

## France

### *Self-rule*

#### INSTITUTIONAL DEPTH AND POLICY SCOPE

France has three tiers of regional governance, thirteen *régions* (regions), ninety-six *départements* (departments), and thirty-three intermunicipal collaborations consisting of twenty-two *métropoles* and eleven *communauté urbaines*. Since 1982, there is one autonomous region, *Corse* (Corsica) (C 1958, Art. 72). The capital *Ville of Paris* has a special status since 1968 and between 2015 and 2016 three *métropoles* (*Aix-Marseille-Provence*, *Lyon*, and *Grand Paris*) obtained a special statute.<sup>1</sup>

The *départements* have long-standing administrative competences in education, environment, health care, and city and regional planning (Cole 2006; Council of Europe: France 1998; OECD: France 2006). Before 1982, each was headed by a *préfet de département* (prefect), appointed by the central state (Law No. 10/1871; Tarrow 1974). Hence, *départements* were both decentralized authorities and deconcentrated divisions of the state (OECD: France 2006; Dupuy 1985; Hayward 1983; Schmidt 1990a).<sup>β</sup> After a reform in 1982, most executive powers of the *préfet* were transferred to the *président* of the elected *conseil général* (Council of Europe: France 1998; De Montricher 2000; Law No. 213/1982, No. 8/1983, and No. 663/1983). The *préfet* is now responsible mainly for mandating the legality of *département* actions (De Montricher 2000).

Recent reforms shifted competences from the *départements* to the *régions*: harbours in 2016 and non-urban transport, school transport, departmental roads and public colleges in 2017 (Council of Europe: France 2016; Law No. 991/2015). In addition, *départements* can make agreements with *métropoles* (discussed below) to transfer competences in youth and elderly, roads, economic development, tourism, and sports facilities from the *département* to a *métropole*. Most *départements* remain responsible for secondary schools, roads, and the promotion of territorial cohesion and they assist municipalities and intermunicipal groupings (OECD 2017: 136–137).<sup>2</sup> *Départements* score 2 on institutional depth and 1 on policy scope until 1981, 2 from 1982–2016, and 1 as of 2017.<sup>β</sup>

The special status for the capital *Ville de Paris* was introduced in 1968 when a law declared that there would be one assembly (*Conseil de Paris*) for the municipality and the *département*.<sup>3</sup> The law also established twenty municipal districts (*arrondissements*) within Paris (Law No. 707/1964, Art. 2; implemented in 1968). Instead of a mayor, Paris was ruled by a centrally appointed prefect (*préfet*). This changed in 1977, when Jacques Chirac was directly elected as the first mayor after more than 180 years (Law No. 1331/1975). However, a centrally appointed *préfet*

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<sup>1</sup> France's four overseas regions (*régions/départements d'outre mer*) are not included (see Hintjens, Loughlin, and Olivesi (1994) for a historical overview of regionalization).

<sup>2</sup> A discussion on the abolition of the *départements* was postponed to 2020 (OECD 2017: 131).

<sup>3</sup> As of 1 January 2019, all the institutions of the *département* and the *Ville de Paris* were merged (Law No. 257/2017).

*de police* remains responsible for the local police (Council of Europe: France 2000, 2016).

In 1955, twenty-two *circonscriptions d'action régionale* (planning regions) were set up as part of a top-down economic strategy (Law No. 873/1955). Initially, these regions were purely administrative categories, but after 1964 they were headed by a *préfet de région* (prefect) who coordinated public investment decisions within a national economic plan. The *préfet* was assisted by an advisory body (*Commission de développement économique régionale*) composed of officials from national ministries, socio-economic elites (e.g. from trade unions and chambers of commerce), and local politicians (Sauviat 2017: 158–167; Simmons 1971). A reform in 1972 renamed the *circonscriptions* as *régions*, and gave them legal status, a limited budget with some autonomous taxation power, limited competences in regional development, and regional consultative councils composed of representatives of *départements* and local governments in the *région* as well as national parliamentarians (Cole 2006; Council of Europe: France 2016; Law No. 619/1972; Loughlin 2008). The regional councils could only advise and the centrally appointed *préfet* exercised legislative and executive powers.

