

Buying Support for Europe: The Impact of Cohesion Funds on Regionalist Parties' Positions on European Integration

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Abstract

This chapter analyses the impact of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) on the attitudes of regionalist parties towards the process of European integration. We consider three distinct funding periods: 1989-1993, 1994-1999 and 2000-2006. Our study shows that the regionalist party family has been overwhelmingly Europhile in the first and second period, while it has shown a clear turn towards Euroscepticism in the latter period. However, the Eurosceptic turn is not linked to changes in the ERDF. In fact, we find a positive effect of the relative share of ERDF on regionalist parties' level of support for European integration. In particular, our data suggest that the ERDF has been an important facilitator for the spreading of Europhile positions in the first period analysed (1989-1993) and has represented a sort of barrier against the diffusion of Eurosceptic positions in the last period analysed (2000-2006). The migration of ERDF from Western to Central-Eastern European member-states can, therefore, further undermine the capacity of the EU to maintain the loyalty of a this small but still important party family.

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Introduction

The literature has portrayed regionalization and European integration as consistent and mutually reinforcing processes (Keating, 1995). The positive view of European integration from a regionalist perspective was mainly justified by the increasing attention devoted to the regions by European institutions, which in some cases crucially contributed the very creation of a regional tier of government (McGarry et al., 2006: 8). After the creation of the Directorate-General for Regional Policy in 1968 and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) in 1975, EU regional policy took off with the launch of the Cohesion policy in 1988, followed by the adoption of the subsidiarity principle and the establishment of the Committee of the Regions in 1993. As the most genuine political advocates of regional claims, regionalist parties were definitely interested in these changes and were affected by them. Indeed, these developments propelled the vision of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ (Keating, 1998: 176; Hepburn, 2008), generating hopes that EU institutions and policies would work in favour of regionalist parties’ self-government aims and, therefore, fostering positive attitudes towards the process of European integration. Arguably, the funds distributed to the regions via Cohesion policy represent the most substantive and tangible manifestation of the EU’s regional policy, possibly winning over the support of regionalist parties.

However, the scholarship on regionalist parties is rather divided in its evaluation and explanation of these political actors’ attitudes towards European integration. On the one hand, quantitative studies have concluded that regionalist parties are consistent and convinced supporters of European integration (Jolly, 2007). On the other hand, qualitative studies have highlighted both an instrumental approach to European integration, which leads regionalist parties to remarkable changes in their stances during their lifespan (Lynch, 1996; Nagel, 2004; Elias, 2009; Hepburn, 2010), and the presence of considerable variance amongst regionalist parties (De Winter and Gomez-Reino, 2002; Massetti, 2009).

Perhaps more importantly, some scholars have advanced the thesis that support for European integration has been on the rise amongst regionalist parties in the 1980s and 1990s, while it has considerably decreased in the 2000s (Elias, 2008; Massetti, 2009). Over the same time span, EU regional policy has drastically changed, in particular with regard to the eligibility of regions for receiving structural funds (see Chapter 1, Brunazzo). In other words, the different allocation of Cohesion policy funds to the regions could be one of the factors accounting for the variance of support for European integration that has been detected amongst regionalist parties. However, so far no systematic analysis has been conducted to investigate the link between the level of Cohesion policy funds received by regions and the level of Europeanism (or Euroscepticism) of regionalist parties. Our chapter aims to answer this unaddressed question and, in so doing, it represents an original contribution to both the regionalist party and EU politics scholarships. We also use an original dataset of 31 regionalist parties’ positioning on European integration from 1989 to 2006. This timeframe is broken down in three periods corresponding to the three waves of Cohesion policy funding – 1989-1993, 1994-1999 and 2000-2006- for which we were able to find data (Dell’Erba and Le Gallo, 2008; Dellmuth, 2011).

