a single measure.
- 6 The operationalization of central fiscalization diverges somewhat from the one published in Woldendorp *et al.* (2000). The adjustments were made after communication with Hans Keman and Jaap Woldendorp.
- 7 'No regional tier': whether the country has a regional tier or not (0 = country has a regional tier; 1 = country has no regional tier – e.g. Cyprus, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, and Slovenia). 'Federal–non-federal': whether the country has been a federal or a non-federal country for the largest part of the post-Second World War period (since becoming democratic) (0 = non-federal country; 1 = federal country – e.g. Australia, Austria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Canada, Germany, Russia, Serbia-Montenegro, Switzerland, and the USA).
- 8 Countries that scored 1 point: Australia (territories versus states), Belgium (*gemeenschappen* versus *gewesten*), Canada (territories versus provinces), Denmark (the Faroes and Greenland versus *amter*), Finland (*Åland*), Italy (*regioni a*

*statuto speciale* versus *regioni a statuto ordinario*), Portugal (the Azores and Madeira), Spain (Ceuta and Melilla; historic *comunidades autónomas* versus the other *comunidades*), the UK (Northern Ireland, London Regional Authority, Scotland, and Wales versus regions) and the USA (Alaska, Hawaii, and Washington, DC, versus states).

- 9 The cut-off point of having regionalized is to have had an absolute change of at least 10 in the RAI country score over the post-Second World War period. The following countries meet this criterion: Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, and the UK. Since most changes involve more autonomy, we call this variable ‘regionalized’, though for the UK there are almost as many ‘negative’ as positive changes (because of the suspension of the parliament of Northern Ireland and the abolition of the counties in Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales, and parts of England). This does not need to concern us, since the variable should indicate whether there is difference cross-sectionally and over time. Differences increase the likelihood of disagreement.
- 10 Dataset from Treisman (2002).
- 11 The upper chamber with *län* representation was abolished in 1971, and the RAI score decreases for subsequent time periods. Therefore, the time points 1990 and 2000 do not lead to a case of disagreement.
- 12 The distinction between the authority to decide and the authority to implement is based upon Braun’s ‘Right to Decide’ and ‘Right to Act’, respectively. ‘The Right to Decide refers to who may decide *what* will be done (policy formulation and decision-making). The Right to Act refers to who may decide on *how* it will be done (policy implementation)’ (Braun 2000: 29; original emphasis).
- 13 Swedish counties (*län*) were represented in an upper chamber before the 1971 parliamentary reform. The data reflect the 1972–2001 period.
- 14 The following countries were considered to be federal: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Russia, Spain, Switzerland, and the USA. Excluding Belgium and Spain from the federal group does not lead to different conclusions (one-way ANOVA analysis:  $n = 35$ ;  $F: 1.85, p = 0.182$ ).

#### 4 An era of regionalization

- 1 Currently, the five largest *Länder* in Germany have two additional regional levels (*Regierungsbezirke* and *Kreise*) while smaller *Länder* have at most just one additional regional level.
- 2 For the 21 countries for which we have data since 1950, the standard deviation in 1950 is 8.9, and in 2006 it is 8.5. The mean score in 1950 is 9.3 and in 2006 it is 13.5.
- 3 Category shifts took place in Belgium, which went from unitary to federal, and Serbia-Montenegro, which went from federal to confederal. Spain and Italy abandoned the unitary category, but do not qualify as federal because the national government can unilaterally reform regional authority.
- 4 Two partial exceptions are the UK, where counties were merged with local authorities to create large-scale unitary authorities, and Germany, where *Regierungsbezirke* were abolished in Rhineland-Palatinate (1999), Saxony-Anhalt (2003), and Lower Saxony (2004).
- 5 In a four-country study of local elite preferences on decentralization, De Vries (2000) finds that country size is the strongest predictor of a general positive attitude towards decentralization.
- 6 This list is derived from an expert survey of optimal jurisdictional scale undertaken by the authors. See also Amin and Thrift (1995); Crouch *et al.* (2001); Keating (1995); Piattoni (2010: ch. 2).
- 7 Intellectual mindsets can be sticky too. Reviewing the history of federal studies,

Watts recounts how federalism was described among leading scholars in the decades before and after the Second World War as an 'outmoded form of government', a view that had probably been shaped by A. V. Dicey's authoritative anti-federalism statements in his work on comparative constitutionalism of the 1880s. In 1939, Laski pronounced: 'I infer in a word that the epoch of federalism is over' (Laski 1939: 367). The rigidity, legalism, and conservatism of federations made them ill-equipped to deliver the kind of positive government action required under modern capitalism. Sir Ivor Jennings, a British constitutionalist and adviser to the British government in establishing several new federations within the Commonwealth, opined that 'nobody would have a federal constitution if he could possibly avoid it' (1953, quoted in Watts 2007: 3).