Regionalization was deepened considerably with the Defferre reforms of 1982 and 1983, which established directly elected regional assemblies with accountable regional *présidents* (De Montricher 2000; Keating 1983; Law No. 213/1982; No. 8/1983; No. 663/1983). *Régions* gained authority over education (excluding tertiary education), career training, planning and economic development, urban planning, the environment, and transport (Cole 2006; Council of Europe: France 1998; OECD 2006). The reforms went into effect in 1986 after the first regional elections.<sup>4</sup> However, as with *départements*, central state deconcentration lingered alongside regional authority (De Montricher 2000; Douence 1994; Loughlin 2008; Smyrl 2004).<sup>β</sup> The post of regional *préfet* was scaled back rather than abolished, thus creating a two-headed regional executive (OECD: France 2006; Sauviat 2017: 158–167; Schmidt 1990a, b).

The constitutional reform of 2003 established the principle of subnational devolution (Law No. 276/2003). Legislation in the following year consolidated regional competences in vocational training, secondary schools and school transport, regional and town planning, rail transport, the environment, and culture (Law No. 809/2004; OECD: France 2006). A reform effective since 1 January 2016 reduced the number of *régions* from 22 to 13 (Law No. 29/2015) and they were made responsible for regional development plans (including applying for and the management of EU funds), regional waste plans, departmental roads, and public colleges (Council of Europe: France 2016; Law No. 991/2015).

*Corse* became a separate region in 1975 with the same limited authority as mainland *circonscriptions*. In 1982, four years ahead of the rest of France, a special statute (*statut particulier*) gave *Corse* the status of a *région* with directly exercised competences, a budget, a directly elected assembly (rather than a council), and an executive elected by the assembly (Law

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<sup>4</sup> Regionalization was regulated by specific laws for different categories of regions: the twenty ordinary regions; *Île-de-France* with a very similar statute but with slightly more extensive powers and resources; the four overseas regions of Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Martinique and Réunion; and Corsica which received a *statut particulier* (Douence 1994).

No. 214/1982; Loughlin and Daftary 1999; Serrano 2016). As in other regions, executive power is shared with a government-appointed *préfet*. In 1991 its special statute was deepened when *Corse* was recognized as a *collectivité territoriale spécifique* (special territory) (Hintjens, Loughlin, and Olivesi 1994; Serrano 2016). *Corse* was granted extensive powers around two pillars: economic, social, and cultural development; and preservation of Corsican identity and environment (Daftary 2008; Law No. 428/1991; Loughlin and Daftary 1999; Serrano 2016). Corsican self-rule was strengthened further in 2002, when it gained additional state subsidies and some enhanced authority (beyond that of other *régions*) over education, culture, the environment, agriculture, housing, transport, and social policy (Law No. 92/2002).<sup>a</sup> These do not include authority for local government, regional political institutions, police, immigration and citizenship, or residual powers. In addition, Corsica obtained the authority to amend national decrees (but not national legislation) that affects regional competences (Daftary 2008: 293–298; Serrano 2016). The latest reform effective from 1 January 2018 merged the institutions of the *région* and the two *départements* of Haute-Corse and Corse-du-Sud (Law No. 991/2015, Art. 30; OECD 2017: 136).<sup>5</sup> *Corse* scores 2 on policy scope from 1982 onwards.

France has a wide variety of different forms of inter-municipal collaboration. In 2011, there were 2,599 inter-municipal communities involving 35,041 municipalities (Council of Europe: France 2016; *Direction générale des collectivités locales* 2011). The *Chevènement* law (Law No. 586/1999) systematized these collaborations into three forms of inter-municipal cooperation which differ with regard to population size and the competences they may exercise<sup>6</sup>: *communauté de communes* (community of communes) meant for rural municipalities and small cities, *communautés d'agglomération* (agglomeration communities) which should include more than 50,000 inhabitants and a city of at least 15,000 inhabitants, and *communautés urbaine* (urban communities) with over 250,000 inhabitants (the population threshold was 500,000 inhabitants

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<sup>5</sup> We do not include the population size of *Corse* when calculating a country score for *départements* as of 2018.