The next section reviews the extant literature on regionalist parties’ positioning on European integration, highlighting the analytical framework that we adopt and the main underlying hypothesis. Then we present and discuss the data, concerning both the funding of Cohesion policy and the scoring of regionalist parties’ positions on European integration, on which our analysis is conducted. The following section presents the results of the analysis, which will be further discussed and summarized in the concluding section.

Regionalist parties' positioning on European integration

European integration is a process of polity formation that, alongside the wider process of globalization and in combination with sub-state regional mobilization, has contributed to the ongoing trend of territorial restructuring (Keating, 1998). As political forces that originate from the centre-periphery cleavage, notably a legacy of processes that led to the formation of supposedly 'nation-states' (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Rokkan and Urwin, 1983), regionalist parties have a natural interest in the process of European integration and in the resulting system of multi-level governance (De Winter and Gomez-Reino, 2002). As far as the self-government ambitions of regionalist parties are concerned, two opposing views of European integration can arise. On the one hand, some regionalist parties might see the European integration process as the source of another and more remote centre of power that further limits the possibilities for authentic regional self-government (Lynch, 1998). On the other hand, European integration is seen as undermining the powers of the member-states (Hix and Lord, 1997), lowering the costs and risks of secession (Alesina and Spolaore 2003; Meadwell and Martin, 2004) and, with the adoption of a European regional policy, pushing member-states to create regional institutions that can manage the regional funds and programs (Jones and Keating, 1995; McGarry et al., 2006). In addition, European integration is seen as creating more opportunities for regionalist mobilization (Hooghe, 1995; Jeffery, 2000), and even for a direct regional engagement at the supranational level bypassing their member-state (Keating and Hooghe, 2001; Tatham, 2008).

According to the quantitative literature, the second (positive) view on European integration appears to be predominant amongst regionalist parties. Comparative cross-party family studies have shown that the regionalist party family is strongly or moderately supportive of the integration process (Hix and Lord, 1997; Hix, 1999; Marks and Wilson, 2000). Seth Jolly (2007) has concluded that regionalist parties are strongly, consistently and coherently Europhile. Qualitative studies have overall confirmed the predominance of Europhile attitudes within the regionalist party family (De Winter and Gomez-Reino, 2002; Lynch, 1998). However, this type of studies have also pointed out that several regionalist parties have adopted a rather instrumental approach on European integration, considerably changing their stances over time (Elias, 2009; Hepburn, 2010; Lynch, 1996). In addition, others have highlighted considerable variance of positioning on European integration amongst regionalist parties (Masseti, 2009), and a general trend towards less Europhile attitudes in the 2000s (Elias, 2008; Massetti, 2009).

On the bases of these findings, it makes sense to analyse what are the factors that can explain variance in attitudes towards European integration within the regionalist party family. In this respect, the main explanatory variables appear to concern linkages between different ideological or issue dimensions. Drawing on the general literature on political parties and European integration, scholars of regionalist parties have pointed out that the left-right ideology of individual regionalist parties can affect their stance on European integration (Elias, 2009: 30; Massetti, 2009: 521-522). Like for all other parties (Hooghe et al., 2002), regionalist parties adopting a radical left or a radical right ideology can be expected to be more Eurosceptic than regionalist parties adopting a centrist or mainstream (left-right) ideology. In addition, it has also been proposed that regionalist parties advocating more radical (secessionist) self-government claims can adopt a more Eurosceptic position compared to those regionalist parties that are satisfied with more moderate (autonomist/federalist) claims (Masseti, 2009: 523-524). This trend has become particularly visible in the 2000s, a period which has seen the EU engaged with a constitutionalization process which largely frustrated the expectations of the most assertive and ambitious regionalist parties. In particular, the proposal for a constitutionally recognized right of

‘internal enlargement’ (i.e. the possibility of a direct accession into the EU by regions of existing member states) did not find consideration in the Convention on the Future of Europe, and the subsequent constitutional treaties confirmed the role of the member-states as gatekeepers of regions’ involvement in EU polity making (Keating and Bray, 2006: 356).