- 8 The exception is the retrenchment of policy competencies for *respubliki* and *subwekty federacji* under President Putin.
- 9 This follows Deutsch's conception of culture as a

common set of stable, habitual preferences and priorities in men's attention and behavior, as in their thoughts and feelings. Culture and community can be used interchangeably because they discuss a single complex of processes. When we say culture, we stress the configuration of preferences or values; when we say community we stress the aspects of communication.

(Deutsch 1953: 89)

- 10 The notion that cultural difference underpins jurisdictional design has a long pedigree in political sociology, beginning with Plato and Aristotle, both of whom conceived the community as the basis for the polity. Stein Rokkan emphasizes the cultural basis of resistance to centralization:

The peripheral predicament arises out of the syndrome of cultural identity and territorial identity, a syndrome that over the centuries has been constantly under pressure from central policies of standardization and regulation. While political mobilization and the desire for political autonomy may incorporate some degree of concern with economic problems of distribution, the latter is not a necessary component.

(Rokkan and Urwin 1983: 135)

Similarly, Deutsch argues that nationalist conflict results when central elites fail to assimilate newly mobilizing groups into the dominant culture. Assimilation is more difficult under rapid social mobilization and a culturally distinct periphery. Smith attributes ethnic minority activism after the Second World War to the effect of modern state policy on pre-existing embedded minority cultures:

The latter have not been entirely forgotten among the relevant people themselves; they remain embedded in separate folklore, customs, myths and symbols. State intervention, literacy and civic culture, and mass education and the mass media tend to rekindle these memories and regenerate these ancient cultures in new forms.

(Smith 1992: 62).

Erk (2008) hypothesizes that, since the war, political institutions have been reformed in congruence with cultural communities because class and religion have declined as cleavage markers and because language is decisive in mass democracies.

- 11 Hence, the standard deviation of population across regional jurisdictions in a country reflects the historical weights of functional and communal pressures.
- 12 Violent claims making cannot explain the trend towards regionalization (Newman 1996). With the exception of ex-Yugoslavia, violent regionalism/separatism

has declined from the 1970s in Catalonia, Corsica, Northern Ireland, Sardinia, Trento-Adige/Südtirol, and the Basque Country.

- 13 The plan put forward by the government-appointed plenipotentiary proposed a regional map that sought to accommodate the concerns of the SMP that the Hungarian minority be concentrated in one or two regions. It was rejected when one of the coalition partners (SDL) defected and endorsed the alternative, much less Hungarian-friendly, plan proposed by the opposition.
- 14 In Belgium, the socialist party in Wallonia and, to a lesser extent, the Christian democrats in Flanders are *super-pivots*: they are pre-eminent in their region and, at the same time, hard to elide in federal coalitions. State-wide political parties are entirely lacking in Serbia-Montenegro and Belgium, and regional parties are predominant in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Some regional parties are dominant in their own region and consequently difficult for the national government to ignore.

When in some regions one party clearly dominates the game, the federal logic gives that party a double role. It becomes then at the same time the regional governing party, linked to the regional electorate, and the party that can speak for the region in the horizontal and vertical intergovernmental relationships.

(Deschouwer 2003: 221)

The Party Québécois, the CSU in Bavaria, and the CiU in Catalonia have been in this position.