<sup>6</sup> Since the systematization of intermunicipal collaboration with the *Chevènement* law (Law No. 586/1999) there are two forms of intercommunal cooperation (*établissements publics de coopération intercommunale*, EPCI), one with and one without taxing powers. The first form comprises *métropoles*, *communautés urbaines*, *communautés d'agglomération*, and *communautés de communes* and, in 2001, they numbered 2,599 and they are further discussed in the main text. The EPCI without taxing powers include three types of *syndicats*. A *syndicat intercommunal à vocation unique* (introduced in 1890; Law No. 22 mars/1890) is responsible for one task. *Syndicats intercommunal à vocation multiple* (introduced in 1959; Law No. 29/1959) can take up on behalf of the member municipalities multiple competences such as water, sanitation, waste disposal, economic development, electricity, environment, and tourism (Council of Europe: France 2016; OECD 2006). *Syndicats mixtes* (introduced in 1935; Décret du 30 October 1935) combine municipalities and their groupings and can also involve different levels of public authorities (*syndicate mixte fermé*) as well as legal entities of public law such as chambers of commerce (*syndicate mixte ouvert*). All types of *syndicats* do not have councils or separate executives and can be conceived as voluntary collaborations between municipalities (*Direction générale des collectivités locales* 2011; Kerrouche 2010).

before 2011) (Council of Europe: France 2000; Law No. 1563/2010 and No. 58/2014).<sup>7</sup> In 2011, a fourth form of inter-municipal cooperation was introduced, the *métropole* (metropolis).<sup>8</sup> Any territory which involves more than 400,000 inhabitants located in an urban area with more than 650,000 inhabitants must be transformed into a *métropole*. In addition, other territories with more than 400,000 inhabitants in which a regional capital is present or which are at the center of an ‘employment zone’ (*zone d’emploi*) with more than 400,000 people may request to become a *métropole* (Law No. 58/2014, Art. 5217-1). The average population sizes of *communauté de communes* and *communautés d’agglomération* are below the threshold of 150,000 inhabitants.<sup>9</sup> *Communautés urbaine* (urban communities) and *métropoles* (metropolises) meet the population threshold. In 2018, the average population size for the eleven *communautés urbaine*<sup>10</sup> is around 217,000 and the average population size for the twenty-two *métropoles* is around 865,000.<sup>11</sup> Collectively, *communautés urbaine* and *métropoles* involve 1,486 municipalities and close to 22 million inhabitants which is a third of the total population.

The first *communautés urbaine* of Bordeaux, Lille, Lyon, and Strasbourg were established in 1967 (Law No. 1069/1966), and they were followed by Creusot Montceau in 1970, Le Mans in 1972, and Brest in 1973 (Kerrouche 2010). Additional *communautés urbaine* were established during the late 1990s when a national law made it possible to transform *districts* (districts)<sup>12</sup> into *communautés urbaine* (Law No. 1350/1995) and during the 2000s with the *Chevènement* reform

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<sup>7</sup> Many municipalities collaborated through districts (*district intercommunalité*) between 1959 and 2002, through *comunautés de villes* between 1992 and 2002, or through *syndicat d’agglomération nouvelle* between 1984 and 2016 (Law No. 30/1959, No. 1297/1970, No. 125/1992, and No. 636/1983; OECD 2006). With the *Chevènement* reform all districts had to transform into a *communauté de communes*, a *communauté d’agglomération*, or a *communauté urbaines* (Kerrouche 2010; Law No. 586/1999 and No. 991/2015). *Communautés urbaines* which do not meet the population threshold of 250,000 but which have been established before the 2011 reform retain their status (Law No. 1563/2010).

<sup>8</sup> In addition to *métropoles*, the law also introduced *pôles métropolitain* which are public institutions through which *métropoles*, *communautés urbaines*, *communautés d’agglomérations* and *communautés de communes* as well as *départements* and *régions* can collaborate on regional development and which may include any matter that lies within the competences of the members (Law No. 1563/2010). We do not code *pôles métropolitain* because these constitute voluntary collaborations between various forms of intercommunal collaborations and regional governments (i.e. they are similar to *syndicates mixtes*, see footnote 6).

