

Online Appendix

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Explanatory and confirmatory factor analyses

This appendix presents the results of two principal factor analyses that assess the question in how far the six survey items displayed in Table 2 measure citizen's preferences for regional authority, self-rule and shared rule. The first factor analysis includes all six items (regional authority; Table A1a), the second factor analysis includes items 1, 2, and 3 (self-rule; Table A1b) and the third factor analysis includes items 4, 5, and 6 (shared rule; Table A1c). The factor analyses are run for all and each of the eight countries separately. In all exploratory factor analyses one latent factor was retained that had an eigenvalue of above 1.

A Cronbach alpha of above 0.70 is generally considered to indicate a sufficiently reliable measurement. The Cronbach alpha's for regional authority meet that criterion but those for self-rule and shared rule do not although they come close. However, the factor analyses on self-rule and shared rule perform better regarding the item factor loadings (above 0.60) and explained variances (above 50%). Together these results indicate that the six survey items tap reasonably well on one latent variable (regional authority) as well as on two different but related latent variables, i.e. preferences for self-rule (items 1-3) and preferences for shared rule (items 4-6).

A confirmatory factor analysis provides additional evidence (Figure A1). The main difference between an explanatory and a confirmatory factor analysis is that the researcher imposes the latent structure –i.e. preferences for self-rule and shared rule– rather than leave the number of latent structures or dimension up for empirical investigation. A benefit of a confirmatory factor analysis is that the method allows for covarying latent structures, i.e. the latent structures of self-rule and shared rule are related to each other and one can estimate the extent of co-variance between the two dimensions.

The overall model fit is good. Li-tze and Bentler (1999) and Brown (2006: 81-88) propose a cut off value close to 0.95 for the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) and they note that values less than 0.08 for the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) suggests adequate model fit. The model yields a CFI of 0.967, a TLI of 0.938, and a RMSEA of 0.067 (Figure A1). The confirmatory factor analysis also reveals that preferences for self-rule and for shared rule are highly correlated and the estimated co-variance is 0.92. The factor loadings are a bit lower in comparison to the exploratory factor analysis. This may indicate that the survey items are a bit distant from the latent variables self-rule and shared rule. However, all factors loadings are above 0.49 which equally suggests that each of the survey items reliably taps into self-rule and shared rule.

Further empirical evidence that the six survey items tap into diffuse regime support regarding regional government is provided by Brown et al. (2018) who find that citizens' responses on these items remain stable across the first (2016) and second (2017-2018) waves of the survey. They also show that satisfaction with the current system or democracy and trust in federal, state, and local governments do not associate with these six survey items. In other words, the survey items do not merely capture transient attitudes towards the present regime or reactions to current events.

Table A1a. Exploratory factor analysis on six survey items tapping into preferences for regional authority.

Survey item	ALL	AUS	BEL	CAN	FRA	GER	SWI	UK	USA
1	0.73	0.75	0.74	0.71	0.72	0.62	0.72	0.73	0.74
2	0.63	0.64	0.74	0.58	0.69	0.52	0.48	0.59	0.65
3	0.61	0.68	0.75	0.61	0.66	0.51	0.43	0.72	0.73
4	0.73	0.73	0.81	0.73	0.70	0.72	0.70	0.70	0.67
5	0.58	0.58	0.77	0.52	0.63	0.69	0.68	0.59	0.51
6	0.67	0.62	0.64	0.65	0.71	0.59	0.72	0.67	0.71
N respondents	4930	955	512	627	586	583	567	531	569
Eigenvalue	2.62	2.68	3.30	2.44	2.82	2.26	2.40	2.68	2.72
% explained	44%	45%	55%	41%	47%	38%	40%	45%	45%
Cronbachs alpha	0.73	0.75	0.84	0.70	0.77	0.65	0.67	0.74	0.75

Table A1b. Exploratory factor analysis on three survey items tapping into preferences for self-rule.