- 15 In multilevel systems, regional and national coalition politics are rarely independent (Deschouwer 2003; Downs 1998). Regional parties can gain or lose influence over reform agendas as their pivot position at one or the other level waxes or wanes. An example of this is the leftist and independentist Catalan ERC's fate in the 2006 reform of the autonomy statute for Catalonia. Riding on its senior role in the Catalan coalition government with the socialists and a small green party, it was able to present itself as the key party in the investiture vote for Zapatero's minority PSOE government in 2004. The ERC lent its support in return for Zapatero's consent in reforming Catalonia's autonomy statute, but opposition in the PSOE to the ERC's tough demands for fiscal autonomy forced Zapatero to abandon his partner and negotiate a less radical reform with the Catalan CiU. The ERC not only lost control over the reform (it wound up campaigning, in vain, against its adoption), it was also ousted from the regional coalition (Stefuriuc 2009). Electoral rules can intensify the interplay and create opportunities for autonomist entrepreneurs to push their reform agenda. In Belgium, simultaneous elections for federal and regional governments combined with the absence of national parties led to 'the two campaigns, voting behaviour, the results and then coalition formation . . . collapse into one' (Deschouwer 2003: 223). This encouraged electoral outbidding on the reform of the Belgian state.
- 16 An alternative hypothesis is that dictators centralize to extract rents (Alesina and Spolaore 2003: 217; Olson 1993). For the most part, the rent-maximizing hypothesis generates the same expectations as the survival hypothesis set out in this chapter, but there are some differences. The rent-maximizing hypothesis assumes that a dictator will squash a regional movement when it is economically expedient to do so, while the survival hypothesis assumes that a dictator will squash a regional movement if it threatens his power base.
- 17 Fear that an independent Quebec would face higher trade barriers with the North American market has been a powerful disincentive for some Quebecois to vote in favour of independence, and opponents of Quebec sovereignty have used it actively in their campaigns.
- 18 Extending shared rule to special autonomous territories faces the additional hurdle of gaining the assent of existing regional governments. Canadian provinces

were fine with seeing the Northwest Territories, the Yukon and Nunavut rule their own affairs, but bristled when the federal government wanted to give them equal access to intergovernmental negotiations.

- 19 Accordingly, reform in federal regimes is biased to the creation and empowerment of special autonomous regions.
- 20 Similarly, post-colonial federations were established to manage the tension between community self-rule and scale efficiency in the production of public goods. In these cases, the communities were thrown together less by external threat than by their shared subjugation to a colonial power (Watts 1966; for a recent evaluation, see Amoretti and Bermeo 2004).
- 21 Prussian bureaucrats pushed for federalization to economize tariff collection, the most important source of income for nineteenth-century German states. A Prussian official who calculated the minimal state size for efficient tariff extraction concluded that only ten of 35 German states were large enough. The solution was to collect tariffs at a higher tier: ‘For officials in the [Prussian] Ministry of Finance an expanded territorial unit was the path of least resistance to public finance stability’ (Ziblatt 2006: 49).
- 22 Remnants of *län* identity persist. A small Sjukvårdpartit emerged in the 1990s in Norrbotten around demands for hospital services at the *län* level.
- 23 Regional tiers in eight countries were given increased fiscal autonomy. Interestingly, this includes three with large regional economic disparities and strongly entrenched communities: Italy, Spain, and Belgium.
- 24 The shape of the S-curve will vary over time in response to the policy portfolio, the technology of communication and control, and the cost of an additional level of government.
- 25 Belgium, which hovered just under the S-curve in 1950, nevertheless increased its RAI score by 14.1 over the following 56 years. Identity rather than functional pressures appears to be responsible for this.
- 26 In the long run, the causality may run in both directions – that is to say, a government may strengthen the collective identity of the population it encompasses and suppress minority identities.
- 27 The *policy* hypothesis is that individuals with different ethno-cultural traditions desire heterogeneous mixes of public goods, such as education, welfare, and economic policy (Alesina and Spolaore 2003). The *self-government* hypothesis is that individuals sharing ethno-cultural norms desire self-rule on intrinsic grounds (e.g. Keating 1998b; Loughlin 2000). While the validity of these hypotheses varies across space and time, we suspect that the self-government hypothesis is the more powerful in the presence of ethno-cultural groups.
- 28 In an unpublished paper analysing cross-sectional data for 166 countries, Treisman (2002) finds that democracy is correlated with several indicators of decentralization, but notes that economic development, not democracy, may explain the association. Our data, which are longitudinal, allow us to examine post-democratic reform when economic development does not change much, and the results are consistent with the notion that democracy has an independent effect.
- 29 Riker (1996: 9) writes:
 

it is worthwhile recalling that only in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have federations been a widely used constitutional form. . . . And this is surprising because this era has also been an era of nationalism when the nation-state, the sovereign political organization of the people, is approved of.

**Appendix A**

- 1 The criterion to categorize a subnational government as regional is an average population of 150,000, which follows the dividing line between regional and local government used in *nomenclature d'unités territoriales statistiques*, a widely used geocode standard for referencing the administrative divisions of countries for statistical purposes. This criterion is relaxed for special autonomous regions, such as Greenland. When we write that a 'constitution enumerates federal legislative powers in trade and commerce', we are using the term 'powers' to refer to formal authority. This convention is common in constitutions.

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