<sup>9</sup> The 191 *communautés d’agglomération* include 3,290 municipalities and around 23.4 million inhabitants which means an average of about 123,000 inhabitants per *communautés d’agglomération*. The 2,387 *communauté de communes* cover 31,298 municipalities and around 27.4 million inhabitants which means an average of about 11,500 inhabitants per *communauté de communes* (Council of Europe: France 2016; Direction générale des collectivités locales 2011).

<sup>10</sup> Three *communautés d’agglomération*—Le Havre Seine, Limoges, and Grand Besançon—will become *communautés urbaine* as of 1 January 2019.

<sup>11</sup> The average population size is around 575,000 when 7.1 million inhabitants of the *Métropole du Grand Paris* are not included.

<sup>12</sup> See footnote 7.

(Law No. 586/1999). Many inter-municipal collaborations started as *communauté de communes*, then developed into a *communauté d'agglomération* and subsequently into a *communauté urbaine*. Some developed further into a *métropole*.<sup>13</sup> The first *métropole* was established in 2012 and others followed after the adoption of a law in 2014 (Law No. 58/2014).

By law, some municipal competences are obligatory shifted upwards to the *communauté urbaine* (Kerrouche 2010; Law No. 586/1999). These competences include tourism, spatial planning, slaughterhouses, public buildings, crematoria and cemeteries, housing, roads, parks, transport, sanitation and water, environmental protection, and waste disposal. In addition, *communautés urbaines* can receive any other competence with the approval of the participating municipalities and social assistance can be shifted to the *communauté urbaine* in agreement with the *département* (Law No. 586/1999).

The first *métropole* was established in 2012 and was followed by eleven in 2015, three in 2016, three in 2017, and four in 2018. *Métropoles* have a wider range of competences than *communautés urbaine* (OECD 2017: 135). A *métropole* receives from the member municipalities responsibility for social policy, economic planning and development, environment, energy, water, housing, cultural and sports institutions, tourism, urban transport, and waste disposal. By agreement with the *département*, a *métropole* can assume competences in youth and elderly, roads, economic development, tourism, and sports facilities (Protière, 2012; Law No. 1563/2010 and No. 58/2014). Furthermore, *régions* can transfer their competences in high school buildings and regional economic development to the *métropole* and the central state can delegate competences in social housing to the *métropole* (Law No. 58/2014). We score *communautés urbaines* 1 and *métropoles* 2 on policy scope.<sup>β</sup>

Three *métropoles* have a special statute: *Métropole d'Aix-Marseille-Provence*, the *Métropole de Lyon*, and the *Métropole du Grand Paris* (Law No. 58/2014, Arts. 12–14 and No. 1212/2015). A unique element in the governance structure of these *métropoles* is that there are two advisory councils: a metropolitan conference of mayors (*conférence de la métropolitaine des maires*) and a development council (*conseil de développement*) with representatives from economic, social and cultural associations. In addition, the *Métropole d'Aix-Marseille-Provence* and the *Métropole du Grand Paris* are subdivided into respectively six and twelve territories (*territoires*).<sup>14</sup> Territorial

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<sup>13</sup> We include inter-municipal collaborations into the country score during their life-span as *communauté urbaine* and/or *métropole*. Although the number of member municipalities and the total population sizes for *communautés urbaines* have varied over time we take the population size of 2016 when we calculate country scores. This overestimates the amount of regional authority for previous time periods but the overestimation is limited considering that the ‘capital’ and the largest municipalities have been members from the inception of a *communauté urbaine* and considering that the other member municipalities often have very small population sizes. Ninety-five per cent of over 36,000 French municipalities have fewer than 5,000 inhabitants, eighty-six per cent have less than 2,000 inhabitants, and only 39 municipalities have more than 100,000 inhabitants (Council of Europe: France 2016). The overestimation does not occur for *métropoles* because these have been established in 2012 or later.

<sup>14</sup> The capital city *Ville de Paris* with a special statute is a member municipality of the *Métropole du Grand Paris*.

councils consist of delegates from the municipal councils from within the territory and each territorial council elects a *président* and one or more *vice-présidents*.<sup>15</sup> *Métropole d'Aix-Marseille-Provence* stands out because this *métropole* has assumed all the competences of the *département du Rhône* (OECD 2017: 135).<sup>16</sup> The three *métropoles* with a special statute are similarly coded as the other *métropoles* on all dimensions.