Survey item	ALL	AUS	BEL	CAN	FRA	GER	SWI	UK	USA
1	0.75	0.80	0.79	0.74	0.77	0.66	0.59	0.81	0.81
2	0.75	0.74	0.81	0.69	0.77	0.75	0.78	0.71	0.67
3	0.74	0.71	0.82	0.73	0.72	0.71	0.76	0.74	0.81
N respondents	4930	955	512	627	586	583	567	531	569
Eigenvalue	1.68	1.69	1.94	1.55	1.71	1.49	1.53	1.69	1.76
% explained	56%	56%	65%	52%	57%	50%	51%	56%	59%
Cronbachs alpha	0.60	0.61	0.73	0.53	0.62	0.50	0.52	0.61	0.64

Table A1c. Exploratory factor analysis on three survey items tapping into preferences for shared rule.

Survey item	ALL	AUS	BEL	CAN	FRA	GER	SWI	UK	USA
4	0.80	0.81	0.84	0.79	0.79	0.80	0.77	0.80	0.75
5	0.71	0.62	0.85	0.65	0.69	0.75	0.79	0.61	0.67
6	0.74	0.72	0.72	0.72	0.76	0.72	0.77	0.77	0.73
N respondents	4930	955	512	627	586	583	567	531	569
Eigenvalue	1.69	1.55	1.95	1.56	1.68	1.73	1.80	1.60	1.54
% explained	56%	52%	65%	52%	56%	58%	60%	53%	51%
Cronbachs alpha	0.60	0.51	0.73	0.52	0.60	0.63	0.67	0.54	0.51

Notes: Shown are the results of three principal factor analyses on three different sets of survey items for eight countries. For each analysis only factor was retained with an eigenvalue larger than 1. The total number of respondents is 4,930. See Table 2 for the wording of the survey items.

Figure A1. Measurement model of self-rule and shared rule.




Notes: shown are the results of a structural equation model which estimates the latent constructs of self-rule and shared rule according to six survey items (see Table 2). The constants for the items are not shown and the variance of self-rule and shared rule are set at 1. Log likelihood = -36,835; number of respondents = 4,930; RMSEA = 0.067; CFI = 0.967; TLI = 0.938.

References

- Brown, A. J., Jacob Deem, and John Kincaid (2018) 'Federal attachment and popular trust & confidence: Lessons from the International Constitutional Value Survey (Mark 2),' paper presented at the 25th World Congress of Politics Science of the International Political Science Association, Brisbane, Australia, July 2018.
- Brown, Timothy A. (2006) *Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Applied Research*. New York: The Guildford Press.
- Li-tze, Hu and Peter M. Bentler (1999) 'Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives,' *Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal* 6 (1): 1-55.

Descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables

Figure A2. Distributions of the preference scores.



Notes: Shown are the proportion of respondents (N = 4,930) across the preference scores for regional authority, self-rule, and shared rule.

Table A2. Citizen preferences for regional authority, self-rule, and shared rule by country.

Country	regional authority		self-rule		shared rule		N respondents
	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	
Australia	0.59	0.19	0.59	0.22	0.60	0.21	955
Belgium	0.51	0.25	0.50	0.27	0.52	0.28	512
Canada	0.65	0.18	0.66	0.20	0.64	0.20	627
France	0.62	0.20	0.62	0.22	0.62	0.21	586
Germany	0.62	0.18	0.51	0.22	0.72	0.20	583
Switzerland	0.66	0.17	0.57	0.23	0.75	0.19	567
United Kingdom	0.60	0.20	0.60	0.23	0.60	0.22	531
United States	0.67	0.19	0.70	0.22	0.63	0.21	569
Total	0.61	0.20	0.59	0.23	0.63	0.22	4930

Notes: Shown are the average and standard deviation of citizen preferences for regional authority, self-rule, and shared rule for eight countries. Scores vary between very undesirable (= 0) to very desirable (= 1). See Table 2 for the construction of the indicators.

Table A3. Variance decomposition of citizen preference scores for regional authority, self-rule, and shared rule.