In this chapter, however, we want to bring back at the centre of the analysis the importance of economic aid distributed by the EU to the regions via the Cohesion policy funds. While single case studies have incidentally mentioned the potential effect of structural funds on regionalist parties’ attitudes on European integration, the impact of this variable has not been systematically studied. By including this factor into our analysis we aim to investigate if regionalist parties are more Europhile when the regions in which they participate in elections receive more structural funds.

Data

Before we start our quantitative analysis, some limits on the scope of the data need to be discussed. Valid and reliable data on structural funds are notoriously difficult to obtain. We draw on two authors who have invested a lot of their resources in creating a systematic and reliable dataset on structural fund spending at the regional level. Sandy Dall’erba shared his data for 145 regions for the 1989-1993 and 1994-1999 funding periods (Dall’erba and Le Gallo 2008). This data is derived from official reports of the European Commission. Data for the 2000-2006 period for 160 regions is provided by Lisa Dellmuth who obtained the data from Commission decisions from 2000 and 2001 (Dellmuth 2011). It is important to note that the data is not comparable because it conflates committed with actual spent funds. Dellmuth’s data concerns regional transfers indicatively allocated for the programming period 2000-2006 which “reflects the outcome of the negotiation process between the Commission, central government and regional governments at the outset of the programming period” (2011: 1022-23). Dall’erba’s data concerns total payments. However, for the 1994-1999 period it also includes “the commitments taken during this period, but that have not been paid yet” (Dall’erba and Le Gallo 2008: 228). In addition, the data collected by the Commission were gathered using different methodologies for each funding period and several obstacles were encountered during the data collection process (for an overview see Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies and Ismeri Europa 2015: 26-30).

Despite these caveats one can still make good use of the data. In the analyses below we will not compare directly over time (i.e. does an increase in ERDF spending induce regionalist parties to adopt more Europhile positions?) and we will analyse the three funding periods separately. In addition, for each funding period, we divide the funding data by the total population size of a region (data obtained from Eurostat) and we calculate a ratio between regional ERDF funding per capita and national ERDF funding per capita. Additionally, we take the logarithm of this relative ratio since there are few outliers in terms of receiving much more ERDF funding relative to the country average (the analyses presented below are not affected when the outliers are excluded).

The coding schemes, the data on regionalist parties positioning on three dimensions - European integration, left-right, and centre-periphery- and also the control variables introduced in the ordered logit regression model presented below come from Massetti and Schakel (2015). As far as positions on European integration are concerned, regionalist parties are coded either as *Eurosceptic* or *Integrationist* or *Federalist*. Eurosceptic regionalist parties either want their region not to be part of the European Union or they resist any further step towards integration. Integrationist regionalist parties are Europhile parties which support the European integration project but are not in favour of the creation of a federal European state.

Federalists are the most Europhile parties, as they would like to see the European Union to develop into a federation. The Europhile category, therefore, includes both integrationists and federalists. We have coded 30 parties (see appendix) that have participated in national elections during three funding periods (1989-1993, 1994-1999, and 2000-2006) yielding a total of 73 observations. In order to link ERDF funding data to positions on Europe we need to define the ‘region’ of the regionalist party. This is not a trivial task when regionalist parties’ definition of their ‘core region’ encompasses multiple institutional regions and they participate in elections in more than one (institutional) region (e.g. the *Lega Nord* (LN) and *Partei des Sozialismus* (PDS)). For these parties we took the region in which the party won most vote share in national elections.