## FISCAL AUTONOMY

The central government collects all taxes and sets their base. The list of subnational taxes has changed considerably over time but *communautés urbaine*, *métropoles*, *départements*, and *régions* (since 1982) have always been able to set the rate on a minor tax (Garello 2016: 133–155).

Fiscal autonomy for *communautés urbaine* and *métropoles* is largely the same and they can set the rate for a self-employment tax, a resident tax, and a waste disposal tax (Council of Europe: France 2000, 2016; *Direction Générale des Finances Publiques* 2017; *Territoires Conseils, Caisse des dépôts et consignations* 2017). The rate of property tax is set in addition to or in replacement of the rate applied by the participating municipalities (Law No. 58/2014; Protière, 2012).

*Départements* and the *Ville de Paris* can set the rate for self-employed tax, mining dues, town planning tax, electricity tax, gambling tax, and, since 1983, motor vehicle tax (Council of Europe: France 1998; Law No. 10 août/1871, Art. 58; No. 8/1983, Art. 99; Négrier and Nicolas 2014: 86–87; Prud'Homme 2006b).<sup>a</sup> *Ville de Paris* can also set the rates of communal taxes such as property and real estate taxes.

Since 1972 *régions* have been able to set the rate for self-employment tax and, since 1983 (and in conjunction with *départements*) motor vehicle tax (Council of Europe: France 1998; Law No. 619/1972, Art. 17; No. 8/1983, Art. 99; Prud'Homme 2006b). But tax autonomy was de facto absent because the regional councils could only provide advice to a centrally appointed *préfet* who exercised fiscal autonomy.<sup>a</sup> The 1982 reform changed this. Moreover, the reform transferred to the regions the option to set the rate (but not the base) of a housing tax based on rental income, two property taxes based on the official market value of buildings and land, and a business tax based on the value added (Gilbert 1994: 40–41; Garello 2016: 113–115). The business tax was abolished in 2010 and, instead, *régions* receive a share of value added tax as of 2018. *Régions* score 0 until 1981 and 1 from 1982 onwards.

Corsica is subject to the same rules as *régions*, except that setting the rate of motor vehicle tax is an exclusive regional competence. Corsica also receives special development grants, which are

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<sup>15</sup> The territorial boundaries of the *territoires* overlap with those of the member inter-municipal collaborations which were subsumed into the *métropole*. The councils of *territoires* are established to give the municipalities which were formerly part of an inter-municipal collaboration an opportunity to adopt their own policies. *Territoires* exercise competences delegated by the metropolitan council which can be revoked or assigned by a simple majority in the metropolitan council from the 2020 municipal elections onwards.

<sup>16</sup> We do not include the population size of *Métropole d'Aix-Marseille-Provence* when calculating a country score for *départements*.

unilaterally determined by the central government, and Corsican residents benefit from lower rates on a range of national taxes, including income tax, VAT, corporate tax, and inheritance tax.

## BORROWING AUTONOMY

Borrowing by intermediate governments is heavily regulated. Most importantly, intermediate governments are required to balance their current budgets and may borrow only to finance long term capital investment (Garello 2016: 117–123; Gilbert and Guengant 2002; Joumard and Kongsrud 2003; *Territoires Conseils, Caisse des dépôts et consignations*, 2017).

Before 1982, *départements*, *Ville de Paris*, and *communautés urbaine* required prior authorization by the *préfet* (Harloff 1987: 55; Mény 1987).<sup>a</sup> *Départements* and *Ville de Paris*, and *communautés urbaine* could borrow only from state-owned institutions such as the *Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations* (Deposits and Consignments Fund) or the *Caisses d'Épargne* (Saving Banks) and only for sums decided by the ministry of finance on a project-by-project basis (Prud'Homme 2006b: 109–110).

Until 1982, the regional councils could give advice to a centrally appointed *préfet* who exercised borrowing powers.<sup>a</sup> *Régions* score 0 until 1982.