Preference for		Constant	Variance components			Log-likelihood
			Countries	Regions	Respondents	
Regional authority	estimate	0.617	0.0017	0.0005	0.0381	1024
	95% conf. interval	0.588	0.0006	0.0002	0.0366	
		0.647	0.0050	0.0010	0.0397	
Self-rule	estimate	0.594	0.0040	0.0006	0.0510	309
	95% conf. interval	0.549	0.0014	0.0002	0.0490	
		0.639	0.0111	0.0016	0.0531	
Shared rule	estimate	0.640	0.0038	0.0008	0.0451	602
	95% conf. interval	0.596	0.0014	0.0004	0.0434	
		0.683	0.0108	0.0014	0.0470	

Notes: The estimates are derived by running a multilevel regression model on preference scores for 4,930 respondents clustered by 142 regions which are subsequently clustered into 8 countries. See Table 1 for the included regions and countries and see Table 4 for the construction of preference scores.

Table A4. Variance decomposition of citizen preference scores for regional government and for intergovernmental transfers.

Preference for		Constant	Variance components			Log-likelihood
			Countries	Regions	Respondents	
regional government	estimate	1.960	0.031	0.014	1.196	-7466
	95% conf. interval	1.831	0.010	0.006	1.149	
		2.089	0.097	0.031	1.244	
intergovernmental transfers	estimate	2.000	0.021	0.014	0.757	-6346
	95% conf. interval	1.892	0.007	0.007	0.727	
		2.109	0.065	0.028	0.788	

Notes: The estimates are derived by running a multilevel regression model on preference scores for 4,930 respondents clustered by 142 regions which are subsequently clustered into 8 countries.

Table A5. Descriptive statistics.

Variable	Mean	Median	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
Preference for regional government	1.94	2	1.11	0	4
Preference for interregional fiscal transfers	1.98	2	0.89	0	3
Preference for regional authority	0.61	0.61	0.20	0	1
Preference for self-rule	0.59	0.67	0.23	0	1
Preference for shared rule	0.63	0.67	0.22	0	1
Regional-level control variables					
Self-rule score	14.27	15.0	3.59	5	18
Shared rule score	7.03	7.5	4.07	0	12
Differentiated region	0.17	0	0.38	0	1
Language region	0.19	0	0.39	0	1
Donor region	0.42	0	0.49	0	1
Regional economy	1.01	0.96	0.23	0.63	3.29
Individual-level control variables					
Gender	0.43	0	0.50	0	1
Age category	2.90	3	1.36	1	5
University education	0.38	0	0.49	0	1
Income category	2.54	2	1.11	1	4
Political interest	2.76	3	0.84	1	4
Left-right placement	6.39	6	2.47	1	11
Relative trust	0.07	0	0.73	-3	3
Satisfaction with democracy	2.74	3	0.80	1	4

Notes: The total number of respondents is 4,930.

Robustness tests

Table A6. Robustness Table 6: OLS and including region dummies.