Analysis

First, we explore the relationship between structural funds and regionalist parties’ positions on European integration in a descriptive manner. In table 1 we cross tabulate positions on Europe across the three funding periods. Overall, regionalist parties emerge as a Europhile party family, with less than a quarter observations being Eurosceptic and more than a third being in favour of the creation of a European federal state (column ‘Total’). As mentioned in the introduction, EU Cohesion policy has changed over time in particular with regard to the eligibility of regions for receiving ERDF. This may have not only affected the allocation of structural funds across countries but also across regions within countries. We have calculated the ratio between regional and national per capita ERDF whereby a ratio larger (smaller) than 1 indicates that a region receives more (less) per capita ERDF than the country average. Indeed, in our dataset, the medians of the ratio between regional and national per capita ERDF are 0.91, 0.67, and 0.41 for respectively the funding periods 1989-1993, 1994-1999, and 2000-2006. The corresponding averages for the three funding periods are respectively 1.63, 1.30, and 1.00. Clearly, regionalist parties can be found in regions which over time have received less ERDF in relative terms.

Table 1: regionalist party positions on European integration according to funding period.

Position on Europe	1989-1993		1994-1999		2000-2006		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Eurosceptic	3	12.5	4	16.7	11	44.0	18	24.7
Integrationists	9	37.5	8	33.3	12	48.0	29	39.7
Federalists	12	50.0	12	50.0	2	8.0	26	35.6
Total	24	100	24	100	25	100	73	100

Notes: Cramer’s V = 0.532; Kendall’s tau-b = -0.35; ASE = 0.09.

From table 1 we can clearly observe that in the 2000s many regionalist parties reversed course and became Eurosceptic. Overall, a majority of 56 per cent of the positions is still Europhile but during the 1990s 50 per cent of the positions were federalist whereas this number reduced to 8 per cent for the 2000s. The percentage of integrationist positions increased from 30 plus per cent to 48 per cent but the largest growth has occurred for the Eurosceptic camp: from below 17 per cent during the 1990s to 44 per cent in the 2000s. Despite a growing overall budget for European structural funds –also for Western European

Union member states (see chapter XX)- our data show a clear Eurosceptic turn among regionalist parties.

Before we turn to a multivariate analysis in order to see whether ERDF funding induces regionalist parties to be more Europhile we need to consider variables that may also impact on EU positioning of regionalist parties. One important factor to consider is linkage between positions on the left-right dimension and positions on European integration. In table 2 we cross-tabulate positions on the left-right and European dimensions. In consideration of what we already know from the established literature on political parties' positioning on European integration (Hooghe et al., 2002), table 2 clearly shows that regionalist parties do not behave differently from other party families. Radical left and radical right parties are unequivocally Eurosceptic. The closer to the center on the left-right dimension the more Europhile a regionalist party tends to be: Eurosceptic positions reduce from 100 to 21 and to 3 per cent when one moves from the radical ends to the center. Table 2 reveals strong ideological linkages and this is an important observation because it shows that the Eurosceptic turn observed in table 1 may have happened without any connection to structural fund spending in the region.

Table 2: regionalist party positions on European integration according to left-right position.

Position on Europe	Radical left and right		Mainstream left and right		Centrist		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Eurosceptic	10	100.0	7	21.2	1	3.3	18	24.7
Integrationists	0	0.00	13	39.4	16	53.3	29	39.7
Federalists	0	0.00	13	39.4	13	43.3	26	35.6
Total	10	100	30	100	30	100	73	100

Notes: Cramer's V = 0.51; Kendall's tau-b = -0.41; ASE = 0.10.

In table 3 we present the results of an ordered logit model with EU positions as a dependent variable (1 = Eurosceptic; 2 = Integrationist; 3 = Federalist). Our main variable is relative per capita ERDF funding which we log (natural). We introduce funding period dummies in order to control for possible time dependent effects (1989-1993 is the reference category) and we include interaction effects between ERDF spending and the funding period dummies for possible differential effects of ERDF across time periods. The most important control variable is left-right radicalism (see table 2).