Following the 1982 reforms all the budgets of *régions*, *départements*, *Ville de Paris*, *communautés urbaine*, and *métropoles*, including their borrowing plans, must be transmitted to the *préfet* (Council of Europe 1997; Council of Europe: France 1998; Garello 2016: 117–123; Sauviat 2017: 190–191). The *préfet*, who is appointed by the central government, reviews the legality of the proposal and may request an audit from the *Chambres Régionales des Comptes* (Regional Audit Office), set up in 1982 (Law No. 213/1982, Art. 9). If the audit reveals a current account deficit, the *Chambre Régionale des Comptes* can propose appropriate fiscal measures (Joumard and Kongsrud 2003). This amounts to post hoc control though in practice regions and departments have escaped this form of constraint (Gilbert 1994). *Corse* is subject to the same rules as the *régions*.

## REPRESENTATION

The *conseil général* of a *département* is directly elected every six years on a three-year rotation (Law No. 10 août/1871, Art. 12). Since 1982 the *président* has been elected by the *conseil général* and presides over the executive. There is also a government-appointed departmental *préfet* who, since 1982, has been primarily responsible for post hoc legal oversight (Council of Europe: France 2016; De Montricher 2000; Law No. 213/1982, Art. 34; Négrier and Nicolas 2014: 74–78; Sauviat 2017: 179–182). The *départements* score 2 on assembly and 0 on executive until 1982, when they score 1.

The *conseil général* of *Ville de Paris* is directly elected every six years. A centrally appointed prefect (*préfet*) held executive power until the first directly elected mayor took office in 1978.

The council of the *communauté urbaine* was indirectly elected by the municipal councils of the member municipalities until a reform effective in 2014 established direct elections to be held every six years except for the representatives of communes with less than 1,000 inhabitants for which

the mayor and/or the deputy mayor are *ex officio* members (Law No. 1563/2010, Art. 9). The council of the *communauté urbaine* elects its own chair. A centrally appointed *préfet* reviews the legality of the decisions made by the *communauté urbaine* and we code this as dual executive.

Once established, there is a transition period during which *métropoles* have an indirectly elected assembly consisting of delegated representatives from the municipalities residing within the *métropole*. The *métropole* council is directly elected from the 2020 municipal election onwards. The councils elect their own president (*président*) who heads the executive office (Law No. 403/2013). A centrally appointed *préfet* reviews the legality of the decisions made by the *métropole* and this we code as dual executive.

From 1964 each *région* had a centrally appointed *préfet* (Simmons 1971). In 1972 parliament introduced indirectly elected *conseils régionaux* (regional councils) which were composed of nationally elected politicians from the region alongside representatives from subnational governments. The regional executive was headed by a government appointed *préfet* (Law No. 619/1972, Art. 21–1). From 1982 the regional council elects its own *président*, and from 1986 the council is popularly elected on a six-year cycle (Law No. 213/1982). The regional *préfet* remains responsible for post hoc legal oversight and some limited policy tasks (Council of Europe: France 2016; De Montricher 2000; Loughlin 2008).

*Corse* has had direct assembly elections and an executive elected by the assembly since 1982 (Law No. 214/1982, Art. 3–26; Loughlin and Daftary 1999). As in other regions, executive power is shared with a government appointed *préfet*.

### *Shared rule*

*Régions, départements, Ville de Paris, communautés urbaine, and métropoles* have no power sharing and the special autonomous region of *Corse* has limited power sharing.

## LAW MAKING

Although the French constitution states that the *Sénat* shall ensure the representation of the territorial entities of the republic (C 1958, Art. 24), *régions, départements, communautés urbaine, and métropoles* are not units of representation. Senators are indirectly elected by a college of 150,000 *grands électeurs* (elected officials), including mayors, city councilors, and national assembly deputies who convene by *département*. *Départements* are allocated seats in rough proportion to their population. In 2004, the term for senators was reduced from nine years to six. According to the constitution, the upper house has the same powers as the lower house. However, when the *Sénat* and the *Assemblée nationale* cannot agree on a bill, the government can refer the final decision to the *Assemblée* (C 1958, Art. 45). The 1982 reforms gave the assembly of *Corse* the right to consult the government or be consulted on all matters concerning the island (*L5*) (Law No. 214/1982; Loughlin and Daftary 1999). The revised special statute of 1991 loosens the requirement for mandatory consultation by stating that the French prime minister may consult the Corsican assembly on draft laws or decrees which directly affect it (Daftary 2008; Law No.