	Preference for regional government			Preference for fiscal transfers			Preference for regional government			Preference for fiscal transfers		
	beta	s.e.	sig.	beta	s.e.	sig.	beta	s.e.	sig.	beta	s.e.	sig.
Preference for regional authority	0.717	0.080	***				1.007	0.063	***			
Preference for self-rule				0.632	0.084	***				0.358	0.066	***
Preference for shared rule				0.063	0.090					0.659	0.070	***
Regional-level control variables												
Self-rule score	0.424	0.571		0.436	0.571		-0.558	0.445		-0.564	0.445	
Shared rule score	-0.688	0.903		-0.714	0.902		0.945	0.704		0.958	0.704	
Differentiated region	4.011	5.299		4.088	5.292		-4.345	4.129		-4.386	4.127	
Language region	0.346	0.650		0.425	0.649		-1.199	0.506	**	-1.241	0.506	**
Donor region	0.421	1.225		0.517	1.224		-1.791	0.955	*	-1.843	0.954	*
Regional economy	-2.149	2.151		-2.153	2.148		1.388	1.676		1.390	1.675	
Individual-level control variables												
Gender	0.145	0.032	***	0.148	0.032	***	-0.003	0.025		-0.004	0.025	
Age category	0.038	0.011	***	0.039	0.011	***	-0.005	0.009		-0.005	0.009	
University education	0.000	0.034		-0.001	0.034		-0.043	0.026		-0.042	0.026	
Income category	-0.004	0.015		-0.004	0.015		-0.088	0.011	***	-0.088	0.011	***
Political interest	-0.050	0.019	**	-0.048	0.019	**	0.044	0.015	***	0.043	0.015	***
Left-right placement	-0.010	0.006		-0.010	0.006		-0.055	0.005	***	-0.055	0.005	***
Relative trust	0.238	0.022	***	0.237	0.022	***	0.030	0.017	*	0.031	0.017	*
Satisfaction with democracy	-0.112	0.021	***	-0.112	0.020	***	0.026	0.016		0.026	0.016	
Constant	1.777	1.287		1.734	1.285		3.572	1.003	***	2.234	0.189	***
Region dummies	Included			Included			Included			Included		
R-squared	0.091			0.094			0.137			0.138		
Root MSE	1.060			1.059			0.826			0.826		

Notes: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Shown are the results of an OLS regression model including 4,930 respondents. The models include dummies for 142 regions. Preferences for regional government vary from 0 (no regional government) to 4 (region should become an independent nation). Preferences for fiscal transfers from rich to poor regions vary from 0 (strongly disagree) to 3 (strongly agree).

Table A7. Robustness Table 6: Multilevel ordinal logit specification.

	Preference for regional government						Preference for fiscal transfers					
	OR	s.e.	sig.	OR	s.e.	sig.	OR	s.e.	sig.	OR	s.e.	sig.
Preference for regional authority	3.896	0.824	***				6.748	1.822	***			
Preference for self-rule				3.821	0.877	***				1.866	0.557	**
Preference for shared rule				0.977	0.236					3.672	1.136	***
Regional-level control variables												
Self-rule score	1.018	0.068		1.017	0.068		0.967	0.096		0.967	0.096	
Shared rule score	1.097	0.058	*	1.087	0.058		1.000	0.059		1.006	0.059	
Differentiated region	0.636	0.186		0.671	0.198		1.388	0.579		1.357	0.567	
Language region	1.343	0.268		1.302	0.262		0.543	0.128	**	0.547	0.129	**
Donor region	1.097	0.139		1.082	0.138		0.766	0.117	*	0.770	0.118	*
Regional economy	0.845	0.212		0.837	0.210		1.369	0.443		1.376	0.446	
Individual-level control variables												
Gender	1.318	0.119	***	1.327	0.120	***	1.151	0.134		1.152	0.134	
Age category	0.974	0.031		0.979	0.031		0.913	0.038	***	0.912	0.038	**
University education	1.229	0.117	**	1.231	0.118	**	0.885	0.107		0.886	0.107	
Income category	1.044	0.042		1.046	0.042		0.797	0.042	***	0.796	0.042	***
Political interest	0.841	0.046	***	0.846	0.046	***	0.907	0.062		0.906	0.062	
Left-right placement	0.962	0.017	**	0.961	0.017	**	0.848	0.019	***	0.848	0.019	***
Relative trust	1.407	0.084	***	1.402	0.084	***	1.016	0.076		1.019	0.076	
Satisfaction with democracy	1.149	0.065	**	1.146	0.064	**	1.368	0.096	***	1.369	0.096	***
Constant	0.718	0.695		0.835	0.813		28.60	40.95	**	26.43	37.88	**
Country dummies	Included			Included			Included			Included		
Variance region	0.020	0.019	**	0.022	0.020	**	0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000	
Wald Chi ²	257		***	264		***	283		***	284		***
Log likelihood	-1847			-1842			-1214			-1213		

Notes: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Shown are the results (odd ratios; OR) of a multilevel ordinal logit model including 4,930 respondents clustered by 142 regions. Preferences for regional government vary from 0 (no regional government) to 4 (region should become an independent nation). Preferences for fiscal transfers from rich to poor regions vary from 0 (strongly disagree) to 3 (strongly agree).