We present the results of three models. Model 1 is our preferred model whereas the two other models are robustness checks. In model 2 we exclude regionalist parties which take up radical left or radical right positions because the results of ordered logit models tend to be less reliable when there are 'empty cells' between categorical variables (see table 2). In model 3 we include a number of control variables which could impact on EU positions (linkage to center-periphery dimensions: secessionists may be more Eurosceptic than autonomist parties; regional government: regionalist parties which have office responsibility at regional level may be more Europhile; vote share national elections: larger parties may be more Europhile; regional language index: when there is a minority in the region which speaks a different language than the rest of the country a regionalist party may be more Europhile because of EU language policies; relative economic position: regionalist parties in affluent

regions may be more Europhile because they see the development of an internal market not as a threat).

From table 3 we can clearly observe that the structural funds variable is statistically significant and positive across the three models which warrants the conclusion that structural fund spending is positively associated with Europhile regionalist parties. In other words, there is a higher probability that one may find Europhile regionalist parties in regions which receive more ERDF funding relative to the national averages.

In order to ease interpretation of the effects of structural fund spending on positions on European integration we estimate change in probabilities of European positions when ERDF funding goes from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean (i.e. -0.33 ± 1.09 ratio ERDF natural log). This change reflects an increase from 0.24 to 2.14 in the ratio between regional and national per capita ERDF. The estimates are based on the results of model 1 in table 3 and we calculate changes in probabilities for the three categories on left-right radicalism separately given the strong linkage between left-right and European integration positions. The changes in probabilities are displayed in table 4.

Table 3: structural funding and regionalist party positions on European integration.

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Beta	s.e.	Beta	s.e.	Beta	s.e.
Structural Funds (SF)	1.28**	0.47	0.92*	0.42	1.29*	0.51
1994-1999 dummy	0.08	0.32	0.14	0.31	0.09	0.34
2000-2006 dummy	-2.10**	0.60	-2.16**	0.69	-2.30**	0.77
SF*1994-1999 dummy	-0.57	0.54	-0.41	0.45	-0.75	0.52
SF*2000-2006 dummy	-0.77	0.52	-0.31	0.54	-0.91	0.54
Left-right radicalism	-2.10**	0.51	-1.01	0.64	-2.30**	0.58
Centre-periphery position					-0.04	0.37
Regional government					0.14	0.51
Vote share national election					-0.03	0.03
Regional language index					-0.05	0.31
Relative economic position					-0.01	0.04
Cut 1	-6.25**	1.23	-5.00*	1.27	-8.15*	4.14
Cut 2	-3.45**	0.96	-1.80	1.02	-5.24	3.81
Log pseudolikelihood	-55		-50		-54	
Wald chi	31**		17*		35**	
Pseudo R ²	0.30		0.20		0.31	

Notes: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$. Shown are the results of an ordered logit model with European positions of regionalist parties as a dependent variable: 1 = Eurosceptic; 2 = Integrationist; 3 = Federalists. The total number of observations is 73 and standard errors are clustered for 30 parties. Model 2 excludes radical left and radical right parties and ten observations and five parties are dropped (see table 2).

Table 4: structural funding and regionalist party positions on European integration for three funding periods.

L-R Position	EU position	1989-1993			1994-1999			2000-2006		
		Low	High	Change	Low	High	Change	Low	High	Change
Center	Eurosceptic	0.09	0.01	-0.08**	0.04	0.01	-0.03	0.21	0.08	-0.13*
	Integrationist	0.53	0.08	-0.44**	0.36	0.11	-0.24	0.60	0.51	-0.09
	Federalists	0.39	0.91	0.52**	0.61	0.88	0.27	0.19	0.41	0.22*
Mainstream	Eurosceptic	0.44	0.05	-0.39**	0.24	0.06	-0.18	0.68	0.41	-0.27*
Left&Right	Integrationist	0.49	0.40	-0.09	0.60	0.47	-0.13	0.29	0.51	0.22*
	Federalists	0.07	0.56	0.48**	0.16	0.47	0.31	0.03	0.08	0.05*
Radical	Eurosceptic	0.86	0.28	-0.58**	0.72	0.36	-0.36	0.95	0.85	-0.09*
Left&Right	Integrationist	0.13	0.58	0.46*	0.26	0.54	0.29	0.05	0.14	0.09*
	Federalists	0.01	0.13	0.12**	0.02	0.10	0.07	0.00	0.01	0.01*