428/1991; Loughlin and Daftary 1999). The Corsican assembly can still initiate legislation and request special consideration of its situation (Daftary 2008; Law No. 92/2002, Art 1.V; Serrano 2016). *Corse* retains a score of 0.5 on bilateral consultation on law making (L5).

#### EXECUTIVE CONTROL

Formal executive control for *régions*, *départements*, *communautés urbaine*, and *métropoles* is virtually non-existent, though the French practice of *cumul des mandats*—combining an elected mandate in local or regional government with a national mandate—has provided a channel for regional influence on national policy making (Cole 2006; Loughlin and Seiler 2001; Thoenig 2005).

There are no regular intergovernmental meetings between the Corsican executive and the national government.

#### FISCAL CONTROL

*Régions*, *départements*, *communautés urbaine*, *métropoles*, and *Corse* do not have fiscal control.<sup>17</sup>

#### BORROWING CONTROL

*Régions*, *départements*, *communautés urbaine*, *métropoles*, and *Corse* do not have borrowing control.

#### CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

*Régions*, *départements*, *communautés urbaine*, and *métropoles* do not have a role in constitutional reform.

The Corsican statute of 1982 gives the assembly the right to consult the government or be consulted on all matters concerning Corsica (Loughlin and Daftary 1999). This right was reinforced in the 2002 Law (Law No. 92/2002, Art. 1.V). The assembly can propose amendments to its statute, which are transmitted to the French prime minister or their representative in *Corse* for consideration (Law No. 92/2002, Art. 1.III). Corsican regional actors have no veto power.

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<sup>17</sup> There is some limited input for subnational governments on the distribution of the tax revenues collected by the central government through the committee for local finances which is consulted by the central government on matters related to transfers from the central state to local government. This committee is composed of 32 elected representatives from the assemblies of the municipalities, *départements* and *régions* plus 11 members appointed by the central government (Garello 2016: 128).

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## Self-rule in France

			Institutional depth	Policy scope	Fiscal autonomy	Borrowing autonomy	Representation		Self-rule
							Assembly	Executive	
Départements	I	1950-1963	2	1	1	1	2	0	<b>7</b>
	I → II	1964-1981	2	1	1	1	2	0	<b>7</b>
	II	1982-2016	2	2	1	2	2	1	<b>10</b>
	II	2017-2018	2	1	1	2	2	1	<b>9</b>
Ville de Paris	II	1968-1977	2	1	1	1	2	0	<b>7</b>
	II	1978-1981	2	1	1	1	2	2	<b>9</b>
	II	1982-2018	2	2	1	2	2	2	<b>11</b>
Communauté urbaine	III	1967-1981	2	1	1	1	1	1	<b>7</b>
	III	1982-2013	2	1	1	2	1	1	<b>8</b>
	III	2014-2018	2	1	1	2	2	1	<b>9</b>
Métropoles	III	2012-2018	2	2	1	2	1	1	<b>9</b>
Régions	I	1964-1971	1	0	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>
	I	1972-1981	1	0	0	0	1	0	<b>2</b>
	I	1982-1985	2	2	1	2	1	1	<b>9</b>
	I	1986-2018	2	2	1	2	2	1	<b>10</b>
Corse	I	1975-1981	1	0	0	0	1	0	<b>2</b>
	I	1982-2018	2	2	1	2	2	1	<b>10</b>

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## Shared rule in France

		Law making						Executive control		Fiscal control		Borrowing control		Constitutional reform		Shared rule	
		L1	L2	L3	L4	L5	L6	M	B	M	B	M	B	M	B		
Communauté urbaine	1967-2018	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
Métropoles	2012-2018	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
Départements	1950-2018	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
Ville de Paris	1968-2018	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
Régions	1964-2018	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
Corse	1975-1981	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
	1982-2018	0	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	<b>2.5</b>

National legislature has: L1 = regional representation; L2 = regional government representation; L3 = majority regional representation; L4 = extensive authority; L5 = bilateral regional consultation; L6 = veto for individual region. Total for shared rule includes the highest score of either multilateral (M) or bilateral (B).

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