Table A8a. Robustness Table 6: Exclusion of one country at a time; preferences for regional government.

Excluded country	Australia			Belgium			Canada			France		
	beta	s.e.	sig.	beta	s.e.	sig.	beta	s.e.	sig.	beta	s.e.	sig.
Preference for self-rule	0.55	0.09	***	0.62	0.09	***	0.67	0.09	***	0.62	0.09	***
Preference for shared rule	0.05	0.10		0.06	0.09		0.03	0.09		0.10	0.09	
Regional-level control variables												
Self-rule score	-0.02	0.03		-0.01	0.03		-0.02	0.03		-0.02	0.02	
Shared rule score	0.06	0.02	***	0.05	0.04		0.06	0.02	***	0.06	0.02	***
Differentiated region	0.02	0.12		0.01	0.11		0.00	0.16		-0.01	0.11	
Language region	0.07	0.06		0.07	0.07		0.06	0.07		0.08	0.07	
Donor region	0.07	0.05		0.07	0.05		0.07	0.05		0.08	0.04	*
Regional economy	-0.19	0.09	**	-0.14	0.10		-0.18	0.09	*	-0.07	0.10	
Individual-level control variables												
Gender	0.15	0.03	***	0.17	0.03	***	0.15	0.03	***	0.16	0.03	***
Age category	0.08	0.01	***	0.03	0.01	***	0.04	0.01	***	0.04	0.01	***
University education	0.00	0.04		-0.02	0.03		0.00	0.04		-0.01	0.04	
Income category	0.00	0.02		0.00	0.01		-0.01	0.02		-0.01	0.02	
Political interest	-0.04	0.02	*	-0.05	0.02	**	-0.06	0.02	***	-0.05	0.02	***
Left-right placement	0.00	0.01		-0.01	0.01	*	-0.01	0.01	*	-0.01	0.01	
Relative trust	0.24	0.02	***	0.24	0.02	***	0.24	0.02	***	0.24	0.02	***
Satisfaction with democracy	-0.12	0.02	***	-0.13	0.02	***	-0.12	0.02	***	-0.10	0.02	***
Constant	1.91	0.42	***	2.02	0.39	***	2.03	0.46	***	1.84	0.39	***
Country dummies	Included			Included			Included			Included		
Variance region	0.000	0.000	**	0.003	0.003	**	0.002	0.002	**	0.001	0.002	**
Variance respondent	1.093	0.025	***	1.053	0.023	***	1.142	0.025	***	1.117	0.024	***
Wald Chi2	411		***	439		***	460		***	416		***
Log likelihood	-5817			-6390			-6394			-6406		
N regions	134			139			132			121		
N respondents	3,975			4,418			4,303			4,344		

Notes: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Shown are the results of a multilevel regression models whereby respondents are clustered within regions. Each model excludes respondents and regions from one country. Preferences for regional government vary from 0 (no regional government) to 4 (region should become an independent nation).

Table A8a. Robustness Table 6: Exclusion of one country at a time; preferences for regional government. *Continued.*