Notes: * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$ (confidence intervals are derived by a bootstrap method with 1,000 replications). Shown are the results of predicted probabilities when the relative ERDF funding per capita (natural log) goes from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean. The estimates are based on model 1 in table 3.

Table 4 reveals funding period effects of ERDF spending. For the 1994-1999 funding period we find no effect of structural funds spending but for the other two periods there is an effect. The effect is largest for the 1989-1993 funding period and it appears to provide a push for strong support for European integration, in the form of massive increases of probabilities for a manifestation of federalist positions. Regionalist parties which are centrist on the left-right dimension have an increased probability of 52 per cent of being federalist when structural fund spending goes from one standard deviation below the mean (0.24, i.e. receiving 4.2 times less ERDF than the country average) to one standard deviation above the mean (2.14, i.e. receiving 2.14 times more ERDF than the country average). Parties on the mainstream left and right go from Eurosceptic (-39 per cent) to federalist (+48 per cent) while radical left and radical right parties move from Eurosceptic (-58 per cent) to integrationist (+46 per cent) and federalist (+12 per cent).

ERDF spending appears to have no effect during the 1994-1999 funding period. Arguably, this period represented the golden age of the Europe of the Regions' vision, during which ideological and/or instrumental convergence between regionalism and Europeanism reached its peak. Therefore, support for European integration within the regionalist party family was widespread and stable, independently of the relative share of ERDF for their particular region. In contrast, the other two periods can be seen as phases of transition - from relatively high intra-party family variance to cohesive and strong support (1989-1993) and *vice versa* (2000-2006) (see table 1)– in which the relative share of ERDF did make a difference.

Structural funds have also an effect in funding period 2000-2006 but the impact tends to be smaller and it appears to mainly limit the probabilities for a manifestation of Eurosceptic positions. Radical left and radical right regionalist parties tend to have a nine and one per cent higher probability of being respectively integrationist and federalist when relative ERDF funding per capita goes from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean. Mainstream left and right parties move from being Eurosceptic (-27 per cent) to integrationist (+22 per cent) whereas centrist parties go from

being Eurosceptic (-13 per cent) to becoming federalists (+22 per cent). How do these results relate to the Eurosceptic turn observed in table 3? From the probabilities displayed in table 5 one may observe that the chance of being a Eurosceptic party is highest for period 2000-2006 than for the other two funding periods no matter the position on the left-right dimension. Hence, it means that the Eurosceptic turn affected most regionalist parties but those regionalist parties that participate in elections in regions which obtain more structural funding tend to be less affected.

Conclusion

The scholarship on regionalist parties has increasingly paid attention to the question how these political actors perceive the European integration process and how they respond to it. The source of regionalist parties' sympathy for European integration, it was argued, was not only the implicit weakening of the state that supranational integration entailed but also the attention devoted by European institutions to the regions and to regionally concentrated minorities. In particular, the launch of a regional policy with its structural and cohesion funds, the importance attributed to the principle of subsidiarity and the establishment of the Committee of the Regions contributed to the rise of a vision of a 'Europe of the Regions'. While some case studies have investigated the interaction between the development of regionalist parties' projects and the unfolding of the integration process, a systematic analysis of the impact of Cohesion policy funding on regionalist parties' attitudes towards European integration has never been conducted. This contribution represents the first the first attempt to fill this lacuna.