Excluded country	Germany			Switzerland			United Kingdom			United States		
	beta	s.e.	sig.	beta	s.e.	sig.	beta	s.e.	sig.	beta	s.e.	sig.
Preference for self-rule	0.58	0.09	***	0.66	0.09	***	0.56	0.09	***	0.59	0.09	***
Preference for shared rule	0.07	0.09		0.03	0.10		0.14	0.09		0.17	0.09	*
Regional-level control variables												
Self-rule score	-0.02	0.03		-0.02	0.03		-0.02	0.09		-0.02	0.03	
Shared rule score	0.06	0.02	***	0.06	0.02	***	0.06	0.03	**	0.06	0.02	***
Differentiated region	0.00	0.11		-0.02	0.11		0.00	0.12		0.00	0.11	
Language region	0.08	0.07		0.11	0.08		0.08	0.07		0.08	0.06	
Donor region	0.09	0.05	*	0.06	0.05		0.08	0.05	*	0.07	0.05	
Regional economy	-0.16	0.10		-0.11	0.09		-0.16	0.10		-0.09	0.10	
Individual-level control variables												
Gender	0.14	0.03	***	0.16	0.03	***	0.15	0.03	***	0.14	0.03	***
Age category	0.03	0.01	***	0.03	0.01	***	0.03	0.01	**	0.03	0.01	***
University education	0.00	0.04		0.00	0.04		-0.02	0.04		0.00	0.04	
Income category	-0.01	0.02		-0.02	0.02		-0.01	0.02		0.00	0.02	
Political interest	-0.05	0.02	**	-0.06	0.02	***	-0.06	0.02	***	-0.05	0.02	**
Left-right placement	-0.01	0.01		-0.01	0.01		0.00	0.01		-0.01	0.01	*
Relative trust	0.26	0.02	***	0.24	0.02	***	0.25	0.02	***	0.24	0.02	***
Satisfaction with democracy	-0.12	0.02	***	-0.12	0.02	***	-0.10	0.02	***	-0.12	0.02	***
Constant	2.01	0.40	***	2.00	0.40	***	1.92	1.50		2.16	0.20	***
Country dummies	Included			Included			Included			Included		
Variance region	0.002	0.003	**	0.002	0.003	**	0.003	0.003	**	0.003	0.003	**
Variance respondent	1.109	0.024	***	1.150	0.025	***	1.100	0.024	***	1.153	0.025	***
Wald Chi2	471		***	464		***	427		***	417		***
Log likelihood	-6398			-6500			-6456			-6503		
N regions	126			118			130			94		
N respondents	4,347			4,363			4,399			4,361		

Notes: * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$. Shown are the results of a multilevel regression models whereby respondents are clustered within regions. Each model excludes respondents and regions from one country. Preferences for regional government vary from 0 (no regional government) to 4 (region should become an independent nation).

Table A8b. Robustness Table 6: Exclusion of one country at a time; preferences for fiscal transfers from rich to poor regions.

Excluded country	Australia			Belgium			Canada			France		
	beta	s.e.	sig.	beta	s.e.	sig.	beta	s.e.	sig.	beta	s.e.	sig.
Preference for self-rule	0.24	0.07	***	0.40	0.07	***	0.33	0.07	***	0.33	0.07	***
Preference for shared rule	0.72	0.08	***	0.65	0.07	***	0.70	0.07	***	0.69	0.07	***
Regional-level control variables												
Self-rule score	-0.03	0.02		-0.02	0.03		-0.01	0.02		-0.01	0.02	
Shared rule score	-0.01	0.01		0.00	0.03		-0.01	0.01		-0.01	0.02	
Differentiated region	-0.21	0.05	***	-0.19	0.05	***	-0.21	0.05	***	-0.22	0.05	***
Language region	0.27	0.1	***	0.18	0.09	**	0.15	0.12		0.23	0.09	***
Donor region	-0.06	0.04		-0.06	0.04		-0.08	0.03	**	-0.05	0.04	
Regional economy	-0.01	0.07		-0.02	0.08		0.02	0.07		-0.08	0.08	
Individual-level control variables												
Gender	0.01	0.03		-0.02	0.03		0.01	0.03		0.00	0.03	
Age category	-0.01	0.01		0.00	0.01		-0.01	0.01		-0.01	0.01	
University education	-0.05	0.03	*	-0.07	0.03	**	-0.05	0.03		-0.05	0.03	
Income category	-0.09	0.01	***	-0.08	0.01	***	-0.09	0.01	***	-0.09	0.01	***
Political interest	0.05	0.02	***	0.05	0.02	***	0.05	0.02	***	0.04	0.02	**
Left-right placement	-0.06	0.01	***	-0.05	0.01	***	-0.06	0.01	***	-0.05	0.01	***
Relative trust	0.01	0.02		0.02	0.02		0.02	0.02		0.01	0.02	
Satisfaction with democracy	0.02	0.02		0.02	0.02		0.02	0.02		0.02	0.02	
Constant	2.12	0.34		1.84	0.32	***	1.76	0.35	***	1.96	0.31	***
Country dummies	Included			Included			Included			Included		
Variance region	0.000	0.000	**	0.003	0.003	**	0.002	0.002	**	0.001	0.003	**
Variance respondent	0.698	0.016	***	0.670	0.014	***	1.142	0.025	***	0.689	0.015	***
Wald Chi2	641		***	590		***	686		***	624		***
Log likelihood	-4927			-5393			-5317			-5360		
N regions	134			139			132			121		
N respondents	3,975			4,418			4,303			4,344		