Our results show that cohesion policy funds have a significant effect on regionalist party positions on European integration. Regionalist parties acting in regions which obtain relatively more structural funds per capita than the national average have a higher probability to be Europhile. In addition, the analysis of three different periods – 1989-1993, 1994-1999 and 2000-2006 – led us to confirm a substantive increase in the presence of Eurosceptic positions amongst regionalist parties. The causes of this Eurosceptic turn are beyond the remit of this chapter and, arguably, should be researched on the frustration of some independentist regionalist parties with EU's constitutionalization process and, perhaps even more, with the disappointment of several leftist regionalist parties with the neoliberal ethos increasingly emanating from EU institutions. The interesting finding of our analysis is that the positive effect of structural funds becomes more important in periods of regionalist parties' changing attitudes towards the European integration process. In the context of the Eurosceptic turn since the early 2000s, structural funds exert an even more significant effect. Indeed, Eurosceptic positions are much rarer in regions which obtain relatively more relative ERDF funding per capita.

What are the policy implications of our research? First of all, the end of overwhelming Europhilia amongst regionalist parties is not linked to the relative share (and even less to the absolute amount) of ERDF received by the individual regions. Assertive regionalist parties, especially once they have already achieved a certain level of regional self-government, tend to evaluate the process of European integration in a rather instrumental way, i.e. they support further integration only insofar as it helps them to achieve more self-government. Buying their support with ERDF will become more and more difficult. Similarly, regionalist parties that strongly oppose the neoliberal character of EU policies will hardly change their position on European integration because of the relative amount of ERDF their region receives. However, there is still a relevant group of regionalist parties, which are ideologically light (centrist) on the left-right dimension and not particularly assertive in terms

of self-government claims, whose support for European integration can be maintained also thanks to the distribution of ERDF. Therefore, the drastic reduction of structural funds for Western European regions due to the Eastern enlargements of 2004 and 2007 might jeopardise the residual support that the EU has been able to 'buy' from some regionalist parties through this funding program.

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Appendix
Regionalist parties*

Regionalist party	Funding Period								
	1989-1993			1994-1999			2000-2006		
	EU	L-R	ERDF	EU	L-R	ERDF	EU	L-R	ERDF
ADA				1	3	0	1	3	0
BNG	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	1
CC	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1
CHA	3	2	1	3	2	0	1	2	0
CiU	3	1	0	3	1	0	2	1	0
DF							1	3	0
EA	3	2	0	3	2	0	1	2	0
ERC	3	1	0	3	2	0	1	2	0
FDF	3	1	1						
HB-BA	1	3	0	1	3	0			
LN	2	1	0	2	1	0	1	3	0
NVA							2	2	0
PA	3	2	1	3	2	1	2	2	1
PAR	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	1	0
PC	3	2	1	3	2	1	2	1	1
PDS	1	3	1	1	3	1	1	3	1
PNV	2	1	0	2	1	0	2	1	0
PR	2	1	0	2	1	1	2	1	0
PRC	3	1	0						
PSd'Az	3	1	1	3	1	1	3	1	1
RW	2	2	1						
SNP	2	2	1	2	2	1	1	1	0
SVP	3	1	1	3	1	0	2	1	0
UDB	3	2	0	3	2	1	3	2	1
UM	2	1	0	2	1	0	2	1	0
UPC	3	1	1	3	1	1			
UV	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	0
UVA	3	1	1	3	1	1	2	2	0
UfS				2	2	0	1	2	0
VB	1	3	0	1	3	0	1	3	0
VU	2	2	0	3	2	0			

Notes:

EU = position of a regionalist party on the issue of European integration (1 = Eurosceptic; 2 = Integrationist; 3 = Federalist).

L-R = radicalism on the left-right dimension (1 = center; 2 = mainstream left and right; 3 = radical left and right).

ERDF = dummy indicating whether the regionalist party participates in elections in a region which receives relative ERDF per capita funding above (= 1) or below (= 0) the country average.

*More detail on regionalist parties and the coding of their ideological positions is provided in Massetti and Schakel (2015).