Notes: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Shown are the results of a multilevel regression models whereby respondents are clustered within regions. Each model excludes respondents and regions from one country. Preferences for fiscal transfers from rich to poor regions vary from 0 (strongly disagree) to 3 (strongly agree).

Table A8b. Robustness Table 6: Exclusion of one country at a time; preferences for fiscal transfers from rich to poor regions. *Continued.*

Excluded country	Germany			Switzerland			United Kingdom			United States		
	beta	s.e.	sig.	beta	s.e.	sig.	beta	s.e.	sig.	beta	s.e.	sig.
Preference for self-rule	0.40	0.07	***	0.44	0.07	***	0.34	0.07	***	0.43	0.07	***
Preference for shared rule	0.65	0.08	***	0.61	0.07	***	0.70	0.07	***	0.59	0.07	***
Regional-level control variables												
Self-rule score	-0.01	0.02		-0.02	0.02		0.04	0.07		-0.02	0.02	
Shared rule score	-0.01	0.02		-0.02	0.01		-0.02	0.02		-0.01	0.01	
Differentiated region	-0.16	0.06	***	-0.26	0.06	***	-0.21	0.05	***	-0.23	0.05	***
Language region	0.18	0.09	**	0.27	0.08	***	0.17	0.09	*	0.26	0.08	***
Donor region	-0.07	0.03	*	-0.02	0.03		-0.05	0.04		-0.07	0.03	**
Regional economy	0.01	0.07		-0.08	0.07		0.00	0.08		-0.08	0.07	
Individual-level control variables												
Gender	0.00	0.03		0.00	0.03		-0.02	0.03		0.00	0.03	
Age category	-0.01	0.01		-0.01	0.01		0.00	0.01		0.01	0.01	
University education	-0.03	0.03		-0.04	0.03		-0.04	0.03		-0.05	0.03	*
Income category	-0.10	0.01	***	-0.09	0.01	***	-0.09	0.01	***	-0.08	0.01	***
Political interest	0.04	0.02	**	0.05	0.02	***	0.03	0.02	*	0.04	0.02	***
Left-right placement	-0.05	0.01	***	-0.06	0.01	***	-0.06	0.01	***	-0.05	0.01	***
Relative trust	0.01	0.02		0.02	0.02		0.01	0.02		0.03	0.02	**
Satisfaction with democracy	0.01	0.02		0.02	0.02		0.03	0.02	*	0.03	0.02	**
Constant	1.86	0.31	***	1.98	0.30	***	1.07	1.17		2.00	0.14	***
Country dummies	Included			Included			Included			Included		
Variance region	0.001	0.002	**	0.000	0.000	**	0.001	0.003	**	0.000	0.000	**
Variance respondent	0.699	0.015	***	0.699	0.015	***	0.692	0.015	***	0.647	0.014	***
Wald Chi2	659		***	660		***	639		***	641		***
Log likelihood	-5392			-5409			-5435			-5238		
N regions	126			118			130			94		
N respondents	4,347			4,363			4,399			4,361		

Notes: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Shown are the results of a multilevel regression models whereby respondents are clustered within regions. Each model excludes respondents and regions from one country. Preferences for fiscal transfers from rich to poor regions vary from 0 (strongly disagree) to 3 (strongly agree).